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Frederick Mackenzie
Portrait of Miguel de Cervantes, engraving.
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Symposium on Eric-Clifford Graf, *Anatomy of Liberty in Don Quijote de la Mancha: Religion, Feminism, Slavery, Politics, and Economics in the First Modern Novel*

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Miguel de Cervantes, today Spain's most revered and iconographic author, was born in Alcalá de Henares, near Madrid, in 1547, the son of a poor surgeon and the third of five children. He studied at a humanist academy in Madrid but never attended a university, and by the end of his own lifetime he was known as *el ingenio lego* (intelligent but unlettered), although he was clearly a person of immense reading and culture. In 1569 he abruptly left Madrid for Italy, possibly to escape punishment for wounding a man in a duel, and served briefly in the household of Cardinal Acquaviva in Rome. In 1571 he enlisted in the military and fought with bravery as a harquebusier at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, a great maritime victory for the Holy League against the Ottoman navy in which he was wounded and lost the use of his left hand, thus earning the subsequent sobriquet *el manco de Lepanto* (the one-handed man from Lepanto). Cervantes was captured by North African corsairs in 1575 and spent five years as a prisoner in Algiers, making four unsuccessful escape attempts before being ransomed back to Spain. There, he tried repeatedly but without success to obtain royal remuneration for his military service, even soliciting administrative positions in the American colonies. In 1584 he had a daughter with the wife of an innkeeper, and that same year married a woman whose company appears to have held little attraction for him. After a moderately successful career as a playwright and publishing the pastoral novel *La Galatea* in 1585, Cervantes embarked on a two-decade period of itinerancy in the region of Andalusia, first as a requisitioning officer for the Armada and later as a tax collector, activities for which he was excommunicated once and unjustly imprisoned twice. He again took up his quill around 1600 and produced a string of masterful prose works (among other interesting theatrical and poetic compositions): *Don Quijote*, Part one (1605); a collection of short stories, *Novelas ejemplares* (*Exemplary Novels*, 1613); *Don Quijote*, Part two (1615); and *Persiles y Sigismunda* (1617), an epic romance following the Greek model of Heliodorus's *Aethiopica*, which Cervantes considered his masterpiece and which he rushed to complete three days before his death on 22 April, 1616.

If today Cervantes occupies a place in Spanish culture equivalent to that of Shakespeare in England, *Don Quijote* has no such analogue in its centrality as a work of foundational national identity. Non-specialists are therefore often surprised to learn that, while very popular, *Don Quijote* was not the biggest best-seller of its age. Nor did Cervantes's contemporaries deem it a masterpiece or even a work of importance, and certainly not expressive of some deep national character. Rather, they reacted to it as a work of pure com-

edy. From their perspective, it is not difficult to see why. *Don Quijote* is the story of a poor country hidalgo, a member of the lowest level of Spanish nobility, who has very little to do other than read books of knight errantry, long prose romances of chivalry based on Arthurian legends that, in content, popularity, and critical reputation, were somewhat akin to James Bond and the superhero movies of today (they are packed with sex, violence, magic, dastardly villains, and superhuman heroes). Such is the hidalgo's mania that he spends most of his money acquiring new tomes, even selling off his one asset, his land, to do so. He reads night and day until finally his brain dries up and he goes insane, believing not only that his books of fiction are true chronicles of real warriors, but that he is a heroic knight himself. He cleans up some rusty old armour, fashioning a new paper mache mask for the one his helmet lacks; names himself Don Quijote (a *quijote* is the thigh guard in a suit of armour); recruits as his squire a dimwitted peasant farmer named Sancho Panza with the promise of the governorship of an island (a familiar trope in the chivalric romances); and goes riding on his emaciated nag through the hot and dusty landscape of La Mancha (south-central Iberia) in search of knightly adventures. He finds them, at least in his own mind: he takes windmills for giants, roadside inns for castles, prostitutes for princesses, and a host of passersby as adversaries whom he challenges to combat, usually taking a fall or a beating as a result and losing half an ear and most of his teeth in the process. In all of these particulars, *Don Quijote* is an obvious parody of the chivalric romances so beloved of its eponymous protagonist. Another aspect of this parody is the conceit, carried over from the books of knight errantry, that *Don Quijote* is a true history about a real hidalgo who becomes a knight. In *Don Quijote*, Part two, however, Cervantes elevates this concept to high art by incorporating into the fiction the historical fact of the publication and popularity of Part one. Don Quijote and Sancho meet many people who have read their "history" and are delighted to encounter them in "real life." Critics are fond of noting the paradox of literary characters being received as real people, but within the fiction this is simply the consistent application of the conceit of historicity: all the characters occupy the same plane of fictional "reality," and so, for them, seeing Don Quijote, while surprising, no more causes them to question the line between life and literature than would meeting the subject of a biography in real life today. Nor did it move any of Cervantes's contemporaries to read *Don Quijote* as anything other than a splendidly funny work of comic entertainment.

