ISSN 2291-5079 Vol 13 / Issue 1 + 2 2025

COSMOS + TAXIS

Studies in Emergent Order and Organization






COSMOS + TAXIS

Studies in Emergent Order and Organization
VOLUME 13 / ISSUE 1 + 2 2025

COVER IMAGE
Cover attribution: Karen Arnold, public domain.

IN THIS ISSUE

EDITORIAL BOARDS

Editorial

LESLIE MARSH

This issue marks twelve years of operations by *Cosmos + Taxis*. Over the course of the decade C+T has gone from publishing three quarterly issues of around 60 pages each to the equivalent page volume of twelve issues (over 120 pages each), each double issue published bimonthly—to date, ninety-two issues. Demand to publish in C+T is such that there is a full publishing slate, a year to eighteen months in advance. Correspondingly, C+T's readership has skyrocketed, now approaching a million downloads. It is especially gratifying to see the number of traditionally underserved regions that have accessed C+T material, a star example being that of Argentina. The topics, the theorists, and the disciplines are distinctively wide-ranging as befits a PPE publication, geared to both the academically inclined *and* the general reader. In an era of bloated workloads, the responsiveness of the editorial board has been very notable. Long may the goodwill from the editors, contributors and readership continue.

Having a most demanding publishing schedule that is timely, requires a diligent and committed team. Charles Ramey has been there from the very beginning, helping sort out many of the under-the-bonnet issues. Charlie, of course, was a longstanding colleague of the late David Hardwick, who most will know as a cofounder of C+T. For the past couple of years Professor Andrew Irvine has very graciously hosted C+T under the auspices of the Department of Economics, Philosophy and Political Science at The University of British Columbia, Okanagan. C+T is profoundly indebted to him. Last, but not least, we are indebted to Claire Roan, C+T's designer and typesetter: the appealing production values are all down to her.

This milestone could be achieved without the continued support of the Hecht Foundation. — LM.

Liberalism is Neither Dead, Dying, in Need of Reformulation, Nor Well Understood

WALTER B. WEIMER
Emeritus, Pennsylvania State University

> If the ideals which I believe unite us, and for which, in spite of so much abuse of the term, there is still no better name than liberal, are to have any chance of revival, a great intellectual task must be performed. This task involves both purging traditional liberal theory of certain accidental accretions which have become attached to it in the course of time, and also facing up to some real problems which an over-simplified liberalism has shirked or which have become apparent only since it has turned into a somewhat stationary and rigid creed.
> *—F. A. Hayek (1967, p. 149)*

> If the future is bound to *succeed* the present instead of being given along side of it, it is because the future is not altogether determined at the present moment.… It is because there is increasingly created in it… something unforeseeable and new.
> *—Henri Bergson (1911, p. 369)*

Keywords: classical liberalism, social theory, rationalism, complex phenomena, cultural Marxism

Abstract: In history a decade is an eyeblink. In a Journal devoted to classical liberalism and complexity, it is an appropriate time to reflect on core principles and enduring themes. We should reflect, as Hayek continually noted, on purging oversimplifications and well-meaning *political* attempts to "improve" upon the actual, which is to say the original, liberal theory of *social* organization. That theory coalesced primarily in writings of the Scottish moralists of the 18th century, such as David Hume, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith. We must constantly re-emphasize that, unlike other political views, liberalism as a political position is based upon negative prohibitions to actions, not prescriptions of particular actions that must be performed. We need to go "back to the future" to understand that it is actual liberalism, rather than socialism (as contemporary progressivists constantly but falsely claim) which has never actually been practiced. The progressivist perversion of liberalism,[1] found today in cultural Marxism and "market" socialism, requiring conscious, directed central planning and defined control structures, has *in fact* been attempted in the past, and, because of its internal structural limitations (detailed beautifully a century ago by Mises (1981), and eighty years ago by Popper (2011, 2013), can never be achieved. Inevitably backwards oriented to tribal existence, progressivist alternatives overstate the positive effects that can be achieved by deliberate intervention into complex social phenomena. In

following such "alternatives," unforeseen negative consequences stifle spontaneous organization, exacerbating problems they were supposed to cure, inevitably creating additional new ones. Liberalism, as a spontaneously evolving series of institutions and constraints on behavior, simply gradually abandons what does not succeed in favor of alternatives that in fact still work. That is the sense in which it is *internally* empirically driven, and retains the testability of actual scientific fields. This is why there are no final or "certain" solutions, only compromises. Progressivism is *not* internally driven, and (exactly like conservatism) has to respond in "catch up" fashion to changes that are external to its stated programs. The political "theory" framework formulation of evolutionary liberalism is found primarily in the later work of Hayek (especially 1979, 1983, and 1989). In that framework, liberalism has not failed and is not in need of reformulation or supplementation, but rather has not yet overcome powerful emotional resistance and good sounding ideas from primitivism and tribalism.

The epigram from Bergson (an unusual source to classical liberals) exactly points to the problem situation—the constantly evolving evolutionary matrix in which the unforeseen and unpredictable take precedence over the static and determined—in which liberalism developed, and in which it must succeed. Liberalism is first and foremost an evolutionary theory of the development of society, and its initial proponents were (again, as Hayek pointed out) the first evolutionary theorists, decades before Darwin's work on the evolution of species, and indeed a significant influence on Darwin's thought. Liberalism is an empirical, and therefore falsifiable, theory of the evolution of the complexity in the social realm. In this it is in direct opposition to socialism and its variants (such as cultural Marxism and Communism), which are *not* empirical positions (but are "given" to suitably enlightened individuals a priori from their clear "common" sense or intuitions and daydreams) but rather, as haunted universe metaphysical doctrines (to use Popper's terminology), are a priori "postulations" that can never be falsified because they are not empirical.[2] In total contrast to progressivist propaganda, it is liberalism which actually has a basis in science. It is progressivist "clear Cartesian common sense" which, by insulating itself from actual history and oblivious to factual refutations,[3] is anti-scientific and anti-rational. Progressivism, despite trumpeting claims of "scientific" socialism and fully spelled out plans for progress, has never gone past being a static religion, a haunted universe doctrine (one created for and by the intelligentsia and media, if not for Marx's "masses").

PLANNING PROGRESS VERSUS PLANNING *FOR* PROGRESS

Classical liberalism arose as a theory of society, as a glimmer of understanding that *civil society had evolved*—somehow made its own changes, elaborations and improvements over time—*without the deliberate direction of its members*. Then as now, this was a novel and terrifying idea. In our extended past there had never been a golden age: there had been no consciously rational society beyond the structure of the family or small group, or tribal band. Someone—the strongest, the eldest, the most experienced, or perhaps just the most cunning—had always, through *coercive* power, dominated the remainder of the group, literally putting them in their place and telling them what to do. Whenever something dangerous or unforeseen arose, group members instinctively looked to the leader's direction to control their behavior—to tell them what to do and how and when to do it. The group was an extension of family, and the family was dominated by one member. Group members were *directly acquainted* with all other members, and as a result of their interactions, aware of their role and place within the overall group structure. We were happiest when a tried and true structured activity schedule was maintained, and at the end of the day the leader rewarded members for their participation. This was a recipe for a golden age of coercion and stasis, not for successful evolution in an uncertain and unpredictable econiche: an attempt to arrest (as Plato later did) disturbance and change. But apparent happiness within tribal structure masked a conflict when we went out farther into the unknown and uncertain. Our primitive mammalian autonomic nervous system and our gut biome have de-

manded (for thousands of millennia) the serenity of cradle to grave comfort and care, but our more developed central nervous system, with its recently overgrown cerebrum, had produced and wanted more than the tribe could deliver—by increasingly going out into the unknown and unforeseen, and bringing back new wealth and prosperity. Our big brains—and our developing CNS—having successfully bypassed what was previously done, continued to flourish by going out into that unknown and unforeseen, and bringing us new and wonderful improvements. This created the tension which we feel so acutely today: our progress has brought wonderful technology and knowledge and improved living standards, but it has done so at the expense of the tranquility and stasis wanted by our ANS emotionality and primitive digestion.[4] All this was accidental occurrence, unplanned and unexpected: the result of human action but not design, as Ferguson (1995) so beautifully put it back in 1767. Our social milieu as a whole—society as it has come to be called—is smarter (i.e., contains far more information and knowledge) than the individuals within it possess, and progress depends on allowing its tacit knowledge capacity to lead us out into the unknown and unforeseen. This is causing a painful transition—from extended tribalism of prior eras to an increasingly more impersonal and abstract society no longer dependent upon face-to-face contact and knowledge of individuals within one's "group." In this new framework we have succeeded by developing institutions and customs which allow us to make decisions for our personal benefit that utilize the dispersed knowledge and resources of many individuals and disparate, even opposed, groups. And (and this is the superiority of liberalism) by advancing our own interests through participating in market orders we also benefit others who remain unknown to us, and who have interests and ends that may be completely different from ours. This is how emergent novelty and unintended co-operation occurs in the social order.

At this point the progressivist, flexing purported mental and moral superiority, makes two claims. The first is that anything that arose—here they fill in derogatory terms—"by chance," "unplanned," "without reasons," "by accident," "randomly," "uncontrolled," "unintended," "by happenstance," and similar terms or phrases, *must be undesirable and inferior to* what arises from deliberate planning. The closely allied second claim is that although we made some minimal progress "by accident" in the past, their deliberate planning and control of society, following their clear Cartesian common sense and mentally and morally superior intellects, can make progress occur more rapidly (on demand), if only the "reactionary" powers and "vested interests" can be exterminated so they cannot interfere. Then the progressive intelligentsia could command all the resources of knowledge and the economy, and direct them to their preferred particular results.

There is literally nothing more to progressivism than those two claims. From their perspective, liberalism was the bare beginning of a good thing, but with superior intellects and deliberate planning (when given absolute coercive power) they can make anything they desire happen more rapidly than it would have occurred by "accident" or "mere chance." All we need to do is elect them dictators, and progress toward the new Utopia of (here one may fill in the blank with the momentarily preferred formulation—communism for the classic or economic Marxist, cultural Marxism for contemporary socialists, utilitarian socialist happiness for the Victorian intellectual such as Russell, etc.) will immediately be forthcoming.

This position is the most damaging instance of the false theory of rationality that Hayek and others (such as Smith's 2002 Nobel lecture, and Weimer 2022a, 2022b, 2022c included) have called *rationalist constructivism*, a view that:

> Assigns far more power to conscious reason and explicitly directed or coerced behavior than it is capable of achieving. Politically this conception leads to the view that we can consciously shape and control society and our values to fulfill certain goals by the redistribution of resources and wealth, and the direction of scientific research.… Psychologically, it leads to a conception of humanity as rational epistemic agents who are in control only to the extent that all the factors governing our behavior are made subject to conscious organization and direction by explicit reason. Methodologically, it leads to the idea that there is a method, *the* scientific method, that leads to proven knowledge claims when correctly applied. Therapeutically, it leads to the idea that adequate

> treatment of our contemporary neuroses and alienation, stemming from the existential predicament and alienation of modern humanity, consists in intervention with algorithms (either behavioral or cognitive) to make the "client" fit a preconceived model of adequate adjustment or "rational" behavior (Weimer 2022b, pp. vii-ix).

Against this, the core insight of liberalism is that it is *never* rational to limit one's knowledge and resources for dealing with indefinitely extended unpredictability and unforeseen circumstances (which is exactly the human existential predicament) to the limited resources available to an individual mind (or planning board) at a particular location and at a defined time, when an evolved structure of institutions and resources based upon the input of the entire social order is readily available to increase the available knowledge and resources. While it is completely rational (and intelligent) for individuals to plan for their own futures in an uncertain world, it is completely irrational and unintelligent to attempt to plan everyone's future in any sort of coordinated or centralized fashion.[5]

OUR EVOLUTIONARY CONTEXT

The evolution of *H. Sapiens* is *incredibly* recent on this planet. What we call civil society could not have existed (due to low population density and hostile climate constraints) prior to 10-15 thousand years ago. It depends crucially on having stumbled upon a means to externalize memory out into the environment, and with that impersonal storage, a means of retrieving it (Weimer 2024). This was the beginning of knowledge (or semantic information) being available to *all* who were in a position to "read" it *outside* our own brains, and then, with writing (incredibly recent, about 3,000 years ago for phonemic representation, according to Schmandt-Besserat [2015], which began with making lists of items for trade and stock), semantic content could explode from the here and now of a definite time and location to everywhere and the indefinite future. These factors, in conjunction with what is the physical feature now derided as global warming (which ended the [most recent] ice age), unleashed modern civilization and learning, moving us from hunter gatherers and roaming warring tribes, through kingdoms as extensions of tribalism, episodes such as feudalism, to attempts to put limits on any "absolute" authority such as constitutions and bills of "rights," and governments through supposed representatives. This historical sequence was first summarized, and its implications for comparing forms of governance outside tribalist dictatorships and absolutist religious contexts studied, in the era in which the Scottish Moralists wrote.

Several hundred years later we are still unbelievably primitive, only a half step or two removed from tribal barbarism, *even though* our technological prowess is unbelievably increased. What little civilization the world possesses is due to our increasing populations being forced by mainly economic circumstances (certainly not conscious political discourse) to find ways to peacefully interact (at least some of the time), and in so doing unleash the unprecedented growth in knowledge and technological achievement we now have. The tremendous cost of this change on our autonomic nervous and enteric systems, going from slow paced small groups and "caring and sharing" within a cradle to grave mentality as we move into the impersonal abstract society based upon a new ethics of competitive cooperation, should be obvious to all. It is no surprise that our primitive ANS and enteric systems, all but unchanged in 200 million years of mammalian evolution, respond with the cascade of "alienation and malaise" symptoms that the existentialists lovingly chronicle, and why we find it so hard to be "human" when moved into the disconcerting and alien world of the disinterested big city (Weimer 2022b, 2022c). This is why the appeal of "scientific socialism," with comforting slogans from the mythical golden past, is so strong to the young, uneducated, and wistful would-be reformer. Isn't it rational and compassionate to want to destroy horrible capitalism and "redistribute" wealth to those who "deserve" it? Is there any wonder that the "educated" have all gone socialist for the last several generations?

The quest for governance since we abandoned the tribe has always been to find the "perfect" tribal leader (Plato yearning for the philosopher-king), and it has been tacitly understood that this actually means

looking for the least damaging central control instead of abandoning the quest for any central control. Decentralization in the face of uncontrollable spread-out members and conflicting individual goals, such as advocated by the Stoics, was always regarded as an indication of *failure* to govern, not an alternative to centralized dictatorship. Limiting absolute power, as by adopting constitutions, was seen as weakness, both within the country, and by its enemies. It just did not seem to be the rational thing to do. Our centuries of continually war-like times demand strong centralized planning and leadership, and sacrifice to survive. The plaint is: How can that be achieved without absolute power and control?

Prior to liberalism, proposed forms of governance were variations of the tribal dictator: a centralized control structure with complete coercive power. Plato's "philosopher" king is a clear example. Plato's quest was to find the least objectionable dictator, one who might (even if by accident) do some good without harming too many, while never giving in to the power of uneducated mob rule in "democracy." It was assumed that a strong central authority with coercive power over all was necessary to ensure desiderata such as peace and prosperity, and to guard against external enemies and internal dissent. Even the Stoics, famous for recognizing liberal themes like spontaneous organization and decentralized control, assumed that the dictator (in their era, the Emperor) had absolute power to be exercised when and as necessary. Feudalism, in respects an agricultural and settled animal husbandry transition to market ordering, still had an absolute monarch (at least until the Magna Carta) overseeing everyone (and the Monarch still owns all the swans and timber over a certain height in supposedly enlightened Great Britain as a result). Economic and epistemic factors—which had actually allowed the larger and larger populations and prosperity to occur—played no central role in such thought.

SO WHAT IS RATIONALITY, WHAT IS SCIENTIFIC, AND DOES IT MATTER?

What can the "philosophical" topics of rationality and epistemology (particularly scientific methodological issues) have to do with liberalism, economics and politics? While most readers would probably prefer to skip such "extraneous" matters, they are in fact essential rather than secondary. The clash between liberals and progressives is fundamentally *epistemic* at the level of basic theory, about the nature of knowledge and its utilization as a localized, scarce resource within a social group. In the applied domains of conduct in society, the clash is about what constitutes rational behavior in uncertain environments where the results of action are unknown. It is between an evolutionary approach to our lives, and a static fixation on definitive prescriptions of what must be done in momentary situations to achieve particular outcomes.

Rationality is action in accordance with reason (Bartley 1984; Weimer 1983). It pertains to human *behavior*, not to propositions or claims (even about truth or falsity). Statements of fact about the physical world—and the physical domain itself—are neither rational nor irrational (although ideally truth functional). Rationality is a denizen of the *functional* domain of agency existence (Weimer 2022a). Discussions about rationality concern whether or not instances of an agent's conduct were in accordance with reason. Rationality is always and inevitably context sensitive. In a war-torn city it is nearly always rational to suspect the motivations of everyone you encounter, while in a decade of peace that behavior would be irrational for a fan watching a ballgame.

The problem of rationality that liberalism addresses concerns when it is "rational" to behave in accordance with what are called traditional customs and follow institutions which have arisen over (usually long) periods of time without deliberate planning and conscious direction. In North America we drive on the right side, yet nobody deliberately said that we had to. Shouldn't we form a committee to assess whether or not this is the way it ought to be? Absurd as this would be, it is exactly what is proposed by all who believe the Cartesian constructivist theory of rationality, as that which *has been shown to follow* "logically" from axiomatic (accepted as true a priori) premises as valid conclusions. Recall that most "scientific" of philosophers, Bertrand Russell's self-evidently "obvious" statement in *The Scientific Outlook*: "No society can be regarded as fully scientific unless it has been created deliberately with a certain structure to fulfill certain purposes" (1931, p. 211).

Russell (as all rationalist constructivists) would judge the custom of driving on the right as irrational unless it had been validated or proven by deliberated examination by "experts." That idea, that rationality must be fully and consciously explicit, and the corollary that propositions expressing rational behavior be derivable by deductive logic from a priori, fixed for all time premises, is absurd.[6] If Russell's position is accepted, then everything he said and wrote is irrational. No one consciously deduced or planned any natural language, and Russell certainly did not originate, give meaning to, or control his command of already evolved English. Language is the paradigm exemplar of an unplanned system that has arisen over time and functions absolutely beautifully without any meddling conscious supervision or direction (Weimer 2022b, 2022c). Language is a spontaneously evolved complex system. The founders of liberalism studied spontaneously originated language as an example of how society, as a similar spontaneously evolved complex system, had come to be what it is. That is the context in which the relatively minor idea of laissez faire—if it isn't broken, don't fix it—came to apply to grown institutions. Liberalism never said or implied that laissez faire was the essential tenet or central position, just that there is no need to fix what is not broken.

A key empirical insight of liberalism is that in a world of unequal division of resources and skills, the division of labor (and its resultant division of knowledge) allow progress beyond the limitations of "consciously or explicitly directed" individual behavior. When these phenomena occur with externalized memory in market orders, the genie is out of the bottle (Weimer 2024). Unplanned and novel growth just "happens" as a result of their co-occurrence (Kauffman 2019). Socialist 'planning' can never account for this creativity and novelty, and could never have led us to where we are now in either technology or knowledge. You cannot plan a novel result. So why assume that "feel good" socialism is a miracle cure—why look backwards to primitive control structures to face unforeseen, only recently emerged problems? Is that not actually what is irrational and unscientific?

WHAT LIBERALISM IS

Liberalism's tenets constitute a context of constraints in which social and individual action are carried out. They provide a functional framework for action by which knowledge and goods are dispersed throughout the resulting order of interactions for the benefit of all. When these constraints arose in our increasing (beyond face to face) populations, behavior was no longer controlled by momentary directives of an individual leader's coterie (taxis structuring), and patterns of unplanned interaction emerged and evolved (into a social cosmos). We evolved institutions which structured behavior into patterns for increasingly complex situations: the family, for instance, is an evolved institution that now bridges between personal security and the ancient morality of caring and sharing, on one hand, and the impersonal, cooperative-through-competition abstract society we are now moving into (Horwitz 2015). Market ordering evolved for economic interaction with unknown-to-us individuals for the mutual benefit of all (the emphasis of "Austrian economics" from Menger through Hayek); we are now beginning to develop a fundamentally new arena of moral behavior based upon abstract principles (the original Moralists, Hayek's later writings, but certainly not Rawls or early Haidt), and more. In such cases these constraints operate in areas of arisen spontaneous complexity through negative rules of order. We follow rules that tell us what not to do, what mistakes to avoid, not what specific particular actions we must perform.[7]

Empirically, liberalism is no more than the framework of constraints making it up—we have found that they are best summarized and formulated as negative rules of order, or constraints that prohibit forms of conduct. A number of crucial constraints have been studied by classical liberals and evolutionary researchers in psychology and other social studies. When we isolate them as desiderata for social order these constraints become reformulated as ideals defining liberalism. We can list them as necessary to a liberal social order, but not necessarily as sufficient (increasing complexity allows more to emerge). Taken together, they become the context necessary to maintain the continuance of the abstract society we now inhabit.

What are constraints? Why not discuss principles or rules? Because constraints are the *context* in which conscious rationalizations such as stated principles and rules arise to account for functional behav-

ior. They are the tacit substrate (in Polanyi's 1958, 1964, sense) or context in which our explicit formulations are embedded. They are "higher order" functional harnessing mechanisms (if 'mechanism' is not taken in a physicalistic sense) as Polanyi (1969) described, or as Campbell (1974) argued, downward causation factors operating over large extents of time and space that direct "billiard ball" physical causal chains into new functional results. Insofar as they are *epistemic* in nature they result in phenomena studied in theories of psychological and economic behavior, such as prices and individual knowledge, as well as negatives such as ignorance and uncertainty. That is why Hayek (especially 1952, and his later work such as 1989) emphasized cognition in the acquisition of knowledge as central to seemingly purely "economic" processes eventuating in choices of agents. The price mechanism, for example, emerged unbidden as a constraint on exchange that enabled agents to make rapid decisions.

We are primarily concerned with constraints on agency. Agents inhabit the functional realm as well as the physical (Weimer 2022a), and thus are internally motivated and self-directed, in opposition to purely physical phenomena which are only externally moved by physical forces. Living systems obey both physical and functional constraints (there are no functional constraints in the physical realm). When thermodynamic considerations are equal with respect to physically equally possible "physical" events, an agent has the power of choice over alternative courses of action. Choice both is and is executed by functional constraint. That is how "purely" physical events become functional behaviors (behavior is a functional, not a physical, concept). Our thought (nervous system activity) is the most thermodynamically neutral realm in our existence, and it provides the initial choices in conjunction with constraints that occur by co-occurrence in physical systems that govern our behavior.

But there are co-occurrences that are not causal in any common sense, and they are crucially important in functionality (especially the context of constraints constituting liberalism as a social theory). Explored primarily by Kaufmann (2019), there are co-occurrence events that *enable novel developments* but are not their causes. Our development of natural languages did not cause writing to occur, but rather enabled it. Writing did not cause mathematics or computers, but enabled them both. They did not cause the internet, but enabled it to come into existence. Enablements *create an opportunity space* in which unintended and unforeseen things or processes can (but are not forced to) arise.

Liberalism focuses on a core set of emergent constraints which, when one arises, create an opportunity space in which others also can emerge. Because they range over infinite possibility spaces, they must be framed as negative constraints upon permissible behaviors. Here are some obvious central ones:

First is the higher order constraint of the concept of private (several) property. From the first fights over who gets the first bite of the kill, we have come to realize that individuals must be allowed to "possess" (have full control, as defined by contractual obligation) all their property, especially their own bodies. An individual's body and conduct are not owned or controlled by others in a liberal society. People do things by contractual obligation, not coercion. This is perhaps the most central tenet of liberal social order: Do no harm to, or usurp another's property. This ramifies throughout: for example, in medicine it is the Hippocratic directive, First do no harm.

Second is the constraint of the rule of abstract, *impersonal* law as binding upon all, including the governors and lawmakers and law finders themselves. "Law is, of course, neither an unalterable fact of nature nor a product of intellectual design, but the result of a process of evolution in which a system of rules developed in constant interaction with a changing order of human actions which is distinct from it" (Hayek 1979, p. 207). As *Nomos,* the mostly unwritten law of moral and social behavior, it embodies the evolved, largely tacit constraints that regulate society as a whole. As such, law protects property, and by extension, the individual, from harm by others. As legislation, as in written contract law, it codifies and regulates interactions between individuals, by trial and error growing to prevent breaches of obligation. The negative constraint of *Nomos* is: Do not violate the laws of conduct in society, or the laws of individual contract. This has seem-

ingly positive formulations that are actually negatives: When in Rome, do as the Romans do. This principle is the same as do not violate the laws of conduct. It is sometimes called the harm principle, but it is not an axiom, but rather a law of *Nomos*.

Third is the concept of freedom or individual liberty. Freedom comes into existence (is a co-occurrent of) when property and law protecting it arise. Actual freedom is always "freedom to do." It is never the socialist perversion of "freedom from." You can be free to receive, and you can be free to supply, and to refuse to do either. But you cannot be freed "from" except in the necessarily negative notion of freedom from unlawful constraint upon your person and conduct. In a liberal society one is constrained to never violate the freedoms of others. Consider New Hampshire's motto: Live free or die.

Fourth is freedom to exchange in the impersonal market order we now inhabit. This order arose because different individuals benefit to differing degrees from the *same* goods. Barter occurs when different individuals recognize (not necessarily consciously) this situation. The market is just an impersonal extension of barter based upon the price mechanism (communality of exchange by convention) through the development of the structure of the market, applying to individuals who are united only through rules of property ownership and transfer by consent. The power of the market order is that it is the only impersonal, cooperative (i.e., non-coercive) system of interacting in which purely selfish individual aims all have a possibility of being satisfied while benefitting unknown others. It is the extension of cooperation beyond individuals known to other participants, and creates the entirely new functional category of the consumer (who can exercise freedom of choice in contractual obligation), which is not found in the top-down tribal direct distribution of goods and services. Here the constraint is: Do not violate the rules of market order and interaction.

Fifth is the morality of the market order. The feeling*less* market creates its own morals, based upon impersonal cooperation through competition rather than pre-existing human feeling and emotion. Impersonal competition creates co-operation. These rules of conduct and their consequences replace the morals of tribalism, which are based on emotion and "feeling," caring and sharing in groups in which all are known to each other. Tribal morality is literally based on personal benevolence: "to each according to their needs as just desserts." Market morality is *im*personal, and dispenses with benevolence as an essential. Cooperation arises without direction or coercion as a result of the competition among individuals to satisfy their own momentary ends, not through direction or fear of retribution. The tremendous advantage of markets is that they are "merely" a means, and cannot address ends or goals at all. As a result, they leave individuals free to form voluntary associations *outside* the market with others who share common interests, rather than being forced to join the group defined by the dictator. Here the negative constraints are familiar: Do not cheat the individuals who participate in market interaction. One cannot separate these constraints from the "law" of contract.

Sixth is closely related: the rules that "keep the peace of the order," as in the framework of constraints in which games are played *as* games, arise when market interactions supplant face to face bargaining. They are akin to rules of fair play and sportsmanship, but applying to playing what Hayek called the game of catallaxy. They specify negative constraints such as "do not cheat," rather than listing specific "must dos," or rules defining a given game (a touchdown counts as six points in American football, and must be achieved by xyz means only). Note that these rules can never specify or provide entitlements to individuals, but only keep the playing field level for all (known and unknown) players. Markets for stock ownership provide good examples: no insider trading, no undisclosed detrimental financial change, etc. These instances show the constraint to be: Do not cheat the system.

Empirical issues surrounding all such principles or constraints are topics in social science inquiry. It is, for example, a legitimate issue as to what could constitute the minimally effective system of governance for a social order, and whether or not externally supplied coercion is actually necessary. For instance, MacCallum (1970, 2014) argues persuasively that governance based upon taxation (obviously coercive) is not necessary, as some real property situations demonstrate. Whether that model can be extended to larger or different types of units of analysis is an empirical issue. Is a government supplied standing army necessary for protection? How should schools be structured to provide education instead of coercive government provided propaganda? Note that concepts that are buzzwords of socialism, such as "capitalism," "supply side economics," "laissez faire," price controls, and dozens of others are not at all essential to understanding the underlying liberal theory of society or the classical liberal approach to political issues. Progressivists create and then deal with "feelings" generated from these secondary concepts to condemn liberal practices, rarely noting the conceptual or factual content related to them.

In contrast to empirical issue-based liberalism, socialism and tribalism provide definitive (if changing) positions on such issues, and remain incorrigible by data that refute their specifications. On this issue Thomas Sowell[8] has books, papers, and talks showing examples of the metaphysical, literally religious, stonewalling of such issues. Progressivism simply does not learn from its mistakes—feelings about a Utopia are not corrigible by facts. Counterfactual conditionals—"If only socialism were forced on us"—never seem to get back to the realm of fact at all.

SOME THINGS LIBERALISM IS *NOT*

Here are a few obvious points:

Liberalism is not a political panacea. It *does not* provide prescriptions for policy that specify particular behaviors that must be achieved. It is incompatible with the intense, constant desire of progressivist politicians to "Do Something, Anything," to trumpet a quick fix to win votes. An example of this is found in a U. S. Full Committee Senate hearing, "Update on the Latest Global Warming Science," chaired by Barbara Boxer, on February 25, 2009, to address the then (as now) climate alarmism being propounded "in the name of science." In his dissenting address (against the alarmist contention that CO2 is causing global warming and a danger to life on Earth), Professor William Happer of Princeton calmly pointed out that, based upon available science, carbon dioxide was not harming but rather helping our environment, producing more food to feed our constantly increasing population, and by itself had no appreciable correlation with pollution or warming. This testimony was ridiculed by Boxer, not because it was false but because she had asked for policy recommendations to fight climate change, and he had dared to say the best policy was to do nothing, except continue to try to reduce known pollutants. She was adamant that "Do no harm" was not an acceptable policy solution, and she was there to determine how to spend taxpayer money for "positive" projects and results. Since that date actual science, combined with the failure of predictions of eminent climate doom to materialize, has not fazed politicians in the least. Science in many areas is now corrupted by government funding "choices" favoring results momentarily dictated by what politicians *want* to hear (Butos and McQuade 2015, 2023; Weimer 2022a).

Once again, liberalism is an empirically corroborated theory of social evolution and an accompanying framework for political organization that will allow (*if* it is empirically correct) our evolution to continue to occur. It is not neologisms like the bizarrely named "compassionate conservatism" of the second Bush administration (which allowed cultural Marxists to trumpet that liberalism actually is conservatism, and that it has had to "add" some missing conception of compassion in order to keep up with socialism). It is not a series of splintered groups in the U.S. such as described by Fonte (2024) as National Conservatism, Freedom Conservatism, and Americanism (liberalism is never conservatism, and nationalism is no necessary component of either conservatism or liberalism). It is not justificationist a priorism as Mises (1966) and students such as Rothbard (1973) and Block (2019) champion. It is not the watered down socialism allowed in to re-

actionary Tory politics in Great Britain (but it is like the 'Tory' position of Thatcher, and the 'Republican' position of Reagan).

One thing liberalism is definitely not is either irrational, nonrational, or anti-rational. It is disheartening to see defenders of classical liberalism make the mistake of Horwitz (2000), labelling Hayek's nonconstructivist rationality as non-rationalist. Hayek argued explicitly against a *false* theory of rationality stemming from Cartesian constructivism, he did not say that society or our behavior was somehow not rational. One could make the mistake of calling his alternative theory of rationality, which is the nonjustificational approach of Bartley and Weimer, *non*rational if and only if the Cartesian theory was the *only* theory of rationality. It is not. Cartesian constructivist rationality is simply a false and therefore inadequate theory. Making the mistake of saying liberalism is nonrational simply plays into the hands of socialists claiming rational "scientific" superiority.

It does not matter at all, as Sen (1970) argued, that the tenets of liberalism are indeed in conflict with an *apparent* fundamental principle of democracy—Pareto Principle or the principle of unanimity (the idea that if everyone prefers one policy to another it "should" be adopted). Just because one's preferences are *sovereign* does not mean that, if all others agree, they should be *followed*. Even if "everyone" (per impossible) preferred a disasterous course of action, that would not ever imply that it was "right," or that one *ought* to impose it, even though seemingly the "democratic" thing to do. Democracy is *not* a defining characteristic of liberalism, but by itself a recipe for mob rule. That is why we evolved to a constitutional republic, based upon representational decisions, not majority will. Majority will democracies have, after all, voted to commit suicide.

Liberalism is not self-contradictory, as Vieira (2017) implies, and her starting point utilizing Mill's harm principle is *not in fact axiomatic*. The harm "principle" is a context sensitive rule, not a certainty, and therefore fallible and subject to modification, unlike an every-where every-when law of inanimate nature. It is an empirical issue whether it holds in particular situations, and in her example one can easily jettison mob rule democracy while retaining liberalism. There is no support for distributive "justice" (or *any* positive rule of distribution at all) in the principles noted above in the section, "What Liberalism Is." The distribution "problem" is insoluble so long as agents are unique in their needs and goals (Weimer 2022b).

HAS LIBERALISM FAILED?

Much recent press has focused on alleged "failures" of liberalism. We are told we now inhabit a "post" liberal era, and (according to the particular pundit at hand) that one or another change to accommodate this "new epoch" must be made. Usually lost in such discussions is adequate specification of the position that has supposedly failed, glossed over in favor of elaboration of the new "one size fits all" political panacea proposed to replace it.

In fact this has been recurring since the early 1800s, when thinkers *who claimed to understand liberalism and wanted to support it*, began proposing "improvements," "elaborations" and "emendations" to make the position viable in the face of the rapid social change of the "new" era. This is how one can understand Thomas Jefferson, who slightly earlier changed a correct original liberal formulation of "life, liberty, and property" into the seemingly better sounding "life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness" specification, bowing to the influence of French Enlightenment Romanticism and constructivism as a "necessary" addition to classical liberalism. As is the case today, the matter of "optics" is everything to politics. Later, but in the same framework, John Stuart Mill would pen "On Liberty," arguably the most famous 19th century "defense" and "elaboration" of the (allegedly) original doctrine, under the influence of feminist and constructivist Harriet Taylor. Hayek's least known book details this little noted influence in the correspondence between Mill and Taylor (Hayek 1951).

By the early 20th century the core original noninterventionist, anti-rationalist constructivist doctrine of liberalism, often summarized in the expression "Do not fix it if it is not broken," was abandoned

entirely by enlightened "intellectuals" such as Bertrand Russell, the dons at Cambridge and Oxford (and the Bloomsbury Group), Woodrow Wilson and the American "democratic" progressives, then progressivism subsequently epitomized by Maynard Keynes in economic and political doctrine, when he replaced long-term economic policies with a series of short term momentary policy fixes designed to ameliorate (in Keynes' case) problems unique to the short term British economy resulting from the cost of World War I and the subsequent "Great" depression. In this century-long transition to sophisticated "improvements," liberalism as a general framework—a context of constraints in which progress could occur but could not be planned—was abandoned entirely, replaced by infatuation with progressive socialist central planning in both the 'free' and totalitarian worlds of World War II.

By the late 1940's and post-World War II era, the original doctrine of liberalism had been entirely abandoned by "progressive" intelligentsia, news media (the "intellectuals" of the times), as well as all major political parties in all countries. It was never refuted, just simply dismissed as inadequate to "modern" times. Its defense and promulgation was limited to scholars whose work was so out of touch with the socialist and Marxist tenor of the times that the "movers and shakers" among the intellectuals, such as college faculties and administrations, news media and recent college graduates, regarded the position as a laughingstock, held by old fossils, long since replaced by better ideas. The "better" ideas were actually old: deliberate control of the economy, and the Marxist version of socialism to replace old, seemingly failing, social organization allegedly due to capitalism. Indeed, socialism was to work through the simple mechanism of planning progress, so it seemed ideal, because it purported to kill these two birds with one stone. With more recent obvious failures of economic Marxism, this has been changed to cultural Marxism, now with emphasis on destroying the credibility of Western civilization to hasten the hoped for "glorious revolution" of the masses. To do this it has often relied on the increasing alienation and malaise of impersonal society as somehow being a failure of classical liberalism, as somehow due to the "success" of liberalism showing its internal "systemic failure" (Deneen 2018), its success being the opposite of what it was to achieve. These authors fail to realize that the increase in population, and its concentration in urban centers without families, is what the alienation reflects, not the abandoned principles of a liberal social order.

Since the market of ideas was dominated after the war by socialist visionaries, it is no wonder that the once widely held ideal of college as a liberal arts education was replaced by generations of socialist planners who cancelled the education "market" in order to replace it with what has recently been called "socialist indoctrination camp" (DiLorenzo, 2016). The "liberal" and "arts" have now been removed entirely, replaced with the idea of a trade school for social activism. Broad based education—requiring actual knowledge of history, *and* the ability to critically assess competing ideas—is anathema to the purposes of affirmative action product college administrators, who see their role as vanguards of cultural Marxist destruction of civilization who are to hasten the "cultural" revolution.

IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THERE ARE NO DEFENSIBLE STANDARDS

The current mess in Western civilization is due *primarily* to one thing: collapse of the ancient justificationist theory of rationality based upon the idea that the only possible standard for an intellectual endeavor is proof, as modelled by proof procedures in mathematics, the first (and only) exact or formal science (Weimer 1979, 2022a). By the mid 20th century, after the depression and worldwide war, it become clear in philosophy that the usual standards of merit—for science, rationality, whatever—could never be proven (or probabilified) to be "true" *as standards*. Thus the standards were *irrational by their own criteria.* Adherence to a particular proposition—whether about knowledge or conduct—was, for those who assumed that knowledge was justified true belief and that rational conduct required one to accept and adhere to only positions which had been justified, nothing but a matter of faith, or irrational belief. Whereas it had just been accepted that the standards of civilization were superior to those of tribalism and barbarism, now the very concept of civilization, and of civil society, were immediately dismissed by the sadder but wiser intellectuals as be-

ing exactly on a par with their opposites. Suddenly there was little to choose between the ideals of several thousand years of civilizing trends and the barbarism of a Hitler or Stalin or a Marx, and it looked like the pseudo-science approach of Marxism (devastated by Popper in 1945 [2011, 2013]) was "working" to some extent. This opened the door to the "equality" of all religions, all forms of governments, all forms of conduct, all traditions. It ushered in the era of forced equality in all education, with students no longer "forced to endure" actual learning when they could instead simply express their feelings and contemplate their navels, ignoring what they did not want to hear, and in the process be told that they were fine and wonderful (so long as they cancelled all others) by woke instructors.

In this environment it was easy for Marxist ideas and propagandists, once discredited by historical data such as the disaster that was Russia by the arguments of Polanyi and Baker in science, and especially Churchill, then endorsed by Kennedy and Johnson in politics, to gain first a foothold and then the upper hand. Among first rate intellects only Hayek, Polanyi and Popper refused to abandon liberalism's defense in England, and Mises, Friedman, and few others in the U.S. While others studied the indispensability of grown or unplanned traditional factors in science (Sellars, Kuhn, Campbell) and society (Oakeshott, 1962, 1975), there was little impact on the overall picture, and the "darlings of the New Left" (Feyerabend, Chomsky, Kennedy, Mao, etc.) were given rapt attention by the swooning youth of the era. A 1967 film by Jean-Luc Goddard entitled *La Chiniose* clearly shows the resultant "theater of the absurd" quality of "educated" life in the newly embraced love affair with Marxism and communism.

WITH THE INEVITABILITY OF GRADUALNESS

Spontaneous complex phenomena, as epitomized in biological evolution, accumulate change very gradually, until a point at which unanticipated complexity becomes recognizable, and we then see a novel outcome. With hindsight (and the right scaling technique) we see a seemingly inevitable progression of part causes and enablements up to the novel conclusion, culminating in a new and unanticipated change (as Kuhn [1970] documented in scientific change). Social domains follow a similar progression: revolutionary changes are only visible with hindsight, when gradual changes cumulate in seemingly abrupt transitions after gradual dispersion of different ideas and behaviors into the social milieu. This can occur in two ways: either rapid and violent force from outside (war), or internally, through a "paradigm shift" in accepted institutions and customs. In either case, the revolutionaries never see themselves as treasonous: from their perspective they are saviors. Their task is only to convince others to see them as saviors.

How then, in less than a century and three quarters, was tribal primitivism able to reassert cultural control, denying and destroying the progress that had occurred under increasing liberal freedoms developed over centuries? How did liberalism go so quickly from revolutionary to old guard? The answer is far too obvious: by progressivists deliberately attacking and subverting the grown institutions that had previously allowed, with no real conscious direction or thought, our progress to occur. There has been a concerted internal attack on the values and institutions of contemporary society by cultural Marxism, just as successful as prior external suppressions like those of the Mongol hoards on eastern European civilization, or the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean, or the Islamic conquest of the middle East. But this attack has been a cold war of attrition rather than a hot war of military conquest. Freedom has been lost with the inevitability of gradualness, as Beatrice Webb put it at the end of the 19th century. She believed in non-violent coercion, to overthrow capitalism with the ballot box and the expansion of the state through bureaucracy (acting as an elite cadre of administrators that would, as she put it, "impregnate" all existing society with socialism). Unfortunately, this has happened. It is "the long march through the institutions" (Sidwell 2020). Crystalized from Dutschke in 1967-68, the long march is the idea that cultural Marxism can triumph peacefully, by slowly but steadily corrupting the institutional structures and institutions of the Western world. Harking back to Gramsci (as in his *The Prison Notebooks*) and the Frankfort School Marxist "intellectuals" such as Marcuse, *cultural* socialism brought Webb's "impregnation" to fruition (half a cen-

tury later) by the simple expedient of taking over the world of the "intelligentsia" in the post war era. When the "intellectuals" thought that there were no longer defensible standards of proof and rationality for the values and institutions of Western society, the only alternative available was "feeling," caring and sharing in communal equality. Here cultural Marxists positioned themselves as saviors, whose clear common sense would lead the masses of "good" people past the selfish evils of capitalist social organization (read oppression) to the promised land of socialist equality. It has been our own primitivism, our gut biome and ANS responsivity to stress, that capitulated first, lulled by the "cradle to grave comfort" and ethics of caring and sharing, not necessarily our CNS and cerebrum (Weimer 2022b, 2022c). Against this, Hayek's 1945 insight (between Webb and Dutschke-Gramsci) that the inevitability of gradualness that the long march envisages invariably leads from a social system based upon rules of order as general principles to orders created by specific commands (in 1948, "Individualism: True and False"), was quickly overpowered.[9]

Two insights from the 20th century can help turn the tide back toward liberal freedom and progress from totalitarianism.

First is the repudiation of classic justificationist rationality as the only 'standard' of standards. Building on the evolutionary approach to epistemology (stemming in the 20th century from Popper and Bartley in philosophy, and Hayek and Weimer in psychology), it is obvious that even though never provable, the framework of civilization has evolved standards of rational behavior that can further the development of liberal society, and that are, on the basis of rational but nonjustificational argument and evolutionary history, far better than no standards or revived prior standards from primitivism.

Second, developments of the insight from the Moralists about "the results of action but not design" have enabled us to realize that the social realm is an *un*conscious evolved structure of constraints that are necessary adaptations to our life in a world of uncertainty and novelty. We cannot simply replace things or dispense with them entirely because some constructivist "social theorist" does not understand the function they serve in keeping the peace of the social order (and thus civilization).

We cannot hope to quickly reverse the corrupt educational establishment, to have it return to teaching the values and precepts of a liberal social order (Weimer 2022c). The situation is the same as Hayek noted decades ago. If we assume that:

> Preservation of the present order of the market economy depends...that the people rationally understand that certain rules are indispensible to preserve the social division of labour, it may well be doomed. It will always be only a small part of the population who will take the trouble to do so, and the only persons who could teach the people, the intellectuals who write and teach for the general public, certainly rarely make an attempt to do so (Hayek 1979, p. 206).

We will have to embark on another "long march," but this time attempting to educate the present socialist "intelligensia" that their ideals and programs are chimerical fictions. Then we will have to rely on Keynes' claim that:

> In the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest but, soon or late, *it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil* (Keynes 1936, p. 384).

It will not be an easy task, but civilization very literally depends upon it.

SUMMARY

Actual (called classical) liberalism is an empirical theory of the organization of spontaneously formed large groups (society). It specifies a context of higher order functional constraints that coevolve without deliberate intervention or conscious reflection in larger populations, such as property, rule by impersonal law, freedom as equal restraint of all members under law, presence of market ordering, and non-tribal morality. These constraints are co-emergent, and enable novelty and creativity. Associated with the social theory are a set of (evolving) political requirements necessary for the preservation of a liberal social order. Perhaps foremost of these is the realization that government should set up conditions in which progress can occur rather than attempt the impossible, which is planning the particulars of progress. Indeed, planning a particular social outcome (at the expense of alternatives) actually slows progress by causing unanticipated problems elsewhere in society. Actual liberalism has nothing to do with modern progressivism (socialism), which took the name "liberalism" to claim its success, substituting socialist planning for spontaneous evolved order.

The liberal framework has been attacked by adherents of primitivism and tribalism *(including* well-meaning but misinformed "defenders" of liberalism), often proposing the "moral superiority" of the ancient ethics of benevolence, of caring and sharing, on the grounds that 1) they are smarter, and can "plan" progress better than leaving things to mere "chance" or "happenstance;" 2) classic liberalism is somehow contradictory, being responsible for the breakdown of contemporary society because "capitalism" leaves no room for the finer things (especially feelings) in life; 3) it is entrenched "vested" interests that are actively suppressing the transition to "mentally and morally superior" socialism and Marxism. Resurgence of primitivist arguments in the last century is due to the perceived failure of standards of rationality and conduct to be successfully "justified" as genuine knowledge, which then allows an "anything goes" abandonment of civilization. These arguments have been refuted, and represent no threat to true liberalism. They invariably rest on the alleged desirability of returning to one or another component of tribal primitivism as somehow an "improvement" over impersonal organization, or upon a "laissez faire" extremism allowing all positions and cultures to be equally accepted. Based on a false conception of rationality and inadequate understanding of spontaneously organized phenomena, these "progressive" positions cannot work even if we were to revert to the small group/face to face society we inhabited for many millennia before civil society arose.[10]

NOTES

1 I reiterate: classical liberalism is a real social theory, and progressivism is an imposter which has stolen its name to appropriate its success. Schumpeter (1954) was perhaps the first to call attention to the fact that the enemies of liberty and private property had seen fit to utilize the liberal label for antithetical positions. It is time for real liberals to take back the correct name for their position, and differentiate it from both conservatism (the opposition to change) and progressivism (leftist approaches presuming to improve liberalism by supplanting it with planned or directed economic, political, cultural, and psychological programs).

2 The empirical realm is defined by what its propositions forbid to occur. A statement is empirical if some things are forbidden, or cannot occur if it is correct. This was discussed by Popper (1959) when differentiating testable propositions from purely metaphysical ones which are compatible with anything and everything, thus excluding absolutely nothing.

3 Haunted universe doctrines are confirmable and influential (Watkins, 1958), but incapable of ever being shown to be false. The claim that a castle on a hill is haunted (Popper's original example) can seemingly be confirmed by all sorts of events (hearing moans or chains rattling at night, etc.), but can never be refuted by any contrary factual state of affairs (one could observe the castle for millions of years without obtaining any 'confirming' instances, but that cannot refute the hypothesis). In similar fashion, proponents of socialism lament that it would be wonderful "but it has never been tried" (allegedly because of powerful vested interests thwarting it). This is nonsense: it has

been tried numerous times and failed every time—exactly as Mises' analysis (from 1922) indicated it would. But you can always cling to belief in the castle being haunted, and make up "saving grace" reasons for why it should be so. Socialists have done this, moving from the position's original formulation as an economic and hedonistic doctrine (from the Benthamite utilitarians through Marx) to the current cultural Marxist political formulation, thus relocating the attempt to destroy civilization and social order from a predicted "inevitable" economic failure that never happened to a deliberate attempt to destroy the evolved institutions of social order that have moved us from tribalism to the abstract society.

4 Few have recognized that the basis of our depersonalized existential malaise is our inadequately evolved biological systems that are in conflict with the gifts of the emerging abstract society. We have more and more knowledge and wealth, life is faster and faster paced, we live longer and longer, but our lives increaingly lack more and more personal contact, warmth, and the "caring and sharing" situation of the long period of tribal existence from which we have so recently emerged (see Levendis, Eckhardt and Block 2020). We lack "the personal touch" of friendship and intimacy, and all the more so in the prison atmosphere of the big city (Weimer 2022c). The appeal of socialism is in large part due to the promise that by destroying present civilization it will restore that lost intimacy and "caring and sharing," but there is no mechanism within any extant socialist doctrine that is capable of doing so. If it could, socialism would reduce us to the "Rainbow Fish" level to do this, as in the socialist children's book about a beautiful fish who gave away all his pretty scales one by one, until his group (actually his class) all had one scale, and he was reduced to having only one left. This is the "equality" of opportunity twisted into equality of outcome of socialism—everyone reduced to equally abject poverty with no means or incentive to get out of it.

5 Why has the Western world slipped so easily into totalitarian regimes and central bureaucratic planning? The answer is obvious. The one and only situation in which the directed mobilization of a country (or many countries) is required is to achieve the goal of waging a war. The last century saw modern technological warfare on an unprecedented scale, and even the seemingly victorious "Western" or "democratic" nations surrendered representative governments to dictatorial control to survive the onslaughts involved. The cold war of communism and Marxism against civilization merely perpetuated this ongoing pattern of directed top down command. We are now in a situation in which more than five successive generations have never known a change in government that was not simply the replacement of one centralized dictatorial structure (each promising Utopia for following its leadership unfailingly) by another one. The whole world has retreated to primitivism and coercion for generations.

Here progressivism deliberately confounds democracy with freedom, claiming one leads to the other. No wonder our youth (of present and other generations) find central planning and "democracy" (which simply means mob or dictatorial rule by minimally 51% over the minority up to 49%) so congenial—they have never known actual liberty or freedom under the rule of law. Nor do they realize that democracy alone, which, as noted, is only a term for mob rule, can and does crush actual freedom (of choice to receive or to supply). That "mob rule" is what progressivist planners require to force their programs on others. With its central tenet of equal protections for all under the abstract rule of law (stemming from a constitution independent of momentary majority will), liberalism is a foreign notion to most of the world (this is why the U.S. constantly fails when it tries to impose democracy on some South American, middle eastern or African area that never has had the rule of law established—all the populace gets in 'democratic' elections is a new dictator [as in the election of Putin in Russia], not representational government and a constitution). This is why those who wish to destroy liberal civilization—from Wilson to Obama among Presidents in the United States—wish to abolish the constitution, and replace it with "democratic" dictatorship. And this is why political propaganda is full of war terms and metaphors, and calls for sacrifice to achieve required sainted goals. Liberalism provides no excuse for any of that, as one finds in reading Hayek (1960, 1979).

6 Why the quest for absolutes? Our primitive approach to knowledge and rationality was modeled on the hope for certainty. Faced with the ever-changing whirl of change and uncertainty in life, thinkers longed for fixed, stable knowledge. Preevolutionary thought sought certainty and immutability, the timeless and invariant, somehow hidden behind our kaleidoscopic appearances. Modeling the ideal of knowledge on our first great success, the certainty of mathematics (thus confusing the formal realm with the empirical realm), it was assumed that genuine knowledge was an apodictic system in which axioms, when combined with initial assumptions, could grind out a conclusion that was as certain as the deduction of a theorem in mathematics. Once demonstrated, such an ideal

result was to be knowledge forever. An axiom is supposed to be proven or self-evidently true (note: true in either case), according to justificationist canons of proof and rationality. Anything else was "mere opinion," as transitory (and illusory) as our momentary appearances. Knowledge was (as Bacon later emphasized) control, and just as the tribal leader had been "in the know" (instead of group members), he or she was controlling of the behavior of others. This was just the way it should be.

But such eternal "truth" comes at an unbearable price—complete lack of empirical content. The axioms and theorems in formal systems make no contact whatever with the real or empirical world, as Einstein (1923/1953) said. So axioms in an empirical science is a contradiction in terms. Instead, the premises in actual science, including economics, are not "proven truths" but rather rules—statements of regularity that are always fallible, subject to change with the accretion of new evidence, and like measurements, ultimately false because they never actually capture all there is in a domain (Weimer 2022a). This is why, as Kuhn (1970) emphasized, normal science puzzle solving (filling out the proposed domain of a theory) leads beyond itself and points to an unanticipated theory with new premises and new data consequences. As Bergson said, there is increasingly created something unforeseeable and new.

7 Complex phenomena, ranging over unspecified domains and novel occurrences, can be regulated (a less deterministic term than 'controlled') only by prohibitions of specified classes of actions (Weimer 2020). This is so because no rule or directive could ever specify the infinite number of particular actions that would have to be achieved in the indefinite number of possible circumstances that might occur. Traditional moral rules exhibit this negative character. For example, Biblical injunctions are negative: Don't commit adultry; Do not commit murder; Do not steal. Such rules are very informative, in that they specify behaviors that, as a result of long trial and error, society says should be avoided and therefore prohibits, or mistakes not to be made. But these negatives simultaneously allow creativity—novel but appropriate behavior—to occur in all cases, precisely because they do not list what must be done in all possible cases. Negative but not delimiting constraints occur in all living systems (as the origin of life research indicates), and they are the mechanism by which all life adapts (and subsequently evolves) to its econiche. Our knowledge is a similar complex evolved structure governed by the negative rule of falsification of theories that are in conflict with available facts. This is why effective methodological directives—Do not falsify or fabricate data; Do not block the way of inquiry; etc.—and even, as Popper argued (1959), the empirical realm itself, are negatively defined. Avoiding mistakes is all we can do in indefinitely extended realms, because positive particulars cannot be specified that cover unknown and unforeseen circumstances—there is no positive or 'inductive' method that can certify knowledge claims.

It cannot be otherwise in science or epistemology. In any evolutionary circumstance in which change and uncertainty occur, evolution occurs through random variation held in check by falsification—the attempt to eliminate error (Weimer 1979, 2022a). No absolutes or quest for certainty, such as knowledge defined as justified true belief, nor any "inductive" methodology for scientific knowledge certification, is other than a waste of time, a fools' game confusing empirical reality with content-less formal systems. At best such attempts produce static situations that are reconstructions of the end products of already available science rather than explaining growing science itself, or the nature of the knowledge it discloses.

8 It is disheartening that academics seldom cite "popular press" authors (whether credentialed or not) who devote considerable time and effort to present, through social media, arguments in favor of liberalism and, with critical appraisals, deflate the plausibility of the latest cultural Marxist cause célèbre. In the U. S. Thomas Sowell's brilliant empirically based presentations in dozens of books are obviously in this category, as are the web-based discussions from Canada of climate alarmism found in Climate Discussion Nexus (historian John Robson), while in Great Britain, History Debunked (Simon Webb) and The New Culture Forum provides excellent, clear summaries of how cultural Marxism has become so popular.

An informative webpage summary of socialism and liberal critiques thereof is: www.davidmhart.com/liberty/indexPages/socialism. Why these and similar resources are so little utilized by academic liberals I do not know. Certainly the left utilizes their media resources to keep up a constant barrage of half-truths and misinformation in favor of socialism.

9 This is what Hayek said: "[T]he aversion to general principles, and the preference for proceeding from particular instance to particular instance, is the product of the movement which with the "inevitability of gradualness" leads us back from a social order resting on the general recognition of certain principles to a system in which order is created by direct commands" (1948, p. 1). There are two fundamentally opposed views of the nature of humanity in this clash between the underlying constructivist and non-constructivist theories of rationality, with the progressivists despising actual individuals but thinking abstract "humanity" is good and wonderful, while liberals think individuals are not explicitly "rational" at all, regarding: "[M]an not as a highly rational and intelligent but as a very irrational and fallible being, whose irrational errors are corrected only in the course of a social process, and which aims at making the best of a very imperfect material,..." (ibid., pp. 8-9).

10 The author appreciates and thanks Marc Glendening for his critical comments.

REFERENCES

Bartley, W. W. III. 1984. *The retreat to commitment.* McLean: Open Court Cricket Media.
Bergson, H. 1911. *Creative evolution* [A. Mitchell, Tr.]. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Block, W. 2019. *Property rights: The argument for privatization.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Butos, W. N. and McQuade, T. 2015. Causes and consequences of the climate science boom. *The Independent Review,* 20:165-196.
_____. 2023. Hayekian systems: Research into the structure of social interaction. London: Routledge.
Campbell, D. T. 1974. "Downward causation" in hierarchically organized biological systems. In: F. J. Ayala and T. Dobzhansky (eds.), *Studies in the philosophy of biology.* London: Macmillan.
Deneen, P. 2018. *Why liberalism failed.* New Haven: Yale University Press.
DiLorenzo, T. J. 2016. *The problem with socialism.* Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing.
Einstein, A. 1923/1953. Geometry and experience. In: H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (Eds.), *Readings in the philosophy of science* (pp. 189-94). Originally in A. Einstein, *Sidelights of relativity* (pp. 27-45). New York: E. P. Dutton.
Ferguson, A. 1767/1995. *An essay on the history of civil society.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fonte, J. 2024. National conservatism, freedom conservatism, and Americanism. *Imprimis* 53(6/7):1-7.
Hayek, F. A. 1948. *Individualism and economic order.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
_____. 1951/2015. *Hayek on Mill: the Mill Taylor friendship and related writings* (Ed. S. J. Peart). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
_____. 1952/2017. *The sensory order.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Reprinted in V. Vanberg (Ed.), *The sensory order and other writings on the foundations of theoretical psychology.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
_____. 1960/2007. *The constitution of liberty.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Now Routledge Classics.
_____. 1967. *Studies in philosophy, politics, economics, and the history of ideas.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
_____. 1979. *Law, legislation and liberty: Vol. 3: The political order of a free people.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
_____. 1983. *Knowledge, evolution and society.* London: Adam Smith Institute.
_____. 1989. *The fatal conceit: The errors of socialism.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Horwitz, S. 2000. From *The Sensory Order* to the liberal order: Hayek's non-rationalist liberalism. *Review of Austrian Economics,* 13:23-40.
_____. 2015. *Hayek's modern family: Classical liberalism and the evolution of social institutions.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kauffman, S. A. 2019. *A world beyond physics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Keynes, J. M. 1936. *The general theory of employment, interest and money.* London: Macmillan.
Kuhn, T. S. 1970. *The structure of scientific revolutions (revised edition).* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Levendis, J., Eckhardt, R. B., and Block, W. 2020. Evolutionary psychology, economic freedom, trade and benevolence. *Review of Economic Perspectives/Narodohospodarsky,* 19(2):73-94.
MacCallum, S. H. 1970. *The art of community.* Menlo Park: Institute for Humane Studies.
_____. 2014. *Looking back and forward.* Voluntaryist.com.
Mises, L. 1966. *Human action* (3rd Edition). Chicago: Contemporary Books.
_____. 1981/1922. *Socialism.* Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Oakeshott, M. 1962. *Rationalism in politics.* London: Methuen.
_____. 1975. *On human conduct.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Polanyi, M. 1958/1974. *Personal knowledge.* New York: Harper & Row; University of Chicago Press
_____. 1964. *The tacit dimension.* New York: Doubleday.
_____. 1969. *Knowing and being* (M. Grene, Ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Popper, K. R. 1959. *The logic of scientific discovery.* New York: Harper.

_____. 2011/2013/1945. *The open society and its enemies* (Rev. ed.). London: Routledge. Princeton University Press.
Rothbard, M. 1973. *For a new liberty.* New York: Macmillan.
Russell, B. 1931/2009. *The scientific outlook.* London: George Allen and Unwin. Now Routledge Classics.
Schmandt-Besserat, D. 2015. The evolution of writing. In: J. Wright (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of social and behavioral sciences.* Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Schumpeter, J. 1954. *History of economic analysis* (E. B. Schumpeter, Ed.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Sen, A. 1970. The impossibility of a Paretian liberal. *Journal of Political Economy* 70(1):152-157.
Sidwell, M. 2020. *The long march: How the left won the culture war and what to do about it.* London: The New Culture Forum.
Smith, V. L. 2002. Constructivist and ecological rationality in economics. nobelprize.org:502-561.
Vieira, H. 2017. The contradiction of classical liberalism and libertarianism. *LSE Business Review* (Feb 1).
Watkins, J. W. N. 1958. Confirmable and influential metaphysics. *Mind* 67(267): 344-365.
Weimer, W. B. (1979). *Notes on the methodology of scientific research.* Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.
_____. 1983. CCR is not completely confused rhetoric (and there is no reason to "pan" it). In: *Absolute values and the creation of the new world order.* New York: The International Cultural Foundation Press.
_____. 2020. Complex phenomena and the superior power of negative rules of order. *Cosmos + Taxis* 8(10+11):39-59.
_____. 2022a. *Epistemology of the human sciences.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.
_____. 2022b. *Retrieving liberalism from rationalist constructivism, vol 1: History and its betrayal.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.
_____. 2022c. *Retrieving liberalism from rationalist constructivism, vol 2: Basics of a liberal psychological, social and moral order.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Michael Oakeshott Goes Fishing

GENE CALLAHAN
Industry Associate Professor of Computer Science, New York University, Tandon School of Engineering

> Oakeshott… liked binaries, needed them, in fact.
> *—James Alexander, An Interview with Robert Grant*

> The theorist who drops anchor here or there and puts out his equipment of theoretic hooks and nets in order to take the fish of the locality, interrupts but does not betray his calling…
> *—Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct*

INTRODUCTION

Michael Oakeshott did indeed like binaries. Perhaps we can even go so far as to say he needed them. And he presented us with a number of them: rationalism versus practical understanding, the politics of faith versus the politics of skepticism, enterprise association versus civil association, and so on. (A larger list appears below).

What are we to make of this plethora of binaries? This paper suggests that we can best understand them with a metaphor Oakeshott employs in *On Human Conduct*, that of the theorist "dropping anchor" and catching the fish available at a certain locale reached in the enterprise of theorizing. (This paper will *not* attempt to explain why Oakeshott liked binaries as opposed to, say, ternaries or quaternaries. The focus here is on why there were *so many* binaries).

Once we comprehend this metaphor, we can see Oakeshott positing these various dichotomies neither as evidence of his deciding an earlier dichotomy was wrong or useless, but failing to describe his mistake, nor of him merely saying the same thing using different terminology. Rather, what Oakeshott is doing in each instance is "dropping anchor" at a different place out on the theoretic sea, and seeing what fish he might catch from that spot.

THE DICHOTOMIES

Let's attempt to set down the dichotomies Oakeshott, at one time or another, employs, knowing that we may miss some:

- Experience without reservation or arrest versus modal experience
- Aesthetic morality versus rule-bound morality
- The politics of faith versus the politics of skepticism
- Rationalism versus *phronesis*
- The individual versus the individual manque
- Civil association versus enterprise association
- Nomocracy versus teleocracy
- *Societas* versus *universitas*

(The above list is similar but not identical to that offered by Fuller 2024, p. 280).[1]

My contention is that these are largely *distinct* ways of "dividing the continuum" (see Eco 1986, pp. 44-45) of experience, and that Oakeshott was most often exploring a new vantage point from which to understand human experience, and not merely giving closely related poles in a dichotomy ever new names, or rejecting an older abstraction in favor of a newer one.

MISAPPREHENDING THE DICHOTOMIES

Let us take a look at some of the ways in which various writers have misapprehended the relationship of these binaries. In general, these fall in two groups (another binary!): Some writers suggest that Oakeshott was merely generating new names for the same poles in an opposition, while others believe he was "abandoning" some now obsolete categorization and replacing it with a new and improved one.

In the first category we find, for example, David Spitz… who also happens to fall into the second category. He claims:

> Unfortunately, *On Human Conduct*… gives no answers at all [to critiques of Oakeshott's earlier work]… *On Human Conduct* is but a restatement of his teaching… it is no more than a linguistic variation on familiar themes… Throughout, of course, there are the usual denunciations of Rationalism (1976, pp. 342-343).

Spitz is so set on seeing Oakeshott as just spinning off variations on the "same old song" that he never notices that there are *no* denunciations of rationalism in that book. Oakeshott himself quite explicitly states the "civil versus enterprise association" dichotomy is *not* just new terms for the "rationalism versus phronesis" dichotomy in his response to Spitz: "in fact the word [Rationalism] is never used, and what it stands for is never mentioned; I am concerned with something else" (1976, p. 357). (In other words, he has dropped anchor at a new fishing locale, and is no longer using the "rationalism" and "phronesis" hooks and nets.)

Elizabeth Corey is much more sympathetic to Oakeshott than is Spitz, but commits a similar error. She writes, "This is what Oakeshott describes as the 'politics of skepticism' and 'civil association'" (2006, p. 156).

This remark posits the 'politics of skepticism' and 'civil association' as two names for the same thing. But if that is so, then the 'politics of faith' and 'enterprise association' must similarly be synonyms. But they clearly aren't: not everyone opening a corner deli (an enterprise association) "posits a uniform condition of mundane perfection" (Corey 2006, p. 172). But it would nevertheless be a mistake for the deli owner to organize his business on a rationalist basis.

John Horton, also sympathetic to Oakeshott, makes a claim similar to Corey's:

> The book articulates a distinction between two 'styles' of the activity of governing—'the politics of faith' and 'the politics of scepticism'. This distinction is clearly related to others he deploys elsewhere, most obviously between rationalism and conservatism, collectivism and individualism and enterprise and civil association. On the one hand, the left as we might say, we have the politics of faith, rationalism, collectivism and enterprise association and on the other, the right, the politics of scepticism, conservatism, individualism and civil association. The terms in each of these sets are certainly not equivalent, but they form two broad families, each loosely linked within a binary structure that is characteristic of Oakeshott's thought (Horton 2005, p. 25).

While, at least Horton recognizes that "these sets are certainly not equivalent," but nevertheless he errs in claiming that "they form two broad families."

For instance, regarding "enterprise association" as a near synonym for "rationalism," and "civil association" as a near synonym for customary behavior won't do: Oakeshott indeed does not fancy enterprise

association becoming the primary way of organizing a government. But entities like for-profit companies, sports teams, and charities are inherently enterprise associations. Does this mean he thinks that their managers should operate or do operate them in a rationalistic fashion? Of course not: Rationalism will fail as a way of managing a sports team just as surely as it will fail as a way of governing a polity. Nor does managing a state as an enterprise association imply that one must do so in a rationalist fashion: Roman government, at least at times, was directed towards the end of the health of the people, but not in a rationalist fashion (Callahan 2012).

Oakeshott himself explicitly rejects this equating of enterprise association with something undesirable (such as rationalism): "[Wolin ascribes to me a] denigration of purposive association, which is nowhere to be found in what I have written" (1976, p. 362).

Furthermore, Oakeshott recognizes that character of the modern European state contains a mingling of the ideal types of civil (*societas*) and enterprise (*universitas*) association:

> *Societas* and *universitas* stand, each, for an independent, self-sustaining mode of association; And my contention is that they are both characteristics of a state, not because they have an inherent need of one another… but because they have become contingently joined by the choices of human beings in the character of a modern European state. And if this is the situation, it may be the most one can do is to offer these terms as the most effective apparatus for understanding the actual complexity of a state… (1975, p. 323).[2]

Thus, Oakeshott is not endorsing any attempt to turn states into purely civil association, but only a way of undersanding their mixed character and the tensions that it creates. To attempt to design a polity as a "pure" civil association is itself a species of rationalism: see for instance, Nozick (1974), Friedman (1989), or Murphy (2010) for examples of just that sort of rationalistic embrace of purely civil association.

Corey goes on to conflate yet a third dichotomy as being alternate names offering slightly different "formulations" for what is in essence the same thing: "To sum up, Oakeshott's three related formulations of a particular kind of politics (Rationalism, 'faith,' and collectivism)" (p. 173).

But, as discussed in Callahan (2012), Ayn Rand and Murray Rothbard were both rationalists *and* representatives of the "politics of faith," but fiercely anti-collectivist. The Romans had great faith in their tradion-oriented political system, while the American founders rationalistically designed a constitution based on their skeptical view of what politics could achieve. Oakeshott was exploring different ways of cutting the world of human action in two, not performing the same cut, again and again, and just calling the different slices by new names.

An example of the latter misapprehnsion—believing that, because Oakeshott is offering a new perspective on some issue, he has abandoned some earlier position, can be found in Stephen Gerencser's book *The Skeptic's Oakeshott*, in which he argues that Oakeshott "abandons… absolute idealism" (2000, p. 12) at least by the late 1940s.

Oakeshott never uses the term "absolute idealism" in *Experience and Its Modes*, and only reluctantly talks about the absolute at all (1933, pp. 46-47), so Gerencser's use of the term to describe Oakeshott's early philosophy is already questionable. But he nevertheless goes on to claim: "In both 'Political Philosophy' and 'The Voice of Poetry' Oakeshott has lost his faith in the notion of 'experience without reservation'…" (2000, p. 38).

Firstly, it is very strange to assert that Oakeshott had "faith" in "experience without reservation": that, for him was a statement of the nature of philosophy, and hardly a matter of faith. Moreover, as we will see in the next section, the essay "Political Philosophy," far from showing any loss of "faith" in "experience without reservation," in fact, restates that as the nature of philosophy using new imagery. And he does so again in *On Human Conduct*, when he talks of the theorist's calling to be "to be perpetually *en voyage*" (1975, p. 11).

GOING FISHING

Oakeshott himself offered to us a key for why he kept generating new dichotomies. As he put it *On Human Conduct*:

> And consequently [the theorist's] engagement to be perpetually *en voyage* may be arrested without being denied. The theorist who drops anchor here or there and puts out his equipment of theoretic hooks and nets in order to take the fish of the locality, interrupts but does not betray his calling… the theorist who interrogates instead of using his theoretic equipment catches no fish (1975, p. 11).

In other words, in the ocean of human experience, there are a vast number of places one might "stop and fish." And the importance to Oakeshott of the idea behind the metaphor is illustrated by his deployment of a similar image some fifteen or so years before he wrote *On Human Conduct*. In "Political Philosophy," an essay unpublished during his life (written sometime between 1946 and 1950), he offered the metaphor of the theorist climbing a tower with many windows looking out on experience, offering views of "what was before invisible" (1993, p. 143). In fact, it is Oakeshott's concept of philosophy as "experience without reservation or arrest" (1933, p. 4) that allows him the freedom to repeatedly explore new arrests in experience: all such arrests are always abstract and so partial and defective. Someone who mistakenly thought that such an arrest could be made without defect or incoherence might believe that any insights gleaned from such an arrest ought to be absolute and final, thus rendering them reluctant to explore any other arrest. Their inclination will be to become attached to any particular fishing spot where they catch a few interesting fish. For example, those enamoured of the scientific mode may readily come to believe that only scientific explanations are valid, in other words, to embrace "scientism."

On the other hand, anyone understanding philosophy as does Oakeshott will be able to visit and leave various fishing grounds without becoming attached to any of them as an "ultimate fishing ground," since he will understand that no such ultimate ground exists: they are all "arrests" in experience. And in "Political Philosophy," Oakeshott makes this explicit: "Philosophical reflection, on the other hand, is what happens when [that] kind of anchorage [i.e., attachment to some particular "fishing ground"] is rejected, each scene being permitted fully to supersede the one before" (1993, p. 143). (As mentioned earlier, this essay actually *refutes* Gerencser's claim that Oakeshott had "lost faith" in the idea of experience without reservation or arrest, rather than being evidence backing that claim).

And we might explain some of the confusion that leads writers to try to identify one of Oakeshott's fishing grounds with another is due to their not fully understanding the philosophical basis behind his free exploration of various arrests in experience.

CLEARING UP CONFUSION ON OAKESHOTT "OPPOSING ABSTRACTION"

Once we comprehend Oakeshott's fishing metaphor, we cannot only clear up the confusion about his dichotomies, but also dismiss an apparent "paradox." As Alexander describes it: "There is something paradoxical about being opposed to theoretical abstraction and yet having such a relentless inclination to carry it out" (2022, p. 2).

But the view Alexander has attributed to Oakeshott is false: There is no passage anywhere in Oakeshott's work that is "opposed to theoretical abstractions." Instead, what he has repeatedly pointed out is that "theoretical abstractions" are fine things, so long as one does not mistake them for a complete understanding of the situation from which they were abstracted.

What Oakeshott does criticize is rationalism. However, the rationalist is not someone who creates abstractions; he is someone who creates abstractions, and then tries to use them as a substitute for the knowledge of a concrete activity. A map of Budapest is an abstraction. Oakeshott is not against the making of such

a map. He is against someone who believes that because they have a good map of Budapest, they are in a position to remake the city along more rational lines.

And we know this is Oakeshott's position because he told us so quite explicitly; in *On Human Conduct*, after telling us he has been closely following Plato so far, he goes on to describe the point at which Plato goes astray:

> The cave-dwellers, upon first encountering the theorist after his return to the world of the shadows [very well might be impressed] when he tells them that what they had always thought of as 'a horse' is not what they suppose it to be… but is, on the contrary, a modification of the attributes of God [, and they will] applaud his performance even where they cannot quite follow it. [The cave-dwellers can appreciate the exotic pronouncements of the theorist, as long as he confines those pronouncements to theoretical enterprises.] but if he were to tell them that, in virtue of his more profound understanding of the nature of horses, he is a more expert horse-man, horse-chandler, or stable boy than they (in their ignorance) could ever hope to be, and when it becomes clear that his new learning has lost him the ability to tell one end of a horse from the other… [then] before long the more perceptive of the cave-dwellers [will] begin to suspect that, after all, he [is] not an interesting theorist but a fuddled and pretentious 'theoretician' who should be sent on his travels again, or accommodated in a quiet home (1975, p. 30).

So Oakeshott does not oppose theoretical abstraction at all: he opposes the *misuse* of theoretical abstraction.

We can now see the confusion behind another of Spitz's remarks, when he complains:

> Apparently it is now [in *On Human Conduct*] possible to speak of the character of a modern European state without attending to the concrete manners of behavior in England, or France, or Germany, or any other national system. The differences he so assiduously urged us to note among them—if we were to acquire true political knowledge—are now forgotten; instead, the diverse manners of behavior are blurred in a presumably (but not demonstrated) common manner of behavior (1976, p. 346).

Again, having understood the idea of "dropping anchor," we can see that Spitz's complaint that the important differences between different European nations "are now forgotten" is misguided:

> Oakeshott has not *forgotten* the differences between various countries; no, he has *dropped anchor* at a new location, and is using different *hooks and nets* to catch what may be caught at that location. One can theorize at the level of individual European nations, or at a higher level of abstraction, "the European nation"… but indeed the nations themselves are abstractions, hiding the differences between the English north and south, or Paris and the French Riviera, or Sicily and Tuscany… and even those are abstractions, as Cornwall differs from Essex, and Florence from Sienna. And so on.

Spitz's confusion continues a page later: "An ideal-type does not describe reality; it is an abstraction, an abridgment, or as the earlier Oakeshott would say, an ideological way of looking at reality" (1976, p. 347).

No: an ideology is an abstraction that has forgotten it is an abstraction and instead takes itself to be concrete reality, so that one attempts to find theoretical solutions to problems requiring *phronesis* or *techne*.

Oakeshott's understanding, which he shares with other British Idealists (see, e.g. Collingwood (1924, pp. 159-160), that all abstractions are partial and therefore defective, far from making it "paradoxical" that he is able to employ so many different abstractions, instead is precisely *why* he is able to do so: no abstraction is ultimately completely satisfactory, so there is no reason to cling to one of them while abjuring all others.

CONCLUSION

When put in the context of Oakeshott's understanding of philosophy as experience without reservation or arrest, we can comprehend his repeated positing of new polarities as the free explorations of an intellect not attached to any particular arrest in experience. When examining new poles, he was neither repudiating earlier writings nor merely saying the same thing using different terms. He had simply found new fishing grounds.[3]

NOTES

1 Fuller's list is:
- Empirical politics—Ideological politics
- Politics of Skepticism—Politics of Faith
- Nomocracy—Teleocracy
- Morality of habit and affection—Morality of reflective thought
- Civil Association—Enterprise Association

2 In the case of "societas versus universitas" and "civil association versus enterprise association," I think we are justified in considering civil association as a synonym for societas, and enterprise associaiton as a synonym for universitas. Indeed, I would argue, the whole connection between essay two and essay three of On Human Conduct hinges on this equivalence. In fact, late in essay three Oakeshott presents them as equivalent (1975, p. 313). So why, then, in this case did he use two different terms for the poles of his dichotomy? I suggest it was because by discussing civil association versus enterprise association in essay two, he was able to introduce novel terms that he could define himself and which indicated precisely the concepts he had in mind, while in essay three the use of societas and universitas demonstrated that this distinction had an historical background dating back millennia, even though the latter two terms had been used ambiguously.

3 I would like to thank Timothy Fuller and Ferenc Hörcher for their helpful comments .

REFERENCES

Alexander, James. 2022a. Oakeshott-22. *Cosmos + Taxis* 10(7+8):1-6.
_____. 2022b. An Interview with Robert Grant, University of Glasgow. *Cosmos + Taxis* 10(7+8):72-82.
Callahan, Gene. 2012. *Oakeshott on Rome and America*. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Collingwood, R. G. 1924. *Speculum Mentis or Map of Knowledge*. London: Oxford University Press.
Corey, Elizabeth Campbell. 2006. *Michael Oakeshott on Religion, Aesthetics, and Politics*, Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
Eco, Umberto. 1986. *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Friedman, David D. 1989. *The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism*, 2nd ed. La Salle: Open Court.
Fuller, Timothy. 2024. *Michael Oakeshott and the Human Condition*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Gerencser, Steven Anthony. 2000. *The Skeptic's Oakeshott*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Horton, John. 2005. A Qualified Defence of Oakeshott's Politics of Scepticism. *European Journal Of Political Theory* 4(1): 23-36.
Murphy, Robert P. 2010. *Chaos Theory: Two Essays on Market Anarchy*, 2nd ed., Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute. https://mises.org/library/chaos-theory.
Nozick, Robert. 1974. *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. New York: Basic Books.
Oakeshott, Michael. 1933. *Experience and Its Modes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
_____. 1975. *On Human Conduct*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
_____. 1976. On Misunderstanding Human Conduct: A Reply to My Critics. *Political Theory* 4(3):353-367.
_____. 1991 [1962]. *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
_____. 1993. *Religion, Politics, and the Moral Life*. Ed. Timothy Fuller. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
_____. 1996. *The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism*. Ed. Timothy Fuller. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Spitz, David. 1976. A Rationalist Malgre Lui: The Perplexities of Being Michael Oakeshott. *Political Theory* 4(3):335-352.

Oakeshott Turned Conservatism Into a Creed of Liberty

JAKOB SÖDERBAUM

Michael Oakeshott's great work *On Human Conduct* was initially not at all well received (Franco 2004, p. 145). As a comparison, the contemporary American conservative thinker Russell Kirk immediately rose to fame when in the mid 1950s he published his major work *The Conservative Mind*. Oakeshott and Kirk can both, in different ways, be said to have been the internationally most important intellectual champions of the new form of conservatism evolving during the second half of the 20th century, which holds the idea of ordered liberty at its core and also has given conservatism its greatest political victories internationally since the French revolution.

Oakeshott's most important books from a conservative point of view is, firstly, the essay collection *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (1962). And, secondly, *On Human Conduct* (1975), where he elaborates further on the basic ideas in the essay *On Being Conservative* from the previously mentioned essay collection. In *On Human Conduct*, Oakeshott formulates both in-depth and in much detail the philosophy of civil society, the nature of freedom and the prerequisites of freedom in human societies. He argues for a clear distinction between moral conduct and prudent action, explaining that activities in the civil society belongs to the former category, basically proving, in line with Burke and with the support of Hegel, that ordered liberty needs morality.