Such remained the dominant reading for nearly two centuries. Some evolution in that time did occur: during the Enlightenment, *Don Qujiote* was read as a national epic comparable to the *Aeneid* and, while comic, also the supreme example of neoclassical good taste whose satire of chivalric romance transcended the literary and expounded coherent ethical principles. But a sea change came with the German romantics, who saw in *Don Quijote*, not a work classifiable in terms of established genres, and certainly not a trivial comedy, but something sui generis, a novel, infused with Romantic Irony and expressive of a national Spanish essence. For the romantics, Don Quijote was no lunatic or figure of fun, but a noble hero estranged from a tragically alienated modern society. All subsequent readings of *Don Quijote* exist in the shadow of this interpretation.

In the prologue to *Don Quijote*, Part one, Cervantes showily bestows interpretative carte blanche on his readers, and modern critics have taken him up on the offer. A reasonably comprehensive bibliographic survey would easily sprawl to book length. Nevertheless, some of the critical history that is particularly germane to this Symposium can be sketched in broad outline. Though a philosophical treatise, not a literary exegesis, the foundational work of twentieth-century scholarship on *Don Quijote* is José Ortega y Gasset's *Meditaciones del Quijote* (*Meditations on Don Quijote*, 1914), which established the basic parameters of much subsequent Cervantes criticism. According to Ortega, the novel arises in the Renaissance in opposition to the epic and encapsulates the new world view of individualism and rationality characteristic of its age. The novel does not discard epic mimesis, expressive of an always-past time (Achilles is as far from Plato as he is from us); rather, it treats it ironically, subsuming it into the hero's psychology and supplanting its mythic narrative with the description of contemporary reality and everyday characters. This ironic perspective allows the novel to peer beneath the mirage of appearance to the deeper essence of the ideal, thereby rendering the real, which is anti-poetic by nature, poetic. *Don Quijote* dramatizes this process metafic-

tionally in a famous scene in which its protagonist intervenes, sword drawn, in a chivalric adventure staged in a puppet theatre, thus establishing a new paradigm by which culture acts on individuals. By showing its hero's self-actualization as a product of his will, the novel rehearses the reader's own process of self-realization. The tragic hero lives a perpetual act of utopian becoming; reduced to the brute reality of merely being, he is rendered comic. The novel is the tragicomic synthesis of the poetic and the real; Don Quijote, the idealistic protagonist of the first modern novel who carries the mythic adventure of epic within his own mind across an unyielding material reality, is a mediating figure between these two planes of existence; and *Don Quijote* is a guide to Spanish cultural and political renewal, a means of recovering its forgotten Germanic (ultimately, Hellenic) essence beneath its Latin reality.