In this paper, I argue that Oakeshott's contribution to modern conservatism is fundamental, and that his importance in this matter is plausibly even greater than that of Kirk's.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF CONSERVATISM

The year after the French revolution in 1789, Edmund Burke published his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. In the history of politics, this is considered as the ignition of conservatism both as a political theory and as a self-conscious political movement internationally. Since then, conservatism as a political theory has basically split into two lines of development—roughly speaking one with its base on the European continent and another with its base in the Anglosphere. Burke has played a crucial role, however in different ways, in both of these lines of development.

On the European continent, the publishing of Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* immediately made him internationally famous. He influenced both counter-revolutionary movements in several countries, and was together with G. W. F. Hegel the most internationally significant thinker of the counter-revolutionary ideology

(Tingsten 1939/1966, pp. 18, 74)—even though, back then in the early 19th century, Burke was only one of many important counter-revolutionary thinkers alongside other internationally famous ones, such as Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald. The counter-revolutionary ideology eventually turned into what today can be called *social conservatism*, which as a contrast to the other line *liberal conservatism* is characterized by its focus on national sovereignty and social responsibility.

The development of social conservatism is to a large extent connected with conservative intellectuals and movements on the European continent. But it is also clear that it is an important political force in the United Kingdom. Benjamin Disraeli also stood for "one nation-conservatism" and was pro-welfare with certain similarities in this respect with two other conservative statesmen of the 19th century, namely the German Otto von Bismarck and the Swede Rudolf Kjellén who also had a focus on national sovereignty and building welfare models. With Hegel as a strong and long-term influential thinker in this social conservative line of thought, it is here also important to point out that Hegel influenced the British idealist movement which maintained the idea of organicism. It so happened that it was the rise of the increasing importance of organicism for British conservative thought in the 1870s that marked the real start of the process of making Burke into "the father of conservatism" that we know him as today (Jones 2017, p. 161).

The original international conservative cause about restoring the fallen European monarchies after the Napoleonic wars, led by prince Clemens von Metternich, ultimately failed, and this ambition died with the socialist revolutions of 1848. At this point in time, conservatism can be said to internationally have lost its sense of unity and a common political cause, and it became ideologically shattered between different countries and their different traditions, making the conservatism of the second half of the 19th century look like there were only very few ideas that united the movements considering themselves to be conservative. Losing its common cause was of course a major problem for conservative movements all over the Western world that really needed to be resolved eventually, because, as Burke himself had noted, "the only thing necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing".

Meanwhile in the United Kingdom, Burke turned to be "the father of conservatism" in the mid 1880s—as late as that (Jones 2017, pp. 154, 196). Lord Hugh Cecil's *Conservatism* published in 1912 is the first book ever to mention Burke as "the father of conservatism"—this being approximately 120 years after Burke's death. In the history of ideas, Cecil's book both reflected something that was by then established about Burke—but it also marked the beginning of a new way of viewing conservatism intellectually.

Notable here is that when Cecil conceptualizes the thought of Burke in this book, he writes about liberty only briefly and in the terms that conservatism on the one hand defends the particular kind of "personal liberty" which exists in society, but solely based on the fact that this form of liberty now exists (i.e. a defence of *status quo*). And, on the other hand, the form of societal liberty which is the consequence of the rule of law. Cecil writes very little on this topic, and he also claims that conservatism holds a position in between "authority and liberty", whereas the embracing of liberty in politics is particularly connected with liberalism and not conservatism.

OAKESHOTT'S IMPORTANCE FOR MODERN CONSERVATISM

And this is where Michael Oakeshott comes in, in being one of the earliest intellectuals to add philosophical substance to Burkean conservatism—and how he does it. Oakeshott was a student in Cambridge in the 1920s, only a few years after Cecil's book was published. As a student, Oakeshott was influenced by the British idealism (Franco 2004, p. 67) who was one of the few surviving intellectual heirs of right-wing Hegelianism in Europe at this time. What Oakeshott later in his life does as a political philosopher, is that he makes use of certain parts of Hegel's thought—namely the *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and *The Philosophy of Right*—as a philosophical substantiation of Burke's predominant views and political positions. This is illustrated below.



Fig 1: Oakeshott (and later Scruton, among others) uses certain parts of Hegel's philosophy to motivate Burke's thought.

Roger Scruton can be said to have carried on the same concept of conservative philosophy—a synthesis of Burke's and Hegel's thought—keeping laying the jigsaw puzzle of conservative philosophy and philosophically true conservatism which was invented by Oakeshott (e.g. Covell 1986), and developing all of this much further in a large number of books. A Swedish conservative thinker who also makes use of this same synthesis is Claes G. Ryn, active in the US since the 1970s.

So, while it had been considered in the United Kingdom since the early 20th century that Burke is "the father of conservatism", and while even British conservatism in this era obviously had no focus at all on liberty, it took until 1953 (and after) before Russell Kirk started to establish Burke in the same way in the USA. The controversy arising from Kirk's claim that Burke is the true intellectual father of conservatism, and that all "true" (small-c) conservatism springs from Burke's political thought, sparked an immense intellectual debate in the USA. The impact of this has, among other important achievements for conservatism, been proven to lead to the political success of Ronald Reagan (Nash 2009, pp. 342-345; Continetti 2018). Oakeshott, too, had a distinct impact on the conservative movement around Reagan.

OAKESHOTT AS THE "GAME CHANGER"

Today, conservatism is generally throughout the Western world recognized as a creed of liberty. At the centre of this creed are the concepts of "ordered liberty" and "freedom withresponsibility". Both of these concepts are clearly important in Burke's writings—you could say that Burke puts checks on liberty to make more citizens in a society get more liberty together and also in relation to each other. But—this view of conservatism is actually a 20th century construction, formulated well after Cecil's era. It can also be easy to view Kirk, with his popularity both in the USA and internationally, and with the USA being the major defender of liberty and freedom on the global political arena, as "the" pioneer for making modern conservatism into a creed of liberty. However, I also see much that suggests that Oakeshott is the real game changer here, regarding the successful transformation of the whole perception of conservatism among academics as well as self-proclaiming (and intellectually respected) conservatives internationally.

In *The Conservative Mind*, Kirk—like Cecil before him but with a different focus—published 6 "canons of Burke". Here, however, Kirk doesn't mention liberty or freedom except for in canon #6 where he merely writes that "freedom and property are closely linked". Forty years after *The Conservative Mind* was origi-

nally published, in 1993, Kirk published *The Politics of Prudence* where he develops the original 6 canons of Burke into 10 canons. Here, Kirk writes about the value of liberty and freedom in as much as four different canons: 2, 7, 8 and 9 (Kirk nd). It is also notable that Kirk 1993 in his canon # 8 speaks about the liberty of civil society, which we all know is the great achievement of Oakeshott to develop and prove philosophically in his *On Human Conduct* from 1975. The Burke-puristic Kirk has also described Oakeshott in later versions of *The Conservative Mind* as "a learned disciple of Burke's", thus recognizing the importance of Oakeshott as one of few notable developers of Burkean thought in Kirk's view.

Now, the historical development of liberal conservatism, alongside that of social conservatism, is closely related on the one hand to the intellectual pursuit of "true conservatism" in the line of Burke, with Kirk as the great intellectual champion of the 20th century, and related on the other hand politically to the political heritage of Thatcher and Reagan. Kirk is to a certain extent the most important thinker in the line of liberal conservatism, because of his great popularity both in the USA and internationally. But so also is Oakeshott. Oakeshott is recognized alongside Leo Strauss as being the European thinker who has asserted the most influence on American conservatism during the 20th century (Franco 2004, p. 16).

Thus, it can be argued that with Oakeshott laying the philosophical foundation for ordered liberty in his *On Human Conduct*, and meanwhile also highlighting the importance of liberty and freedom under responsibility in Burke's thought, he proved liberty to be a central value within conservatism directly inherited from Burke. And then—after Oakeshott—Kirk, Reagan and Thatcher made this view internationally popular. I think it is beyond doubt that this couldn't have happened without Reagan or Kirk. But it was also undoubtedly Oakeshott who did the philosophical work, and while he had a strong general impact on American conservative thought, there is also much that suggests that Kirk's personal change of view in 1993 was inspired by Oakeshott.

OAKESHOTT TOGETHER WITH KIRK HELPED UNITE CONSERVATIVES INTERNATIONALLY AGAIN

I believe Oakeshott's *On Human Conduct* to be as important a milestone in the development of modern conservatism as is Russell Kirk's *The Conservative Mind*, if not even more important. Oakeshott's great philosophical work here resulted in a turning point for the international understanding of conservatism as such—not only of liberal conservatism—and this also meant that conservatism once again obtained a common international cause.

For a relevant perspective on this, it is here important to understand that Kirk refused Hegel as a conservative thinker, while Oakeshott (and Scruton and Ryn among others) view Hegel as an equally central thinker to modern (Burkean) conservatism as Burke himself, and have built a whole concept of "conservative philosophy" based on a kind of synthesis of these two thinkers. Giving conservatism a deep intellectual foundation this way, and making it relevant again in our time in a developed form, is of course a great political achievement in its own right. But the relevance of Oakeshott's contribution to modern conservative thought is even greater than this consequence. Because by merging Burke with Hegel this way, the concept of conservative philosophy that springs from this also connects a larger amount of European conservative thinkers and movements from the last two hundred years than the ones who, like Kirk, relate directly and/or mainly to Burke. This fact in itself can be seen as another reason why Oakeshott's more liberal view of conservatism managed to get internationally established. And, finally, this conceptualization opens up for social conservatism and liberal conservatism to be viewed as two sides of the same coin instead of just two different lines of thought with Burke as some kind of root for both.

Mapping the major ideas of modern conservatism and the major thinkers concerned with those ideas, as I have done in my book (Söderbaum 2020 with an upcoming edition in English), all of this can also be understood in the following perspective. To begin with, Kirk's refusal of Hegel as a conservative thinker marks the difference between liberal conservatism (without Hegel), and social conservatism (with Hegel). Thus, we can today speak of modern conservatism in the line of Burke (this is Cecil's original concept, and

also used in our time for instance by Emily Jones) as a two-sided coin with liberal conservatism on the one side and social conservatism on the other, both stemming from Burke in different ways and today united with Burke but separated by Hegel. Oakeshott, with his conservative philosophy concerned with the philosophical essence of true conservatism and ordered liberty at the heart of civil society, has contributed to both modern liberal conservatism and modern social conservatism. This is proven by the influence on, among others, Kirk and Scruton, where Kirk today can be seen as a liberal conservative thinker and Scruton as a social conservative thinker. While Kirk reached out from the USA to Europe to agree upon the common heritage from Burke, it was Oakeshott who made modern conservatism truly international by combining Hegel with Burke, and it was Oakeshott who this way put the emphasis of ordered liberty at the core of modern conservatism, both (true philosophical) social conservatism and liberal conservatism. Figure 2 visualises how these lines of thought and several of the mentioned thinkers, unite in what in our time can be viewed as the core of modern conservative thought.

Oakeshott's reputation today as being the greatest political philosopher in the UK of the 20th century (Franco 2004, p. ix, s 1), is likely to help maintain his groundbreaking achievements also for intellectual conservatism in the long term.



Fig 2: How modern conservatism is divided into liberal conservatism and social conservatism, and how the most important thinkers in modern conservatism relate to these lines of thought.

REFERENCES

Burke, Edmund. 2015. *Reflections on the Revolution in France and Other Writings*. London: Everyman's Library.
Cecil, Lord Hugh. 1912. *Conservatism*. London: Williams and Norgate.
Continetti, Matthew 2018. The Forgotten Father of American Conservatism. *The Atlantic*. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/russell-kirk-father-american-conservatism/573433/
Covell, Charles. 1986. *The Redefinition of Conservatism—Politics and Doctrine*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Franco, Paul. 2004. *Michael Oakeshott—An Introduction*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Hamilton, Andy. 2016. Conservatism. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
Jones, Emily. 2017. *Edmund Burke & the Invention of Modern Conservatism, 1830–1914: An Intellectual History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kirk, Russell. 2001. *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot* (1953), 7th revised ed., Washington: Regnery Publishing.
_____. 1993: *The Politics of Prudence*. Wilmington: ISI Books.
_____. undated. https://kirkcenter.org/conservatism/ten-conservative-principles/
Larsson, Reidar. 2005. *Politiska ideologier i vår tid* (7 ed.). Lund: Studentlitteratur.
Nash, George. 2009. *Reappraising the Right: The Past & Future of American Conservatism*. Wilmington: ISI Books.
Oakeshott, Michael. 1975. *On Human Conduct*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
_____. 1962. *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays*. London: Methuen & Co.
Scruton, Roger. 2017. *Conservatism—An Invitation to the Great Tradition*. London: Profile Books.
_____. 1990. *The Philosopher on Dover Beach*. Manchester: Carcanet.
Söderbaum, Jakob. 2020: *Modern konservatism—filosofi, bärande idéer och inriktningar i Burkes efterföljd*. Everöd: Recito.
Tingsten, Herbert. 1966[1939]. *De konservativa idéerna*. Stockholm: Aldus/Bonniers.

Friedrich August von Hayek: An Economist Who Possessed Strong Convictions

GARY A. LOMBARDO

Courtesy of the Mises Institute

Gary A. Lombardo (Ph.D., University of Oregon), retired as a professor, is an independent scholar who has written extensively on the topics of economics, international business, and strategic management. An earlier version of this profile appeared as part of a chapter in his book, *Nobel Memorial Economists, 1969-1979.*

The Nobel Foundation announced, in 1974, that Friedrich August von Hayek was a co-recipient of The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. According to "Friedrich von Hayek Facts", the Noble Foundation announced that the prize motivation was "for their (Hayek and his co-recipient, Karl Gunnar Myrdal) pioneering work in the theory of money and economic fluctuations and for their penetrating analysis of the interdependence of economic, social and institutional phenomena." Their contributions were assessed as "Research on the interrelations between economic, social and political processes."

According to "Friedrich von Hayek Biographical", Hayek was born May 8, 1899, in Vienna which at that time was in the Austro-Hungarian empire. He died in Freiberg, Germany March 23, 1992. Hayek served in the Austro-Hungarian military during World War I as an officer in an artillery regiment. He saw combat and was decorated for his bravery. Influenced by his father who was a medical doctor and part-time university professor as well as the scholarly careers of his grandfathers, he was interested in pursuing an academic career. His maternal grandfather was a leading Austro-Hungarian economist who knew Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk. Hayek began his studies at the University of Vienna in 1918, eventually earning one doctoral degree in law (1921) and a second doctoral degree in political science (1923). He also studied philosophy, psychology and economics during his student days. His first posting upon completion of his studies was facilitated by Wieser's recommendation to Ludwig von Mises that he hire Hayek to work for the Austrian government on the legal and economic details of the Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye (September 10, 1919). The treaty was signed by the World War I Allies and the Republic of German-Austria but was not ratified by the United States due to the language regarding the establishment of the League of Nations.

Friedrich von Wieser (Dr. jur., University of Vienna, 1872), was an economist affiliated with the Austrian School of economic thought. Wieser, a brother-in-law to Böhm-Bawerk and student of Menger, was the author of *Der Natürliche Werth* (English translation: *Natural Value,* 1889 [1893]) and *Theorie der gesellschaftlichen Wirtschaft* (English translation: *Social* Economics*,* 1914 [1927]). These influential books presented, among other concepts, the alternative-cost doctrine and the marginal utility theory respectively. Ludwig Heinrich Edler von Mises (Dr. jur., University of Vienna, 1906), as a doctoral student was advised by Böhm-Bawerk. Mises was affiliated with the Austrian School of economic thought. He was a monetary theorist who wrote a critique of socialism, *Die*

Gemeinwirtschaft: Untersuchungen über den Sozialismus (English translation, *Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis,* 1922 [1936]). Mises mentored Hayek who attended Mises' private seminars, known as *Privatseminar,* which were offered to a select group of economists in Vienna. Hayek continued his studies doing post-graduate work at New York University from March 1923 to June 1924. He worked for Jeremiah Jenks, a professor at New York University, as a research assistant. The assistantship required Hayek to compile macroeconomic data on the American economy and its Federal Reserve operations.

Hayek and Mises founded the *Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung* (English translation: Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research) in 1927. Hayek served as the director for the entity. The organization's purpose was to analyze national and international economic trends and provided economic forecasts to its clients as well as offering a series of publications addressing economic issues. Hayek, during his tenure at the Institute, published his first book, *Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle* (1929).

Hayek was affiliated with a few academic institutions during his career including the London School of Economics and Political Science (commonly known as the London School of Economics), the University of Chicago, the University of Freiburg and the University of Salzburg. He was appointed also as a visiting professor at other universities. Hayek was a central figure of the Austrian School of economic thought. The Austrian School which developed in the late 1800s came into existence based on Carl Menger's publication (*Principles of Economics.* Translated by J. Dingwall and B. F. Hoselitz, with an introduction by Friedrich A. Hayek, 1871 [1981]) describing a new theory of value. Menger (Dr. jur., Jagiellonian University in Kraków) was an Austrian economist holding the University of Vienna chair of economic theory. He was the founding figure of the Austrian School. William Stanley Jevons, an English economist, independently presented a similar theory in his book (*The Theory of Political Economy*, 1871 [1888]) published the same year. Menger as well as economists Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk [(*Capital and Interest,* 1890), first volume titled *A Critical History of Economic Theory,* second volume titled *Positive Theory of Capital,* 1889, and third volume titled *Further Essays on Capital and Interest,* 1921] and Ludwig von Mises [*Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel*. [English translation: *The Theory of Money and Credit*, 1912 [1981]] were major contributors to the Austrian School of economic thought. They were also strong influences on Hayek. Philosophers such as David Hume, John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Ludwig Wittgenstein (Hayek's second cousin on his mother's side of the family) also influenced Hayek's thinking.

In 1931, Lionel Robbins, a noted British economist and professor, invited Hayek to the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) to deliver four lectures on monetary economics. This led to his appointment, in 1931, as the Tooke Professor of Economic Science and Statistics. During Hayek's tenure at the LSE, prominent economists who were at the institution with him included William Baumol, Ronald Coase (Economic Sciences Laureate, 1991), John Kenneth Galbraith, Sir John Hicks (co-recipient, Economic Sciences Laureate, 1972), Leonid Hurwicz (co-recipient, Economic Sciences Laureate, 2007), Nicholas Káldor, Arthur Lewis (Economic Sciences Laureate, 1979) and George Shackle. Some of these individuals were in agreement with Hayek's perspective regarding economics, while others were not. Hayek had his supporters and detractors. John Kenneth Galbraith, John Maynard Keynes, Paul Krugman (Economic Sciences Laureate, 2008) and Gunnar Myrdal (co-recipient with Hayek, Economic Sciences Laureate, 1974) are numbered among the detractors. McNair and Meriam (*Problems in business economics*, 1941) reported that, in 1932, Hayek exchanged letters, co-signed by Robbins and other economists, with John Maynard Keynes, published by *The Times* (of London), critiquing Keynes's economic views.

During his tenure at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Hayek wrote *The Road to Serfdom* (1944) for which he became well known. He observed that, at the time, the British intelligentsia, especially the professorial class, was viewing fascism as the capitalist response to the socialist political philosophy. The book, originally published in England, was subsequently published in the United States to a warmly receptive audience that included a readership beyond academia. Readers valuing the concepts of individualism and the classical view of liberalism found Hayek's writing resonating with their philosophy. Hayek viewed the free market as representing the best possible societal system providing freedom for its members. Government intervention in the marketplace reduces that level of freedom enjoyed by its citizens.

Thus, socialism represents a societal structure that limits human freedom. Fascism, in the form of Nazism, is another political philosophy, like socialism and communism, that fosters government intervention in the economic system limiting the freedom of its citizens. It is capitalism that is the only economic policy approach that engenders prosperity, dignity and, ultimately, liberty for its population. While at the London School of Economics, Hayek refused to return to Austria after the Anschluss. In 1938, he gained British citizenship.

He departed from the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1950 to take a position as a visiting professor at the University of Arkansas. He then received an appointment as a professor on the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago. The William Volker Charities Fund underwrote his salary. The Fund, established in 1932, expanded its focus in 1947 when its founder William Volker died and his nephew, Harold W. Luhnow, became chairman of the board of directors. The Fund's mission now included the promotion and dissemination of free market economic ideas. The Fund became a leading organization in the United States providing financial support for the development of libertarian and conservative philosophies.

Hayek's influence extended to numerous scholars at the University of Chicago including Milton Friedman (Economic Sciences Laureate, 1976), Aaron Director (who, in 1958, founded the *Journal of Law and Economics*) and Frank Knight. Hayek was the driving force organizing an initial meeting and inviting others, Knight, Friedman, and George Stigler (Economic Sciences Laureate, 1982), to attend to discuss the formation of an economic forum. They planned the establishment of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947. The introductory meeting of the Society was held at Mont Pèlerin in Switzerland April 1-10, 1947. Its membership includes classical liberals; scholars, senior government officials and journalists, who oppose socialism. Its objective ("A Short History of the Mont Pèlerin Society") is solely, by facilitating the exchange of views among minds inspired by certain ideals and broad conceptions held in common, to contribute to the preservation and improvement of the free society and to study the workings, virtues, and defects of market-oriented economic systems ("The Mont Pèlerin Society"). Hayek served as the inaugural president of the Society from 1947 to 1961. After his presidential tenure, the office was limited to a term of two years. Friedman served as president from 1970 to 1972; Stigler was president from 1976 to 1978. In all, eight economists since 1969 ("Notable Members: Nobel Prize Winners") who were awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences were affiliated with the Society.

Hayek worked with Friedman to support the Intercollegiate Studies Institute (formerly named, Intercollegiate Society of Individuals); an organization committed to libertarian ideas. Hayek was keenly involved founding the Institute of Economic Affairs, a libertarian and free-market think thank admired by Margaret Thatcher.

He left the University of Chicago in 1962 for a professorship at the University of Freiberg from which he retired in 1968. While at Freiburg, Hayek began writing *Law, Legislation and Liberty* [Volume I: *Rules and Order,* 1973; Volume II: *The Mirage of Social Justice,* 1976; Volume III: *The Political Order of a Free People,* 1979]. Upon his retirement, Hayek continued his work on the book as a visiting professor the following year at the University of California at Los Angeles while he taught a graduate seminar related to the book. Hayek also delivered a seminar on the philosophy of social science in which he addressed "Degrees of Explanation" (1955) and "The Theory of Complex Phenomena" (1964). He completed preliminary drafts of the book by 1970 and then, after editing the drafts, the book was published subsequently in three volumes. He accepted an honorary professorship appointment in 1969 which he held until 1977 at the University of Salzburg to continue his scholarly research. He was critical of the support he received from Salzburg, explaining that the small economics department and inadequate library facilities were constraints. The Hayek Library at the University of Salzburg was named in his honor and contains his collection which he donated to the Faculty of Law.

Shortly before Hayek's Nobel was announced, Edwin G. Dolan (Ph.D., Yale University, 1969) of Dartmouth College organized the South Royalton Conference, which contributed greatly to the resurgence of interest in the Austrian School of economic thought. Papers were presented by Dolan; Murray

N. Rothbard (Ph.D., Columbia University, 1956) of Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute, who later taught at the University of Nevada at Las Vegas and was affiliated with the Ludwig von Mises Institute, editing the *Review of Austrian Economics*; Israel M. Kirzner (Ph.D., New York University, 1957) of New York University; Ludwig M. Lachmann (Ph.D., University of Berlin, 1933) of the University of the Witwatersrand; Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr. (Ph.D., University of California at Los Angeles, 1973) of Iowa State University, and later vice president and director of policy analysis at Citigroup, vice president and economic adviser at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, staff director of the Meltzer Commission on international financial institutions, also holding faculty positions at the University of California at Santa Barbara and New York University; and Sudha R. Shenoy (Ph.D., University of Newcastle, 2001), lecturer in economics at the University of Newcastle in Australia. Each of the presenters had studied in some capacity under Hayek or Ludwig von Mises. Milton Friedman (Economic Sciences Laureate, 1976) presented the keynote address and Dolan edited the conference volume, *The Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics*, 1976.

Ebenstein (*Friedrich Hayek: A Biography,* 2001) wrote that Hayek receiving the economic sciences award was "the great rejuvenating event in his life." Early in his career, Hayek contributed important work on business cycles. He later critiqued what he believed to be the deficiencies in a nation's economy directed by central planning. He posited that a decentralized national economy with free competition and pricing was the superior economic model.

Hayek became involved with the British government's economic policy deliberations in 1975. Margaret Thatcher, elected as Prime Minister during February of that year, referred to Hayek's book, *The Constitution of Liberty* (1960), when she visited the Conservative Research Department during the summer. The Conservative Research Department, a unit of the United Kingdom's Conservative Party, operates in Westminster as a training facility for leading party members. In 1977, Hayek ("Letters to the Editor: Liberal pact with Labour"), who was adamantly against public ownership of the means of production and distribution, identified his displeasure with the Lib-Lab pact, a working arrangement between two British political parties (Liberal Party and Labour Party), in a letter to the editor of the newspaper, *The Times* (of London). In 1978, Hayek ("Letters to the Editor: The dangers to personal liberty") disputed Liberal Party leader David Steel's contention that government intervention was a required necessity to achieve social justice and an equitable distribution of wealth and power. Hayek's influence extended to President Ronald Regan in the United States and several Central European leaders during the 1980s.

Hayek is recognized for his scholarly efforts and contributions in the study and understanding of business cycles, dispersed knowledge, price signals and spontaneous order. His thinking was that business cycles, capital theory and monetary theory were interconnected. He pursued his scholarly investigations into business cycles during the late 1920s while serving as the director of the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research. The outcome of his effort to understand the concept resulted in the publication of *Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle* (1929). His view was that the business cycle is influenced by monetary causes. He disagreed with theorists who posited that the aggregate money supply and the average price level were connected. Thus, in the preface of his book, he railed against individuals, known as price stabilizers, who believed maintaining stable prices would result in the continuation of the boom phase of the business cycle (p. 5). Hayek considered the bust (contraction) phase of the business cycle as the legacy of the boom (expansion) phase. His view was that the boom phase continued until maladjustments (his word) in the production structure created the bust phase. He opposed government deficit expansion and a policy of monetary expansion. He denounced the United States Federal Reserve's efforts to expand credit to stabilize prices during the late 1920s as well as to use the tool to end the depression during the early 1930s.

His book, *Prices and Production,* 1931, numerous reprintings) reflected his further developed thinking of the synthesis that he argued existed between the business cycle as described by Mises and the capital theory of Böhm-Bawerk. Hayek, in 1929, introduced this synthesis in his earlier work, "The Paradox of Saving". The book reflected his thinking that when central banks increase the money supply, interest rates are lowered, and the credit extended to business interests is artificially less expensive. The result is that riskier investment decisions are made that ordinarily would not be made if available credit was more expensive to

the recipients. Consequently, the expansionary phase of the business cycle is fueled but ultimately will not be supported sufficiently to continue. The expansion phase leads inevitably to the contraction phase of the business cycle.

His refutation of the Anglo-American version of the quantity theory of money was done, in part, to embrace a complete statement of what has become known as Austrian business cycle theory. The quantity theory of money recognizes that both the money supply and price level are directly proportional. Hayek believed the quantity theory was accurate when explaining a comparatively static environment but failed to account for the real effects of relative price changes. His reasoning was that the theory offered the comparatively static approach that failed to consider adjustment problems, and it emphasized the average price level with the resulting disregard for other possible explanations. His thinking was counter to John Stuart Mill's view that monetary supply impacted nominal prices (a good's value in terms of money) only and not relative, or real, prices (a good's value in relation to another good). Hayek reasoned that real prices would be impacted and, thus, the resultant price levels would have real effects and be reflected in the business cycle.

The Austrian view, based on the work of Mises (*Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel*, 1912 [1981]) and Hayek among other economists, contends that business cycles come about due to central banks generating artificially low interest rates which, in turn, encourages excessive growth of bank credit. Lending institutions that experience an easing of fractional reserve banking requirements are permitted to loan a higher percentage of their deposits. When this circumstance occurs over a prolonged period the result is an increase in credit creation. The combination of the central bank's effort to maintain unreasonably low interest rates and the commercial banks fractional reserve easing for lending leads to distorted price signals and increased borrowing. This situation causes increased capital spending funded by the increased availability of bank credit. The resultant investments are not necessarily the best resource allocations for society. The correction transforms the boom (expansion) phase of the business cycle into the bust (contraction) phase. When this condition occurs, the money supply experiences either a slower rate of growth or is reduced. The recession that ensues imposes a stricter discipline that encourages a more effective and efficient allocation of resources.

Dispersed knowledge is the recognition that the individual charged with the full authority of making a final decision regarding a complex issue does not possess all the relevant and accurate information concerning the issue at hand. Hayek presented the concept of dispersed knowledge, "The Use of Knowledge in Society", (1945) and *The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism*, (1988), noting that the totality of information is fragmented among many sources. This condition is especially true in the contexts of a dynamic environment and a rapidly evolving organization. Dispersed knowledge is the recognition that information asymmetry exists.

Hayek discussed his ideas regarding dispersed knowledge in the context of the political philosophy of socialism and central planning. The government official in a socialist regime lacks all relevant information including knowledge of an initial set of preferences, production capabilities and end-user demand to develop a rigid production plan for goods. Thus, the official's decisions regarding factory output can, in many cases, led to purchase price distortions and either supply overages or shortages. In reality, all relevant knowledge is not concentrated but rather dispersed amongst many individuals. The government official with the final decision-making authority receives both incomplete and contradictory information from numerous sources to base the decision upon. As a result, the societal attempt to allocate resources effectively and efficiently is constrained not only by the lack of complete knowledge for forecasting supply and demand of particular goods and services but also by the knowledge deficiency in determining the best use of resources to produce the optimum mix of goods and services for the society. His argument is that central planning that directs an economy is by definition deficient in its attempt to serve society with one national plan. The alternative to the central planning approach is one of decentralized planning which is commonly considered to be capitalistic in nature relying on competition among producers and consumers. Hayek is reinforcing Adam Smith's view that the "invisible hand" is the superior approach for a complex and evolv-

ing economy to achieve the optimal relationship among its components, i.e., supply, demand and prices, to serve the society.

Hayek ("The Use of Knowledge in Society", 1945) posited that given the prevailing condition of dispersed knowledge, the pricing for goods and services is at the nexus for coordinating the peoples' separate actions. The price system fosters the production and consumption of goods and services resulting in the efficient allocation of a society's resources. It is this price system that directs the factors of production and influences the distribution channels in the marketplace. Socialist governments or regulated economies attempt to fix or control the price system by resorting to a central planning process administered by a government agency. The government agency executes decisions regarding resource allocations, production levels for goods and capacity levels for providing services. Alternatively, the price system can be free of government intervention as is common in competitive or capitalist economies whereby prices continually adjust or float based on the interaction of numerous producers and consumers who are unrestricted by government regulations. In other words, in a regulated economy decisions made by government bureaucrats facilitate economic coordination; in a competitive economy price signals found in the marketplace facilitate economic coordination.

Hayek extended understanding of the concept of spontaneous order. His position was that the price system, absent government intervention, developed spontaneously as a result of market forces manifested by the cooperative interaction of many individuals. Adam Ferguson (*An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, 1767 [1782]), a Scottish philosopher, declared that the price system was "the result of human action but not of human design."

The doctrine of spontaneous order may be defined as a self-ordering system whereby the components are arranged in an ethically neutral process that when participants observe behavioral rules, outcomes may arise regardless of any one actor's intentions. An intelligent administrator in a spontaneously ordered system makes decisions restricted to process issues and does not address outcome issues. The firm is modeled as a design order, not as a spontaneous or emergent order. Firms must operate in, and should be designed to operate in, spontaneously evolving orders, particularly the economy and the legal-institutional environments. For example, bank regulation differs from one country to the next. This reality has obvious implications for the locus of control and functions allowed or designated for various employees and administrators within the bank's hierarchy. The bank will be designed to operate in its environment. Perhaps less obviously, these differences in function should tend to influence or affect how the bank is organized.

Spontaneous order is found in complex systems whereby constituent members have freedom of action provided they observe the general rules related to process. A review of the writings of von Mises, Hayek and their adherents indicates that general rules are developed because of coincidence and members' interactions responding to endogenous and exogenous influences while pursuing their individual objectives. This situation represents a dynamic milieu in that complex systems operate in an imperfect world (where agents are imperfectly informed and lack omniscience and prescience), thus resulting in an organic and gradual evolutionary change. Given the reality of human design fallibility, an administrator's effort to design or intensively manage a complex system in terms of effectiveness and efficiency is delusional.

In the early 1980s, Hayek began writing what would be his final book, a critique of socialism. Because his health was deteriorating, another scholar, philosopher William W. Bartley III, helped edit the ultimate volume, *The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism,* 1988. Hayek criticized the political philosophy of socialism not only on the grounds that its theories could not withstand a logical analysis but also that the premises from which the theories were developed were incorrect. Hayek argued that private property was central to the development of civilizations. Private property leads to the buying and selling of goods which is the basis for competition and the current capitalist system. He was vehement in his critique of the socialist form of government with its emphasis on purposeful design directed at producing the most efficient economy.

Hayek has been recognized with numerous awards, honors and invited and elected memberships in prestigious intellectual organizations for his extensive scholarly work. A selected list of the tributes he received, both during his lifetime and posthumously, can be found at Appendix A. His extensive scholarly

output in terms of books, articles and essays are far too numerous to provide a complete list. A selected list of publications is presented at Appendix B.

REFERENCES

A Short History of the Mont Pèlerin Society, About MPS. The Mont Pèlerin Society. https://www.montpelerin.org/about-mps/

Böhm-Bawerk, Eugen von (various dates). *Capital and Interest*. London: Macmillan. Tr. William Smart (1890).
Volume 1: *A Critical History of Economic Theory* (1884)
Volume 2: *Positive Theory of Capital* (1889)
Volume 3: *Further Essays on Capital and Interest* (1921) [Appendices to the third edition of the second volume (1909-1912) appeared as a separate third volume.]

Dolan, Edwin G. (ed.) 1976. *The Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics*. Kansas City: Sheed and Ward. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/104.

Ebenstein, Alan. 2001. *Friedrich Hayek: A Biography*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Trade.

Ferguson, Adam 1767 [1782]. *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*. London: T. Cadell.

Friedrich von Hayek Biographical. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1974. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1974/hayek/biographical/

Friedrich von Hayek, Facts. The Nobel Prize: The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1974. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1974/hayek/facts/.

Hayek, Friedrich A. 1929a. *Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle*. London: Jonathan Cape. [Augustus M. Kelley, Publishing, New Issue edition (1966).]

_____. 1929b. The 'Paradox' of Savings. *Economica*. 32:125-169.

_____. 1931. *Prices and Production*. Reprinted January 1932 Second edition (revised and enlarged) 1935 Reprinted 1941, 1946, 1949, 1951, 1957, 1960 and 1967. Published in the U.S.A. by Augustus M. Kelly, Publishing: New York. Library of Congress Catalogue Number 67-19586.

_____. 1944. *The Road to Serfdom*. London: Routledge Press. [University of Chicago Press.]

_____. 1945. The Use of Knowledge in Society. *The American Economic Review*. 35(4):519-530.

_____. 1955. Degrees of Explanation. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*. VI(23):209-225.

_____. 1960. *The Constitution of Liberty*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

_____. 1964. The Theory of Complex Phenomena. In: Michael Martin and Lee C. McIntyre (eds.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science*. Chapter 4: 55-70. Cambridge, MA: A Bradford Book, The MIT Press.

_____. 1973. *Law, Legislation, and Liberty*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Volume I. *Rules and Order*, 1973.
- Volume II. *The Mirage of Social Justice*, 1976.
- Volume III. *The Political Order of a Free People*, 1979.

_____. 1977. Letters to the Editor: Liberal pact with Labour. *The Times*. (March 31), 15.

_____. 1978. Letters to the Editor: The dangers to personal liberty. *The Times* (July 11), 15.

_____. 1988. *The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism*. (*Collected Works of Friedrich August Hayek*). W. W. Bartley III (ed.). London: Routledge.

Jevons, William Stanley. 1871 [1888]. *The Theory of Political Economy*. London: Macmillan. 3rd edition.

McNair, Malcolm Perrine and Richard Stockton Meriam. 1941. *Problems in business economics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Menger, Carl. 1871 [1981]. *Principles of Economics*. Tr J. Dingwall and B. F. Hoselitz, with an introduction by Friedrich A. Hayek. New York: New York University Press.

Mises, Ludwig Heinrich Edler von. 1912. *Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel*. [English translation: *The Theory of Money and Credit*]. 3rd English edition, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, (1981).

_____. 1922 [1936]. *Die Gemeinwirtschaft: Untersuchungen über den Sozialismus*. Jena: Gustav Fischer Verlag. [English translation, *Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis*. London: Jonathan Cape].

Notable Members: Nobel Prize Winners. The Mont Pèlerin Society. https://www.montpelerin.org/notable-members/.

The Mont Pèlerin Society. https://www.montpelerin.org/statement-of-aims/.

Wieser, Friedrich von 1889 [1893]. *Der Natürliche Werth* (English translation: *Natural Value*). Christian A. Malloch, translator, William Smart, editor.

_____. 1914 [1927]. *Theorie der gesellschaftlichen Wirtschaft* (English translation: *Social* Economics). A. Ford Hinrichs, translator, preface by Wesley Clair Mitchell.

APPENDIX A

AWARDS, HONORS AND MEMBERSHIPS

- Honored, The Hayek Society, London School of Economics
- Honored, Auditorium named in his honor, Cato Institute
- Distinguished Senior Fellow, Cato Institute.
- Honored, auditorium names in his honor, Universidad Francisco Marroquín (Guatemala), School of Economics
- Honored, Hayek Fund for Scholars, Institute for Humane Studies
- Honored, Annual Lecture at the Austrian Scholars Conference named in his honor, The Ludwig von Mises Institute
- Honored, Economics essay award named in his honor, George Mason University
- Honored, Philosophy, politics and economics program of study named in his honor, The Mercatus Center, George Mason University
- Honored, Annual lecture in his honor *Journal of Law and Liberty*, New York University
- Founder and President (1947-1961), Quadrennial economics essay contest named in his honor, The Mont Pèlerin Society
- Honorary degree, Rikkyo University
- Honorary degree, University of Vienna
- Honorary degree, University of Salzburg
- Member, Philadelphia Society.
- Honored, The Hayek Fund (investment portfolio) named in his honor
- Fellow (1944), British Academy.
- Fellow (1947), Econometric Society
- Awarded (1954), Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship
- Awarded (1974), Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel
- Awarded (1974), Austrian Decoration for Science and Art
- Awarded (1977), Pour le Mérite for Science and Art (Germany)
- Awarded (1983), Honorary Ring of Vienna
- Honored (1983), The Oxford Hayek Society named in his honor Honorary Dean (1984), WHU-Otto Beisheim School of Management
- Awarded (1984), Companion of Honour (United Kingdom)
- Honored (1984), (Inaugural) Recipient, Hanns Martin Schleyer Foundation Prize
- Awarded (1990), Grand Gold Medal with Star for Services to the Republic of Austria
- Awarded (1991) Presidential Medal of Freedom (United States)
- Honored (1994), F A Hayek Scholarship in Economics or Political Science, University of Canterbury
- Honored (2011), Article, "The Use of Knowledge in Society", selected in top twenty articles published by *The American Economic Review* during its first 100 years

APPENDIX B

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS

Hayek, Friedrich A. 1929. *Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle*. London: Jonathan Cape. [Augustus M. Kelley, Publishing, New Issue edition (1966).]

_____. 1929. The 'Paradox' of Savings. *Economica*. 32:125-169.

_____. 1931. *Prices and Production*. Reprinted January 1932. Second edition (revised and enlarged) 1935 Reprinted 1941, 1946, 1949, 1951, 1957, 1960 and 1967 Published in the U.S.A. by Augustus M. Kelly, Publishing: New York. Library of Congress Catalogue Number 67-19586.

_____. 1931 [1985]. Richard Cantillon. *Journal of Libertarian Studies*. 7(2):217-247. (Translated by Micheál Ó Súilleabháin.)

_____. 1931. Reflections on the Pure Theory of Money of Mr. J. M. Keynes. *Economica* 11(33):207-295.

_____. 1932. Reflections on the Pure Theory of Money of Mr. J. M. Keynes (continued). *Economica*. 12(35):22-44.

_____. 1936. The Mythology of Capital. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 50(2):199-228.

_____. 1937 [1989]. *Monetary nationalism and international stability*. Fairfield: Augustus M. Kelley.

_____. 1937. Investment That Raises the Demand for Capital. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*. 19(4):174-177.

_____. 1937. Economics and Knowledge. *Economica*. 4:33-54. [Reprinted in James M. Buchanan and G. F. Thirlby (1973) (eds.), *L.S.E. Essays on Cost*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

_____. 1939. Price Expectations, Monetary Disturbances, and Malinvestments. In: Hayek, *Profits, Interest, and Investment: and Other Essays on the Theory of Industrial Fluctuations*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

_____. 1939. The Paradox of Saving. In: Hayek, *Profits, Interest, and Investment: and Other Essays on the Theory of Industrial Fluctuations*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

_____. *The Road to Serfdom*. London: Routledge Press. [University of Chicago Press.]

_____. 1945. The Use of Knowledge in Society. *American Economic Review*. 35(4):519-530.

_____. 1948. *Individualism and Economic Order*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

_____. 1952. *The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason*. Glencoe: Free Press.

_____. 1955. Degrees of Explanation. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*. VI(23):209-225.

_____. 1960. *The Constitution of Liberty*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

_____. 1964. The Theory of Complex Phenomena. In: Michael Martin and Lee C. McIntyre (eds.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science*. Chapter 4, 55-70. Cambridge, MA: A. Bradford Book, The MIT Press.

_____. 1973. *Law, Legislation, and Liberty*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Volume I. *Rules and Order*, 1973.
- Volume II. *The Mirage of Social Justice*, 1976.
- Volume III. *The Political Order of a Free People*, 1979.

_____. 1976. *Denationalization of Money*. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.

_____. 1977. Foreword. *Economics as a Coordination Problem: The Contributions of Friedrich A. Hayek*. Gerald P. O'Driscoll Jr. Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews, and McMeel.

_____. 1977. Letters to the Editor: Liberal pact with Labour. *The Times* (March 31), 15.

_____. 1978. Letters to the Editor: The dangers to personal liberty. *The Times* (July 11), 15.

_____. 1988. *The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek*. W. W. Bartley III (ed.). London: Routledge.

- *The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism.*
- *The Road to Serfdom: The Definitive Edition.*
- *The Trend of Economic Thinking: Essays on Political Economists and Economic History*
- *Studies on the Abuse and Decline of Reason: Text and Documents*
- *The Fortunes of Liberalism: Essays on Austrian Economics and the Ideal of Freedom.*
- *Good Money, Part 1. The New World.*
- *Good Money, Part 2. The Standard*
- *Business Cycles: Part I.*
- *Business Cycles: Part II.*
- *Contra Keynes And Cambridge: Essays, Correspondence.*
- *Socialism and War: Essays, Documents, Reviews.*
- *Capital and Interest.*
- *The Pure Theory of Capital.*
- *The Sensory Order and Other Writings on the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology.*
- *The Market and Other Orders.*
- *Hayek on Mill: The Mill-Taylor Friendship and Related Writings.*
- *The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition.*

James McGill Buchanan Jr.: An Economist Who Advocated for Public Choice

GARY A. LOMBARDO

Courtesy of the Atlas Network

The Nobel Foundation[1] announced, in 1986, that James McGill Buchanan Jr. was the recipient of The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. According to "James M. Buchanan Jr.—Facts", the Nobel Foundation recognized his scholarly pursuits as, "Contributions to the theory of political decision-making and public economics." The Foundation identified his prize motivation in terms of "his development of the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory of economic and political decision-making."

Haskew (2018) reported that James McGill Buchanan Jr. was born on October 3, 1919, in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, United States of America. He died on January 9, 2013, in Blacksburg, Virginia, United States of America. His grandfather, John Price Buchanan, according to Lee (2018), was an influential person in Tennessee who was a continuing delegate for an extended period to the Democratic state conventions. He was elected as a representative of Rutherford County for two terms (1887-1891) to the Tennessee General Assembly. In 1888, John Buchanan served as the first president of the Tennessee Famers' Alliance. Subsequently, he became the first president of the Tennessee Farmers' and Laborers' Union upon the joining of the Agricultural Wheel with the Farmers' Alliance in 1899. He then served as the governor of Tennessee from 1891 to 1893. James Buchanan, the future economic sciences laureate, pursued his undergraduate studies at Middle Tennessee State Teachers College (renamed in 1965 as Middle Tennessee State University) during the day while living at home and working on the family farm during the evening milking cows and accomplishing his chores. He completed his Bachelor of Arts degree in 1940 earning honors in English, literature, mathematics and social sciences.

Buchanan chose to continue his formal education rather than accepting a position in banking. He enrolled at the University of Tennessee earning his Master of Science degree in economics in 1941. He was drafted into the Armed Services and after completing a Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) program was commissioned and eventually served as a naval officer on the staff of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz at the Pacific Fleet Headquarters. Nimitz served as fleet admiral, the last individual to do so, commanding all Allied land, sea and air forces in the Pacific theater during World War II. Admiral Nimitz subsequently served as the Chief of Naval Operations from 1945 to 1947. Buchanan was a self-acknowledged socialist during his youth and he considered that during his military service he observed discriminatory practices occurring toward individuals who were not part of the establishment. Individuals from the

southern and western regions of the United States were not afforded opportunities granted to those individuals from the northeast region. His views registered more as anti-big business rather than anti-government oriented. Buchanan, upon his discharge from active military service, chose to continue his formal education by enrolling at the University of Chicago to pursue his doctoral studies. Unbeknownst to Buchanan at the time of his application to the University of Chicago, the prevailing philosophy in the economics program was market oriented and definitely, and perhaps defiantly, not supportive of the socialist perspective.

Professor Frank Knight directed Buchanan's doctoral studies and influenced his evolving perspective from a socialist to a market orientation. Knight (Ph.D., Cornell University, 1916) was a revered economist and educator who worked with Milton Friedman (Economic Sciences Laureate, 1976) and George Stigler (Economic Sciences Laureate, 1982) to assist Friedrich August von Hayek (Economic Sciences Laureate, 1974) in the establishment of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947. He promoted classical liberal thought contributing to the advancement of economic theory and social philosophy. Buchanan was introduced to Knut Wicksell's scholarly research in general and, specifically, to his article, (1896 [1958]), "Ein neues Prinzip der gerechten Besteuerung" (English translation: "A New Principle of Just Taxation"), which Buchanan read in German and translated into English. In the article, Wicksell argued that governmental expenditures and tax policy can only be justified if approved unanimously. This view was inconsistent with mainstream economic thinking that offered the perspective that a taxpayer's benefits need not be commensurate with the taxes paid. Wicksell's orientation would eventually serve as a basis for Buchanan's development of public choice theory. Buchanan was intellectually influenced also by Hayek and Ludwig von Mises; both scholars are identified as major philosophical forces in the Austrian School of economic thought. Hayek was to accept an appointment at the University of Chicago in 1950, after Buchanan's departure, and continued at the institution until 1962. Hayek and Mises were influenced by John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) who offered the framework for the classical liberalism philosophy embedded in the market orientation of the Austrian School. Mill, a British philosopher and political economist, was influential in the development of the concept of classical liberalism. Classical liberalism is a particular political view that values civil liberties, emphasizing economic freedom within the rule of law. Mill (1848 [1909]) addressed international trade issues in his publication, *Principles of Political Economy,* specifically in Book III: "Exchange," Chapter XVII. Mill advanced the work of David Ricardo and proposed that economic crises occurred from time to time introducing the concept of periodicity to the existing understanding of the business cycle. Buchanan authored his thesis, "Fiscal Equity in a Federal State," presenting a perspective that was aligned with Knight's views. Buchanan completed his doctoral studies in 1948.

Buchanan accepted faculty appointments at the University of Tennessee, from 1948 to 1951, and Florida State University, from 1951 to 1955. According to "Nobel Laureates", during 1955 to 1956, Buchanan was a Fulbright Scholar in Italy. He then accepted an appointment at the Department of Economics, University of Virginia commencing in 1956. He served as a professor and department chair while establishing the Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy during 1957. The Virginia School of political economy emerged from the Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy at the University of Virgina. The Virginia School, so called because of the work of Buchanan and others at the University of Virginia, Virginia Tech and George Mason University, gained identity during the post-World War II era with a scholarly emphasis on public choice theory, constitutional economics and the dual examination of law and economics.

"Nobel Laureates" reported that Buchanan accepted a second Fulbright appointment as a scholar to the United Kingdom from 1961 to 1962. Tension arose as the central administration of the University of Virginia thought his scholarly orientation was outside the economic mainstream. Commencing in 1968, he spent one year at the University of California, Los Angeles prior to accepting an appointment to the faculty of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in 1969. The academic institution is commonly known as Virginia Tech. At Virginia Tech, he co-founded the Center for Study of Public Choice, becoming its first director and holding the title Distinguished Professor of Economics. Buchanan came into conflict

with Daniel Orr who led the economics department. During his time at Virginia Tech from 1978 to 1989, Orr (Ph.D., Princeton University) recruited well respected economists to develop the department.

The Center for Study of Public Choice was relocated when Buchanan accepted a professorship at George Mason University in 1983. "About the Center" communicated that The Center, "a unique research institution at George Mason University, provides a single location where eminent scholars conduct innovative research, publish their findings and conclusions in a variety of print and electronic media and teach the science of public choice." Buchanan ultimately retired from George Mason University and was granted emeritus status in 1999. He held the title Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Economics. He enjoyed a long tenure as the Advisory General Director, Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University until his retirement. Buchanan also held the title University Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Economics and Philosophy at Virginia Tech.

From the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, Buchanan conducted extensive research in the field of public choice theory for which he is widely known. His scholarly investigations during this time also examined a series of related topics in the areas of the benefit principle, club good, logrolling, which is presented in his co-authored book, *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy* (Buchanan and Tullock 1962), and the Samaritan's dilemma. The benefit principle is a concept that is derived from the study of public finance and specifically from the theory of taxation. The benefit principle may be generally unimplementable. The principle recognizes that the government's resource allocation decisions, i.e., how the public agency spends its tax revenues, should be consistent with the citizens' preferences. Since citizens typically are unwilling to pay for a public service, unless they are excluded from the service benefit, the implementation of the benefit principle is not universal. However, the benefit principle is implemented for various government services. The police and fire services offered by cities are illustrative contexts for understanding the benefit principle. These services do not exclude a city's residents from receiving the associated benefits even if some residents do not pay for the police and fire departments' operations. In contrast, highway construction financed exclusively by tolls which are essentially user fees would be an implementable example of the benefit principle. Other contexts in which the benefit principle may be implemented also involve the exclusive use of users' fees. Examples may include vehicular fuel taxes, United States National Parks (if not partially funded by federal tax dollar allocations), state colleges and universities (if not partially funded by state tax dollar allocations) and municipal public transportation (if not partially funded by municipal tax dollar allocations).

The history of the benefit principle can be traced to two noted economists of the Stockholm School of economic thought. Knut Wicksell and Erik Lindahl. Wicksell formulated the benefit principle predicated on a distribution process that provides a just, or morally right and fair, income for all individuals and households. He first wrote in German about the concept in his 1896 doctoral dissertation which was later translated to English by Buchanan and published as, Wicksell (1896 [1958]) "A New Principle of Just Taxation." Wicksell identified the benefit principle as "the well-known principle of equality between Value and Countervalue." Johan Gustaf Knut Wicksell (Ph.D., Uppsala University,[2] 1885) was educated as a mathematician and was affiliated with the Stockholm School of economic thought. His scholarly research in the fields of monetarism and macroeconomics influenced both the Keynesian and Austrian perspectives.

Lindahl, Paul Anthony Samuelson (Economic Sciences Laureate, 1970), Richard Musgrave and James Buchanan conducted research to extend knowledge regarding the benefit principle concept. Lindahl wrote his doctoral thesis, subsequently published as an article, "Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuering" (English translation: Lindahl (1919 [1958]) "Just Taxation: A Positive Solution"), under the guidance of Wicksell calling for a public policy whereby individual taxpayers are assessed taxes for the receipt of a public good according to the marginal benefit received. Consequently, all taxpayers enjoy equal benefits from receipt of a particular public good; however, they experience different costs associated with the public good. His concept became known as the Lindahl tax. Erik Robert Lindahl (Ph.D., University of Lund, 1919), a Swedish economist and member of the Stockholm School of economic thought, conducted scholarly research on financing public goods. He was a professor of economics at Uppsala University (1942-1958), president of the

International Economic Association (1956-1959), and president of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (elected in 1943).

Samuelson (1954) wrote about public goods crediting the work of Wicksell, Lindahl and Musgrave for delving into the theory of optimal public expenditure and not being distracted on the theory of taxation. He states that he had learned from Musgrave's previously published and unpublished research. He offers his assumption of two categories of goods; that is "ordinary private consumption goods" and "collective consumption goods." Samuelson developed an empirical analysis to identify the optimal conditions for the goods. He emphasized that each individual experiences "different distributions of relative welfare along the utility frontier." Musgrave (1956/1957) distinguishes among three major budget functions. They are: "(1) the function of providing for the satisfaction of public wants; (2) the function of providing for adjustments in the distribution of income; and (3) the function of contributing to stabilization." Richard Abel Musgrave (Ph.D., Harvard University, 1937) served as a research economist for the (United States) Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System eventually returning to Harvard University accepting an appointment in 1965 to join the faculty. In 1969, he was named the H. H. Burbank professor of Political Economy, faculty of Arts and Sciences and the Law School. A well-respected scholar and writer, he served as the editor of the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* from 1969 to 1975.

Buchanan investigated the concept of a club good. Club goods are a category of goods and services that are excludable and non-rivalrous. In this context, excludability is associated with the practice of limiting access to a good or service unless a monetary fee is paid. Non-rivalrous connotates that additional users consuming the good or service do not result in cost increases for the provider. Club goods, by virtue of the imposed conditions, possess an artificial scarcity. As the imposed conditions are relaxed enabling an increase in the number of users, congestion may arise. The non-rivalry condition exists for club goods until an unsatisfactory congestion level arises at which time the user assesses that the benefit is diminished, and the monetary value of the imposed fee is reduced. Club goods are differentiated from other types of goods, i.e., common, private and public goods, in terms of excludability and rivalry.

Club Goods

	Excludable Goods	Non-Excludable Goods
Rival Goods	Private Good	Common Good
Non-Rival Goods	Club Good	Public Good

Source: Prepared by Gary A. Lombardo based on a review of the available literature.

Club goods are numerous in number; a few examples are cable television services, country club memberships, services offered to fraternal club members and the European Union. Examples of private goods are items personally purchased by individuals including food, clothing, computers and cars. Common goods, typically over-consumed without regard for the long-term implications, are forests, fish in international waters and coal. Examples of public goods include police and fire protection services, national defense and municipal and national parks.

Samuelson (1954, 1955) distinguished between goods and services that were either purely private or purely public. Buchanan called for the need for an overarching general theory addressing the gamut of ownership-consumption states. He identified the concept of club goods as one of the essential links between purely private goods (individual goods) and purely public goods (collective goods). His purpose was to develop a general theory of clubs which he labeled consumption ownership-membership arrangements and researched club goods in terms of the size, or membership, variable. Buchanan was determined to identify the optimal membership, i.e., what he expressed as the optimal sharing arrangement, which he framed as the "size of the most desirable cost and consumption sharing arrangement." He used an empirical process

to arrive at his determination. By way of explanation, Buchanan (1965) provided an illustrative example using a swimming pool as a club arrangement to present his reasoning. Buchanan predicated his work on the arrangement when exclusion is possible.

Logrolling may be defined formally as a *quid pro quo* (English translation: something for something) arrangement commonly understood to be the act of trading favors whereby reciprocity occurs as one individual does a particular deed for a second person in exchange for that second person doing a particular deed for the first individual. The exchange relationship may have either positive or negative attributes depending on the situation at hand. However, each party involved in a logrolling event must assess that those benefits will be accrued. An early, however an extremely significant, example of the concept in the United States took place during a dinner hosted by Thomas Jefferson (Secretary of State) and attended by Alexander Hamilton (Secretary of the Treasury) and James Madison (Representative of Virginia). Congress had debated two issues (the location of the seat of the national government and the federal assumption of the states' Revolutionary War debts) for an extended period without reaching an agreement. Northern Congressional members were in favor of the assumption of Revolutionary War debt. Southern Congressional members were opposed to the assumption of the debt. Madison, opposed to the assumption of state debt, agreed not only to support legislation to do so but also convinced other Southern members of Congress to support such legislation in return for the country's capital to be located on the Potomac River. Kratz (2015) wrote that the resultant legislation (the capital's location in July and the assumption of debt in August), a classic *quid pro quo* event, has become known as the "Compromise of 1790."

Tullock wrote about the two general approaches to develop logrolling models. One approach being the development of a model essentially spatial in nature describing preferences initially along a one-dimensional continuum as presented by Harold Hotelling (1929), Duncan Black (1948) and Anthony Downs (1957). This approach was later presented in a multidimensional context by Black (1958) and Otto Davis and Melvin J. Hinich (1966), among other collaborative efforts. The second approach was the model presented by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) describing the phenomenon of logrolling. Buchanan and Tullock analyzed decision making in the public arena including the concept of logrolling and the exchange of considerations. The two scholars were critical of majority voting procedures introducing relative unanimity rules consistent with Knut Wicksell's earlier work. They emphasized that politics involves an exchange relationship exhibited during the voting process. Trading votes is a fundamental aspect of a process that unfolds as one individual gives his vote on an issue considered less important to gain a vote on an issue considered more important. The work of Buchanan and Tullock has influenced subsequent scholarly investigations into the political realm. Tullock (1970) continued to examine the concept and wrote about his effort to develop a logrolling model using a spatial approach that would reconcile each previous approach.

The Samaritan's dilemma is a concept that recognizes that two distinct outcomes are possible when charity is provided: either the recipient of charity will react by improving the individual's current condition or the recipient will develop a reliance on charity as a way of life. Buchanan (1975) presents the situation in terms of a rule of conduct when individuals offer charity to assist people in need. His interest in the subject emphasized economic efficiency considerations. The offering of charity may be harmful to the recipient in the long-term if a reliance on the aid develops. Furthermore, charity may be harmful also to society in the long term. As a result of satisfying a short-term need a long-term problem may occur as individuals become dependent on the charitable offering and fail to develop self-reliance to meet their needs.

The Samaritan's dilemma offers implications for public policy as governments attempt to assist the less fortunate individuals in society with structured safety net programs. These safety net programs provide food, shelter, medical care and cash among other charitable offerings. The economic implications are extensive. Not only are individual members of society affected by charitable offers, but so are sectors of the national economy. For example, many countries offer some type of crop subsidies to the agricultural sectors of their national economies. In some cases, safety net programs for a particular service are also offered to all society members. An example would be government provided medical care. Additionally, governments may provide subsidies, which may be considered as charity, for goods and services for all societal members. This

condition, found frequently in communist or socialist regimes, typically results in the individuals' diminished ability to be self-reliant, eventually becoming dependent on governmental aid programs.

Public choice theory originated during the 1950s from research conducted about taxation and government expenditures. According to "James M. Buchanan Jr. - Prize Lecture", Buchanan credits Wicksell "as the most important precursor of modern public-choice theory." The recognition of the theory increased dramatically when Buchanan was awarded the economic sciences prize. Fundamentally, economists considered that individuals are guided by self-interest when interacting in commercial markets. That same principle of self-interest served as the basis for research into the area of public decisions made by government officials. Public choice theory applies various economic principles using a framework to analyze political decisions. As a result, scholarly research represents a departure from the traditional, conventional perspective that politicians consider their constituents' self-interests paramount for their voting decisions. The politicians substitute their self-interest for the self-interest of the citizens they represent as the determining factor when casting votes. In other words, the politicians' personal benefits tip the scale as the basis for their voting behavior. The politicians' decision making, as a result, is viewed more critically rather than as an idealistic venture to help society.

Buchanan's collaborative scholarly work with Gordon Tullock culminated in the publication of *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy* (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) which launched the public choice theory field of economics. Anthony Downs (1957) is also credited with the initial development of the public choice theory by virtue of his article, "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy." Downs argues that voter ignorance regarding political issues exists and is rational. The economics and political science disciplines formed the basis for Buchanan's development of public choice theory. Buchanan's scholarly research and resultant publications regarding public choice theory served as the foundation for subsequent economic theory development professing conservative and libertarian perspectives. His work with Tullock was offered from the perspective that the political process was one of exchange whereby votes regarding public policy have potentially positive and negative characteristics.

Tullock began his graduate studies at the University of Chicago. His studies were interrupted by his military service during World War II. He returned to the University of Chicago to complete his studies earning a Juris Doctor degree, also known as a Doctor of Jurisprudence, in 1947. He served as a professor of law and economics at the George Mason University School of Law and as the Holbert R. Harris University Professor at the academic institution from 1983 to 1987. He and Buchanan founded the *Journal of Non-Market Decision Making* (later renamed *Public Choice*). Tullock served as the founding editor of the journal and continued as the senior editor until May 1990. The journal established a focus of publishing articles that analyzed economic theory in a non-economic market context such as governmental and political environments. Tullock was a prolific author writing scholarly books and articles. Buchanan and Tullock enjoyed a long collaborative period developing the public choice theory field.

Buchanan and Tullock viewed public choice along two dimensions which may be considered in terms of constitutional decisions (structure or content) and political decisions (process). First, public choice is concerned with the development of a constitution (the structure or content) which establishes the operating rules. Second, public choice considers how the actors make decisions (the process) constrained within the given constitution. Their view is that the constitution itself is of greater importance. Buchanan and Tullock's (1962) book, *The Calculus of Consent*, is presented in three parts: Part I: *The Conceptual Framework;* Part II: *The Realm of Social Choice;* and Part III: *Analyses of Decision-Making Rules.* According to the book's preface, the authors attempted to

> … analyze the calculus of the rational individual when he is faced with questions of constitutional choice. Our main purpose is not that of exploring this choice process in detailed application to all of the many constitutional issues that may be presented. We examine the process extensively only with reference to the problem of decision-making rules.

Buchanan (1986 [1987]) acknowledged his gratitude to Wicksell's influence that formed a basis for his own scholarly endeavors eventually leading to the recognition garnered and ultimately the economic sciences prize. Buchanan's scholarly pursuits introduced a realistic appraisal of the political incentives and the economics of government intervention into the marketplace. He challenged the prevailing notion that the government decision makers can correct issues associated with market failures. His view was at odds with the Keynesian perspective that emphasized the ability of governments to correct market deficiencies. He was of the opinion that given the self-interest of all people including politicians, the appropriate way to improve political decision-making is to improve the rules that create the environment for political decision making. Buchanan was recognized for his contributions to economic theory. A selection of his awards, honors and memberships is presented at Appendix A. His extensive writing has been well received and remains an essential element within the economics canon. His publications have been archived at George Mason University ("Guide to the James M. Buchanan papers, 1920-2013"). A selection of his publications is presented at Appendix B.

NOTES

1 The greater part of Buchanan's biographical information presented in this article can be found at "James M. Buchanan Jr.—Biographical". NobelPrize.org. Nobel Media. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1986/buchanan/biographical/.

2 Author's note: Archbishop Jakob Ulvsson of Uppsala, Primate of the Catholic Church of Sweden, established Uppsala University on July 2, 1477 as the first university in Sweden. "Uppsala University History", Uppsala University. https://www.uu.se/en/about-uu/history/.

REFERENCES

About the Center, The Center for Study of Public Choice, Economics Department. https://publicchoice.gmu.edu/about/about.

Black, Duncan.1948. On the Rationale of Group Decision-making. *Journal of Political Economy*. 56(1):23-34.

_____. 1958. *The Theory of Committees and Elections*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buchanan, James M. 1965. An Economic Theory of Clubs. *Economica*, New Series. 32(125):1-14.

_____. 1975. The Samaritan's Dilemma. In: Edmund Prelim (ed.), *Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory*. 71-85. New York: Russell Sage.

_____. 1986 [1987]. The Constitution of Economic Policy. Nobel Memorial Prize lecture. *American Economic Review*. 77(3):243-250.]

Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock. 1962. *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Davis, Otto A., and Melvin J. Hinich. 1966. A Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society. In: J. L. Bernd (ed.), *Mathematical Applications in Political Science II*. Dallas: Arnold Foundation, SMU Press.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. *The Journal of Political Economy*. 65(2):135-150.

Guide to the James M. Buchanan papers. 1920-2013. James M. Buchanan papers C0246. George Mason University Libraries. http://scrc.gmu.edu/finding_aids/buchanan.html.

Haskew, Barbara. 2018. James McGill Buchanan. *Tennessee Encyclopedia*. Tennessee Historical Society. http://tennesseeencyclopedia.net/entries/james-mcgill-buchanan/.

Hotelling, Harold. 1929. Stability in Competition. *Economic Journal*. 39(March):41-57.

James M. Buchanan Jr.—Biographical. NobelPrize.org. Nobel Media. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1986/buchanan/biographical/.

James M. Buchanan Jr.—Facts. NobelPrize.org. Nobel Media. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1986/buchanan/facts/.

James M. Buchanan Jr.—Prize Lecture. NobelPrize.org. Nobel Media. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1986/buchanan/lecture/.

Kratz, Jessie. 2015. The Compromise of 1790. (May 31). Pieces of History, National Archives. https://prologue.blogs.archives.gov/2015/05/31/the-compromise-of-1790/.
Lee, Connie L. 2018. John Price Buchanan. *Tennessee Encyclopedia*. Tennessee Historical Society. http://tennesseeencyclopedia.net/entries/john-price-buchanan/.
Lindahl, Erik. 1919 [1958]. Just Taxation: A Positive Solution. In: Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock (eds.), *Classics in the Theory of Public Finance*. International Economic Association Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan. [Original publication translated from German by E. Henderson. "Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuering", Lund: Gleerup. Part I, chapter 4, 'Positive Lösung'.]
Mill, John Stuart. 1848 [1909]. *Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy*. 1st edition: London: John W. Parker. 7th edition: William James Ashley (ed.). London: Longmans, Green and Co.
Musgrave, Richard A. 1956/1957. A Multiple Theory of Budget Determination. *FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis*. New Series, 17(3):333-343.
Nobel Laureates. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. https://eca.state.gov/fulbright/fulbright-alumni/notable-fulbrighters/nobel-laureates.
Samuelson, Paul. 1954. The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*. 36(4):387-389.
_____. 1955. Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*. 37(4):350-356.
Tullock, Gordon. 1970. A Simple Algebraic Logrolling Model. *American Economic Review*. 60(3):419-426.
Wicksell, Knut. 1896 [1958]. A New Principle of Just Taxation. In: Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock (eds.), *Classics in the Theory of Public Finance*. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. [Original publication translated from German by James M. Buchanan. "Ein neues Prinzip der gerechten Besteuerung", Finanztheoretische Unterschungen, Jena, 76-87, 101-159.]

APPENDIX A

AWARDS, HONORS AND MEMBERSHIPS

- President (1963), Southern Economic Association
- Vice President (1971), American Economic Association
- Recipient (1982), Honorary doctoral degree, University of Giessen, Germany
- Recipient (1984), Distinguished Fellow (1983), American Economic Association
- President (1983 and 1984), Western Economic Association
- Recipient (1984), Honorary doctoral degree, University of Zurich
- President (1984-1986), Mont Pèlerin Society
- Awarded (1986), Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel
- Distinguished Senior Fellow, Cato Institute
- Honored (1997), Buchanan Scholars Program established, Middle Tennessee State University
- Recipient (2001), Honorary doctoral degree, Universidad Francisco Marroquin, Guatemala City, Guatemala
- Recipient (2006), (United States) National Humanities Medal
- Recipient, Frank Seidman Distinguished Award in Political Economy
- Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
- Member, Board of Advisors, The Independent Institute
- Member, Institute of Economic Affairs

APPENDIX B

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS

Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan. 1977. Towards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan. *Journal of Public Economics*. 8(3):255-273.

_____. 1978. Tax Instruments as Constraints on the Disposition of Public Revenues. *Journal of Public Economics*. 9(3):301-318.

_____. 1980 [2006]. *The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____. 1981. Der verteilende Staat: Ansätze zu einer Theorie der Umverteilung. *Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik*. 30(1):103-128.

_____. 1981. The Normative Purpose of Economic "Science": Rediscovery of an Eighteenth Century Method. *International Review of Law and Economics*. 1(2):155-166.

_____. 1981. Revenue Implications of Money Creation under Leviathan. *American Economic Review*. 71(2):347-51.

_____. 1983. Predictive Power and the Choice among Regimes. *Economic Journal*. 93(369):89-105.

Brennan, Geoffrey, James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee. 1983. On Monopoly Price. *Kyklos*. 36(4):531-547.

_____. 1985. On Monopoly Price: Reply. *Kyklos*. 38(2):274-275.

Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan. 1985 [2008]. *The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buchanan, James M. 1949. The Pure Theory of Public Finance: A Suggested Approach. *Journal of Political Economy*. 57(6):496-505.

_____. 1951. Knut Wicksell on Marginal Cost Pricing. *Southern Economic Journal*. 18(2):173-178.

_____. 1951. Fiscal Equity in the Unequal Treatment of Unequals: A Rejoinder. *Journal of Political Economy*. 59:358.

_____. 1952. Federal Grants and Resource Allocation. *Journal of Political Economy*. 60(3):208-217.

_____. 1952. Federal Grants and Resource Allocation: A Reply. *Journal of Political Economy*. 60:536-538.

_____. 1954. Individual Choice in Voting and the Market. *Journal of Political Economy*. 62(4):334-343.

_____. 1954. Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Marketa. *Journal of Political Economy*. 62(2):114-123.

_____. 1958. *Public Principles of Public Debt*. Homewood: Richard D. Irwin.

_____. 1959. Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy. *Journal of Law and Economics*. 2:124-138.

_____. 1960. *Fiscal Theory and Political Economy*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

_____. 1963. The Economics of Earmarked Taxes. *Journal of Political Economy*. 71(5):457-469.

_____. 1964. Confessions of a Burden Monger. *Journal of Political Economy*. 72(5):486-488.

_____. 1964. What Should Economists Do? *Southern Economic Journal*. 30(3):213-222.

_____. 1965. Ethical Rules, Expected Values, and Large Numbers. *Ethics*. 76(1):1-13.

_____. 1965. An Economic Theory of Clubs. *Economica*, New Series. 32(125):1-14.

_____. 1966. Economics and Its Scientific Neighbors. In: Sherman Krupp (ed.), *The Structure of Economic Science: Essays on Methodology*, pp. 166-183. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

_____. 1968. *The Demand and Supply of Public Goods*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

_____. 1968. An Economist's Approach to Scientific Politics. In: Malcolm B. Parsons (ed.), *Perspectives in the Study of Politics*. 77-88. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company.

_____. 1969. *Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory*. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company.

_____. 1969. Is Economics the Science of Choice? In: Erich Streissler (ed.), *Roads to Freedom: Essays in Honour of Friedrich A. von Hayek*. New York: Augustus M Kelley.

_____. 1969. External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure. *American Economic Review*. 59(1):174-177.

_____. 1970. Political Economy and National Priorities: A Review Essay of the Economic Report of the President and the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers. *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*. 2(4):486-492.

_____. 1970. Notes for an Economic Theory of Socialism. *Public Choice*. 8(1):29-43.

_____. 1971. Equality as Fact and Norm. *Ethics*. 81(3):228-240.

_____. 1972. Politics, Property, and the Law: An Alternative Interpretation of Miller et al. v. Schoene. *Journal of Law and Economics*. 15(2):439-452.

_____. 1972. Who Should Pay for Common-Access Facilities? *Public Finance = Finances publiques*. 27(1):1- 8.

_____. 1973. Introduction: L.S.E. Cost Theory in Retrospect. In: James M. Buchanan and G. F. Thirlby (eds.), *L.S.E. Essays on Cost*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

_____. 1973. Public Choice and Public Policy. In: *Increasing Understanding of Public Problems and Policies*. 131-136. Farm Foundation.

_____. 1973. The Institutional Structure of Externality. *Public Choice*. 14(1):69-82.

_____. 1974. Hegel on the Calculus of Voting. *Public Choice*. 17(1):99-101.

_____. 1975. Public Finance and Public Choice. *National Tax Journal*. 28(4):383-394.

_____. 1975. The Samaritan's Dilemma. In: Edmund Prelim (ed.), *Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory*, pp. 71-85. New York: Russell Sage.
_____. 1975. Utopia, the Minimal State, and Entitlement. *Public Choice.* 23(1):121-126.
_____. 1975. The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective: Comment. *Journal of Law and Economics.* 18(3):903-905.
_____. 1975. A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory. *American Economic Review.* 65(2):225-230.
_____. 1975. *The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
_____. 1976. Methods and Morals in Economics: The Ayres-Knight Discussion. In: William Breit and William Patton Culbertson (eds.), *Science and Ceremony: The Institutional Economics of C. E. Ayres*, pp. 163-174. Austin: University of Texas Press.
_____. 1976. Barro on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem. *Journal of Political Economy.* 84(2):337-342.
_____. 1976. Adam Smith on Public Choice. *Public Choice.* 25(1):81-82.
_____. 1976. A Hobbesian Interpretation of the Rawlsian Difference Principle. *Kyklos.* 29(1):5-25.
_____. 1976. Taxation in Fiscal Exchange. *Journal of Public Economics.* 6(1-2):17-29.
_____. 1977. *Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist.* College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
_____. 1978. Markets, States, and the Extent of Morals. *American Economic Review.* 68(2):364-368.
_____. 1979. *What Should Economists Do?* Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
_____. 1981. Introduction: LSE Cost Theory in Retrospect. In: James M. Buchanan and G. F. Thirby (eds.), *L.S.E. Essays on Cost.* New York: New York University Press.
_____. 1982. The Domain of Subjective Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy. In: I. M. Kirzner (ed.), *Method, Process and Austrian Economics.* 7-20. Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath.
_____. 1982). The Political Ambiguity of Reagan Economics: Marginal Adjustment or Structural Shift? *Journal of Monetary Economics.* 10(3):287-296.
_____. 1983. Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession. *Journal of Law and Economics.* 26(1):71-85.
_____. 1983. Social Security Survival: A Public-Choice Perspective. *Cato Journal.* 3(2):339-359.
_____. 1984. The Ethical Limits of Taxation. *Scandinavian Journal of Economics.* 86(2):102-114.
_____. 1985. The Moral Dimension of Debt Financing", *Economic Inquiry.* 23(1):1-6.
_____. 1986. *Liberty, Market and the State*: *Political Economy in the 1980s*. Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf Books.
_____. 1986 [1987]. The Constitution of Economic Policy. Nobel Memorial Prize lecture. [(1987). *American Economic Review.* 77(3):243-250.
_____. 1986. Ideas, Institutions, and Political Economy: A Plea for Disestablishment. *Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy.* 25(1):245-257.
_____. 1987. Bibliography of James M. Buchanan's Publications, 1949-1986. *Scandinavian Journal of Economics.* 89(1):17-37.
_____. 1987. *Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice*. Chappel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
_____. 1987. Justification of the Compound Republic: The Calculus in Retrospect. *Cato Journal.* 7(2):305-312.
_____. 1987. Zur Verfassung der Wirtschaftspolitik. *Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik.* 36(1):101-112.
_____. 1987. Tax Reform as Political Choice. *Journal of Economic Perspectives.* 1(1):29-35.
_____. 1987. Towards the Simple Economics of Natural Liberty: An Exploratory Analysis. *Kyklos.* 40(1):3-20.
_____. 1988. Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government by Robert Higgs. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. *The Journal of Economic History.* 48(01):226-227.
_____. 1988. Market Failure and Political Failure. *Cato Journal.* 8(1):1-13.
_____. 1988. Contractarian Political Economy and Constitutional Interpretation. *American Economic Review.* 78(2):135-139.
_____. 1988. The Economic Theory of Politics Reborn. *Challenge.* 31(2):4-10.
_____. 1989. Reductionist Reflections on the Monetary Constitution. *Cato Journal.* 9(2):295-299.
_____. 1989. Nobelity. *Eastern Economic Journal.* 15(4):339-348.
_____. 1990. Hayek Et Les Forces De L'Histoire. *Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines.* 1(1):1-3.
_____. 1990. The Domain of Constitutional Economics. *Constitutional Political Economy.* 1(1):1-18.
_____. 1991. An American Perspective on Europe's Constitutional Opportunity. *Cato Journal.* 10(3):619-629.
_____. 1991. The Minimal Politics of Market Order. *Cato Journal.* 11(2):215-232.
_____. 1991. Jack Wiseman: A Personal Appreciation. *Constitutional Political Economy.* 2(1):1-6.
_____. 1991. Economics in the Post-Socialist Century. *Economic Journal.* 101(404):15-21.
_____. 1991. *The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
_____. 1992. *Better than Plowing and Other Personal Essays*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
_____. 1992. Economic Science in the Future. *Eastern Economic Journal.* 18(4):401-403.