Ortega's brief *Meditaciones* anticipate many of the fundamental themes taken up by twentieth-century critics (not only specialists in Cervantes but important theorists of the novel such as György Lukács and Mikhail Bakhtin): the relationship between epic and novel and their respective chronotopes; the role of comedy in the rise of the novel; the novel as reflective of an historically specific epistemology; the history-fiction dialectic; the romance-novel binary; irony; existentialism; perspectivism; metafiction. Ortega had a profound impact on the two most important works of twentieth-century Cervantes criticism, Américo Castro's *El pensamiento de Cervantes* (*Cervantes's Thought*, 1925) and E. C. Riley's *Cervantes's Theory of the Novel* (1962); either directly or indirectly, his influence has permeated the aesthetic, philosophical, and cultural analyses of successive generations of scholars. Running somewhat parallel to this tradition but ultimately accepting its basic premises and hermeneutic framework are explications of *Don Quijote* in its specifically socio-political and economic contexts. José Montero Reguera (*El Quijote durante cuatro siglos: lecturas y lectores,* 2005) has shown that the earliest explicitly political interpretation (of a single episode, not the whole novel) is in a comment from 1639 by Manuel de Faria y Sousa on Luís de Camões's epic poem *Os Lusíadas* (1572). Writing in the context of impending Portuguese independence from Spain (1640), and from that perspective advancing a reading not taken up by subsequent critics, Faria e Sousa reads Sancho Panza's governorship of the "island" Barataria in *Don Quijote* as a satire of the incompetent governors that Spain foisted on its Italian territories. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the "esoteric" school of interpretation initiated by Nicolás Díaz de Benjumea anticipated more modern analyses both in its search for hidden clues to textual meaning and in some of its conclusions. It sees in Cervantes a liberal republican, while the satire of chivalric romance in *Don Quijote* reflected the crisis of late feudalism and the rise of rational, bourgeois democracy. More rigorous and textually grounded studies arrived with the turn of the twentieth century. Alfred Morel-Fatio's "Le Don Quichotte envisagé comme peinture et critique de la societé espagnole du XVI^{e} et XVII^{e} siècle" ("*Don Quijote* Considered as a Painting and Critique of Spanish Society of the XVIth and XVIIth Centuries," 1895) and Ángel Salcedo Ruiz's *Estado social que refleja el Quijote* (*Social Reality Reflected in Don Quijote*, 1905) present strikingly positivist analyses of *Don Quijote* as a faithful description (a "painting" or "reflection") of contemporary Spanish society and a criticism of its increasingly anachronistic noble mentality at an historical moment of waning feudalism. But the two foundational studies for modern socio-political and economic approaches to *Don Quijote* belong to the second half of the twentieth century: José Antonio Maravall's *Utopía y contrautopía en el Quijote* (*Utopia and Counterutopia in Don Quijote*, published in 1976 as a revised version of 1948's *El humanismo de las armas en Don Quijote* [*The Humanism of Arms in Don Quijote*]) and Pierre Vilar's "El tiempo del *Quijote*" (The Time of *Don Quijote*, 1956).

Maravall reads *Don Quijote* as a satirical socio-political allegory. He argues that there was no sharp break between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Rather, currents of the former fed into the latter, including in the Erasmian Humanism that produced in sixteenth-century Spain a group of thinkers who, stimulated by the discovery of America, proposed a reformist utopian socio-political programme. Under the social, political, religious, and economic pressures of the Habsburgs' imperial project, however, in the later sixteenth century that reform-minded project curdled into an escapist utopianism of anachronistic chivalric agrarianism. *Don Quijote* is a counter-utopian satire of that delusional current of thought, represented by its protagonist, which responded to the large bureaucracy, professional military, and, above all,

the monetary economy of the modern State with a utopian retreat into the fantasy of a world organized according to traditional social and economic structures and values. According to Maravall, Cervantes clearly perceived the socio-economic and political crisis into which Spain was sliding, and by responding directly and critically to this historical context, he created the first modern novel. His purpose, in this view, was essentially political, not aesthetic.

Vilar, for his part, takes *Don Quijote* as a reflection, not only of its social milieu, but of its broader historical context, the crisis that arose as Spain declined from greatness to decadence in the period 1598-1620, concurrent with the reign Philip III. His Marxist analysis, which has been generally accepted by literary critics, sees the discovery of America as paradoxically ending feudalism in Northern Europe while prolonging it in Castile, where the widespread desire to emulate the nobility and live idly from rents short circuited the nascent bourgeois developments of the mid-fifteenth to mid-sixteenth centuries. The treasure of America was thus squandered on imported luxuries but not invested productively, as some contemporary observers (the so-called *arbitristas* or early political economists) argued. Like Maravall, Vilar sees in Don Quijote the embodiment of an escapist fantasy, but for Vilar he is not an analogue of an unrealizable humanist utopia, but an anachronistic representative of the feudalism that Castile could not overcome and a comforting affirmation of the traditional values (honor, goodness, etc.) of the Old World.

The general approaches of Maravall and Vilar have proven very influential on a broad range of scholars, independently of their ideological premises. Some have followed Vilar in concentrating primarily on the socio-economic and political contexts in Cervantes's Spain. Notable examples include: Javier Salazar Rincón, *El mundo social del "Quijote"* (*The Social World of Don Quijote*, 1986); Antonio Feros and Juan Gelabert (eds.), *España en tiempos del Quijote* (*Spain in the Time of Don Quijote*, 2004); Manuel Rivero Rodríguez, *La España de don Quijote* (*The Spain of Don Quijote*, 2005); and Miguel Ángel Galindo Martín (ed.), *Cervantes y la economía* (*Cervantes and the Economy*, 2007). Other scholars have adopted Maravall's methodology of using the historical context to advance a critical interpretation of *Don Quijote* itself. One of the earliest works in the latter tradition, Ludovik Osterc's *El pensamiento social y político del Quijote* (*Social and Political Thought in Don Quijote*, 1962) cites neither Maravall nor Vilar, however, mentioning only Díaz de Benjumea as a predecessor. Osterc's aggressively Marxist analysis (critics who disagree with him are pilloried as being blinded by their bourgeois class interests) reads *Don Quijote* as a realist novel that satirizes a moribund feudal society transitioning toward capitalism. It is anti-clerical, anti-aristocratic, and anti-bourgeoisie, Osterc contends, and Cervantes was a radical Erasmian humanist and democrat. Possibly due to its stridently ideological interpretation, Osterc's study has had little impact, but its materialist approach has recurred in more influential analyses, for example, Carroll Johnson's widely cited *Cervantes and the Material World* (2000), which situates *Don Quijote* (and other works by Cervantes) within the socio-economic fissures between a fractured feudalism and a frustrated Castilian capitalism. David Quint's *Cervantes's Novel of Modern Times* (2003) jettisons the explicitly Marxist rhetoric but retains the feudalism-to-capitalism context and adds a more formally literary analysis. For Quint, the generic multiplicity exemplified by *Don Quijote* directly corresponds to the increasingly fluid social classes of the early capitalist period. We could dramatically expand this list by including the works of cultural studies published over the past quarter century that incorporate the basic feudalism-to-capitalism framework and locate *Don Quijote* at the nexus of that historical change, while expanding the frame to include law, history, Islam, feminism, colonialism, imperialism, etc.

Eric-Clifford Graf's *Anatomy of Liberty in Don Quijote de la Mancha: Religion, Feminism, Slavery, Politics, and Economics in the First Modern Novel* (2021) belongs to this tradition, although it is different from its predecessors in important ways. For Graf, *Don Quijote* is the first modern novel, realist, ironic, and perspectivist. It descends directly from the picaresque novel and, like the foundational text of that genre, *Lazarillo de Tormes* (c. 1554), is an inheritor of the ancient Menippean satire, a protean fiction that was notable for its stylistic promiscuity and thematic diversity. Graf accepts that *Don Quijote* takes place in and actively reflects an historical moment of decaying feudalism and burgeoning capitalism. He contends that Cervantes clearly perceived this epochal transition and wrote *Don Quijote* as an explicitly so-

cio-political commentary, a materialist satire of the prevailing ideologies of the time: religious orthodoxy, gender inequality, racial categories, arbitrary political power, and economic dirigisme. The unifying theme in Cervantes's treatment of these topics is liberty. As the title of his study indicates, Graf conceives of *Don Quijote* as an anatomy of liberty, that is, a compilation and systematic analysis of the concept of freedom in its multiple personal, political, economic, and religious manifestations. Accordingly, Graf organizes his own dissection of liberty in *Don Quijote* into five categories: religious tolerance, respect for women, abolition of slavery, resistance to tyranny, and economic freedom. Most modern scholars would agree that Cervantes was at least relatively anti-Inquisition, anti-imperialist, anti-misogyny, anti-slavery, anti-aristocratic, and anti-tyranny. Where Graf departs decisively from the critical mainstream is in his argument that these positive values are particular to modern Western democracies and that Cervantes was not only critical of his own society, but actively in favour of common-sense bourgeois realism. This he set in contraposition to Don Quijote's medieval chivalric idealism and thereby created the modern realist novel. As Graf sees it, in *Don Quijote* Cervantes was not only documenting the end of medieval feudalism, he was celebrating, and spurring on, the arrival of bourgeois capitalism and its promise of personal liberty, which he viewed as an antidote to the tyranny and oppression of the past. Such was Cervantes's intention in *Don Quijote*, in the writing of which he drew on the pro-freedom philosophical tradition of a group of sixteenth-century Spanish theologians and moral philosophers collectively known as the School of Salamanca, who were an important influence on Friedrich Hayek and other twentieth-century economists of the Austrian School. Cervantes also anticipated and influenced the socio-economic and political philosophies of later generations of classical liberal thinkers, such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, Edmund Burke, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Stuart Mill, Frédéric Bastiat, Mark Twain, and Mario Vargas Llosa. *Don Quijote* therefore occupies a privileged position, not only in the rise of the modern novel, but in the development of philosophical liberalism. The novel retains its vital political relevance today because Cervantes's pro-liberty, bourgeois message remains the best solution to the pervasive poverty and tyranny that continue to menace far too many people around the world.