_____. 1992. I did not call him "Fritz": Personal Recollections of Professor F. A. v. Hayek. *Constitutional Political Economy.* 3(2):129-135.
_____. 1993. Public Choice after Socialism. *Public Choice.* 77(1):67-74.
_____. 1993. The Political Efficiency of General Taxation. *National Tax Journal.* 46(4):401-410.
_____. 1993. How can constitutions be designed so that politicians who seek to serve "public interest" can survive and prosper? *Constitutional Political Economy.* 4(1):1-6.
_____. 1993). *Property as a Guarantor of Liberty (Shaftesbury Papers).* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
_____. 1994. Ethics and Economic Progress. *Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines.* 5(1):1-9.
_____. 1994. Pareto Superior Tax Reform: Some Simple Analytics. *Eastern Economic Journal.* 20(1):7-9.
_____. 1994. Lagged implementation as an element in constitutional strategy. *European Journal of Political Economy.* 10(1):11-26.
_____. 1994. Erratum to: Lagged implementation as an element in constitutional strategy. *European Journal of Political Economy.* 10(3):619-619.
_____. 1994. Notes on the Liberal Constitution. *Cato Journal.* 14(1):1-9.
_____. 1995. Economic Science and Cultural Diversity. *Kyklos.* 48(2):193-200.
_____. 1995. Individual Rights, Emergent Social States, and Behavioral Feasibility. *Rationality and Society.* 7(2):141-150.
_____. 1995. The Metamorphosis of John Gray. *Constitutional Political Economy.* 6(3):293-295.
_____. 1995. Clarifying Confusion About the Balanced Budget Amendment. *National Tax Journal.* 48(3):347-355.
_____. 1996. Europe as social reality. *Constitutional Political Economy.* 7(4):253-256.
_____. 1996. Federalism and Individual Sovereignty. *Cato Journal.* 15(2-3):259-268.
_____. 1997. The Balanced Budget Amendment: Clarifying the Arguments. *Public Choice.* 90(1-4):117-138.
_____. 1997. *Post-socialist Political Economy.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
_____. 1997. Albert Breton, Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance. *Public Choice.* 93(3):523-524.
_____. 1998. Agreement and Efficiency: Response to Guttman. *European Journal of Political Economy.* 14(2):209-213.
_____. 1998. Majoritarian Logic. *Public Choice.* 97(1-2):13-21.
_____. 1999-2002. *The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan* (20 vols.). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
_____. 2001. The Economics and Ethics of Idleness. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology.* 60(5):181-192.
_____. 2001. Direct Democracy, Classical Liberalism, and Constitutional Strategy. *Kyklos.* 54(2-3):235-242.
_____. 2001. Game Theory, Mathematics, and Economics. *Journal of Economic Methodology.* 8(1):27-32.
_____. 2002. Obituary: The Sayer of Truth: A Personal Tribute to Peter Bauer. *Public Choice.* 112(3-4):233-234.
_____. 2003. Justice among Natural Equals: Memorial Marker for John Rawls. *Public Choice.* 114(3-4):1-1.
_____. 2003. Endnote. *Il Pensiero Economico Italiano.* 11(1):283-284.
_____. 2003. Politics as Tragedy in Several Acts. *Economics and Politics.* 15(2):181-191.
_____. 2004. Constitutional Efficiency and the European Central Bank. *Cato Journal.* 24(1-2):13-17.
_____. 2004. The Status of the Status Quo. *Constitutional Political Economy.* 15(2):133-144.
_____. 2004. Heraclitian Vespers. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology.* 63(1):263-271.
_____. 2005. The Market, Yes; Demos, No. *Cato Journal.* 25(3):461-464.
_____. 2005. Afraid to be Free: Dependency as Desideratum. *Public Choice.* 124(1):19-31.
_____. 2005. Natural Equality, Increasing Returns, and Economic Progress: A Reinterpretation of Adam Smith's System. *Division of Labor & Transaction Costs.* 1(1):57-66.
_____. 2005. *The Normative Vision of Classical Liberalism.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
_____. 2006. *Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative: The Normative Vision of Classical Liberalism.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publication.
_____. 2006. The Virginia Renaissance in Political Economy: The 1960s Revisited. In: Roger Koppl (ed.), *Money and Markets: Essays in Honor of Leland B. Yeager.* 34–44.
_____. 2007. *Economics from the Outside In: "Better than Plowing" and Beyond.* College Station: Texas A&M Press.
_____. 2008. Let Us Understand Adam Smith. *Journal of the History of Economic Thought.* 30(1):21-28.
_____. 2008. Same players, different game: how better rules make better politics. *Constitutional Political Economy.* 19(3):171-179.
_____. 2008. In Search of Homunculus Politicus. *Public Choice.* 137(3):469-474.
_____. 2009. Economists Have No Clothes. *Rationality, Markets and Morals.* (9):151-156.
_____. 2010. The Constitutionalization of Money. *Cato Journal.* 30(2):251-258.
_____. 2011. The Limits of Market Efficiency. *Rationality, Markets and Morals.* 2(38).
_____. 2012. Genesis. *Public Choice.* 152(3):253-255.
_____. 2013. Better than Ploughing. *PSL Quarterly Revie, Economia civile.* 66(264):59-76.
_____. 2015. NOTES ON HAYEK—Miami, 15 February, 1979. *The Review of Austrian Economics.* 28(3):257-260.
Buchanan, James M. and Antonio S. Pinto Barbosa. 1980. Convexity Constraints in Public Goods Theory. *Kyklos.* 33(1):63-75.

Buchanan, James M. and Charles J. Goetz. 1972. Efficiency limits of fiscal mobility: An assessment of the tiebout model. *Journal of Public Economics*. 1(1):25-43.
Buchanan, James M. and Dwight R. Lee. 1982. Tax Rates and Tax Revenues in Political Equilibrium: Some Simple Analytics. *Economic Inquiry*. 20(3):344-354.
_____. 1982. Politics, Time, and the Laffer Curve. *Journal of Political Economy*. 90(4):816-819.
_____. 1986. Vote Buying in a Stylized Setting. *Public Choice*. 49(1):3-15.
_____. 1990. Vote Buying in a Stylized Setting: Reply. *Public Choice*. 65(3):287-289.
_____. 1991. Cartels, Coalitions, and Constitutional Politics. *Constitutional Political Economy*. 2(2):139-161.
_____. 1992. Private Interest Support for Efficiency Enhancing Antitrust Policies. *Economic Inquiry*. 30(2):218-224.
_____. 1994. On a Fiscal Constitution for the European Union. *Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines*. 5(2-3):1-14.
Buchanan, James M. and Frank Forman. 1985. Reviews. *Public Choice*. 47(3):531-534.
Buchanan, James M., Gérard Debreu, Lawrence R. Klein, Milton Friedman and Robert M. Solow. 2001. The most significant contributions to economics during the twentieth century: lists of the Nobel laureates. *The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*. 8(3):289-297.
Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock. 1962 [1965]. *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
_____. 1975. Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes. *American Economic Review*. 65(1):139-147.
_____. 1976. Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Control versus Taxes: Reply. *The American Economic Review*. 66(5):983-984.
_____. 1977. The Expanding Public Sector: Wagner Squared. *Public Choice*. 31(1):147-150.
Buchanan, James M. and Jennifer Roback. 1987. The Incidence and Effects of Public Debt in the Absence of Fiscal Illusion. *Public Finance Review*. 15(1):5-25.
Buchanan, James M., Marshall R. Colberg and Clark Lee Allen. 1954. *Price, Income and Public Policy: The Abc's of Economics*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.
Buchanan, James M. and Nicos E Devletoglou. 1970. *Academia in Anarchy: An Economic Diagnosis*. New York: Basic Books.
Buchanan, James M. and Richard Musgrave. 1999. *Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Buchanan, James M. and Richard E. Wagner. 1978. Dialogues Concerning Fiscal Religion. *Journal of Monetary Economics*. 4(3):627-636.
Buchanan, James M., Richard E. Wagner and John Burton. 1978. *The Consequences of Mr Keynes: An Analysis of the Misuse of Economic Theory for Political Profiteering, with Proposals for Constitutional Disciplines*. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
Buchanan, James M. and Robert D. Tollison. 1981. The Homogenization of Heterogeneous Inputs. *American Economic Review*. 71(1):28-38.
_____. 1984. The Homogenization of Heterogeneous Inputs: Reply. *American Economic Review*. 74(4):28-38.
_____. 1986. A Theory of Truth in Autobiography. *Kyklos*. 39(4):507-517.
Buchanan, James M. and Roger D. Congleton. 1979. Proportional and progressive income taxation with utility-maximizing governments. *Public Choice*. 34(2):217-230.
_____. 1994. The Incumbency Dilemma and Rent Extraction by Legislators. *Public Choice*. 79(1-2):47-60.
Buchanan, James M. and Roger L. Faith. 1979. Trying Again to Value a Life. *Journal of Public Economics*. 12(2):245-248.
_____. 1980. Subjective Elements in Rawlsian Contractual Agreement on Distributional Rules. *Economic Inquiry*. 18(1):23-38.
_____. 1981. Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externalities. *Journal of Law and Economics*. 24(1):95-111.
_____. 1987. Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit. *American Economic Review*. 77(5):1023-1031.
Buchanan, James M. and Viktor J. Vanberg. 1988. The Politicization of Market Failure. *Public Choice*. 57(2):101-113.
_____. 1989. A Theory of Leadership and Deference in Constitutional Construction. *Public Choice*. 61(1):15-27.
_____. 1991. The Market as a Creative Process. *Economics and Philosophy*. 7(2):167-186.
_____. 2002. Constitutional Implications of Radical Subjectivism. *Review of Austrian Economics*. 15(2-3):121-129.
Buchanan, James M. and Warren J. Samuels. 1975. On Some Fundamental Issues in Political Economy: An Exchange of Correspondence. *Journal of Economic Issues*. 9(1):15-38.
Buchanan, James M. and William C. Stubblebine. 1962. Externality. In: C. Gopalakrishnan (ed.), *Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
_____. 1972. Pareto-Optimality and Gains-from-Trade: A Comment. *Economica*. 39(154):203-204.
Buchanan, James M. and Winston C. Bush. 1973. Anarchism. *Journal of Economic Issues*. 7(1):162-164.
_____. 1974. Political Constraints on Contractual Redistribution. The *American Economic Review*. 64(2):153-157.
Buchanan, James M. and Yong J. Yoon. 1995. Constitutional implications of alternative models of increasing returns. *Constitutional Political Economy*. 6(2):191-196.

_____. 1999. Generalized Increasing Returns, Euler's Theorem, and Competitive Equilibrium. *History of Political Economy.* 31(3):511-523.
_____. 1999. Rationality as Prudence: Another Reason for Rules. *Constitutional Political Economy.* 10(3):211-218.
_____. 2000. A Smithean Perspective on Increasing Returns. *Journal of the History of Economic Thought.* 22(1):43-48.
_____. 2000. Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons. *Journal of Law and Economics.* 43(1):1-13.
_____. 2001. Majoritarian Management of the Commons. *Economic Inquiry.* 39(3):396-405.
_____. 2003. A Correction in Elementary Public Choice Geometry. *Public Choice.* 115(3-4):285-298.
_____. 2004. Majoritarian exploitation of the fiscal commons: general taxes-differential transfers. *European Journal of Political Economy.* 20(1):73-90.
_____. 2006. All Voting is Strategic. *Public Choice.* 129(1):159-167.
_____. 2008. Public Choice and the Extent of the Market. *Kyklos.* 61(2):177-188.
_____. 2012. Choosing for Others: A Neglected Element in the Theory of Collective Action. *Public Choice.* 153(1):9-16.
_____. 2014. The Costs of Collectivization, per se. *Public Choice.* 159(3):321-326.
_____. 2015. *Individualism and Political Disorder.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Faith, Roger L. and James M. Buchanan. 1981. Towards a Theory of Yes-No Voting. *Public Choice.* 37(2):231-245.
Forte, Francesco and James M. Buchanan. 1961. The Evaluation of Public Services. *Journal of Political Economy.* 69:107.
Goetz, Charles J. and James M. Buchanan. 1971. External Diseconomies in Competitive Supply. *American Economic Review.* 61(5):883-890.
_____. 1973. External Diseconomies in Competitive Supply: Reply. *American Economic Review.* 63(4):745-748.
Solo, Robert, Daniel R. Fusfeld and James M. Buchanan. 1979. Three Reviews of Charles E. Lindblom: Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems. *Journal of Economic Issues.* 13(1):207-217.
Tollison, Robert, Barry Keating and James M. Buchanan. 1978. Reviews. *Public Choice.* 33(3):129-133.
Vanberg, Viktor J. and James M. Buchanan. 1986. Organization Theory and Fiscal Economics: Society, State, and Public Debt. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.* 2(2):215-227.
_____. 1989. Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice. *Journal of Theoretical Politics.* 1(1):49-62.

Milton Friedman: An Economist Who Championed Free Markets

GARY A. LOMBARDO



Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

Milton Friedman received the economic sciences prize in 1976 and according to the award committee, the prize motivation reported by "Milton Friedman: Facts" was "for his achievements in the fields of consumption analysis, monetary history and theory and for his demonstration of the complexity of stabilization policy." His recognition was for "Contributions to consumption analysis and to monetary history and theory, including observations of the complexity of stabilization policy."

Milton Friedman was born July 31, 1912, in Brooklyn, New York and died November 16, 2006, in San Francisco, California.[1] He graduated from Rutgers University with a Bachelor of Arts (1932) and the University of Chicago with a Master of Arts (1933) in economics. At Rutgers, he studied mathematics and economics and was influenced by Arthur Frank Burns and Homer Jones who were professors of economics. Burns wrote about business cycles and inflation and served as the research director (1945-1953) at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Additionally, he was appointed to several senior influential government positions including chair of the United States Council of Economic Advisors (1953-1956), chair of the Board of Governors of the United States Federal Reserve serving two terms (1970-1978) and United States ambassador to West Germany (1981-1985). Homer Jones joined the United States Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in 1958 as the research director and later became a senior vice-president. While at Rutgers University, Friedman was required to enroll in a Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program for a period of two years. He explained later to the Editors (2017), "Milton Friedman: There is no Such Thing as a Free Lunch," that the experience was unpleasant and led to his opposition against compulsory military service.

Friedman was awarded a Columbia University fellowship for studying statistics during the 1933-1934 academic year under Harold Hotelling. Hotelling (Ph.D., Princeton University, 1924) was a statistician and economic theorist who developed Hotelling's law and Hotelling's rule. Hotelling advised doctoral student Kenneth Joseph Arrow (Economic Sciences Laureate, 1972). Friedman returned to the University of Chicago during the following academic year, 1934, to serve as Henry Schultz's research assistant until 1935. Schultz had arranged the fellowship for Friedman to study under Hotelling at Columbia. Schultz (Ph.D., Columbia University, 1925) was an early contributor to the development of econometrics. Schultz (1938) wrote, in *The Theory and Measurement of Demand*, about statistics and the mathematics of Léon Walras and Vilfredo Pareto.

Friedman became life-long friends with George Stigler (Economic Sciences Laureate, 1982) and W. Allen Wallis while studying at the University of Chicago.

Friedman joined Wallis at the National Resources Planning Board in Washington, D.C. during the summer of 1935. President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 6777 with the authority of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 to create the entity. Friedman worked on a project involving a consumer budget study that would be addressed in one of his future books published in 1957, *A Theory of the Consumption Function*. His belief in free markets led him to co-author a monograph with George Stigler (1946), *Roofs or Ceilings? The Current Housing Practice*, opposing rent control. Stigler received the Economic Sciences Laureate in 1982. Friedman and Stigler believed that in the context of the immediate post-World War II housing shortage, restricting rental income was the wrong remedy, since private owners would not find it attractive to build additional housing units if the rents were kept artificially low in the face of a shortage. Friedman (1953a) followed this experience with his essay "The Methodology of Positive Economics" which was included in his book, *Essays in Positive Economics*.

He left his position at the National Resources Planning Board in the fall of 1937 to take a job at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). His position as a member of the research staff would last until 1981. He worked initially as an assistant to Simon Kuznets (Economic Sciences Laureate, 1971) studying professional income and wealth distribution. Kuznets and Friedman (1939) were co-authors of *Income from Independent Professional Practice*. In the book, they commented that medical licensing results in a barrier to enter the profession restricting competition, consequently resulting in doctors being able to demand higher fees due to their partial monopoly power.

Friedman served on the faculty at the University of Wisconsin as an assistant professor during 1940 experiencing considerable organizational conflict regarding the economics department and its possible merger with the business school, his employment status and antisemitism. He then took a position in 1941 with the United States Department of the Treasury examining wartime tax policy. In 1943, he relocated to New York City as a mathematical statistician for the Division of War Research at Columbia University to work with Hotelling and Wallis on weapon design, military tactics and metallurgical experiments. This work lasted until 1945 when he relocated to the University of Minnesota for one year and was a colleague of George Stigler. Kuznets was Friedman's doctoral advisor at Columbia University. Their co-authored book (1939), *Income from Independent Professional Practice,* was submitted in 1945 as Friedman's doctoral dissertation and he earned a Doctor of Philosophy degree (1946). He then accepted a post at the University of Chicago in 1946 teaching economic theory.

Friedman attended the first meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947 along with the other co-founders; Friedrich August von Hayek, Frank Hyneman Knight, Ludwig Heinrich Edler von Mises, Sir Karl Raimund Popper and George Joseph Stigler. Frank Hyneman Knight (Ph.D., Cornell University, 1916) served at the University of Chicago on its faculty and taught Friedman, Stigler and James McGill Buchanan, Jr. (Economic Sciences Laureate, 1986). Mises was an Austrian-American economist who advanced the cause of classical liberalism through his contributing efforts to the Austrian School of economic thought. Popper was a preeminent Austrian-British philosopher of science who argued that empirical science theories cannot be proven but could be potentially falsified. Stigler (Ph.D. University of Chicago, 1938) conducted scholarly research on regulation and the history of economic thought. Friedman's views, compatible with that of Hayek, were consistent with the Mont Pèlerin Society's mission which was to provide a forum for scholars to contribute to the advancement of a free society and free market economic systems. Friedman served as the president of the Society for one term from 1970 to 1972.

At the University of Chicago, he was appointed as an associate professor in 1946, a full professor in 1948 and as the Paul Snowden Russell Distinguished Service Professor of Economics in 1962 retaining his appointment until 1982. Burns, serving as the research director at NBER, invited Friedman upon his appointment to Chicago to rejoin the staff and lead the effort to examine money's role in the business cycle. Friedman was the recipient of the John Bates Clark Medal in 1951. The Medal is awarded by the American

Economic Association to economists under the age of forty who have contributed most significantly to economic thought and knowledge while residing in the United States.

In 1953, Friedman offered his Money and Banking Workshop at the University of Chicago. The workshop was attended by faculty, doctoral students and visitors. At Chicago, the prevailing view of economics was neoclassical in nature and oriented toward monetarism while rejecting the Keynesian perspective. In 1954, he attended Harry Markowitz's (Economic Sciences Laureate, 1990) doctoral dissertation defense on portfolio theory and questioned the topic's suitability as an economics subject, according to Markowitz (1990). In a sense, Markowitz was vindicated regarding Friedman's, perhaps flippant, comment. He was awarded his doctorate and a paradigm shift occurred in the 1970s as new classical macroeconomics based on the concept of rational expectations emerged.

Friedman was a consultant to the United States government analyzing the Schuman Plan while living in Paris during the fall of 1950. The Schuman Plan, introduced by Jean-Baptiste Nicolas Robert Schuman, the former two-term French prime minister. His first term as prime minister was for a period of eight months from November 1947 to July 1948; his second term was for a period of six days during September 1948. Schuman served as the foreign minister from 1948 to 1953 under successive governments. On May 9, 1950, Schuman and other individuals called for the creation of a multinational steel and coal production authority. The proposal was ratified on July 23, 1952, and the European Coal and Steel Community came into existence as a group of six nations: Belgium; France; Italy; Luxembourg; the Netherlands and West Germany. The plan also became the basis for the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1958. Friedman was an early advocate for the implementation of floating exchange rates that he thought would be beneficial for countries by enabling them to avoid balance of payments problems. Consistent with his concern regarding government intervention, he viewed fixed exchange rates as government interference in the marketplace. Friedman (1953b) expressed his views in an article, "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates."

Friedman spent the 1953-1954 academic year as a Fulbright visiting professor at Gonville & Caius College, University of Cambridge. He was critical of the United States Federal Reserve Bank's policy decisions when reacting to the economic crisis during the 1930s. Specifically, he was opposed to the credit restriction activities after the stock market crash, which he believed increased the severity and length of the Great Depression. The Federal Reserve should have engaged in its role as the lender of last resort providing liquidity to the economic system. Friedman referred to the period from 1929 to 1933 as the Great Contraction. He and Anna Jacobson Schwartz (Ph.D., Columbia University, 1964) wrote (1963) about this period of time using the title, *The Great Contraction, 1929-1933*, and included the work as Chapter 7 in *A Monetary History*. Their chapter was subsequent published (1965) separately as *The Great Contraction, 1929-1933*. Friedman also criticized the Federal Reserve's actions during the Great Depression in a co-authored article in 1963 with David Meiselman (Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1961). In *Free to Choose*, co-authored with Rose D. Friedman and published in 1980, they posited that lender role should have involved the Federal Reserve purchasing government bonds through its open market activities. The banks would have been able to use their now additional monetary resources as a result of the sale of their government bonds to meet their depositors' demands to either close their accounts or withdraw money from their accounts. Ben Shalom Bernanke, nearly fifty years after the analysis by Friedman and Schwartz regarding their assessment of the Federal Reserve actions during the Great Depression, lauded their judgment, in his 2002 "On Milton Friedman's Ninetieth Birthday." Bernanke, (Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1979; Economic Sciences Laureate, 2022) served as the chair of the Federal Reserve from February 1, 2006 to January 31, 2014.

In Friedman's (1956) collection of essays published as a book, *Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money*, Friedman opined that in the short-term money supply increases result in increases in employment and production output, money supply decreases result in employment and production output decreases. This direct relationship does not hold in the long term. In contrast, the long-term effect of money supply growth results in price increases without a corresponding impact on production output. Friedman's scholarly in-

vestigations resulted in his recommendation that the money supply should increase at a fixed rate on the order of three to five percent annually with monthly or even daily adjustments. Although it may seem at odds with the monetarist view about expanding the money supply, the logic was that if the economy expanded while the money supply remained constant then the resultant and continuous fall in prices would lead to lower output and higher unemployment. Alexander William Salter (2014), wrote "An Introduction to Monetary Policy Rules" upon reviewing Friedman's *A Program for Monetary Stability* (1960) and "The Role of Monetary Policy (1968)," indicated that the rate of increase should be equivalent to the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rate increase. GDP, a measure developed by Kuznets in 1934 for a United States Congressional report, is the total monetary value of finished goods and services produced within a country during a specific time. The Friedman formulation, known as the k-percent rule, can be reduced to the following formula according to Salter:

$$gM = k = gP - gV + gy = gy - gV$$

where:

g = growth
M = money supply
k= money supply growth rate
P = price level (inverse of money's purchasing power)
V = money turnover rate
y = real income (real GDP)

Friedman was interested in the M1 and M2 money supply and recommended significant changes in the current banking rules. One recommendation was to require a one hundred percent reserve position on deposits to enhance currency controls. M1 is the supply of money that is very liquid and includes cash, demand deposits and traveler's checks. M2 is a less liquid supply of money that includes M1, as well as less liquid assets, i.e., savings and time deposits, money market funds and certificates of deposit.

Friedman developed his permanent income hypothesis in 1957 introducing the term "permanent income" and defining its meaning as the average annual income expected during a period of a few years. The hypothesis theorizes that a person will set a personal expenditure level consistent with expected long-term average annual income. Friedman found that consumers may finance a new tax increase from savings and maintain the current consumption levels thus frustrating the fiscal policy objective of reducing consumption. This view contrasted with the Keynesian view that consumption is a more direct function of existing income.

Friedman expressed his libertarian views on a number of subjects in his 1962 book, *Capitalism and Freedom*. He was of the opinion that a country's successes derive from free markets and its failures are a result of government intervention in the marketplace. He was in favor of legalizing drug use, prostitution, gay rights, school vouchers and all immigration as well as eliminating medical licenses as a way to lower medical fees. He opposed discrimination. He was also opposed to raising the minimum wage which he thought would be a deterrent to the hiring of young laborers and low-skilled laborers particularly minority individuals. Friedman (1962) argued in his book, *Capitalism and Freedom,* against conscription into the military service as an unneeded government intervention in the lives of its citizenry. His view was that the process of conscription was both inequitable and arbitrary. During the Richard M. Nixon (United States) presidential administration, Friedman was appointed to head the committee to seek a transition from conscription to a volunteer military service program. According to Doherty (1995), in reflection, Friedman commented in an interview that, "In the realm of policy, I regard eliminating the draft as my most important accomplishment."

Monetarism considers the quantity theory of money vital for understanding the economy in general and inflation specifically. This theory views the pricing of goods and services as proportional to the economy's money supply. The theory offers that if an economy's monetary level increases by a particular per-

centage, then so also will the prices for the goods and services, at least on average. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) addressed this issue. Schwartz was a research economist who met Friedman through Arthur Burns while Friedman was at the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Friedman served as an economic advisor to Senator Barry Goldwater, the Republican Party nominee, during his unsuccessful candidacy for the United States presidency in 1964. In 1966, *Newsweek* magazine invited Friedman to write a triweekly column about economics alternately with Paul Samuelson (Economic Sciences Laureate, 1970) and Henry Wallich. Henry Christopher Wallich (Ph.D., Harvard University, 1944) was a German-American economist, who emigrated to the United States and became an American national in 1944. He was appointed as a governor of the United States Federal Reserve System in 1974. In 1977, Friedman retired from the University of Chicago but continued to maintain a relationship with the institution by continuing his research activities. As a retiree, his title was the Paul Snowden Russell Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Chicago. He was appointed as a senior research fellow (1977-2006) at Stanford University's Hoover Institution.

Friedman enjoyed an active retirement as he was involved in many scholarly and advisory pursuits. He continued his *Newsweek* column until 1983 when the magazine terminated the project. He co-authored with Anna J. Schwartz (1982) *Monetary Trends in the United States and the United Kingdom: Their Relation to Income, Prices, and Interest Rates, 1867-1975* and wrote (1992) *Money Mischief: Episodes in Monetary History*. In addition, he authored numerous op-ed pieces in various newspapers. He was an unofficial advisor to Ronald Reagan as he campaigned during 1980 for the office of the President of the United States. Upon Reagan's election, Friedman served as a member of the President's Economic Policy Advisory Board. In 1996, he and his wife, Rose, founded the Milton and Rose D. Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice to promote parental choice in schooling. According to the EdChoice Foundation website, the organization was renamed the EdChoice Foundation in 2016. In 1998, he and his wife co-authored (1998) *Two Lucky People: Memoirs*. Friedman's professional and retirement years were considered distinguished by those individuals who found his research and advocacy compatible with their views and misguided by those individuals who opposed his economic philosophy.

Friedman contributed to the understanding of economics in various ways. He is best known for his work on monetarism which is a theoretical approach to economic stabilization by controlling the money supply. Economic stabilization refers to government policy interventions to control the business cycle's behavior with the aim to maintain stability in the economy. Monetary and fiscal policy tools are used to reduce the fluctuations, both expansionary and contractionary phases, found in the business cycle. Monetary tools include the discount rate, reserve requirements, open market operations and interest on reserves. Fiscal policy tools include taxes and government spending. Friedman conducted research on the policy implications of using monetary tools.

The discount rate represents the amount of interest the United States Federal Reserve banks charge commercial banks for short-term loans. The discount rate influences the interest rates charged by commercial banks and other financial institutions. A lower discount rate results in an expansionary liquidity because increased borrowing by businesses and households becomes less expensive and more attractive. Conversely, a higher discount rate is contractionary because borrowing by businesses and households is more expensive and less attractive.

Banks are required to observe reserve requirements which dictate the amount of money that must be held on deposit to protect against loan defaults. If the Federal Reserve reduces the reserve requirement the results are expansionary because the amount of a bank's deposits that can be loaned to businesses and households increases. Conversely, the implementation of higher reserve requirements is contractionary as the result is a reduction of money available for lending to businesses and households.

Open market operations take place when the Federal Reserve purchases and sells United States Government securities, commonly known as bonds, notes and bills, depending on their term to maturity. The purchase of the securities increases the monetary supply within the economy; thus, the purchases are expansionary as the result is increased bank reserves available to be loaned to businesses and households.

Conversely, if the Federal Reserve sells the securities, it had previously purchased the result is a contractionary move to decrease the money supply by reducing loanable bank reserves limiting the businesses and households' access to borrow funds.

Monetarists are quite concerned that an event causing inflation results in a deteriorating economy. Friedman, as perhaps the leading monetarist of his time, insisted that the monetary growth rate and, ultimately, its supply influences potential inflationary outcomes. A rise in wages results in consumers being willing to pay higher prices for goods and services. The incremental increase in money chasing after goods and services results in inflationary prices. This rise in wages may be either higher pay or higher levels of employment. Alban William Housego Phillips was a New Zealand economist and a professor of economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He studied the relationship between employment levels and wages. Phillips (1958) model, known as the Phillips curve, described, in "The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957," the inverse relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate and presented his findings to the economics profession. The inverse relationship found that high unemployment was paired with slowly increasing wages and low unemployment was paired with rapidly increasing wages. His reasoning was that in a tight labor market, employers were required to raise wages to attract scarce workers. Higher wages were not required when unemployment rates were high. Thus, the potential for wage inflation existed at higher employment levels. An example of a Phillips curve is provided in the figure immediately following the paragraph.

The Phillips Curve, 1961–1969[1,2]



[1]Note: Inflation based on the Consumer Price Index.
[2]Source: United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Friedman and Edmund Strother Phelps each independently conducted scholarly research that challenged the theoretical foundation of the Phillips curve. Phelps (Economic Sciences Laureate, 2006) earned his Ph.D. at Yale University (1959) and was employed on the staff at the Cowles Foundation (1960-1966). He held a professorship at the University of Pennsylvania (1966-1971) and subsequently joined the faculty at Columbia University (1971). Friedman and Phelps recognized that labor markets include a certain amount of unavoidable unemployment. This level of unavoidable unemployment is a composite of both frictional and structural unemployment. Frictional unemployment considers workers in the process of changing jobs whereas structural unemployment accounts for workers who lose their positions due to industrial reorganization or demographic migration rather than supply and demand changes. Their critique of the Phillips curve was that real (inflation adjusted) wages, not nominal (non-inflation adjusted) wages, should be the focus of study. Labor availability (supply) would equal labor requirements (demand) based on the adjustment of real wages. The resultant unemployment rate at the intersection of the supply and demand curves

would be unique for that specific real wage. This unemployment rate was labeled the "natural rate" of unemployment. The "natural rate" of unemployment may be influenced by exogenous factors such as a recession which would increase the rate. The rate is also influenced by institutional factors, e.g., minimum wage laws and unionization, which tend to result in a long-term wage rate increase.

Friedman and Phelps believed the government policy of accepting higher inflation for lower unemployment was not sustainable. With a focus on real wages, workers' expectations were that cost-of-living adjustments to enable them to maintain the level of their purchasing power would be necessary to offset inflationary increases. When the government uses expansionary monetary or fiscal policies to drive the unemployment rate below the "natural rate," the increased demand for goods and services will influence producers to raise prices faster than the anticipated inflation rate. Producers will increase their employment levels; unemployment decreases and over time workers demand pay increases to maintain their purchasing power as it decreases because goods prices rise. The real wage rate is adjusted to its previous level and unemployment increases to its "natural rate."

Friedman and Phelps noted that the relationship between the inflation and unemployment rates was not maintained when examining the short-term and long-term experiences. Government monetary and fiscal policy actions to reduce the unemployment rate below its "natural rate" will be unsuccessful as enduring inflation rates shift the unemployment rate. Economists generally agree that substantial aggregate demand increases during a period of time when the economy operated below full capacity. This condition will lead to a lower unemployment rate and a higher inflation rate. Fundamentally, Friedman, as a monetarist, posited that the Phillips curve can explain the inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation in the short-term. However, the resultant inflationary pressure ends the relationship over the long-term. Contrarily, Keynesians view that the relationship can be maintained over the long-term. Friedman's position was confirmed during the 1970s when the United States experienced an extended period of stagflation that exhibited high inflation, high unemployment and stagnant demand. More recent empirical scholarship by Mulligan (2011) has demonstrated that inflation tends to increase unemployment, even in the short run.

Although most economists accepted the view of Friedman and Phelps that a specific unemployment rate would be appropriate for a stable inflation rate, the term "natural rate" seemed to suggest that it connotated a socially optimal, unchanging level unaffected by government policy. As Hoover has reported, economists have developed the term "nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment" known as NAIRU to describe the relationship between the unemployment and inflation rates. NAIRU can be a changing rate neither observable nor quantifiable. It is inferred using various statistical measures. The United States Congressional Budget Office estimates NAIRU based on historical data on unemployment rates and inflation rate changes. The United States Federal Reserve staff estimates NAIRU using similar methods. However, the Board of Governors and presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks may develop their own estimates. These potential disagreements are debated as public policy is developed.

Friedman developed what has become known as the Friedman test. He presents his work (1937, 1939, 1940) describing the nonparametric statistical test used to detect differences in treatments across multiple test attempts. Friedman devised a procedure that ranks each row (block) together prior to considering the values of the ranks by columns. The Friedman test is a special case of the Durbin test. Whereas the Durbin test applies to incomplete designs, the Friedman test is applicable to complete block designs. In the Friedman test, the null hypothesis being tested is that there are no differences between the variables. The null hypothesis is rejected when the calculated probability is less than the selected significance level. The researcher can then conclude that at least two of the variables are significantly different from each other. The Friedman test is like the Kruskal-Wallis test which is a non-parametric ANOVA (analysis of variance) statistical test to determine if the samples originate from the same distribution. William Henry Kruskal (Ph.D. Columbia University, mathematical sciences, 1955) was an academician who served as president of both the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (1971) and the American Statistical Association (1982). Wilson Allen Wallis was an economists and statistician who served as dean of the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business (1956-1962) and president of the University of Rochester (1962-1970) prior to his appointment

as chancellor (1970-1982) and chief executive (1970-1975). Wallis also served as an economic advisor from 1959 to 1989 to four United States presidents. Many statistical software packages include the Friedman test application.

Friedman collaborated with Leonard J. Savage (Ph.D., University of Michigan, 1941), a mathematician and statistician, to develop the Friedman-Savage utility function. An individual's wealth influences the person's utility function and risk tolerance. Friedman and Savage (1948) found that higher wealth corresponds to risk-prone behavior; a lack of wealth corresponds to risk-averse behavior. He also developed the Friedman rule which is a monetary policy that considers establishing the nominal interest rate at zero percent. He thought that the opportunity cost of holding money should be equal to the social cost of creating fiat money. Fiat money is government issued lacking the backing of a physical commodity, typically gold or silver. A country's central bank would establish a rate of deflation equal to the real interest rate on government bonds thus making the nominal interest rate equal to zero percent. Friedman (1969) reported that this action favors the holding of money (savings) because the value of money is not lessened during periods of inflation.

Friedman's view of corporate social responsibility inflames the passions of many people both supportive of and opposed to his opinion. He has argued that corporate executives are employed by the owners of the entity and serve as the shareholders' agents. Thus, executives are responsible to the owners and that responsibility entails increasing shareholder wealth measured by increased organizational profitability. The increased profitability permits the corporation to declare dividends that pass money to the owners. The owners can then decide how to spend their newly acquired money. In an article written by Friedman (1970) for *The New York Times Magazine,* Friedman refers to his position in his (1962) book, *Capitalism and Freedom.* He identified the doctrine of social responsibility as a "fundamentally subversive doctrine" in a free society. He added, "there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud."

Friedman served in various capacities as an advisor to national governments or as a proponent of what he thought about the form of their economic systems. Beginning in the 1950s, he was invited often to speak to audiences and his influence grew in the conservative community. The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) hosted many of his lectures. The IEA was founded in 1955 and devotes its energies to promoting the free market. He met with Margaret Thatcher during his visit to England in 1978 prior to her election as Prime Minister in 1979.

Friedman visited the People's Republic of China initially in 1980 and subsequently in 1988 and 1993 to discuss economic development. The official Chinese government invitation in 1979 for his visit was to hold discussions about inflation as China was beginning to relax price controls transitioning away from fixed prices. Friedman delivered four lectures during this visit. In 1988, he lectured to 400 students at Fudan University in Shanghai and received an honorary professorship during his second visit to China. Zhao Ziyang (Premier (1980-1987) and General Secretary (1987-1989) of the Chinese Communist Party) requested a meeting and the discussion revolved around the issues of a centrally planned economy and a free market. Friedman was invited for his third visit during October 1993. Gewirtz (2017) reported that Friedman participated in official government meetings with Jiang Zemin (General Secretary (1989-2002) of the Communist Party and President (1993-2003)). Friedman was invited to visit Iceland during 1984 and deliver a lecture at the University of Iceland. During his visit, he participated in a debate with three intellectuals who were known for expressing their left-of-center political views. One of the intellectuals was Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson who was elected president of the country for a four-year term beginning in 1996 and re-elected multiple times serving through 2016.

Of all Friedman's involvement with foreign countries, none have resulted in the heated controversy that surrounds his activities regarding his Chilean experience. He visited Chile during March 1975 to lecture and meet Augusto José Ramón Pinochet Ugarte. Pinochet was a career military officer appointed as the commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army by President Salvador Guillermo Allende Gossens. Pinochet

served in that role for a period of eighteen days before leading the *coup d'état* to oust President Allende. Allende was a Marxist activist elected as a socialist in 1970. The coup occurred on September 11, 1973, and, on that date, during an attack on the Presidential Palace, Allende died. The rebels claimed he committed suicide; his supporters claimed he was killed, and his death was made to look like a suicide. Pinochet, serving as head of the military junta, received international condemnation for his harsh tactics to suppress dissent.[2]

Friedman was the focus of controversary for his involvement with Chile. He did write a letter, dated April 21, 1975, to Pinochet after his visit advising him to administer policies to cure the inflation in the economy which he indicated would be part of a "shock treatment" including reducing the rate of increase of the quantity of money (Friedman and Friedman, 1998). The advice was implemented by a number of Chilean economists, known as the "Chicago Boys," who studied at the University of Chicago during the 1950s and 1960s. The implemented policy included severe public spending reductions, privatization of former state-owned businesses, elimination of wage and price controls and the deregulation of the financial markets as well as international commerce. In addition to his 1975 visit, he returned to Chile during November 1981. He coined the term "Miracle of Chile" to describe the Chilean economy's transition during the 1980s under the dictatorship of Pinochet. According to Caldwell (undated), Friedman claimed he was not an advisor to Pinochet, that his involvement was in the form of lectures and seminars he delivered on inflation.

Friedman's supporters argued that due to his advice, inflation in Chile decreased and the living standard increased. His detractors argued that the severe internal oppression was too high a price to pay for the improving economy. Myrdal (Economic Sciences Laureate, 1974), upon learning that the economic sciences prize was awarded to Friedman, challenged the concept of the prize. Although his remarks did not specifically indicate the appropriateness of the award in the case of Friedman, his letter to the *Dagens Nyheter* (a Swedish newspaper) called for the termination of the economic sciences prize. He argued that economics is a soft science influenced by political and social values. Silk (1977) wrote that Myrdal stated that he should have declined the award he received in 1974. Four Nobel laureates, David Baltimore (Nobel Laureate, Physiology or Medicine, 1975), Salvador Luria (Nobel Laureate, Physiology or Medicine, 1969), Linus Pauling (Nobel Laureate, Chemistry, 1954) and George Ward (Nobel Laureate, Physiology or Medicine, 1967) registered their disapproval (Baltimore and Luria, 1976 and Wald and Pauling, 1976) for Friedman's award specifically due to his involvement in Chile in letters to *The New York Times*. Friedman (1977) responded to their objections in *The New York Times*.

In summary, Friedman influenced economic theory and government policy. His achievements were recognized by various organizations. A selected list of his honors and recognition is provided at Appendix A. Friedman was a prolific and influential author who, in addition to his scholarly output, attempted to educate the public with his articles in *The Wall Street Journal* and *Newsweek Magazine* as well as numerous op-ed pieces in newspapers. Together with his wife Rose, Friedman produced *Free to Choose*, a ten-part public television series on economics with a companion book, broadcast on the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) in 1980. In some ways *Free to Choose* was inspired as a response to John Kenneth Galbraith's (Ph.D., University of California at Berkeley, 1934) 1977 series *The Age of Uncertainty*. More than 1,500 digital items of Friedman's writing and writing about him can be found at The Collected Works of Milton Friedman website at the Hoover Institution Archives (https://miltonfriedman.hoover.org/collections). The National Bureau of Economic Research website (https://www.nber.org/people/milton_friedman) also lists his writing while he was on staff at the organization. His publications are indexed by Google Scholar (https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=DV6pTH0AAAAJ). A selected list of his writing is presented at Appendix B.

NOTES

1 Biography obtained, in part, from "Milton Friedman Biographical."

2 Information reported in this paragraph was obtained by two entries, both undated, in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* attributable to Editors and updates by Amy Tikkanen.

REFERENCES

Baltimore, David and Salvador E. Luria. 1976. Letters to the Editor: The Laureate. *The New York Times.* (October 24):166.

Bernanke, Ben S. 2002. On Milton Friedman's Ninetieth Birthday, Remarks. (November 8). The Federal Reserve Board. https://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2002/20021108/.

Caldwell, Bruce J. (undated). Milton Friedman: American Economist. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Milton-Friedman.

Doherty, Brian. 1995. Best of Both Worlds: An Interview with Milton Friedman. *Reason Magazine.* (June 1).

Editors 2017. Milton Friedman: There is no Such Thing as a Free Lunch De Gruyter Conversations. (November 16). https://blog.degruyter.com/milton-friedman-no-thing-free-lunch/.

Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica and updated by Amy Tikkanen. Augusto Pinochet: President of Chile *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Augusto-Pinochet.

Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica and updated by Amy Tikkanen. Salvador Allende: President of Chile. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. https://www.britannica.com/biography/SalvadoCalAllende.

Friedman, Milton. 1937. The Use of Ranks to Avoid the Assumption of Normality Implicit in the Analysis of Variance. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. 32(200):675-701.

_____. 1939. A Correction: The Use of Ranks to Avoid the Assumption of Normality Implicit in the Analysis of Variance. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. 34(205):109.

_____. 1940. A Comparison of Alternative Tests of Significance for the Problem of m Rankings. *The Annals of Mathematical Statistics*. 11(1):86-92.