Graf draws on an array of disciplines to make his arguments, including literary criticism, historiography, intellectual and cultural history, political science, and economic theory. The essays collected in this Symposium are similarly eclectic in their approaches to Graf's book. Nicolai Wenzel first summarizes Graf's study and then situates it in relation to Deirdre McCloskey's concept of the bourgeois virtues. Bourgeois capitalism not only makes us rich, McCloskey argues, it also improves us ethically. Wenzel applies this framework to *Don Quijote* to argue that the novel, and especially the relationship between Don Quijote and Sancho Panza, demonstrates precisely the ethically beneficial effects of capitalism posited by McCloskey, while also showing the fraught nature of the uneven historical transition away from the traditional, aristocratic virtues of feudalism towards the modern, meritocratic virtues of the bourgeoisie.

David Harper and Félix-Fernando Muñoz apply economist Bruce Yandle's theory of "Bootleggers and Baptists" to the changing regulation of brothels and prostitution in early modern Spain. They show how ostensibly adversarial interest groups, e.g., brothel owners and moral reformers, could tacitly form an unanticipated coalition that propelled political action. Their public choice analysis of early modern political reality and rent seeking elaborates on ideas that are hinted at in *Don Quijote* and suggested but undeveloped in Graf's *Anatomy*.

Francisco Cabrillo analyzes the Jesuit Juan de Mariana's reaction to the economic crisis of the early seventeenth century, especially the inflation caused by the Crown's opportunistic debasement of Castile's copper petty coinage (*vellón*), which he considered the theft of the people's property. Mariana was a radical defender of popular rights, even going so far as to countenance regicide in the face of incorrigible tyranny. But, Cabrillo notes, he was not an original economic thinker in the mould of his predecessor, Martín de Azpilcueta, who in 1556 first correctly diagnosed the cause of Spain's early inflation and elaborated the still-current quantity theory of money. Cabrillo qualifies Graf's description of Mariana as a liberal thinker, observing, for example, that the Jesuit's ideas about international trade were mercantilist.

Nayeli Riano advances a more direct challenge to Graf's core arguments, not just his conclusions but his fundamental premises, by contending that *Don Quijote* is not a philosophical or political treatise and does not present Cervantes's personal views. Riano draws a sharp distinction between non-literary and literary texts, which are only "about" their relationship with their readers. Liberty is the crucial theme in *Don Quijote*, and all literature, but the question remains, What kind of liberty? For Riano, it is not political but existential, which she illustrates through a comparison of José Ortega y Gasset's concept of rational liberty in contrast to Miguel de Unamumo's idealism as reflected in both thinkers' divergent interpretations of *Don Quijote*. Riano argues that María Zambrano's formulation of a synthetic "poetic reason" expressed through literature transcends the realism-idealism dialectic of Ortega and Unamuno. *Don Quijote* depicts, without an imposed philosophical unity, the ineluctable heterogeneity of real life, its "fragile unity" of hope and failure.

Frederick A. de Armas also addresses the fundamental concept of liberty in *Don Quijote*. He poses the question, What are the margins of freedom? Focusing on the five Latin sayings included in the Prologue to Part one, de Armas posits that Cervantes is playfully expositing a novel paradigm of epistemic independence, challenging readers to consider new forms of thought and expression that undermine established categories of authority by means of a disorienting series of literary games that provide material for thought experiments on the nature of freedom. De Armas argues that this interpretation refutes Graf's characterization of perspectivist readings of *Don Quijote* as unserious ("lighthearted entertainment") and counters his explicit attempt to recover Cervantes's authorial intentions. Liberty, de Armas observes, is not an unconditional proposition but a constant socio-political negotiation between the extremes of absolute freedom and slavery; autonomy and authority; expression and restraint. De Armas proposes that Cervantes's declaration of epistemic independence is simpatico with the freedom of speech enshrined in the United States Constitution and contrary to any kind of ideological censorship. He concludes with a philological flourish, linking Cervantes's fictive authorial pose to Saturn, the planet of melancholy and esoteric knowledge, the hidden wisdom of plurality that *Don Quijote* invites us to contemplate.