Friedman, Milton. 1953a. The Methodology of Positive Economics. *Essays in Positive Economics*. Part I:3-43. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

_____. 1953b. The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates *Essays in Positive Economics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

_____. 1956. *Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

_____. 1957. *A Theory of the Consumption Function*. National Bureau of Economic Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Also appearing in (1969) *The Optimum Quantity of Money and Other Essays.* Aldine Publishing Company.]

_____. 1960. *A Program for Monetary Stability.* New York: Fordham University Press.

_____. 1962. *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

_____. 1968. The Role of Monetary Policy. *The American Economic Review.* 58(1):1-17.

_____. 1969. *The Optimum Quantity of Money.* London: Macmillan.

_____. 1970. The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. *The New York Times Magazine.* (September 13):32-33, 122-124.

_____. 1977. Letters Follow-Up: An Exchange Among Nobel Laureates. *The New York Times.* (May 22):166.

_____. 1992. *Money Mischief: Episodes in Monetary History.* New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Friedman, Milton and Rose D. Friedman. 1980. *Free to Choose.* New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. [Complements a ten-part TV series of the same name, shown over PBS in early 1980.]

Friedman, Milton and Leonard J. Savage. 1948. Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk *Journal of Political Economy.* 56(4):279-304.

Friedman, Milton and David I. Meiselman. 1963. The Relative Stability of Monetary Velocity and the Investment Multiplier in the United States, 1898-1958. *Commission on Money and Credit Stabilization Policies*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Friedman, Milton and Anna J. Schwartz. 1963. *A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

_____. 1965. *The Great Contraction, 1929–1933.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Friedman, Milton and George J. Stigler. 1946. *Roofs or Ceilings? The Current Housing Problem.* Foundation for Economic Education.

Friedman, Milton and Anna J. Schwartz (1982). *Monetary Trends in the United States and the United Kingdom: Their Relation to Income, Prices, and Interest Rates, 1867-1975*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Friedman, Milton and Rose D. Friedman (1998). *Two Lucky People: Memoirs*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [Appendix A, 591–93. Letter from Friedman to Pinochet, April 21, 1975.]

Gewirtz, Julian (2017). "The Little-Known Story of Milton Friedman in China", Policy Report. (September/October). Cato Institute.

Hoover, Kevin D. "Phillips Curve", The Library of Economics and Liberty. https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PhillipsCurve.html.
Kuznets, Simon and Milton Friedman (1939). *Income from Independent Professional Practice.* National Bureau of Economic Research.
Markowitz, Harry M. (1990). "Foundations of Portfolio Theory". Nobel Lecture (December 7).
"Milton Friedman Biographical", The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1976. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1976/friedman/biographical/.
"Milton Friedman Facts", The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1976. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1976/friedman/facts/.
Mulligan, Robert F. (2011). "An Austrian Rehabilitation of the Phillips Curve," *Cato Journal* 31(1): 87-9.
Phillips, A. W. (1958). "The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957", *Economica*. New Series. 25(100): 283-299.
Salter, Alexander William (2014). "An Introduction to Monetary Policy Rules", Mercatus Working Paper. (December). Mercatus Center, George Mason University.
Schultz, Henry (1938). *The Theory and Measurement of Demand.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Silk, Leonard (1977). "Nobel Award in Economics: Should Prize Be Abolished?", *New York Times*. (March 31) 83.
Wald, George and Linus Pauling (1976). "Letters to the Editor: The Laureate". *The New York Times*. (October): 166.
"Who we are: Our Legacy". EdChoice Foundation. https://www.edchoice.org/who-we-are/our-legacy/.

APPENDIX A

HONORS AND RECOGNITION

- Awarded (1951), John Bates Clark Medal
- Trustee (1966-68, 1970-73, 1976-79), Philadelphia Society
- Member (1969-1970), President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force.
- Member (1971-1973), President's Commission on White House Fellows
- Awarded (1976), Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel
- Member, (1981-1988), President's Economic Policy Advisory Board
- Awarded (1986), Grand Cordon of the First Class Order of the Sacred Treasure (Japanese government)
- Awarded (1988), (United States) National Medal of Science
- Awarded (1988), (United States) Presidential Medal of Freedom
- Awarded, Honorary degrees by universities in the United States, Japan, Israel, and Guatemala.
- President, American Economic Association
- President, Western Economic Association
- President (1970-1972) and Member, Mont Pèlerin Society
- Member, American Philosophical Society
- Fellow, Econometric Society
- Member, (United States) National Academy of Sciences
- Honored (2001), Biannual Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty, Cato Institute

APPENDIX B

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS

Friedman, Milton (1937). "The Use of Ranks to Avoid the Assumption of Normality Implicit in the Analysis of Variance". *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. 32(200): 675–701.

Friedman, Milton (1939). "A Correction: The Use of Ranks to Avoid the Assumption of Normality Implicit in the Analysis of Variance ". *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. 34(205): 109.

Friedman, Milton (1940). "A Comparison of Alternative Tests of Significance for the Problem of m Rankings". *The Annals of Mathematical Statistics*. 11(1): 86–92.

Friedman, Milton and George J. Stigler (1946). *Roofs or Ceilings? The Current Housing Problem*. Foundation for Economic Education.

Friedman, Milton and Leonard J. Salvage (1948). "Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk". *Journal of Political Economy*. 56(4): 279–304.

Friedman, Milton (1953a). "The Methodology of Positive Economics", *Essays in Positive Economics*. Part I, 3-43. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Friedman, Milton (1953b). "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates". *Essays in Positive Economics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Friedman, Milton (1956). *Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Friedman, Milton (1957). *A Theory of the Consumption Function*. National Bureau of Economic Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Also appearing in (1969) *The Optimum Quantity of Money and Other Essays*. Aldine Publishing Company.]

Friedman, Milton (1960). *A Program for Monetary Stability*. New York: Fordham University Press.

Friedman, Milton (1962). *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Friedman, Milton (1962). *Price Theory: A Provisional Text*. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.

Friedman, Milton and Anna J. Schwartz (1963). *A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Friedman, Milton and David I. Meiselman (1963). "The Relative Stability of Monetary Velocity and the Investment Multiplier in the United States, 1898-1958", in Commission on Money and Credit, *Stabilization Policies*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Friedman, Milton and Anna J. Schwartz (1965). *The Great Contraction, 1929–1933*. Princeton University Press.

Friedman, Milton (1968). "The Role of Monetary Policy", *American Economic Review*. 58(1): 1–17.

Friedman, Milton (1969). *The Optimum Quantity of Money*. London: Macmillan.

Friedman, Milton and Anna J. Schwartz (1970). *Monetary Statistics of the United States: Estimates, Sources, Methods*. NBER Books and New York: Columbia University Press.

Friedman, Milton (1970). "The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits", *New York Times Magazine*. (September 13): 32-33, 122-124.

Friedman, Milton (1972). *An Economist's Protest: Columns on Political Economy*. Glen Ridge, N.J.: Thomas Horton and Daughters.

Friedman, Milton (1977). "Letters Follow-Up: An Exchange Among Nobel Laureates". *The New York Times*. (May 22): 166.

Friedman, Milton (1977). "Inflation and Unemployment: Nobel Lecture", *Journal of Political Economy*. Volume 85, pp. 451-472.

Friedman, Milton and Rose D. Friedman (1980). *Free to Choose*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. [Complements a ten-part TV series of the same name, shown over PBS in early 1980.]

Friedman, Milton and Anna J. Schwartz (1982). *Monetary Trends in the United States and the United Kingdom: Their Relation to Income, Prices, and Interest Rates, 1867-1975*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Friedman, Milton (1983). *Bright Promises, Dismal Performance*. Thomas Horton and Daughters. [Consists mostly of reprints of tri-weekly columns written for Newsweek from 1966 to 1983.]

Friedman, Milton and Rose D. Friedman (1984). *Tyranny of the Status Quo*. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. [Complements a three-part TV series of the same name, shown over PBS in early 1984.].

Friedman, Milton (1992). *Money Mischief: Episodes in Monetary History*. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Friedman, Milton and Rose D. Friedman (1998). *Two Lucky People: Memoirs*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [Appendix A, 591–93. Letter from Friedman to Pinochet, April 21, 1975.]

Kuznets, Simon and Milton Friedman (1939). *Income from Independent Professional Practice*. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Oakeshott's Early Conception of Authority

CHRISTOPHER ADAIR-TOTEFF
University of South Florida

INTRODUCTION

There appears to be a single thread that runs through Michael Oakeshott's thinking, from his earliest book reviews to his final essays. This single thread is the concept of authority. When Oakeshott first began to publish his work, the focus of authority was mostly on God; but for much of his life, the focus was on authority in law. To examine this thread of authority would require at least an entire book so the intention here is much more modest. It is to explore Oakeshott's early conception of authority by examining his 1929 essay "The Authority of the State."[1] While this short essay may not be as elegant nor as sophisticated as many of his post war writings, it does focus on some of thorniest problems of political philosophy: the nature of authority, the purpose of the state, and the role of authority in and of the state.[2]

This essay has four parts: Oakeshott's review of Philip S. Belasco's *Authority in Church and State*, Oakeshott's essay "The Authority of the State", some comments, observations, and questions, and then some concluding comments. The intention here is to draw more attention to Oakeshott's essay and to set out his early conception of authority.

OAKESHOTT'S REVIEW

In the summer of 1929, Michael Oakeshott published his twelfth book review. He had published his first three in 1927 followed by another seven the following year. Each of the first three appeared in *Journal of Theological Studies* while only one from 1928 was published in that journal. The other six appeared in the *Cambridge Journal*. Oakeshott did not publish any reviews in 1928 and only two in 1929: The first one appeared in *Journal of Philosophical Studies* while the second was in *Journal of Theological Studies*. The subject of the first review was philosophical: *Fundamental Problems of Life: An Essay on Citizenship as Pursuit of Values* by John Stuart Mackenzie and the subject of the second was theological: *Authority in Church and State* by Philip S. Belasco. Both books were published by George Allen and Unwin in 1928. As both titles indicated, the books were a combination of disciplines: philosophy and political thought and theology and political thinking. Mackenzie was a retired professor and well-respected author of a half dozen books; Belasco had just received a degree from the London School of Economics and this was his first book.

Oakeshott's early reviews tended to be very brief but those on the two books were close to three pages. His review of Mackenzie's book is very positive and he praises the

author for his erudition and his moderation (Oakeshott 2007a, pp. 52-53). In contrast, Oakeshott is highly critical of Belasco's *Authority in Church and State*. Oakeshott accused Belasco of producing a book which covered "a wide and miscellaneous field of topics" and doing so "in a rather unsystematic manner". In addition, he faulted Belasco for writing two different books: one on the Quakers and one on authority. This gives the book its "dual character: it is an historical survey and an account of the author's own position" (Oakeshott 2007b, p. 54).

Oakeshott indicated that as an historical study, *Authority in Church and State* "has much to recommend it" but adds that it has its defects. One problem is Belasco's attempt to separate politics and religion. In response, Oakeshott noted that these were not separate during the seventeenth century and that Belasco was not consistent in his discussions of them. Another problem that Oakeshott found was that Belasco was almost exclusively interested in practical matters; thus, he failed to provide a theoretical account of authority. An additional problem was Belasco tendency to simplify things as well as being occasionally incorrect (Oakeshott 2007b, p. 55). But Oakeshott leveled two major criticisms at Belasco. First, he misunderstood and misused history. Belasco believed that the contemporary situation was similar to the historical period that he had explored and as a result he engaged in "vague and unhistorical generalizations". Both of these are, in Oakeshott's opinion, "dangerous paths" and that Belasco "felt the seduction of both these paths", but he seemed to have found "the second more fascinating" (Oakeshott 2007b, p. 54). Second, Oakeshott criticized Belasco for his style of execution and that the reader does not know whether "an argument is the author's own, somebody else's, or merely hypothetical." (Oakeshott 2007b, p. 56).

Was Oakeshott's criticism of Belasco warranted? The first major criticism can be answered only by consulting Oakeshott's later writings on history. That would provide a justification for Oakeshott's criticism of Belasco but is beyond the scope of this paper. The second main criticism regarding Belasco's views requires a brief examination of his book.

Oakeshott complained that one could not determine whose ideas were being investigated and he alleged that part of the problem was that Belasco's account was neither systematic nor focused. Oakeshott may have meant that Belasco's *Authority in Church and State* has three parts: Part One is "The Political Ideas of the Quakers of the Seventeenth Century", Part Two is "Authority in Church and State", and Part Three is "A Defence of William Penn." But these are not unrelated but are interconnected: there is the theme of liberty of conscience which runs through all three Parts. In Part One, Belasco emphasizes the Quaker conviction that each individual's conscience is the authority so that neither the Church nor the State have a legitimate claim of authority over a Quaker (Belasco 1928, pp. 32, 42, 86-87). Belasco indicated that both the Church and the State were too preoccupied with material matters and as a result ignored spirituality. Both the Church and the State believed in compulsion—but the Quaker rejects force. A Quaker is not a beast, but is a human being (Belasco 1928, pp. 62, 72). Compulsion can make a person do things but it cannot persuade him; progress cannot be made from fear, but from ideals. Ideals would then benefit society (Belasco 1928, pp. 63, 69-70). Belasco argued that the Quakers believed that society as it existed was dominated by the few and they were indifferent to the sufferings of the poor. In contrast, the Quakers were concerned with the welfare of all and they based their struggle on the "absolute liberty of conscience" (Belasco 1928, pp. 84, 86-87, 108).

In the chapter "Political Implications", Belasco argued that the Quakers were the first to challenge the State's claim of sovereignty. He pointed especially to Hobbes' *Leviathan* and his notion of the contract of giving up freedom for security. But the Quakers rejected this as artificial; only one's conscience mattered. Hence, there is the problem of authority (Belasco 1928: 110-117).

Part Two is "Authority in Church and State" and Belasco suggested that when the Church lost its sense of infallibility, the State became the authority (Belasco 1928, pp. 130-131, 142). It was then the State which granted some authority to the Church (Belasco 1928, pp. 146-152, 193). Whereas the Catholic Church continued to differentiate between what is owed to God and what is owed to Caesar, the Protestant Church believed in the nation and provided "the formative elements of its authority" (Belasco 1928, pp. 196, 201-204). Belasco concluded Part Two with the claim that organized religion believed that the State has authority

(Belasco 1928, p. 221). But Belasco's interest was not in organized religion but in its dissenters: the Quakers. Thus, Part Three is "A Defence of William Penn" and does not have relevance here.

It would appear that Oakeshott's criticisms of Belasco's book are partially warranted and partially unwarranted. They are unwarranted because Belasco was providing an account of the Quakers as dissidents who believed in the sole power of conscience. As such, Belasco was arguing against the notion of authority and denying that the visible Church and the actual State have any legitimate claim to authority. The criticisms are warranted in that Belasco's account in a unwieldly mixture of history and theory and that it is not always clear whether the value judgments are from Belasco or from the Quakers. In essence, Oakeshott's review is revealing; but what is really important is that Belasco's book prompted Oakeshott to investigate the role of authority in church and state.

OAKESHOTT ON AUTHORITY

Michael Oakeshott's essay "The Authority of the State" was not intended to address the question of the power of authority; it was intended to address the more fundamental question of what authority is. Actually, Oakeshott had three questions: 1) what is meant by authority?, 2) what is meant by the state?, and 3) what is meant by the authority of the state? Each of the three could be a subject of a book and it was audacious of Oakeshott to think that he could provide answers to all three in a single, brief essay. He devoted most of the essay to the first question, a lesser amount to the second, and he dispatched the third question in just over two pages. There are two additional pieces which follow Oakeshott's essay: a critical letter from G. E. G. Catlin and Oakeshott's rather caustic reply.

Oakeshott begins the large first section with the question "What do we mean by authority?" and he suggests that there are three possible answers to this question. First, simply answer it by appealing to "what is commonly understood by the word." Yet, Oakeshott indicates that this answer is not nearly as straightforward as it seems. It is neither readily apparent by the usual term "authority" nor is there some deeply embedded idea that lurks underneath our everyday usage of the word. Oakeshott insists that what is needed is something both less and more than these two approaches: an agreed upon meaning. But this is also insufficient because what is needed is not a "merely agreed upon meaning"; what we really need is "a coherent and unambiguous conception of authority." This does not mean that Oakeshott rejects the common meaning of the term "authority"; in fact, he readily admits that it should be the starting point of any inquiry into the definition of the word "authority." He also insists that the means of dealing with the inconsistencies regarding authority should not be resolved by adopting some arbitrary definition but by "transforming them into a coherent whole"—which is what he sets out to do (Oakeshott 1993b, pp. 74-75).

Oakeshott draws attention to two ambiguities in the common notion of authority. On one hand, it is regarded as an external and coercive power. It is external in the sense that we experience that as being ordered or commanded by someone else. It is coercive in the sense that we are ordered or commanded by an individual instead of that individual either persuading us or explaining it to us. This is the notion of authority that we learn as a child. Oakeshott contrasts authority with reason. Reasoning is, briefly, the process that one does by one's self. It is the mental process of seeking reasons and justifications for one's own actions. But authority is the belief that someone has the competency to make the judgments for us. That this is not a form of persuasion is indicated by the fact that it is delivered "dogmatically"—it is the forcing of opinion. Oakeshott explains the difference by a reference to Socrates who dogmatically opined "'I am confident that the dead have some kind of existence.'" Oakeshott explains that Simmias is dissatisfied with this assertion, asks Socrates to share this belief. This is asking Socrates to move from authority, which "merely constrains opinion" to reason which "persuades and enlightens" (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 75).

Oakeshott has pointed to the claim that authority is both external and coercive; but now he insists that it cannot be both—it must either be external *or* coercive. He justifies this assertion by pointing out that if it is external, then it must be coercive is some "vague, metaphoric sense." Oakeshott attempts to base this on the distinction between a *cause* and a *ground*. He explains that "it would be absurd to maintain that

the power which actually compels a belief belongs merely to its cause." (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 75). It is this sentence that will be the basis for Catlin's first criticism of Oakeshott's conception of authority. However, Oakeshott does not simply assert this statement; he spends the next two pages elaborating and defending this distinction between external and coercion.

This distinction is not a minor one; but is actually a very important one. He offers three scenarios in which we believe a statement to be true: 1) we have been taught it; 2) a friend believes it; and 3) the whole village believes it. The basis for this belief is trust—trust in education, trust in friends, and trust in the community. It is the opposite of trusting in one's ability to determine the relevant facts and the draw the appropriate conclusion. This is relatively straightforward but his distinction between cause and ground is not. He tries to explain this by discussing the belief that a man is a convicted murderer. The cause is knowing from media that he has been convicted in a court of law. But the ground of the belief is not a simple absorption of that fact, but the accumulated information about the workings of courts, the amassing of facts, the judge's instructions, the jury's deliberations, and finally, the judge's determination of guilt. The cause and the ground of belief are different. As Oakeshott explains "A mere external authority is, then, left hanging in the air; it is a cause severed from a ground." The ground is more than a mere cause; the ground is the basis for the authority of the belief. Oakeshott further clarifies this by pointing out that the basis for authority lies outside the sheer cause. If it were simply a matter of accepting the cause as ground, then all such assertions would be unremarkable. This belief that authority is external and coercive is untenable. Oakeshott insists: "In short, this 'authority' is a vicious abstraction; if it be external, it cannot be itself coercive, and if it be not coercive I fail to understand in what sense it can be authoritative." This claim for authority fails the test of being unambiguous, so Oakeshott states that he must look further for determining a proper definition of authority (Oakeshott 1993b, pp. 76-77).

However, Oakeshott does not actually do that. Instead, he states that the common notion of authority is self-contradictory as he has just explained. It is also self-contradictory in another way. Oakeshott does not state what way that is; instead, he points to a number of problems. First, he points to the fact that we tend to distinguish between authority as a matter of right and as a matter of power. The question is what confers legitimacy on a particular authority; that is, what makes it different from a particular authority which is a usurper? He writes "All authority is, as such, legitimate so long as it is really authoritative" (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 77). But is this not tautological? Oakeshott does not address that nor does he explain how it might not be redundant. Instead, he moves to a second point, that of "limited authority." But this is, he contends, problematic because how can somebody be authoritative and yet be reliant on another authority. Again, Oakeshott does not elaborate on this; but the proper answer would be that we often meet authorities who answer to higher authorities. One does not need to think about Belasco's conviction that one's conscience is the higher authority in contrast to any and all earthly authorities. Instead, one needs to think of most Western legal traditions in which a lower court gives deference to a higher court. Oakeshott seems to conclude his discussion of the problems with the common notion of authority by pointing to the difference between someone who *claims* authority and someone who actually *exercises* it (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 77). Much of the remaining discussion regarding the notion of authority centers on the belief that somehow authority is an external coercive force. These five lengthy paragraphs are densely argued and Oakeshott's thread of thinking is not always easy to follow. Some of the density is due to the difficulty of the material but some of the density is because of its style. Oakeshott had not achieved the brevity and precision that he would soon be known for; here there are almost Germanic sentences, perhaps a legacy of his several years of study in Germany. For example, there is one sentence that consists of seventy-one words, contains two semi-colons and two commas, and covers almost seven full lines. It is worth exploring because of its importance as the first sentence of the five-paragraph explanation and because it is so complex.

> I take it that only a measure of perversity which can expect no reply will question the supposition that coerciveness is inseparable from whatever is actually authoritative; that which does not actually compel belief or action, and from the command of which there is no appeal, is not in the full

> sense authoritative; and conversely, that which is really coercive of belief and action is the authority upon which they rest (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 77).

If I understand this sentence (which I may not), Oakeshott is making four points. One, that there must be a willingness to understand in order to achieve agreement. Any unwillingness to do so is a type of perversity which prevents any real discussion. If one is not perverse and is willing to discuss, then there needs to be a focus on the supposed connection between authority and coercion. Two, that there are levels of authority and that the "final" level of authority is that which is the actual power to command belief and action. Three, it is only that which is "really coercive of belief and action" that is authoritative. Four, it is this "final" level of authority which cannot be appealed. From this lengthy sentence Oakeshott draws the conclusion: "If this be so, it follows that authority is never external, for we are never compelled by that which remains outside of us" (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 78). Here it seems that Oakeshott has distinguished between coercion and compulsion and that the former is a threat while the latter is a persuasion. Again, there is Oakeshott's difference between a cause and a belief. He provides the example of the soldier who has been ordered to shoot. The commander's order to shoot is external and is a cause; but, the soldier who has decided to obey has made a judgment about the commander's authority. This is an internal decision and provides the belief that justifies the soldier's decision. Oakeshott emphasizes that that superior's command is external but the soldier's decision to obey is internal.

Oakeshott offers a slightly different approach and that we may have external sources which compel us to believe: "a book, a person, or a tradition" but we do not believe them simply because they are a book, a person, or a tradition; we believe them because we believe them to be trustworthy. There are millions of people, thousands of books, and hundreds of traditions and none of these are authoritative in and of themselves. It is only in the rare cases that we are not only familiar with these sources and that they speak to us. He offers a slightly different example: He first believed that the earth was round because his nursemaid or kindergarten teacher told him so. That was the external cause but is no longer the ground of his belief. Oakeshott emphasizes his (internal) willingness to believe; without it, the (external) cause is not an authority (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 78).

Oakeshott reinforces his contention by again stressing that what one believes cannot be dependent on something further down the line. That is because that cause is dependent and Oakeshott explains that the "real authority" is that, and only that, which "can show itself to be absolute, irresponsible, self-supporting and inescapable" (ibid.). This quotation is revealing for two reasons: first, it reveals Oakeshott's continued fascination with Idealism and second, while "absolute" and "self-supporting and inescapable" seem self-evident, the other term does not. It is not clear what he means by "irresponsible"—one would think that an authority would be the ultimate provider of responsibility. He does, however, later clarify that irresponsible means being ultimately responsible only for itself and that there is no possibility for any type of responsibility for anything or anyone else.

Oakeshott offers a further reinforcement. The genuine authority is "always single and indivisible." He explains that the foundation for belief is always a unity. If it is not, then it is insufficient to support the belief. He insists that it is "nonsense" to attribute the authority of Christianity to "history, reason and spiritual experience" because none of these are sufficient grounds for belief. As a further indicator of his idealism, Oakeshott is adamant that the final authority which is the only thing that possesses "the power to coerce" is "our world of ideas as a whole." (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 79). He differentiates between inauthentic "authority" which is merely an imposter, and authentic "authority" which alone has the capacity to compel. He claims that with genuine authority, we must accept it as "we have no choice in the matter." Again, an "authority" from which we can "escape" is no authority but an imposter. Oakeshott returns to his distinction between an external authority and an internal one. An external "authority" does not exist; regardless whether it is a person, an institution, or a society; it lacks the power to compel. Again, an authority can only be internal and this is true if the original origin of the belief was external. We were taught to believe things as children so it seems as if the authority was external. Oakeshott addresses this by reminding us that even as children

we have the sense of who to believe. As adult, we do not simply accept someone else's word as authoritative; we have sufficient grounds to take that word and turn it into ours. We are the ultimate judges of what counts as an authority. Oakeshott repeats his distinction between cause and ground of belief. Authority is always greater than a mere cause. "An absolute, compelling and at the same time external authority is as much a psychological curiosity as it is a logical monster" (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 79). Oakeshott's final point in the section on authority involves reason. Something that is contrary to reason cannot be the grounds for a belief in an authority because reason is the only ground for legitimate belief. In a case in which superstition or something like it claims authority, it is no more than a usurper and the basis is nothing more than something that is "random, capricious and unstable."[3]

OAKESHOTT ON THE STATE

Oakeshott turns to his second question "What do we mean by the state?" but instead of answering it, he launches into a scathing criticism regarding political thought. He has little regard for contemporary theology because it is dark and misplaced, but he thinks that political philosophy is not just dark and misplaced but is downright ill and evil. He complains that it is too consumed with jargon and its ideas are divorced from reality—there is no hope for "any sudden rejuvenation." There is only "the familiar wreckage of dead controversies" and he is afraid that whatever answer he attempts to give to the question "What do we mean by the state?" will be inconclusive and obscure—two of the greatest flaws that Oakeshott tries to avoid (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 80).

Oakeshott considers four notions from three contemporary books. He has two references to R. M. MacIver's *The Modern State,* one to Ernst Barker's *The Study of Political Science,* and one to Harold Laski's *The Study of Politics.*[4] Despite the fact that all three of these authors had significant reputations and held professorships at distinguished universities, Oakeshott took issue with all three. MacIver was wrong on two counts: the first was his allegiance to what Oakeshott referred to as "perverted realism" which led MacIver to believe that the state was a "fact" when it is only an idea, if not a fiction. Laski's mistake was prompted by his "pluralism run to seed" which led him to contend that there are bare alternatives from which we should choose while MacIver's second mistake was to believe that there are two opposing conceptions of the state. Finally, Barker's problem was that one can construct a complete conception of the state from "lesser and different conceptions" (Oakeshott 1993b, pp. 80-81).

Oakeshott does not elaborate on the flaws in MacIver's, Laski's, and Barker's notions of the state. Instead, he suggests that he will pivot to his own understanding of what we mean by the state. However, he does not do that; what he does is he justifies his dismissal of these other conceptions on the basis that they compete among themselves but offer us nothing new. He suggests that the attempts to offer alternatives are doomed to fail just like an attempt to compare a mathematical conception of the world with a moral notion—they are not just irrelevant but misleading. These other views "are obstacles to be overcome, abstract points of view to be superseded" (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 81). Yet he does borrow from the common conceptions of the state, just as he began his quest for the meaning of authority by considering its common conceptions. Like his earlier question, here he builds upon the less satisfactory and moves to higher levels of satisfaction.

Oakeshott notes that there are at least four common conceptions of the state: 1) the state is geographical, 2) the state is a collection of people, 3) the state is a secular whole, and 4) the state is a political whole. Regarding 1), Oakeshott does not think it will involve much effort to show that this is obviously an insufficient conception. He states that this is easily shown by the fact that its proponents do not insist that it is territory as much as they insist that it is "*at least* a piece of a territory" (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 81). But it is not a definition of the state as it is part of what a state is. Oakeshott admits that territory is indeed a necessary part of what makes up the state; however, it cannot be a definition because the boundaries of any state are subject to change. Since the territory limits are arbitrary, abstract, and agreed upon, a state's geographical

limits cannot be regarded as a definition of what counts as a state. In Oakeshott's Hegelian approach, this definition "must be superseded."

Something similar can be said about 2) and that a state is a collection of people. Yes, as with land, persons are also necessary for a state. Just as a state cannot exist without some territory, no state can exist without a population. But Oakeshott counters that this number is abstract and is merely mathematical; what is necessary is not something abstract, but something concrete. Like the claim that a state is territory, a state as a collection of persons must also be superseded.

Conception 3) is intriguing because it is something that most Englishmen believe. Oakeshott explains this by pointing out that the English in particular hold that the state is a secular whole; that it, the state exists to further a non-theological entity. Oakeshott thinks that this is also incomplete in that a secular collection of persons is still only an abstraction. Since he thinks that abstractions are fictions, the state as a secular whole is also a fiction and not a fact.

Oakeshott takes up conception 4) and he thinks that this conception is perhaps the most common of the four. He quotes two scholars: G. D. H. Cole's *Self-Government in Industry* and Laski's *Authority in the Modern State*. Like Laski, George Douglas Howard Cole was a leftist politician and had connections to the Webbs and their community. *Self-Government and Industry* was rather Marxist—it first appeared in 1917 and Cole revised it in 1920. Oakeshott's quotation is "The state is the political machinery of government in a community." By community, Oakeshott suggests that Cole meant "the political whole." Laski published his *Authority in the Modern State* in 1919 and, out of the more than 400 pages, Oakeshott quotes one sentence from page 26: the state "is concerned with those social relations which express themselves by means of government" (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 82, and notes 9 and 10). Again, he finds fault in both Cole's and Laski's conceptions as being abstractions. The state as a political whole is an abstraction just as the other three; but, in this case, it is an abstraction because it is a group assembled for some indeterminate purpose. As with the other three, this conception of a state is a fiction and not a fact; it is abstract and not concrete. Oakeshott regards the notion of the political whole as only less barren than the others.

Having devoted three and a half pages to four conventional conceptions of the state, Oakeshott spends only two pages on his own conception. Even then, he cautions that it is neither full nor without its own problems. It is, however, an honest attempt at defining what makes a state a state. As with his conception of authority, he insists that any realistic concept of the state must be both concrete and self-contained. It must be a fact and not a fiction; it must be self-explanatory. By the first, he means it exists and not as an abstraction; by the second, he means that it cannot rest upon some further and external explanation. His answer is that the state is the "social whole"; that is, it is an "actual community." Oakeshott does not explain how this differs from either a collection of individuals or from a political whole. What he does say is that the state is "an actual community which satisfies the whole mind of the individuals who comprise it" (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 83). This is the final end of the state—not as a teleological end but as an explanatory end. Government, law, economic, religious, and intellectual considerations are only means; this self-regarding community is the final resting point.

Oakeshott admits that this definition is not as clear as he would like it to be nor does he elaborate upon it. Instead, he confronts three of the "commonest misapprehensions" of it. One, that this is tantamount to maintaining that the state is the government. However, it is a social whole which the "government implies" so they are not one and the same. Two, it fails to distinguish between society and the state. Yet, the state as government is an abstraction whereas the members who comprise the social whole are concrete individuals. He argues further that separating state from society not only does not provide us with a concept of each; it also fails to give us something "full enough to dignify with the name of 'fact'" (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 84). Three, allowing that the state and the social whole are the same, then "*where*, then, is the state?" Oakeshott's reply is that the locus of the state is unimportant; what is, is that the state meets the needs of the individuals which make up this social whole.

Oakeshott defends his view by pointing out that it is a fact and not a mere abstraction. He allows that these abstractions are useful fictions. However, as generalities they cannot serve as definitions. It is

Oakeshott's method to proceed from the general to the less abstract to the concrete. He offers as an example "society as politically organized" is less general than "secular society" because it specifies the political aspect of secular society. But when the state is defined as that which satisfies the needs of concrete persons, then the state is a fact.

Oakeshott concludes the discussion about the state by allowing that there are apparent difficulties with the idea that the state is the members. But, this difficulty cannot be addressed until such time that political theorists abandon the conviction that the state is somehow "the moral or legal conception of the individual" (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 85).

OAKESHOTT ON AUTHORITY OF THE STATE

One might think that Oakeshott would spend close to the same amount of time discussing authority of the state as he did with the notion of the state, if not the concept of authority. Instead, he devotes one brief paragraph to it and even then he suggests that his answer to the third question is not a real answer. The reply to the third question "where, then, is the authority of the state?" is only implied by his answer to the first two questions (Ibid.). Instead of developing this implication, Oakeshott addresses two fashionable answers. The first answer is the "government" and the second is the "people."

The first answer is not only "government" but "government and law." Oakeshott reminds us once again that the proper definition must be "something from which there is no appeal, something irresponsible, inescapable, and something complete in itself" (Ibid.). He admits that the "legislative authority" is absolute and irresponsible—but adds that this is true only from one point of view. That is, it is true from the point of view of the administrator or the practicing attorney—they do not ask whether the law is just or is expedient. Instead, they ask only what it says. In this sense and only in this sense does the law appear to be an "absolute and inescapable authority." Oakeshott adds that for the administrator, attorney, and judge, "The law, for him, can do no wrong" (Ibid.). Yet many laws not only do wrong; they are wrong. Oakeshott does not pursue this line of thinking; instead, he again points out that this belief that the law can do no wrong is an abstract fiction and is not a concrete fact. He does not question that this fiction is a useful one; just that it remains a fiction.

In addition, it is a fiction to assert that the legislative body is an authority. Laws are frequently changed and even governments are occasionally overthrown. That is to say that the legislators and governmental officials are answerable to the people. It is here that Oakeshott clarifies what he means by "irresponsible." He means the lack of responsibility but not in a negative sense; rather, while the legislative is the "creator" of the law, "it is always responsible to another and wider tribunal"—the subjects. Oakeshott does not embody "the people" with wisdom; instead, he suggests that sometimes the government turns "opinions of idiots into laws." He also references Montaigne's saying that there is nothing so gross as the faculty of laws (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 86). Instead of the government and laws being an authority, it is derivative—it draws its power from outside of itself. Rather than being sovereign, it is dependent. It is a "legal fiction and not a fact." It lacks the power of the real authority which "actually compels any belief or action."

The second answer is based upon the notion of consent or a type of contract. In almost every variation it involves the idea of "the people." Oakeshott begins this discussion by considering John Locke's assertion that the supreme power remains with the people. This involves the will of the people, if not all, at least most of them. Oakeshott dismisses this notion as being scarcely better than the one it was designed to replace. First, as he points out, consent is not authority. Consent can be a cause but not the ground of a belief. Consent can be given or withheld but since it is dependent it cannot be "absolute and independent". Second, he asks, what is meant by "the people"? Is this not a fluctuating group? Even Rousseau's general will is neither sovereign nor authoritative. It lacks the marks of authority which are "absoluteness, self-subsistence and irresponsibility" (Oakeshott 1993b, pp. 86-87).

In the final paragraph of "The Authority of the State" Oakeshott again dismisses the claim that authority is founded upon the government and he rejects again the assertion that it rests on the people. But he cau-

tions that such rejections should not lead one to think that authority is some illusion. Rather, our own experiences dictate that we believe in authority and he repeats that authority is in and of itself. It is "absolute and inescapable"; it is the "absolute, irresponsible, inescapable power." It is neither a form of government nor a type of consent, but is a power that is complete in itself. It is "the whole ground upon which a belief or action rests." The final sentence is "*Non est potestas super terram quae comparetur ei.*"—"There is no power on earth greater than he"….—that is "authority of the state" (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 87).

CATLIN VERSUS OAKESHOTT AND OAKESHOTT VERSUS CATLIN

The first "appendix" was a letter signed by a certain G. E. G. Catlin from Cornell University. Both parts of this are slightly misleading. G. E. G. stood for George Edward Gordon and Catlin was only temporarily associated with Cornell University. George Edward Gordon Catlin (1896-1979) was born, educated, and lived most of his life in England. He was at Cornell from roughly 1926 through 1929 and was there teaching political science. He had made a name for himself with the 1927 publication of *The Science and Methods of Political Science* in which he argued that "political science" needed to become a genuine science alongside the physical sciences. In his letter, Catlin lodged three criticisms against Oakeshott's essay. First, he accused Oakeshott of confusing authority with the "grounds of accepting authority." Second, he accused Oakeshott of confusing the nation state with an ideal. Third, he accused Oakeshott for insisting that "a society must have organization." Regarding the third point, Catlin maintained that Oakeshott was mistaken for believing that a society must be organized as a state when there could be other means of organizing. Catlin insisted that his criticism was not "mere carping" but was a reaction to a very popular but very vulnerable argument which is actually "most dangerous" (Oakeshott 1993b, pp. 87-88).

The second "appendix" is Oakeshott's reply. Oakeshott did not begin his reply with any pleasantries but went straight to Catlin's first criticism. As he had indicated in the opening paragraph of his essay, here Oakeshott writes about his attempt to avoid confusion. He acknowledges that he is well aware of the distinction between an 'authority' and its ground but chose to ignore it because of its confusion. He argued that authority is not respected as an abstraction, but because of one's belief. Oakeshott clarified that a police officer is not by himself authoritative but that the law confers authority upon the officer. But the law itself is not authoritative but rests upon the belief that law should have authority.

Oakeshott countered Catlin's second criticism by admitting that some of his argument drew from Hegel and Bosanquet but added that he also rejected some of their lines of reasonings. He claimed that Catlin misrepresented Oakeshott's claims. One such claim that he denied making was Catlin's assertion that Oakeshott was referring to an "'ideal' state." Furthermore, Oakeshott denied that he wrote exclusively about the "nation state", and he objected to the idea that "state" has one and only one meaning—the "nation state."

Oakeshott objected to Catlin's third criticism by replying that he was insisting only that government is just one aspect of "social experience." Instead, Oakeshott insisted that he did not use "national state" in either the sense that it is the best form of organization or that it was the only type of organization. Finally, Oakeshott complained that if a critic accuses someone of being an "Erasian, Hegelian, 'old Bosanquetian'" then there is an end to rational discussion. He would be as inclined to call himself an "Erasian" as he would be to call himself "pink or mammalian" (Oakeshott 1993b, pp. 89-90). Oakeshott's questioning of Catlin's judgment would resurface a year later. As much as Oakeshott disagreed with Catlin, it should be allowed that there was some basis for all three of Catlin's complaints. In particular, it seemed that Oakeshott's rebuttal of Catlin's first criticism not only missed its mark but contradicted what he had actually written. Oakeshott's other responses were more accurate but the overall sense that one gets is that Oakeshott was upset by Catlin's critique.

COMMENTS, OBSERVATIONS, AND QUESTIONS

It is noteworthy to compare Oakeshott's book reviews from the 1920s with those from the 1930s. His earlier, overtly critical tone is replaced by a more measured approach. It is as if his earlier sense of being right has shifted into an increasing comfort with skepticism—including doubting himself. There is at least one exception to this and that is both notable and relevant. It is notable for its negativity and it is relevant because it was a review of Catlin's 1930 book *The Principles of Politics*. First, Oakeshott objects to Catlin's aim to make political science into a science like chemistry. Second, he objects to Catlin's shift from chemistry to economics. Third, he objects to Catlin's definition of the state. These are specific complaints; Oakeshott's general criticisms are that this book is largely unintelligible unless the reader is well acquainted with Catlin's earlier *The Science and Method of Politics*. Oakeshott's damning assessment was that the topic seemed to be tangent and there is no central argument to be found. Oakeshott concludes with one comment that it was "particularly difficult to ascertain what Prof. Catlin's views are" and another comment that "Cailin's learning (which is evidently great) is better than his judgment" (Oakeshott 2007d, pp. 61-62). Catlin might have been highly educated but he was mistaken to think that political science could ever be a genuine science. Of course, Oakeshott would go on to develop a political thinking that was more "art" than "science."