Brian Brewer argues that Cervantes's liberalism is pre-political and expressed through his treatment of character. *Don Quijote* is a comedy, and Don Quijote and Sancho Panza are based on longstanding comic tropes as codified in contemporary treatises on literary theory. Rather than depict them with derision as traditional figures of fun, however, Cervantes invests unprecedented care in developing Don Quijote's and Sancho's individual psychologies from within the established parameters of comic characterization. Cervantes ultimately transcends the characters' typological origins in collective identity by imbuing them with a level of individuality, complexity, and dignity unlike any previously afforded to such personages.

In the final article in this Symposium, Eric-Clifford Graf extends the historical context that he analyzes in *Anatomy of Liberty in Don Quijote de la Mancha* to the young United States republic and its "monstrous" constitution. He begins with the debates, voiced in *The Federalist Papers*, between Alexander Hamilton and James Madison on the structures of the new government and the tension between Hamilton's preference for centralization expressed in a strong federal executive and Madison's defense of the sovereignty of the states, institutionalized in the Senate. Both Founders recognized that the egalitarian, bourgeois North would soon surpass the aristocratic, agrarian South in population, wealth, and power. In the short term, each assumed, this would lead to the forcible abolition of slavery in the southern states and, eventually, to the extension of the franchise to women and racial minorities. But Hamilton and Madison also acknowledged the need to protect the fledgling democracy from the (unknown and unknowable) unchecked passions of future majorities, hence the incorporation of an archaic and anti-democratic Senate. Graf sees in this socio-political dialectic the outworking of the same process that Cervantes documented in *Don Quijote*: the eclipse of oligarchic, aristocratic feudalism, represented by Don Quijote, by democratic, merchant capitalism, embodied by Sancho Panza. Graf advances the original argument that Alexis de Tocqueville perceived this same relationship in *Don Quijote* and included it as the principal source for his characterizations of liberal society and politics in the second volume of *Democracy in America*. Therefore, *Don Quijote*'s influence as a political document in the second volume of *Democracy in America* is symmetrical to that of *The Federalist Papers* in

the first. In Graf's analysis, Don Quijote comes to represent the Madisonian minority that must safeguard freedom in a future ruled by Sancho's Hamiltonian majority. By synthesizing *The Federalist Papers* and *Don Qujote*, Tocqueville created a new kind of epic, a manual on liberal political philosophy and a guide for future generations of Americans. Graf's essay undertakes a detailed exposition of the "philosophical precision" with which Tocqueville read *Don Quijote* as part of his meditations on the nature and limits of freedom; and it offers *Democracy in America* as a liberal romantic rejoinder to the critical tradition that reads *Don Quijote* as a comedy. In doing so, it addresses arguments advanced elsewhere in this volume by Riano, de Armas, and Brewer and serves as a fitting capstone to this Symposium.

In *Anatomy of Liberty in Don Quijote de la Mancha*, Graf is generous in seeking common critical and ideological ground with those scholars who take alternative viewpoints. He demonstrates the same *esprit de camaraderie* in his formal responses to the essays collected in this volume.

Don Quijote and the Bourgeois Virtues: Eric-Clifford Graf's *Anatomy of Liberty in Don Quijote de la Mancha*

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the 1960s, my late French grandfather opened a number of factories in Spain, which gave him the opportunity to enjoy several extended sojourns and immerse himself in local culture. His shenanigans with the village pharmacist, doctor, judge, and captain of the Guardia Civil are the stuff of family lore. I once asked him if he had read *Don Quijote* while he was living in Spain. His reply was emphatic: "Non, je ne l'ai pas lu… je m'en suis nourri!" (No. I didn't *read* it. I *nourished* myself from it). Perhaps the pace of life is faster now, and perhaps I'm busy working, while he was enjoying months of downtime in a foreign country, in between bouts of consulting. I, too, read the first modern novel in the original Spanish, but I think I suffered a lot more than he did. It's great, to be sure, but it was also clearly written for a readership without television and other modern distractions. The novel can be slow and dense, but it is also rich with insight into the human condition, early modern Spain, and the tensions of transition to a new intellectual and economic paradigm.