Oakeshott's review of Catlin's book was published late in 1930 and his reviews from that year as well as the next five reflect a range of interests—from religion, to philosophy, to politics. But it is worth remarking that his earlier concern with theological matters was increasingly being replaced by political philosophy.[5]

Belasco's *Authority in Church and State* is not a political book and he preferred religious figures to political actors. Similarly, political philosophers were mentioned in passing and often with negative tones. This was particularly true regarding Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes was painted as the advocate of absolutism, the opponent of conscience, and the proponent of "slavish obedience" (Belasco 1928, pp. 19 23, 37, 111). Oakeshott himself had little to say about Hobbes until 1934. In his review of Otto von Gierke's *Natural Law and the Theory of Society* Oakeshott noted that the notion of contract of surrendering rights for security might have been better understood "if we had listened to him" (Oakeshott 2007e, p. 99). Oakeshott writes "we" so it is safe to say that he has changed his mind about Hobbes' philosophy. It is clear from "Thomas Hobbes" that Oakeshott realized there was much to be learned from Hobbes' "doctrine of authority." (Oakeshott 2007f, p. 120). However, to pursue the question of what lead Oakeshott to write his "Thomas Hobbes" and his reviews of Strauss' Hobbes book leads too far from my focus in this essay.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

In the "Introduction" to *The Intellectual Legacy of Michael Oakeshott* Timothy Fuller described Oakeshott's view of the transformation from medieval to modern Europe as "the transformation of relations of command and obedience into relations of authority and acknowledgement" (Fuller 2005, p. vii). It would take Oakeshott decades to develop these accounts as found later in *On Human Conduct* and "The Rule of Law." It may have been the problems with Belasco's book that prompted Oakeshott to start thinking about authority. And, perhaps it was Belasco's scattered references to Hobbes that led Oakeshott to begin to recognize Hobbes' importance in political thought. These are questions that can be answered later. The intention in this essay was to draw sufficient attention to the importance of "Authority of the State" and to show how Oakeshott's early essay was the beginning of the red thread of authority that runs throughout almost all of Michael Oakeshott's writings on political philosophy.

NOTES

1 To my knowledge, only two scholars have commented on "Authority in the State." Timothy Fuller discusses it briefly in the "Introduction" to the collection in which Oakeshott's essay is found. Steven Anthony Gerencser does devote a number of pages to that essay and I will make references to Gerencser's account. But as with much of Gerencser's book, his larger purpose is to show Oakeshott's move from idealism to skepticism and that often means criticizing other scholars. Fuller's account is more of a contextualization than a commentary, which is appropriate given that is in in an introduction to Oakeshott's published and unpublished works. Fuller 1993, pp. 11-13 and Gerencser 2000, pp. 54-63. This is not to minimize either scholar's contribution to my understanding of Oakeshott. I have learned from Gerencser and even more from Fuller.

2 This is not to suggest that Oakeshott did not write about the state prior to his 1929 book review. He devoted Chapter 4 to "The State" in his 1925 *A Discussion of Some Matters Preliminary to the Study of Political Philosophy.* However, this work was never published during Oakeshott's lifetime and in it he insisted that it was "a collection of notes" and was nothing more than "scattered notes" (Oakeshott 2010, pp. 39, 138).

3 Oakeshott ends the entire section with an odd reference to Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (5.1361). The quotation is "Der Glaube au [sic] den Kausalnexus ist der Aberglaube." "au" is a misprint and it should be "aus"—"The faith out of the causal nexus is superstition" (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 79 note 4).

4 R. M. (Robert Morrison) MacIver published *The Modern State* in 1926 and it appeared in Oxford University Press's Clarendon series. The book has had a long life: it was republished in 1928, 1932, 1941, 1946, 1947, 1950, 1961, 1964, and 1966. It was again republished in 2006. Sir Ernst Barker published his book in 1928 and it had a longer title than what Oakeshott gave: *The Study of Political Science and Its Relation to Cognate Studies.* It was published by Cambridge University Press. Similarly, Harold Laski's title was *On the Study of Politics.* It was published in 1928 in Oxford by Humphry Milford. It was a lecture that Laski gave at the London School of Economics and is a pamphlet of 27 pages. Barker's book was slightly longer at 52 whereas MacIver's book was just over 500 pages. Oakeshott's two references are just to page 3. Barker and Laski continued to teach in Great Britain but MacIver left Aberdeen for Toronto in 1915 and then moved in 1927 to teach at Columbia. He was later associated with The New School for Social Research.

5 Again, this is not to minimize the importance of the 1925 dissertation but to point out that many of his book reviews from the early and late 1920s are on religious and theological works.

REFERENCES

Abel, Corey and Fuller, Timothy. (eds.). 2005. *The Intellectual Legacy of Michael Oakeshott.* Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Belasco, Philip S. 1928. *Authority in Church and State.* London: George Allen and Unwin.
Fuller, Timothy. 1993. Introduction. In: Oakeshott 1993a:1-26.
_____. 2005. Introduction. In: Abel and Fuller 2005:vi-ix.
Gerencser, Steven Anthony. 2000. *The Skeptic's Oakeshott.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Oakeshott, Michael. 2010a. *Early Political Writings 1925-1930.* Ed. Luke O'Sullivan. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
_____. 2010b. *A Discussion of Some Matters Preliminary to the Study of Political Philosophy.* In: Oakeshott 2010a:39-138.
_____. 2007a. *The Concept of Philosophical Jurisprudence: Essays and Reviews 1926-1951.* Ed. Luke O'Sullivan. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
_____. 2007b. Review of P. S. Belasco, *Authority in Church and State.* In: Oakeshott 2007a:54-56.
_____. 2007c. Review of J. S. Mackenzie, *Fundamental Problems of Life.* In: Oakeshott 2007a:51-53.
_____. 2007d. The Principles of Politics. In: Oakeshott 2007a:61-62.
_____. 2007e. Natural Law and the Theory of Society. In: Oakeshott 2007a:97-99.
_____. 2007. Thomas Hobbes. In: Oakeshott 2007a:110-121.
_____. 1993a. *Religion, Politics and the Moral Life.* Ed. Timothy Fuller. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
_____. 1993b. The Authority of the State. In: Oakeshott 1993a:74-90.

An Oakeshottian Analysis of Stephen Wolfe's Christian Nationalism: Civil Associations vs. The Complete Good

MICHAEL N. JACOBS
Associate Professor, Political Science,
University of Mary Hardin-Baylor, Belton TX

INTRODUCTION

On January 6, 2021, supporters of President Donald Trump's reelection efforts stormed the U.S. Capitol building in protest of what they viewed as a stolen election. During the chaos, rioters hoisted a large wooden cross near the steps of Congress. Not long after, Stephen Wolfe published his best-selling and polarizing book, *The Case for Christian Nationalism* (2022). Wolfe's book, the Capitol riot, and other events and trends in U.S. politics sparked debates over the meaning and usage of the following terms: nation, nationalism, and in particular, Christian nationalism.

Much ink has been spilled in the intellectual battle over the proper understanding of Christian nationalism and its place in American politics. Both progressive and conservative Christian writers have made their case against Wolfe's political vision, while others have taken his side.[1] This essay is not a theological examination of Wolfe's Christian nationalism. Instead, after a short summary of Wolfe's book, it assesses his vision of the Christian nation through the lens of two key Oakeshottian concepts: civil association and enterprise association.

SUMMARY OF *THE CASE FOR CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM*

Wolfe defines Christian nationalism as "*a totality of national action, consisting of civil laws and social customs, conducted by a Christian nation as a Christian nation, in order to procure for itself both earthly and heavenly good in Christ*" (2022, p. 9; italics in original). Wolfe seeks to restore this conception of the Christian nation in Christian political thought, which he argues was dominant among the Protestant Reformers, and in Christian thinking more broadly, until the French Revolution and its eventual displacement by modern understandings of secularism (2022, pp. 4-5).

Wolfe frames his argument in the creation, fall, redemption, and glorification schema. He starts with the Covenant of Works in Genesis when God charged humanity with taking dominion of creation and conditioned humanity's receiving of eternal life upon its adherence to the entire moral law. Consequently, taking dominion of creation and following the entire moral law are essential to human nature, Wolfe argues (2022, pp. 49-52).

Wolfe then imagines community life in a prelapsarian world. As part of the dominion mandate, humans would need to form communities. And because these communities would develop in "a localized space" (2022, p. 64) and

involve a limited number of people, Wolfe reasons "that prelapsarian people would form geographically and culturally distinct nations" making "[c]ultural diversity […] a necessary consequence of human nature" (2022, p. 57). These distinct peoples, Wolfe argues, would form civil government to guide and coordinate human activity to the common good.[2]

Wolfe claims that the fall does not fundamentally alter social relations (2022, p. 86). The primary effect of the fall, he says, "is found in man's inability to worship God in heart to attain his ultimate heavenly end" (2022, p. 83). Postlapsarian humanity still has access, though corrupted, to reason and the natural law and the ability to distinguish good from evil (2022, p. 84). And just like mothers still have a natural inclination to love their own children, Wolfe argues, people still maintain their natural preferences to live in a community characterized by a particular culture emanating from a particular people and place (2022, p. 88).

According to Wolfe, human nature is restored through Christ's redemptive work. This includes the restoration of Adam's dominion mandate and has important implications for the Christian's engagement in public life (2022, pp. 98-99). Wolfe explains: "Since a Christian—having restored integrity—possesses the same gifts as Adam, he is equipped and drawn, by his nature, to exercise the same sort of dominion—to mature earthly life according to its principals and to order this world to the next" (2022, p. 99). While the Christian nation does not bring heaven to earth and man can no longer earn eternal life through his actions, Wolfe argues that in a Christian nation, government should order the nation to God (2022, p. 105). It is to the topics of nationalism, in general, and Christian nationalism, in particular, to which Wolfe next turns for a more detailed discussion.

Wolfe defines the nation as "a particular people with ties of affection that bind them to each other and their place of dwelling" (2022, p. 165). Nationalism then, is a "nation acting for its national good, which includes conservation of those ties of affection" (2022, p. 165). For Wolfe, the terms nation and ethnicity are interchangeable, and he emphasizes that "no nation (properly speaking) is composed of two or more ethnicities" (2022, p. 135). Ethnically homogenous nations "make possible the highest form of social life" because of their shared customs and common love for place (2022, p. 142).

In Wolfe's view, the Christian nation is a particular Christian people in a particular place that orders all aspects of life (civil law, customs, social expectations, etc.) to their "complete good" (2022, p. 174). In Wolfe's thinking, civil government and particular ethnicities (or nations) are natural, prelapsarian phenomena, and since grace restores nature, the Christian nation is equipped and obligated to resume its Adamic responsibilities. Additionally, the Christian nation is responsible for creating the cultural conditions under which its people are likely to receive the gospel and come to faith in Christ. These responsibilities, which Wolfe summarizes as the complete good, are best advanced in the context of ethnic (or cultural) homogeneity for the reasons explained above. Overall, a Christian nation's Christian culture will shape its people through civil law and social expectations to receive the gospel and live together in what Wolfe calls a "commodious" (2022, p. 208) society. For Wolfe, "[a] commodious life is a fitting life, one in which people are in their proper place, according to their gifts, and each receives the full measure that providence allots him" (2022, p. 219).

Next, Wolfe addresses the responsibilities of government and the role of civil law. He defines law as "*an ordering of reason by an appropriate lawgiver for the good of the community*" (2022, p. 245; italics in original). Civil magistrates act appropriately when the laws they establish emanate from natural law, direct the nation toward the common good, and are within the civil leader's proper authority (2022, pp. 249-250). Wolfe maintains that while civil authorities in a Christian nation cannot coerce belief in the Christian faith, other faith-related actions—such as suppressing public blasphemy, punishing heresy, funding churches and seminaries, and requiring Sabbath observance—are within the bounds of the Christian government's authority and are necessary to guide its people to the complete good (2022, p. 182).

An important component of Wolfe's political theology is his conception of social hierarchy. He embraces hierarchy as a natural good, not a product of the fall (2022, pp. 66-70). In this aristocratic political vision, some men, because of their natural abilities, rightly and naturally rule over others. This is especially the case with civil leadership in a Christian nation. Wolfe argues that the civil leader of a Christian nation—

whom he dubs the Christian "prince" (2022, p. 279)—is "the divinely sanctioned vicar of God who binds conscience to just applications of natural law, as one who directs public reason" (2022, p. 290). The Christian prince's responsibilities are immense: He uses the powers of the state "to order his people to commodious temporal life and to eternal life in Christ" (2022, p. 290).

The following is a five-point summary Wolfe's Christian nationalism:

1 Human nature is inseparable from God's call for humanity to take dominion of creation and adhere to the entire moral law. Humanity's essence cannot be separated from this call and these parameters.

2 Fulfilling these tasks requires humans to form (1) particular communities and cultures and (2) civil government. Thus, distinct cultures and their governments are natural phenomena because they are necessary for humanity to fulfill its God-ordained tasks (which are inseparable from human nature).

3 While the fall impeded humanity's ability to successfully complete its responsibilities, grace restores human nature, making Christians capable of taking dominion and adhering to the moral law.

4 The Christian nation, then, is a logical conclusion. It involves civil society and civil government shaping a particular people toward their complete good: following the entire moral law, preparing them to receive the gospel, and orienting them toward God and the coming kingdom.

5 The Christian nation is hierarchical and led by a great man—the Christian prince. The Christian prince is divinely sanctioned to guide his people to become a commodious society and to their complete good.

OAKESHOTT AND CIVIL ASSOCIATIONS

In his book *On Human Conduct*, Michael Oakeshott addresses one of political philosophy's foundational questions: can civil law, which is coercive and nonvoluntary, be reconciled with individual freedom? (Nardin 2020). To answer this question, Oakeshott distinguishes two types of human association—civil association and enterprise association. This distinction provides a path to conclude that, indeed, civil law and individual freedom are not inherently at odds with one another.

In enterprise associations, people voluntarily come together in "joint pursuit of a common purpose or interest" (Franco 2004, p. 154). The enterprise association's joint pursuits may require the coercion of its members, but this is not a violation of the individual autonomy of its members because they voluntarily join the association and submit themselves to its rules and goals. Universities, guilds, churches, and political parties (at least in multi-party democracies) are all examples of enterprise associations. Take the example of the university. A person voluntarily accepts a position on a university's faculty; and when she does so, she limits her freedom in certain ways, submitting to university-determined protocols and norms as part of her voluntary participation in the university's larger mission of educating students and advancing knowledge.

Civil associations work differently than enterprise associations in two main ways. First, membership in a civil association is non-voluntary (Ibid.). Free individuals are born into a political community; they do not choose to join one. Because membership in a state is non-voluntary, it is properly categorized as a civil association. Second, civil associations are noninstrumental; that is, they do not seek to advance a particular

purpose or interest (Ibid.). Civil associations merely create the conditions under which individuals can voluntarily partake in mission-oriented enterprise associations.

This brings us back to the original question: can civil law established through the state in a particular political community be reconciled with individual freedom? Oakeshott argues that civil laws used to set the conditions where enterprise associations can take place, but that do not require participation in the pursuit of a substantive purpose or interest with which an individual might not agree, do not violate the individual's freedom. Take the example of transportation (Franco 2004, pp. 163-164). Roads, and the civil laws created to facilitate their safe use, do not determine where one must drive their car. In this example, roads are like civil associations. Even though civil law creates and enforces rules regulating one's automobile and its operation, the rules of the road do not determine the location to where one must drive. However, government-built roads and government-established traffic laws are necessary for safe and expedient travel to whatever destination one chooses. Language provides another example. The English language contains numerous rules for speakers to follow. While these rules constrain and shape speech, the rules do not violate the speaker's individual autonomy since the rules allow communication to take place. Proper punctuation, for instance, does not coerce an individual's use or acceptance of certain ideas. In summary, coercive civil law that merely establishes the conditions under which enterprise associations can occur does not violate individual autonomy. For Oakeshott, the individual's autonomy is violated only if coercion is used in non-voluntary settings and in the pursuit of substantive interests and goals.

Oakeshott's ideal vision of civil government is one that can be characterized entirely as a civil association. However, Oakeshott recognizes that civil governments usually represent the logic of both civil associations and enterprise associations, as they pursue both noninstrumental purposes and instrumental ones. That said, Oakeshott clearly prefers that states primarily reflect the logic of civil associations because it is in this way that individual freedom and autonomy is maximized (Franco 2004, p. 170).

ANALYSIS

Oakeshott and Wolfe proceed from different starting points and with different aims. In a sense, their arguments are mirror images of one another's. On the one hand, Oakeshott idealizes political arrangements that maximize individual autonomy, although he does concede that political communities require the social cohesion that comes from at least a minimum shared understanding of the common good. On the other hand, Wolfe's teleological vision for the nation stems from God's purpose for humanity (at least as Wolfe understands it). He envisions political arrangements, and society writ large, as working together to promote a community's complete good, although he recognizes the wisdom of some limits to government's scope and power.

Oakeshott would likely accuse Wolfe of mis-conceptualizing the responsibilities of government. In Oakeshottian terms, Wolfe envisions each individual nation as an enterprise association. The joint interest pursued in the enterprise association that is Wolfe's ideal Christian nation is a commodious society oriented to Christ and his coming kingdom. Oakeshott would argue that this society violates the individual autonomy of its members, since membership in a nation is non-voluntary. He would likely label Wolfe's Christian nationalism a form of rationalism, and he would be skeptical of the ability of Wolfe's Christian prince to engineer a commodious society. Overall, Oakeshott prefers to analogize the role of government to that of a referee (Franco 2004, p. 103). This is a far cry from Wolfe's Christian prince and the perfectionist goals Wolfe assigns to him.

However, Oakeshott is not against religion if religion is used to realize one's individual autonomy. In his essay "Religion and the World," Oakeshott argues that religion equips individuals to resist "external worldly values," thus freeing them to pursue their autonomy (Devigne 1999, p. 133). Glen Worthington summarizes Oakeshott's view of religion this way: "a religious system of value holds the self as its primary object so that the self is its own end. The moral life in a religious system of value is understood in terms of a self realizing what it is" (Worthington 2000, p. 380). Thus for Oakeshott, the Christian religion does not

represent an eternal truth external to oneself. It is a historically-and-culturally-specific view of reality that liberates the individual from worldly demands. At the same time, Oakeshott does not oppose all social constraints emanating from religious beliefs. This is especially the case if those religious constraints facilitate the social conditions needed for voluntary enterprise associations to flourish in a larger political community characterized predominantly as a civil association.

CONCLUSION

Oakeshott's conceptualization of civil association provides grounds for a non-theological and, broadly speaking, liberal critique of Wolfe's Christian nationalism. Wolfe seeks too much from politics, Oakeshott would argue, and at the expense of the autonomy of individuals, which Oakeshott prioritizes. However, this critique will be unconvincing for proponents of Christian nationalism. Philosophers in the Oakeshottian tradition would need to proceed from a starting point that understands the Christian faith as a truth external to all individuals. But such an approach may undercut the foundation of Oakeshott's philosophy—individual autonomy. However, Wolfe's Christian nationalism thesis is also the subject of numerous theological critiques. These critiques even come from members of the Christian denomination to which Wolfe belongs, the Presbyterian Church in America (PCA), a conservative and Reformed church. For instance, Kevin DeYoung, a prominent PCA pastor, takes Wolfe's book to task in his review titled, "The Rise of Right-Wing Wokeism" (DeYoung 2022). DeYoung notes the shaky grounds from which Wolfe argues in favor of ethnically homogenous nations—the alternative realty in which the fall never happened—and he criticizes Wolfe for not reconning with passages of Scripture stating that the gospel removes walls of division between people groups (e.g., Ephesians 2:11-22; DeYoung 2022). Consequently, from the perspective of either liberalism or Reformed theology, Wolfe's Christian nationalism thesis is easily punctured and unlikely gain traction among many Christians.

NOTES

1 For a conservative theological critique of Wolfe (2022), see DeYoung 2022.

2 Wolfe (2022, p. 90) recognizes that in our postlapsarian world, government responsibilities have expanded to include restraining sin, and checks on government's power are needed to prevent abuses.

REFERENCES

Devigne. Robert. 1999. The Legacy of Michael Oakeshott. *Political Theory* 27(1):131-139.

DeYoung, Kevin. 2022. The Rise of Right-Wing Wokeism. Review: *The Case for Christian Nationalism* by Stephen Wolfe. *The Gospel Coalition*. https://media.thegospelcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/02195248/The-Rise-of-Right-Wing-Wokeism.pdf

Franco, Paul. 2004. *Michael Oakeshott: An Introduction*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Nardin, Terry. 2020. Michael Oakeshott. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Wolfe, Stephen. 2022. *The Case for Christian Nationalism*. Moscow ID: Canon Press.

Worthington, Glenn. 2000. Michael Oakeshott and the City of God. *Political Theory* 28(3):377-398.

Review

Werner Sombart and the 'Spirit' of Modern Capitalism. Rediscovering a Classic, by Christopher Adair-Toteff

ALBERTO MINGARDI
IULM University

Christopher Adair-Toteff, *Werner Sombart and the 'Spirit' of Modern Capitalism. Rediscovering a Classic*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024, pp. 180.

One century ago, "Werner Sombart was regarded as the leading German authority on modern capitalism" (pp. 1-2). Indeed, Sombart originated the term. Christopher Adair-Toteff engaged with Sombart after having worked extensively on Max Weber. In a sense, Adair-Toteff's book is an attempt to explain the gap between the esteem in which Weber and Sombart were held by their contemporaries, and other, more recent assessments of the two. Weber was not as renowned in life as he has been ever since, also thanks a to a widow who turned out to be an impeccable vestal of his altar. With Sombart the opposite happened. There may be good reasons for that, including a certain verbosity. For Adair-Toteff, "Sombart often preached the importance of value neutrality in scholarly writings, but he failed to adhere to this dictum even more than Weber" (p. 3).

Adair-Toteff sees Sombart's mastodontic work on modern capitalism as quite stronger than the thinner book by Weber on the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Both works may be considered as paramount of the German reflection on the nature of a modern economy at the time, yet Adair-Toteff finds Weber's more impressionistic whereas, on this subject, Sombart "wrote numerous books loaded with facts, statistics, and even tables" (p. 164). The fortune of a book, however, is seldom a consequence of its *accuracy.*

Adair-Toteff explores thoroughly Sombart's writings on capitalism and argues that we should read them more than we do. He does not deny that Sombart became sympathetic to Nazism but he maintains that the political faults of the author do not mean that we cannot learn something from his work. He argues convincingly that Sombart cannot be considered antisemitic. And he suggests that we should consider carefully the viewpoints of an author's contemporaries, before dismissing him. "Even the most critical of his critics admitted that Sombart was a genius" (Ibid.). Perhaps he would not go as far as German historical school economist Gustav Schmoller in considering "Sombart as an equal to Smith and Marx" (p. 62) but shares the appreciation for "the richness of his choice of material and his ability to synthesize his ideas".

Sombart's vocation seems to have been first and foremost one of a great classifier. The first tome of his book on modern capitalism bears an epigraph from Blackstone: "Qui bene distinguit, bene docet" (who distinguishes well, teaches well). The German sociologist was busy in differentiating modern capitalism from anything which happened before. Adair-Toteff presents his views with great care and is interested in making the case for their relevance, more than to prove them right or wrong by the standard of modern scholarship. He also provides much needed contextual-

ization and suggests to consider Sombart as an historian of capitalism, much invested in understanding its genesis.

Sombart's characterization of capitalism has a somewhat Weberian taste:

> He offered an abstract definition of capital in terms of its goal and that is the accumulation of profit. He also provided three important markers of capitalism which he stressed were always present: (1) an impersonal organization, (2) an emphasis on calculation and speculation, and (3) a rationalistic approach (p. 24)

All of the above came together because of what Sombart labels "the spirit of capitalism", which, different than in Weber's perspective, is not only propelled by religion. Interestingly, Sombart thought that "the notion that the trader was no longer a negative one [sic] was a product of Luther and other Reformers", as the trader had his own *Beruf* and "was his ability to determine the just price" (p. 23). Interestingly, Sombart seems to believe that Protestantism attracted to the trading professions more educate and talented people, assuming that in earlier times people "lacked the means and ability to 'calculate'" (p. 24). Though I am no historian of trade, I find such sketch of a "childhood of trade", lasting for most of human history, quite bizarre, considering the extent and complexity world trade reached way before the Industrial Revolution.

Anyway, what matters most, for Adair-Toteff, is that this idea of a business vocation is not enough for Sombart to mark the beginning of the capitalist era. He insisted on calculation, profit, and what we may call the severing of craftmanship from its traditional ways, in order to work at a bigger, mechanized and impersonal scale. In discussing Sombart's answer to the question "how is profit possible", Adair-Toteff writes that "his short answer is Marxist: the appropriation of labor; but his longer answer is far less Marxist and far more complicated" (p. 25). Yet there is a lot in Sombart which sounds like Marx (perhaps all that doesn't sound like Weber!) though Sombart's argument seems less mechanistic. Yet his vast historical account seems, not unlikely Marx's historical *tour de force* in *Das Kapital*, conceived as to explain a domino effect backwards. Given that modern capitalism has such characteristics, let us see how and where it did pick them up.

Of course Marx would not have concentrated so much on the "spirit" of capitalism, which Sombart considered the result of mixing together the spirit of the entrepreneur with the "bourgeois spirit", the subject of another of his big books. Distinguishing three kind of individuals, the conqueror, the organizer and the trader, Sombart was convinced that only the third type "manifested the genuine spirit of capitalism" (p. 87). In pre-Industrial times, he was convinced that the only people who were genuine "merchants" were the Florentines, the Scots and the Jews. It is interesting that he outlined thirteen "economic virtues" that, being considered "holy during the end of the medieval period", allowed for the making of the bourgeoisie. Not by chance, he seemed convinced that capitalism was a wholly urban phenomenon and considered carefully the role of cities in its development.

From Adait-Toteff's elegant survey of Sombart's works, it is quite apparent that there is nothing even vaguely associated with capitalism Sombart has not written on: mechanization, globalization, the "decline in taste" associated with mass production, competition, the emergence of the proletariat, et cetera. Adair-Toteff reports that Sombart was convinced that he had incorporated in his work some insights of the Austrian school of economics (p. 17). Yet the reader is at loss when she tries to understand which ones. Sombart did not share Weber's methodological individualism, which is what Weber shared with the Austrians. The Austrians emphasize subjectivism, which paves the way for an account of capitalism in which the consumer is the key actor. A "good" is not properly such, Carl Menger thought us, if it is not only scarce but perceived as useful by the individual. The process of production is oriented by the needs and wants of the consumer. Sombart seems to be convinced, not unlikely your average college professor, that producers perform "tricks" to force their customers to buy what they make (p. 146). This counts for their alleged "dependency" on the producer. Sombart apparently held Bohm-Bawerk's work on the nature of capi-

tal and interest in great esteem (p. 120) but there are no reflections of such appreciation in his own understanding of capital.

In one of the most interesting section of his monograph, the one devoted to the reception of Sombart's work, Adair-Toteff reports that German "liberal" Friedrich Naumann, in reviewing Somabart's work, insisted that the latter "underestimated the role that state played in capitalism's rise". "A history of capitalism without Napoleon and Bismarck is at outset something that contains gap" (p. 59). Such a remark is interesting and goes well with something Adair-Toteff hints at, that is Sombart's understanding of capitalism as a totally un-political and un-heroic matter. Such intuition will riverberate spectacularly in his WW1 propaganda pamphlet on *Merchants and Heroes* (1915).

Christopher Adair-Toteff has done a splendid job in presenting the views of a very influential writer who is indeed less read today than he used to be. He makes the case that Sombart should be read. The question is: by whom? Sombart's verbosity makes him an unlikely subject of continuing reverence. Style may not be (the whole of) substance, but it matters. Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* may be more superficial than the thicker Sombart's books, but is a manifesto of how you write for the ages. Was Sombart's account of the origins of capitalism foreshadowing successive scholarship? It does not seem so: his genius was more in weaving together different things, than in coming up with the new, big one. Does his understanding of the origins of capitalism still keep up with contemporary scholarship? Perhaps not. Those who should read Sombart more carefully are historians of ideas and culture, those who are more interested in how we speak about capitalism than in the nature of capitalism itself. To them, this agile and yet carefully researched book by Christopher Adair-Toteff provides a most needed compass.

Review

Aron and Tocqueville: Liberty and Equality: A Review Essay

CHRISTOPHER ADAIR-TOTEFF
University of South Florida

Raymond Aron and Alexis de Tocqueville were two of the most important French thinkers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although there are significant differences between them in terms of the times in which they lived and the types of books that they wrote, there are a number of convictions that they shared. Among these, the most important was their shared belief in the ideas and ideals of freedom and equality. Both of these concepts were found in the American and French Revolutions but Tocqueville approached it from his early nineteenth century perspective of democracy in America and Aron considered it in light of the twentieth century Europe. There are two new books which reflect the themes of freedom and equality: *Liberty and Equality* which is a new English translation of Aron's final lecture in Paris and *The Man Who Understood Democracy* which is Olivier Zunz' biography of Tocqueville. Both are superb books which help enlarge and illuminate Aron's and Tocqueville's ideas about freedom and equality.

ARON: LIBERTY AND EQUALITY

Raymond Aron's preoccupation with the notion of liberty intensified during the Second World War. Although he had been concerned with political responsibility in the early years that Hitler was in power, that preoccupation grew during the war. The concern with freedom never left him and he lectured on it numerous times, especially in the Thomas Jefferson lectures that he gave in California in 1963 (Aron 1965). The lecture that is translated here was his final lecture in Paris. It was the last lecture in a series of eighteen that focused on the themes of liberty and equality which he delivered on April 4, 1978. The original recording of the Collège de France lecture was lost but Pierre Manent and Giulio di Ligio managed to decipher and transcribe a handwritten manuscript. Both Manet and di Ligio admit there might be some shortcomings with their French edition, both are convinced of the importance of Aron's lecture.

Liberty and Equality has five parts: the first three are brief: the Translator's Note, the Translator's Acknowledgements, and a Preface. The other two are lengthy in comparison: Aron's lecture and an Epilogue. The work was translated by Samuel Garrett Zeitlin who provides an account of his translating practices. Zeitlin maintains that Aron's lecture is not like Twitter but is more like Pericles. It is a lecture that reflected the "high diction appropriate to a lecture at the height of the French academic system (Aron 2023, p. vi). It is Zeitlin's intention to "offer a close and accurate translation of the French original within

the limits of contemporary English" (Aron 2023, p. v). The Translator's Acknowledgements is also brief yet Zeitlin acknowledges the helpful comments from 25 people, the love of his family, and has dedicated his translation to two of his former professors.

In the original French edition, the lengthy discussion by Pierre Manet precedes Aron's lecture whereas in the English translation it is the Epilogue. I will follow the English version by discussing it after the examination of the lecture. However, I will discuss the Preface by Mark Lilla at the end of the section because it serves as an appropriate transition to the Tocqueville biography.

The title in French and in English is a bit misleading; instead of an essay on liberty, Aron insists that he should be talking about liberties. He has three types in mind: personal liberties, political liberties, and social liberties. Personal liberties include the right to security, the right to free movement, and the right to employment of our choosing. Political liberties include the right to vote, the right to protest, and the right to assemble. Social liberties include the right to health care and the right to education. It also includes the collective right to organize or to unionize (Aron 2023, pp. 10-15). Aron then declares that these liberties can be placed in either the category of formal liberties or the category of material or real liberties. He must have discussed this in a previous lecture because he assumes that his audience is familiar with the two categories. They were not new to Aron because he had distinguished between them in the 1963 Jefferson lectures that he gave in California. Personal liberties are real liberties; they are not formal but are concrete. An example is to move to another city, another state, another country. Political liberties are more difficult to place in one class or another. They are clearly personal in the sense that each individual has the right to vote but they are also formal in the sense that voting is not just concrete but formal because it is symbolic (Aron 2023, pp. 15-18; see Adair-Toteff 2019, pp. 152-153).

Aron notes that there are two issues: One, which of these liberties are truly essential and two, what is the relationship between the political liberties and the social liberties. The first has the problem of what counts as the essential liberty given that there are the three types. The second has the problem of which has priority—the state or society (Aron 2023, pp. 27-29). Aron does not spend much time on the first and the time he devotes to the second is spent mostly on Marxism. But it leads to the problem of exploitation and he offers a joke from the Soviet Union: What's the difference between capitalism and socialism? The answer is "In the one case, it's the exploitation of man by man, in the other, it's the reverse" (Aron 2023, p. 34). Aron identifies two issues from the idea of exploitation: that it leads to the unfortunate confusion of liberty and equality: one may be free to attend a university but that does not mean that one has the same power of learning than anyone else (Aron 2023, pp. 37-39). This leads to the second issue and that is the contemporary rejection of the idea of power. This is the idea of the "good society" in which all are equal. Aron rejects this ideal as an ideological dream (Aron 2023, pp. 40-44).

Aron moves to his final point and that is the relation between political liberty and philosophical liberty. He suggests that it is the philosopher who provides both the richer and the simpler notion of liberty: richer because it is the idea of "mastery of reason or of the will over the passions" and simpler because it is more precise than mere choice. It is evident that Aron prefers philosophical liberty for more than these two reasons; for the philosopher the "reasonable man is a postulate" but for the political thinker the "free man" is an objective. He suggests that freedom today is not obeying laws but engaging in hedonistic behavior; there is no longer such a thing as virtue. Aron concludes his lecture by offering a number of observations: his account of liberties is restricted to western democracies and therefore is neither universal nor abstract. Nor does he want to impart any wisdom regarding liberty; rather, he wants to remind us that we should reflect on our good fortune to enjoy our liberties because it is "a privilege rare in history and rare in space" (Aron 2023, pp. 45-55). It is this concern with the fragility of liberty that Aron shares with Tocqueville.

Pierre Manent's contribution is almost as long as Aron's lecture and is well worth reading carefully. Manent not only discusses Aron's essay but he places it in some important contexts. In one way he explains that Aron had disavowed his French professor's apolitical naivety and the years that he spent in Germany in the early 1930s taught him the importance of political realistic thinking and an appreciation for Weber's scholarly analysis (Aron 2023, pp. 60-62). Manent maintains that Aron abandoned Weber because of his

immoderate attitude and bellicose approach (Aron 2023, pp. 92-93). Manet may not be so convincing about this, but he needs to show that Aron replaced Weber with Aristotle. He claims that Aron learned much from studying Aristotle's philosophy and he points in particular to three different things. First, like Aristotle, Aron starts from what is, which is certainly true in both cases. But Manent insists that that means "to begin from 'opinions'" and while that is true for Aristotle, it is not so evident in Aron's case. (Aron 2023, pp. 89-92). Second, both Aron and Aristotle do not refrain from value judgments and this clearly distinguishes Aron from Weber who insisted that value judgments had no place in scholarship. However, Weber thought that value judgments do have a place in politics. Third, Manent claims that Aron also thought in terms of virtue and again there is a similarity between Aron and Aristotle (Aron 2023, pp. 90-91). Manent is on more solid ground when he suggests that Aron regards people as more than individuals in that they need to be part of a group; that is, a political collective. This emphasis is revealed in Manent's claim that Aron is a "liberal *classical* thinker rather than a classical *liberal* thinker." Manent is also correct to insist that unlike some thinkers, Aron never longed for the past but embraced the present. History may not be as important to Aron as philosophy but it has its uses (Aron 2023, pp. 83-84). Manent is correct in distinguishing Aron from John Locke over the latter's insistence on individual rights. He is also correct to show that Aron might have learned from Kant but that he believed that morality was more than following rules (Aron 2023, pp. 85-86). Manet is certainly right to claim that Aron was always preoccupied with politics and that Aron's subtitle to his memoirs was *50 Years of Political Reflection* but it meant *50 Years of Political Education* because Aron recognized that political philosophy was observing and thinking about humans and that meant continuously learning (Aron 2023, p. 58). One may not agree with every claim that Pierre Manent makes in his essay, but all of them compel one to think more about what Aron wrote.

The comments by Mark Lilla serve to accomplish a number of functions in a brief span. They serve to remind us that Aron was a scholar who was often misunderstood—many of his compatriots regarded him as a conservative because he objected to Marxist ideology. Lilla argues that Aron's critics misinterpreted Aron's positions and that he was a genuine liberal. Aron learned in the 1930s that democracy was intended to "prevent political life from descending into a raw struggle of all against all." But he also learned how fragile democracy was when confronted with myths and distortions (Aron 2023, pp. xii-xiii). Lilla insists that Aron was right to call himself a liberal because he reminds us that the French liberal tradition differs from the Anglo-American one. While both traditions emphasize democracy and individual rights, the French tradition also extolls codes, habits rituals, and beliefs. Lilla emphasizes that Aron is a democrat in the French tradition that is more sociological than moralistic—the tradition which began with Alexis de Tocqueville (Aron 2023, p. xv).

TOCQUEVILLE: EQUALITY AND LIBERTY

There is a degree of difficulty in distilling the contents of *Liberty and Equality* but that pales in contrast to attempting to examine a book as large as Olivier Zunz' biography of Tocqueville. The "Note on Sources" is six pages, the index is 22 pages, and there some fifty pages of notes. The main text is 350 pages divided into a Prologue, 11 chapters, and an Epilogue. The inside cover blurb notes that this is "a definitive biography" of Alexis de Tocqueville and it clearly is. However, Zunz is careful in determining how much time to devote to the different stages of Tocqueville's life. For example, there are under eight pages covering Tocqueville's life from birth until he was sixteen and then twenty pages from then until just prior to his twenty-sixth birthday (Zunz 2022, pp. 8-15, 15-35). In contrast, Zunz spends almost 100 pages on the years between 1835 and 1848 (Zunz 2022, pp. 162-256). We tend to think of Tocqueville as the author of *Democracy in America* but Zunz spends much of his book detailing the private and public aspects of Tocqueville's life. He spells out how often Tocqueville was ill; that he continuously suffered from stomach ailments and severe breathing problems caused by tuberculosis. Zunz also details Tocqueville's marriage to a middle-class English woman by the name Mary Mottley. Tocqueville had met her while in England in 1835 and they married in late October of that year. Zunz describes how Tocqueville's family objected to his choice of wife and that the

marriage was not blissful. On one hand, Tocqueville was controlling but on the other hand he was considerate regarding her health. While he was "critical of his wife's every move" he traveled with her to Switzerland for a cure (Zunz 2022, pp. 164-166). Zunz spends more time in discussing Tocqueville's politics.

In 1836 Tocqueville decided that he wanted to enter politics and those interested in this aspect of his life will find Zunz' account detailed and full. Those who are more interested in Tocqueville as a person will find his account even more rewarding and that is because Zunz provides an almost psychological account of the man. Zunz describes how Tocqueville began his initial attempt to gain office was marked by timidity. But he also shows how Tocqueville quickly learned from his mistakes; Tocqueville finally won a seat in the assembly in the March 1839 election. What Zunz also demonstrates is how independent and honest Tocqueville always was and how that was in marked contrast to other politicians at the time (Zunz 2022, pp. 171-172, 179-180, 197). Unlike many of his contemporaries, Tocqueville was genuinely interested in the welfare of the French people. Zunz writes about Tocqueville's various investigations into penal reform as well as on electoral reform. He also recounts how Tocqueville achieved considerable success in both being reelected and in promoting a better government (Zunz 2022, pp. 203-212, 221-224). One of Tocqueville's greatest challenges was to argue for the abolition of slavery in the French colonies (Zunz 2022, pp. 216-233).

Zunz does not shy away from pointing out Tocqueville's failings. One of the largest failings was Tocqueville's conviction that having colonies was not only just but was beneficial and Zunz points out that this was nowhere as clear as in Tocqueville's belief in subjugating Algeria. He explains that Tocqueville justified this by comparing Algeria to the American frontier (Zunz 2022, pp. 243-256). Zunz also does not refrain from pointing out that Tocqueville could change his mind quickly. This is evident in his account of how Tocqueville went from condemning the 1848 Revolution to promoting it (Zunz 2022, pp. 261-268). But as Louis Napoléon had taken power Tocqueville believed that he could be an asset; he wanted to become minister of education but instead was appointed minister of foreign affairs. Zunz notes that this was short-lived: from June 3 to October 29, 1849 when Louis Napoléon dismissed the entire cabinet (Zunz 2022, pp. 276-280).

Tocqueville felt depressed after his dismissal but Zunz explains that the depression was also caused by his declining health. Tocqueville suffered his first bout of tuberculosis in March 1850 (Zunz 2022, pp. 281-282, 287, 301). The retirement from politics and declining health prompted Tocqueville to devote his remaining time to the study of history. But Zunz also points out that his political circle shrank and his relations with his brothers grew worse (Zunz 2022, pp. 288-290). Zunz details how France's turn to the Right prompted Tocqueville to look to the past to explain why France was forever giving up on democracy. The result was *The Ancient Régime and the Revolution* which was published in June, 1856 (Zunz 2022, p. 316).

Zunz recounts Tocqueville's father's death in 1856 and how afterward he was able to restore good relations with his brothers. But Tocqueville's tuberculosis returned in July 1858 and the next ten months saw periods in which he was debilitated and other times was able to take daily walks. In February and March of 1859 Tocqueville seemed to have recovered but it was momentary. Tocqueville died on April 16, 1859—as a Catholic. Earlier Zunz had discussed Tocqueville's conversations with several people about Christianity in general and Catholicism in particular, but he notes that it was Marie who had convinced him to receive communion (Zunz 2022, pp. 340-345). He may have died finally convinced of religion but he was always committed to democracy. It was democracy and its insistence on equality that was the thread that ran through Tocqueville's writings and that is the idea that informs most of Zunz' biography. The focal point of that was Tocqueville's travels to the United States and the writing of the two volumes of *Democracy in America*.

That Tocqueville would decide that at age twenty-five was rather astonishing. Zunz notes that Tocqueville had a protected childhood and was not of robust health (Zunz 2022, pp. 8-12). But in 1830 he was realizing that he had no future in France and decided that he and his friend Gustav Beaumont would travel across much of the United States and investigate the different penal systems (Zunz 2022, pp. 31-35). They left on April 2, 1831 arriving in Newport, Rhode Island on May 9. They would travel North from May

until October and then head South from October until February. Tocqueville and Beaumont would not depart for France until February 20, 1832.

Tocqueville began his travels in New York City and he visited jails as well as the elite but he also found time to read in a New York City institution the Athenaeum. It was not all work: Tocqueville and Beaumont attended a number of balls but the social events were not always to their liking. They disapproved of the food they were served and they were somewhat concerned about various toasts. They also realized that their ideas of American women were not matched by reality: the women were "remarkably unsheltered." Tocqueville also failed to appreciate the importance of New York City for shipping and he had much to learn about the city's penal system. As much as he thought he was understanding American democracy, he had "blind spots." These included his inability to grasp the fact that despite being an open society, there were secret societies and that there were fissures within political parties (Zunz 2022, pp. 43-53). In his travels across New York to Michigan Tocqueville encountered a number of Native Americans and he was appalled how badly they were treated. They crossed into Canada and were surprised to see how feudal it was and how dominant the Catholic Church was (Zunz 2022, pp. 66-70).

Tocqueville left Quebec and traveled to Boston and Zunz emphasized the contrast Tocqueville saw between the "powerlessness" of the French Canadians and the apparent "intellectual superiority" of the New Englanders (Zunz 2022, pp. 70-71). From Boston, Tocqueville and Beaumont traveled to Philadelphia and then to Cincinnati and then down to Nashville. Zunz is at his best in describing Tocqueville's physical and mental health: after the coach broke down Tocqueville "fell sick. Shivering and without appetite, he could not go on." When Tocqueville had become depressed earlier in Philadelphia he had written in his notebooks that the "three 'human miseries'" were diseases, death, and doubt (Zunz 2022, p. 91). Tocqueville saw disease and death when he returned to France in May 1832 because it was in the middle of a cholera epidemic (Zunz 2022, p. 101). Zunz ensures that his reader gains a balanced view of Tocqueville—as much as he suffered from bouts of depression, he also had hope: late in life Tocqueville noted that he had written *Democracy in America* with "'faith in a cause and hope'" (Zunz 2022, p. 117). Zunz comments on his writing schedule but what is more interesting is his account of Tocqueville's writing style—he had an "innate penchant for complexity" and that leads to doubt. Friends advised him to read Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Pascal (Zunz 2022, pp. 119-120). Zunz is also at his best when discussing Tocqueville's views about the American political principles (Zunz 2022, pp. 122-127). Less successful is Zunz' account of Tocqueville's fears regarding the "tyranny of the majority"—not because it is mistaken; rather, it is too brief (Zunz 2022, pp. 128-129).

Zunz again excels at describing Tocqueville's doubts about the publication and response to *Democracy in America*. He quotes Tocqueville's "'The best thing that can happen to me is if no one reads my book'" but adds that "His enthusiastic readers did not cooperate." Zunz maintains that Tocqueville's success was founded on two things: the excellence of the book and that it appeared at the right time as the Franco-American relationship was imperiled. A conflict between President Andrew Jackson and the French government had drawn French interest in America; hence in Tocqueville's book, but it also generated anti-American feelings (Zunz 2022, pp. 133, 141). But, the book was favorably received by not just in France but in England. Tocqueville and Beaumont travelled to England in 1835 where Tocqueville met with John Stuart Mill. It was Mill who wrote a review which was a "magisterial introduction to *Democracy in America* for the British public." (Zunz 2022, pp. 149, 151). The purpose of the visit to England was to investigate the poverty and inequality in England and Ireland. Regarding Ireland, Tocqueville observed that it had "'all of the evils of aristocracy without any of its advantages,' generating extreme poverty and taking no blame for it" (Zunz 2022, p. 157). The Americans blamed France for the indemnity quarrel and that was part of the reason that Tocqueville was having difficulties finding an American publisher. With some major intervention by some notable political players, a highjacked version of the English translation was published in 1838. Zunz clarified that America did not recognize international copyright until the 1890s and adds that "Tocqueville never earned any money from the American editions of his book" (Zunz 2022, pp. 160-161). Tocqueville was

born an aristocrat but he believed in democracy. As Zunz asserts in his Prologue, Tocqueville believed in democracy because it promoted liberty and equality (Zunz 2022, pp. 1, 7).

If there is a flaw in *The Man Who Understood Democracy* it is Zunz' occasional tendency to fault Tocqueville. Zunz criticized him for his "blind spots" which not only included those already mentioned but others like his dismissal of how solitary confinement caused mental suffering and his failure to have "connected the dots" about how Southern slavery was more than a matter of climate (Zunz 2022, pp. 86-95).

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Given that Aron and Tocqueville are two of the most famous French thinkers, it is notable there has not been much written about Aron's reception of Tocqueville's thought. This is not the place to discuss this neglect but it is an appropriate place to mention one of Aron's final comments about his illustrious predecessor. The inaugural issue of *The Tocqueville Review* began with an essay by Aron on Tocqueville. In "Tocqueville Retrouvé" he maintained that Tocqueville's writings were often referred to in America, less so in England, but were mostly ignored in France. He concluded his essay with the suggestion that a biography of Tocqueville was still warranted and added that the Americans and the English are the best at writing biographies (Aron 1979, pp. 10-11, 22-23). Olivier Zunz taught in the United States for many years but he was born and educated in France. His biography proves that in this one instance Aron was mistaken. In the "Introduction" to the same issue of *The Tocqueville Review* the editor indicated that it was fitting that Aron wrote the lead article because his talents, analyses, and his tone "deserves to be called the modern-day Tocqueville" (Editor 1979, p. 7). There is no doubt about that assessment but as Aron's essay and Zunz' biography demonstrate, Aron and Tocqueville were more than scholars investigating the meaning and significance of the ideas of liberty and equality. Aron emphasized liberty while Tocqueville stressed equality; but they were ardent defenders of both of these ideals.

REFERENCES

Adair-Toteff, Christopher. 2019. *Raymond Aron's Philosophy of Political Responsibility.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Aron, Raymond. 2023. *Liberty and Equality.* Transl. Samuel Garrett Zeitlin. Preface: Mark Lilla Epilogue: Pierre Manent. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

_____. 1979. Tocqueville Retrouvé. *The Tocqueville Review.* Vol. 1(1):8-23.

_____. 1965) *Essai sur les libertés.* Paris: Calmann-Lévy.

Zunz, Olivier. 2022. *The Man Who Understood Democracy. The Life of Alexis de Tocqueville.* Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Review

Hayek. A Life 1899-1950 by Bruce Caldwell and Hansjoerg Klausinger

CHRISTOPHER ADAIR-TOTEFF
University of South Florida

Hayek. A Life is not a biography of F. A. Hayek's entire life; as the other part of the subtitle indicates, this book covers Hayek's life from 1899 until 1950. It begins with a detailed account of Hayek's family and his birth and it concludes with his decision to leave England. It covers the time from his early life, through his educational years, and his first marriage. It details his time teaching in Vienna and then his years in England. It ends as he divorces his wife and leaves his two children and moves to the United States. It is not a complete biography since Bruce Caldwell and Hansjoerg Klausinger are finishing their companion volume which will cover Hayek's life from 1950 until his death in 1992. *Hayek. A Life 1899-1950* is not so much an intellectual biography as it is a lengthy volume about his life. It is a book which reveals much about F.A. Hayek as a scholar, a professor, and especially as a person.

EARLY LIFE

The book provides far more than just than bare facts. This is especially true regarding the period from Hayek's birth until his maturity. In "Part I A Viennese Youth" Caldwell and Klausinger discuss in detail Hayek's parents and grandparents and their city Vienna. Caldwell and Klausinger often refer to Friedrich August von Hayek as Fritz. They note his father's influence on Fritz' youth which ranged from literary favorites like Goethe and Schiller to their shared love of biology and the outdoors. Hayek did not suggest that it was his love of the outdoors that contributed to his poor performance in school; rather, he was often bored because it was not at all intellectually challenging. It also did not help that the precocious boy was independent- minded and even rather rebellious. His parents had him change schools but that did not help him much. While his grades showed that he was often at the bottom of his class, his fellow students recognized his wide-ranging knowledge. His classmates regarded him with almost a sense of awe—Fritz seemed to know about everything "(except, perhaps, the one then being taught)" (p. 52). The final two chapters of Part I deal with anti-Semitism and the war. Caldwell and Klausinger note that anti-Semitism was widespread in Vienna and his family was anti-Jewish but that Fritz did not share their prejudices. Fritz did not join the war effort at first because of his age, but then he sat for an exam that allowed him to become a cadet. Caldwell and Klausinger admit that not much is known about Hayek's time at the Italian front. There are two sources—his diary which was more of a "datebook" and does not tell much, and his correspondence. It is from his letters to his family that we can determine that it was

Bruce Caldwell and Hansjoerg Klausinger, 2022. *Hayek. A Life 1899-1950.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

the death of his childhood friend Walter Magg that left Fritz "emotionally shaken" (pp. 75-76). Just before the war ended, Fritz forgot to take his quinine and contracted malaria (p. 83).

TEACHING LIFE

For someone who apparently enjoyed giving lectures, Hayek seemed less than enthusiastic about teaching. Although he set his sights on gaining a professorship and remained in academe most of his life, he seemed uninterested in actually teaching students. Although he was considered a fairly good lecturer at the London School of Economics, he was apparently more comfortable performing administrative duties and discharging editorial tasks than dealing with students and grading papers and exams. The exception appears to be graduate seminars, many of which he held jointly with other professors at LSE. But after World War Two when Hayek was seeking a position in America, he made it rather clear that he did not want to be in a lecture hall or classroom in front of students, but in an office or library doing research.

"Part II A Broadening of Horizons" covers approximately five years of Hayek's early life, from the time he returned to Vienna from the war until his first trip to the United States. Caldwell and Klausinger suggest that the horrors of war and the economic aftermath did not appear to have affected Hayek; instead, he worked hard and played hard: during the day, he threw himself into his university studies and in the evening, he danced. It is about this time that his "relationship with his cousin, Helene 'Lenerl' Bitterlich, apparently deepened." (p. 96). Lenerl would continue to play a crucial role throughout the rest of Hayek's life.

Hayek took advantage of the university's policy of letting students take courses in various subjects: he was studying law but he took courses in philosophy and in psychology—both would have lasting impacts on his intellectual interests. His concern with economics also stems from this time; first with courses given by Othmar Spann and then Friedrich von Wieser. While he became a favorite student of Wieser's and later edited a volume of his works, it was Spann who recommended Fritz read Carl Menger's works (pp. 137-138). But it would be Ludwig von Mises who would have the lasting effect on Hayek in terms of the study of money and inflation and socialist economic calculation (p. 143).

As Hayek was finishing his degree in law he was also looking for work. He went to see Ludwig von Mises who was one of the directors at the "Austrian Clearing Office for War Debts" ("Österreichisches Abrechnungsamt für Kriegsschulden", or "Aba") and it was there that he met his future wife Helena (Hella) Fritsch. Working as a secretary with a sound knowledge of law and economics, Hayek appeared to enjoy his time at the Aba. It not only paid well but put Hayek into daily contact with Mises. It also allowed him to get to know Hella much better (pp. 141-142). It also gave him considerable free time to enjoy the outdoors and to attend public lectures.

The American economist Jeremiah W. Jenks presented a paper on currency in Vienna on October 25, 1922 and Hayek was in the audience. He later introduced himself to Jenks and he told him of his interest in visiting the United States. Jenks encouraged him to do so, but Hayek had to pay his own way. Wieser and Schumpeter gave Hayek letters of introduction (pp. 156-157). Before he left, he finished his thesis which was graded by Othmar Spann and Hans Kelsen. Despite his disagreement with Hayek, Spann approved of the thesis on the theory of imputation and announced it "Excellent" to which Kelsen added simply "Agreed" (pp. 159-160). The final chapter of Part II details Hayek's journey to America where he stayed for more than a year. He attended New York University and was expected to write a dissertation. According to Caldwell and Klausinger, he never intended to follow through because of his poor English. They also indicated that Hayek found America too noisy, too crowded, too crass, and lacking culture. But they suggest that Hayek based his opinions about the United States primarily on his long-term stay in New York City (pp. 176-179, 183).

SCHOLAR'S LIFE

As much as Hayek had set his sights on an academic career, it took him a number of years before he became a professor. This is the subject of "Part III The Making of an Economist." After his return from America, Hayek needed to "reestablish his ties" to the university and especially to the Economics department. What he encountered was the conflict between Mises and Hans Mayer. Mayer had been chosen to be chairman over Mises, much to Mises' dismay. Caldwell and Klausinger maintain that there were a number of "flash-points" between Mises and Mayer: Mises was a classical liberal and Mayer was not; while Mises resented Mayer's elevation, Mayer was envious of Mises' success with his private seminar (pp. 205, 208-209). Hayek had little regard for Mayer, but he continued to be impressed with Mises. It was Mises who created the Institute for Business Cycle Research and who employed Hayek. There, Hayek was able to do research and consider a future academic career (p. 228). Mises' choice of Hayek also allowed Fritz to attend conferences and it was there that Hayek would meet John Maynard Keynes and William Beveridge (pp. 234-235). It was during the second half of the 1920s that Hayek was working on two book projects as well as editing. All of this was done with the goal of being appointed to a university professorship (p. 256). He would not become a professor in Austria for decades; he would first become a professor in England.

"Part IV Hayek in 1930s England" is the account of Hayek's move to England and more than half of this Part is devoted to his life at the London School of Economics (LSE). As Caldwell and Klausinger observe, LSE would not have seemed to be a welcoming institution for someone like Hayek. They remind us that LSE was founded in 1895 by the Fabian socialists. Although they rejected Marxist philosophy the founders still believed in socialist ideals. The path towards realizing those lay mostly in education with a priority of empiricism over pure theory. However, Hayek the theorist was to be a part of this education. It was William Beverage who issued the invitation to Hayek; Beverage had been the director of LSE since 1919 and had met Hayek in 1928 (pp. 273-274, 277). Hayek was invited to London to give the University Lectures which he did over four days at the end of January 1931. Caldwell and Klausinger maintain that "from all accounts" Hayek's lectures "were a smashing success." They attribute that to his "full command of the history of monetary theory", his penetrating analysis, and his reasonable policy suggestions—"It was a tour de force" (pp. 282-283). Much of this Part is devoted to Hayek's close friendship with his LSE colleague Lionel Robbins. It is also devoted to clarifying Hayek's relationship with John Maynard Keynes (pp. 291-306). Hayek began his time at LSE as a much sought after thinker, but towards the end of that period he found that most everyone had been converted into Keynesians (see pp. 344, 364).

Caldwell and Klausinger spend considerable effort in detailing Hayek's criticism of planning. They suggest that Hayek objected to socialism because it lacked real competition and because it embraced unrealistic goals. The authors also spend considerable effort in detailing Hayek's time at LSE. They note that Hayek's ideas were not always the clearest and they recount a story in which an argument broke out about whether Hayek "was lecturing in English with a strong German accent or in German with an English accent" (p. 343). Caldwell and Klausinger suggest that Hayek's "unassuming personal style" was not a pose but may have been a combination of the recognition that he was a "stranger in a strange land" as well as "a reflection of his own personal tastes" (pp. 357-358). He was, after all, a cultured man from Vienna.

Hayek had been working on a book since the late 1930s and after numerous delays it was published in the winter of 1941. *The Pure Theory of Capital* is regarded as both "magisterial" and "tedious"—even Hayek confessed that it was "'a rather arid tract'". But as Caldwell and Klausinger point out, the reader does not encounter this confession until after laboring through "seventy pages of introductory material" (p. 374).

"Part V Fighting the Spirit of the Age" is meant in two ways: Hayek's fight for liberalism and his fight against socialism. Although Hayek is often considered a neo-liberal, he was convinced that he was more like a traditional British liberal. He believed fervently in the fundamental rights of freedom of conscience, religious tolerance, and constitutional restraints on political authority (pp. 439, 564). What he strenuously objected to were the so-called "men of science" who insisted that "science was to aid man and only socialist science could do so" (pp. 440-445). But the "men of science" had no clue and they did not realize that

planning does not lead to prosperity but to impoverishment (p. 454). Caldwell and Klausinger repeatedly emphasize that Hayek believed that his classical liberalism lay between conservatism and progressivism (p. 456).

Three of the chapters in Part V are devoted to Hayek's book *The Road to Serfdom*. Instead of continuing to pursue his efforts to write a book on the abuse of reason, in 1941 Hayek decided to turn his attention to what would become his most famous book (pp. 516-519, 541). Its history was not positive—it had been turned down by three publishers in the United States but it was accepted by Routledge in England. It was only by some interventions that the University of Chicago Press accepted it (pp. 524-526). Of course, the book's reception would radically change with the publication of it in installments in *Reader's Digest*. That led to a number of things: Hayek's grand tour promoting his book in the US, his connections to Walter Lippmann, and to his relationship with Karl Popper. What he shared with both Lippmann and Popper was a commitment to liberalism and the belief in the power of education.

The final part, "Part VI Changing Worlds," discusses the changes in the real world as well as the changes in Hayek's world. Many of these changes overlapped. In particular, Hayek wanted to rehabilitate Germany but he recognized the challenges that he and others would face. They could not impose their liberal ideas and ideals; they needed Germans to recognize and adopt them as their own. This did not mean that Hayek and his liberal minded allies could do nothing. Rather, Hayek envisioned a group that would be dedicated to spreading liberal values by intellectual discussions. He wanted to name it after Lord Acton because of his German training but Hayek's friends pointed out that Acton was not only a devout Catholic but that his name would be too unfamiliar (pp. 592-593, 596). Hayek thought that the name Acton-Tocqueville would be workable but he was not able to convince people that the name was right nor could he secure financial backing. He was not successful but he was unwilling to give up his dream of establishing a scholarly group devoted to classical liberalism. He was finally able to achieve that when he arranged for a number of his scholarly acquaintances to meet at Mont Pèlerin in eastern Switzerland. A group of 39 scholars met for two weeks in early April, 1947 and the group was dedicated to the renewal of liberalism in Europe. Hayek explained in his paper that competition in his vision of liberalism was crucial; however, the state was necessary to ensure that competition was "effective and beneficial". Unlike those who embraced laissez faire economics, Hayek insisted that the state was necessary, just that it should be minimal (pp. 648, 654-655, 662-664). Not everyone was convinced that the idea of the state was warranted—Mises supposedly shouted "You're all a bunch of socialists" and stomped out (p. 665). There was also disagreement about a statement of principles and even about the proper name. The group fought over the ten principles that had been proposed, so Lionel Ribbons was tasked with drafting a new statement. He had it ready the next morning and it had six principles. Then there was the debate about the society's name: Hayek's Acton-Tocqueville was rejected as Robbins's the Protagonist Society. Several others were offered when another participant offered "the Mont Pèlerin Society" to which Popper responded: "That is meaningless." Caldwell and Klausinger added "It was sufficiently inoffensive that the group ultimately adopted it" (pp. 669-670).

PERSONAL LIFE

There is no particular part or even section devoted to Hayek's personal life; rather, it is expertly woven throughout the book. But the final three chapters of Part V are largely focused on the Hayek's family life. Some of his history is drawn from others' accounts and some of it is based upon Hayek's letters. But a large amount of it is taken from two major sources: Hayek's own later recollections and from Caldwell's interviews with Hayek's daughter Christine. Hayek's memory was not always perfect and it appears that Christine's account is somewhat biased. In any case, Hayek's personal life was anything than straightforward.

In the years before Hayek took his extended trip to America, he had been on very close terms with Helene—"Lenerl." She was evidently in love with Hayek and Hayek was apparently smitten with her (pp. 96-98). However, he could not, or would not, bring himself to commit himself to her. During Hayek's absence,

she accepted the marriage proposal from Hans Warhanek who was a friend of Hayek. Lenerl and Hans married in 1923 and had several children. Caldwell and Klausinger are at a loss to explain Hayek's puzzling early relationship with Lenerl. They offer some possible answers before announcing "For all of his intelligence, women appeared to have been a complete mystery to him" (pp. 163-165). It seems as if Hayek was also a mystery to his wife and to his daughter.

When Hayek returned to the Aba in June, 1924, he renewed his contact with Hella. Just under two years later they became engaged and were married in August of that year. Caldwell and Klausinger discuss Hayek's parent's later lives; his father had contracted blood poisoning from an accident in 1910 and he never fully recovered. He died in 1928 at the age of fifty-six (p. 222). Hayek's mother had always been athletic and liked being active outdoors—something that Hella had in common with her mother-in-law. Fritz and Hella had two children: Christine Maria Felicitas (the Felicitas was in honor of Fritz' mother) who was born in July 1929, and Lorenz (Laurence) who was born in July, 1934 (pp. 224-225, 405). Although the Hayeks were living in London in 1934, Hella decided that she would feel more comfortable returning to Vienna to give birth to her son. That turned out to have been a good decision because the birth was problematic (pp. 405-407).

According to Caldwell and Klausinger, Hella was both a good mother and wife. She did most of the cooking and took care of the children; she also watched over her husband. Caldwell interviewed Christine in October of 2012 and in one, Christine spoke of her mother: "She jolly well had to be practical because my father had *no idea*…" (p. 404). Christine was the source of much of the information regarding her father's life, but it is fairly obvious that she was not overly fond of him. On the one hand, she recounted how her childhood was relatively normal and even during the war her life seemed pleasant (pp. 490-491, 506-507). But she also complained that her father was often at home and that meant that she and her brother had to keep quiet. She told Caldwell that her father appeared much different to his colleagues than he did to her. To her, she appeared distant and dour but to others he was warm and outgoing. He might have been a friend to other people; but she added "he wasn't *our* friend" (pp. 403, 514, 692). Of course, Christine was mostly justified in her negative opinion of her father; after all, he abandoned her, her brother, and their mother—all because of Lenerl.

The relationships between Hayek and Hella, and especially between Hayek and Lenerl were convoluted and confusing. Caldwell and Klausinger are excellent at explaining the arrangements without much judgment. By mid-1934, Hayek had realized that he had made a terrible mistake and that he had married the wrong woman. It was around that time that Hella had their son Lorenz and she thought that would strengthen their marriage but it did not. Hayek brought up the subject of divorce, but Hella, who disliked conflict, simply refused to hear about it. Hayek would see Lenerl when he visited Austria. The war put a stop to that: Hayek would not see Lenerl or his mother until well after the war ended. It was after Hayek returned from another trip to the United States that he explained that he was insisting on a divorce, would provide financially for Hella and the children, but that he wanted to start a new life with Lenerl—who was willing to join him (pp. 682-683). Caldwell and Klausinger detail Hayek's legal problems with getting a divorce and how he had to take a position in Arkansas in order to obtain one. They also discuss how wounded Hella was and that she was justified in doubting Hayek's promises of money. Finally, they seem to side with Lionel Robbins who sided with Hella and broke off his lengthy friendship because of Hayek's reprehensible behavior. All of this took its toll on Hayek as well—he suffered emotionally and physically (pp. 702-705, 710-720, 722). Hella had not wanted to grant Hayek a divorce, but Lenerl's husband Hans was willing to grant her one. But before it was granted in Vienna, Hans was hospitalized with pleurisy and died. Lenerl blamed herself for her husband's death and had a nervous breakdown. Caldwell and Klausinger suggested that that her attitude might not have been totally reasonable—and they note that Hayek was unable to help her because he was in Arkansas (pp. 724-725). They conclude by observing that "The divorce clearly left no one unscathed, and the scars would last for years." Hella lost her husband, Christine and Lorenz were told that their father would not return. Lenerl lost her husband Hans and her own two children lost their father.

"Finally, Fritz had lost his best friend"—Lionel Robbins (p. 730). Hayek would begin a new life in a new world with a new wife and a new job. This will be the story in their next volume.

HAYEK'S LIFE: AN EVALUATION

Hayek. A Life raises a number of questions. They range from the mundane: many accounts indicate that Hayek did not use the "von" in his name when Austria dispensed with titles after the war. Yet he often used it—as in his name on the masthead of the journal that he helped edit *Economica.* Caldwell and Klausinger suggest that he dropped the "von" in 1945 when his opponents were referring to this "German" professor as "Professor Friedrich August von Hayek" (pp. 514, 567, 582, 584). Another question is more scholarly: the authors never fully answer the question of how many critics could miss the fact that Hayek was no progressive but he was also no libertarian. Hayek was constantly trumpeting the liberal virtues of freedom, tolerance, and moderation (pp. 533, 564, 642, 662). Finally, which Hayek is it: the suave, cultured, diplomat or "the prof in the study" who never had a clue (pp. 403, 506, 692). These are questions that are never answered. It may be that there are no definitive answers to these questions, but the authors might have admitted as much.

More importantly than those questions; there are two problems with this book; one is mostly subjective and the other is rather objective. Regarding the first, some readers will tire of amount of space devoted to Hayek's father, mother, and brothers, and perhaps even more, to his other relatives. Some readers may wish to have less detail regarding some of the accounts of Hayek's interactions at conferences and in seminars. But these are largely subjective issues. But there are more serious implications regarding the rather objective problem. Caldwell and Klausinger correctly object to some of the "lazy characterizations" of Hayek (p. 565), yet they are often guilty of the same transgression. For some examples: Alfred Schütz is portrayed as a mindless critic, Werner Sombart is blasted because of his nationalism, and Edgar Salin is simply labeled a "neo-romantic." Wilhelm Dilthey and Ernst Troeltsch are dismissed as historicists, Hans Kelsen is taken to task for the "weaknesses" of his legal positivism, and Karl Mannheim is constantly derided as an ignorant planner. But Caldwell and Klausinger never explain either what legal positivism is or tried to understand what it actually meant. They also do not describe what historicism was and why some found it so objectionable. Similarly, they do not offer an account of the "Kulturkampf" and even more important, they do not spend much time on the "Methodenstreit." As a result, the reader does not learn why Carl Menger was so important to Hayek and why Hayek was so preoccupied with developing a theory of money. And, it was Menger who had insisted that history was just as important as theory—which is another reason why Hayek revered Carl Menger. These omissions cannot have occurred because of concerns about space: the References alone are more than 70 pages.

These are serious problems but they do not diminish the value of this book. Bruce Caldwell and Hansjoerg Klausinger have done an admirable job in detailing the first fifty years of Hayek's life. It took them more than a decade for *Hayek. A Life* to be written; let us hope that their second volume does not take that long. Anyone interested reading about the life of one of the twentieth century's leading intellectual will find *Hayek. A Life* to be richly rewarding.

Review

An Idea Betrayed: Jews, Liberalism and the American Left by Juliana Geran Pilon

WALTER E. BLOCK
Loyola University New Orleans

Most books on history fall into one of two main categories, the micro or the macro. In the latter case, there is an attempt to "tell it all" from the beginning of recorded history right up to the present. As for the former, the focus is much more narrow. For example, US history, or European history, or World War II.

The present book under review does not fit neatly into either category. Rather, it has one foot in both of these camps. On the one hand, it goes way, way back in time, and reaches into the present. That is the macro element. But it also narrowly focuses on only two dimensions: the Jews, and the downward, regrettable path from classical liberalism, or libertarianism, to left, liberal, politically correct, socialism and the connections between these two universes of discourse.

This is a book by a gifted author. Her words fairly leap off the page at you, and her command of the material she addresses is thorough. Abraham Lincoln had a relationship with the Jewish community of the day? Who knew? Certainly not I. She sets for herself two tasks, and brilliantly succeeds in both. The first is to document the ruination of Judaism as it takes on both anti-Zionism and, yes, anti-Semitism, conflating this religion with, of all things, woke socialism. No. Contrary to all too many reform Jews and their rabbis, Judaism is not at all reducible to, or an equivalent of, the left wing of the Democratic party. To be Jewish it is not at all necessary to adopt the policies and attitudes of that Jewish Senator from Vermont, Bernie Sanders. Second, left liberalism, or progressivism, it quite a gigantic step down from classical liberalism. The latter stood for, and still stands for freedom, liberty, private property, free enterprise, laissez faire capitalism. The former for egalitarianism, "equity," transgenderism, racism, the required use of politically correct pronouns.

What interests me most in her tales of woe are the self-hating Jews, those who really are traitors to their co-religionists, to their ethnicity. These people have sold their souls to a mess of pottage; not so much if at all for financial reasons, rather to socialism, communism, and other anti-life philosophies. In order to get along with, to be accepted by, the groups they wish to placate (Black Lives Matter, Hamas, Iran, Hezbollah, the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions movement; campus protests against Israel) they have embraced the extremes of anti-Zionism, even anti-Semitism.

Pilon owes a debt of gratitude to retired Harvard Professor Ruth Wisse, and she is not at all behindhand in expressing it. In so doing, Pilon has demonstrated her excellence as a student of this world class scholar.

Juliana Geran Pilon. 2023. *An Idea Betrayed: Jews, Liberalism and the American Left.* Washington: Academica Press

No book is perfect, and I would be derelict in my duty as a reviewer if I did not mention a few of my minor reservations. For example, on pages 81 and 85 she offers a strong, quite proper and eminently justifiable condemnation of eugenics as a coercive policy. But she disparages it as a "cult of science" thus throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Playing around with genes is how we now have watermelon with practically no seeds and tomatoes of all sizes and varieties. On page 83, she rejects racial differences in intelligence, saying there is no evidence to support such a contention. Murray and Herrnstein's Bell Curve is chopped liver? On page 85 she disparages "cutthroat completion." This is strange coming from a strong advocate of free enterprise such as she. On numerous occasions she mentions the "Civil War" that supposedly took place in 1861-1865 in the US. Not so. In a true civil war, such as Russia, 1917, Spain 1936, two contending sides each want to rule the entire country. In the US at that time, the North did indeed wish to rule the South, but the latter did not return the favor. Instead, it wanted to secede. So this was a war of secession, not a civil war. On page 140, William F. Buckley announced that he would prefer to be ruled by the first 2,000 names (not 100 of them) in the Boston telephone book rather than by the Harvard professoriate. On that same page she mentions the following Jews who supported capitalism: William S. Schlamm, Morris Ryskind, Eugene Lyons, Frank S. Meyer and Frank Chodorov. Curiously, she omits Ayn Rand, Ludwig von Mises and Murray N. Rothbard. On page 153, she is entirely too pro President Eisenhower for my taste. I find it difficult to forgive him for requiring that Israel not annex the Sinai Peninsula, which that country had won in defensive wars against Egypt. But these are minor glitches, and/or matters of tastes and preference in which allies in the intellectual war for freedom and liberty, as this author and I, can disagree.

This book transcends the micro-macro distinction in that it offers macro coverage, all throughout history, but only as it pertains to its two main micro foci: Jews and liberalism-socialism. Within these parameters, if offers a scintillating and very thorough coverage. All throughout this volume Pilon offers in bold face type numerous inspirational quotes; these alone are almost worth the entire price of admission. There are few books that disappoint me in that they are much too short. This is one of them. It is only 350 pages (50 of them devoted to notes and bibliography), but I so enjoyed reading it I wish it were twice that size. Hint, hint to the author: write a follow up volume II!

Author Index

SIEO refers to the assimilated *Studies in Emergent Order*

Back Issues

THEMATIC

13:3+4	Liberal Education
12:11+12	Society for the Development of Austrian Economics
12:1+2	Hume's Political Epistemology
11:11+12	Gender and Spontaneous Order
11:5+6	Revisiting Cultural History
10:9+10/11+12	Sovereignties, World Orders, and the Federalist Option: Reviving Libertarian Foreign Policy
10:7+8	*Rationalism in Politics*: sixty years on
10:5+6	Carl Menger and Classical Liberalism
9:5+6	The Political Economy of Pandemics: Towards Uncharted Territory
9:1+2	Economics of Religion
8:8+9	Spontaneous Urban Planning at the Intersection of Markets, Democracy and Science
8:4+5/6+7	Philosophy, The World, Life, and The Law: In Honour of Susan Haack
6:6+7	Karl Popper
5:1	Jazz as a Spontaneous Order
4:4	Barry Smith: On the Occasion of his 65th Birthday
4:2+3	Jane Jacobs
3:2+3	Methodological Individualism, Structural Constraints, and Social Complexity
1:3	Michael Oakeshott

BOOK SYMPOSIA

12:11+12	*The Virtues of Limits*
12:9+10	*The Classical Liberal Case for Israel*
12:5+6	*Why Machines Will Never Rule the World: Artificial Intelligence without Fear*
12:3+4	*Anatomy of Liberty in Don Quijote de la Mancha: Religion, Feminism, Slavery, Politics, and Economics in the First Modern Novel*
11:9+10	*Trust in a Polarized Age*
11:3+4	*Wittgenstein and the Social Sciences: Action, Ideology, and Justice*
11:1+2	*Economic Freedom and Social Justice: The Classical Ideal of Equality in Contexts of Racial Diversity*
10:1+2	*Michael Oakeshott and Leo Strauss: The Politics of Renaissance and Enlightenment*
9:9+10	*Commerce and Manners in Edmund Burke's Political Economy*
9:3+4	*F. A. Hayek and the Epistemology of Politics*
8:12	*Walker Percy and the Politics of the Wayfarer*
8:1	*Adam Smith: What He Thought, and Why it Matters*
7:5+6	*F. A. Hayek: Economics, Political Economy and Social* Philosophy
7:1+2	*Expert Failure*
6:5	*Inequality: An Entangled Political Economy Perspective*
6:3+4	*Conservatism—An Invitation to the Great Tradition*
5:2	*The Tyranny of the Ideal*
2:3	*Adam Smith's Pluralism: Rationality, Education And The Moral Sentiments*

GENERAL

13:1+2/12:7+8/11:7+8/10:3+4/9:11+12/9:7+8/8:10+11/8:2+3/7:3+4/6:6+7/6:1+2/5:3+4/4:1/3:1/2:2/2:1/1:2/1:1

Editorial Information

AIMS AND SCOPE

COSMOS + TAXIS takes its name and inspiration from the Greek terms that F. A. Hayek invoked to connote the distinction between *spontaneous orders* and *consciously planned* orders.

COSMOS + TAXIS is a joint initiative run under the auspices of the Department of Economics, Philosophy and Political Science at The University of British Columbia Okanagan and the Political Science Department at Simon Fraser University.

COSMOS + TAXIS offers a forum to those concerned that the central presuppositions of the liberal tradition have been severely corroded, neglected, or misappropriated by overly rationalistic and constructivist approaches. The hardest-won achievements of the liberal tradition has been the wrestling of epistemic independence from overwhelming concentrations of power, monopolies and capricious zealotries. The very precondition of knowledge is the exploitation of the *epistemic* virtues accorded by society's *situated* and *distributed* manifold of spontaneous orders, the DNA of the modern civil condition.

COSMOS + TAXIS is not committed to any particular school of thought but has as its central interest any discussion that falls within the *classical* liberal tradition as outlined above.

COSMOS + TAXIS publishes papers on *complexity* broadly conceived in a manner that is accessible to a general multidisciplinary audience with particular emphasis on political economy and philosophy.

COSMOS+TAXIS offers a forum distinctively engaging the confluence of interest in situated and distributed liberalism emanating from the Scottish tradition, Austrian and behavioral economics, non-Cartesian philosophy and moral psychology, philosophy of social science, social epistemology, and political philosophy.

COSMOS+TAXIS publishes a wide range of content: refereed articles, topical issues and book symposia, though to moderated discussion articles, literature surveys and reviews. If you'd like to make a thematic proposal as a guest editor or suggest a book review, please contact the managing editor. All books listed on COSMOS + TAXIS' Facebook page are available for review. COSMOS + TAXIS does not have article processing—nor any submission—charges.

COSMOS + TAXIS does not assume responsibility for the views expressed by its contributors.

Books for review should be sent to:

Laurent Dobuzinskis
Department of Political Science
Simon Fraser University
AQ6069—8888 University Drive
Burnaby, B.C.
Canada V5A 1S6

http://cosmosandtaxis.org

SUBMISSIONS

Submitting an article to COSMOS + TAXIS implies that it is not under consideration (and has not been accepted) for publication elsewhere. COSMOS + TAXIS will endeavor to complete the refereeing process in a timely manner (i.e. a publication decision will be made available within three months). All submissions should be in digital format, and emailed to: leslie.marsh@ubc.ca

Papers should be double-spaced, in 12 point font, Times New Roman. Accepted papers are usually about 6,000-8,000 words long. However, we are willing to consider manuscripts as long as 12,000 words (and even more under very special circumstances). All self-identifying marks should be removed from the article itself to facilitate blind review. In addition to the article itself, an abstract should be submitted as a separate file (also devoid of author-identifying information). Submissions should be made in Word doc format.

COSMOS + TAXIS welcomes proposals for guest edited themed issues and suggestions for book reviews. Please contact the Editor-in-Chief to make a proposal: leslie.marsh@ubc.ca

All business issues and typsetting are done under the auspices of the University of British Columbia. Inquiries should be addressed to the Editor-in-Chief: leslie.marsh@ubc.ca

ELEMENTS OF STYLE

1. Submissions should be in English: American, Canadian and UK spellings and punctuation are acceptable so long as they consistently adhere to the one convention.

2. Citations should be made in author-date format. A reference list of all works cited in the body of the text should be placed at the end of the article.

   The most common permutations are as follows:

   Author, A. B. 2013. Title. *Journal*, 1(1): 1-10.
   Author, C. D., Author, B., and Author, C. 2013. Article Title.
   In: *Title*. City: Publisher, pp. 1-10.
   Author, J. E. and Author, B. (Eds.) *Title*. City: Publisher, pp. 1-10.
   Author, E. F. 2008. *Title*. City: Publisher.

   To use as a fully detailed style sheet, please consult the most recent issue of COSMOS+TAXIS.

3. All notes should be as end notes.

4. Please keep mathematical formulae to a bare minimum.

COSMOS + TAXIS acknowledges the generous support of the Lotte & John Hecht Memorial Foundation.

Design and typesetting: Claire Roan, UBC Studios,
Information Technology, The University of British Columbia.

COSMOS+TAXIS