Eric-Clifford Graf's *Anatomy of Liberty in Don Quijote* is a magisterial and useful guidebook to the first modern novel. Graf has an intimate and loving knowledge of the novel—but he has also read everything, from epics to economics, and from political theory to the Scholastics of Salamanca. In the first section, I will briefly review Graf's book. In section two, I will summarize Deirdre McCloskey's bourgeois virtues, as juxtaposed against the noble virtues, as a framework within which to analyze one slice of the complex and rich novel. In section three, I will apply McCloskey's framework to *Don Quijote*. The final section concludes.

2. ERIC-CLIFFORD GRAF, *ANATOMY OF LIBERTY IN DON QUIJOTE DE LA MANCHA*

It would be futile to attempt to summarize the 1,000+ pages of *Don Quijote de la Mancha* here. Alonso Quijano, an hidalgo (a member of Spain's lesser nobility), reads too many chivalric epics. He loses his reason and imagines himself to be a knight errant, committed to righting wrongs and defending *la veuve et l'orphelin* (widows and orphans), and hopefully a few damsels in distress along the way. He renames himself Don Quijote de la Mancha, has himself knighted in a dodgy but funny *benedicto militis*, and takes as his squire a local peasant, Sancho Panza. Adventures ensue, not least the famous episode of tilting at windmills. All through the novel's funny and grotesque episodes, we are treated to allegories

and commentaries—on religion, liberty, the status of women, slavery, inflation, economics, politics, and the uneasy shift to the early modern world—as Cervantes deftly walks us through Spain of the early seventeenth century and provides insights into eternal questions of the human condition.

Enter Eric-Clifford Graf's (2021) magisterial commentary, *Anatomy of Liberty in Don Quijote de la Mancha*. Graf masterfully weaves his knowledge of literature, and especially epic literature, with deep reading across multiple disciplines. Epic literature and the classics are there, of course—but so are the Scholastics of Salamanca, the Austrian School of Economics, inflation and monetary theory, history (from the expulsion of the Moors to different forms of slavery and Habsburg mismanagement of the realm), as well as careful readers of *Don Quijote*, from Frédéric Bastiat to John Locke, and from Thomas Hobbes to Karl Popper, with a dash of Aristotle and Plato. It's all in there, it's messy, it's rich, it's deep, it's complicated, and yet Graf manages to weave it all together into an intelligible and enlightening story. These may be Clifford notes, but they are not Cliff's Notes. The interested reader should heed the words of Aeschylus (1997, p. 109): "we must suffer, suffer into truth." Graf's book is no substitute for suffering through the long, dense, repetitive, sometimes boring novel, to find the gems of wisdom, historical insight, and humor. Rather, Graf offers a complement to the book, which will cast light on the erudition and teaching of Cervantes.

The Austrian economist F. A. Hayek peppers his works with Latin phrases, and with paragraph-long quotations in French and other languages, without offering translation—because, clearly, an educated reader will know those languages. The same applies to *Don Quijote*: the footnotes in my *Edición del IV Centenario* were invaluable, for context and for helping me through the sometimes archaic Spanish, which was alien to my eyes—I learned Spanish at the US Foreign Service Institute, at the visa window at the US Embassy in Mexico City, and over doctoral fieldwork and Malbecs in Buenos Aires, but I have no formal training in early modern Spanish, or in Spanish literature.[1] Graf goes beyond the footnotes, offering both in-the-weeds subtlety and a 30,000-foot view of the novel.

Graf (p. 3) opens the book with a clear statement of his theses: (1) to explain *Don Quijote* as a realist bourgeois solution to a "confusing labyrinth" of social, political, and economic problems; (2) the novel anticipates Montesquieu's *doux commerce*, the sweet commerce that softens relationships among market participants, in the extended market order; and (3) the gradual replacement of chivalric idealism with bourgeois common sense. He then proceeds with five chapters, each addressing each of his book's five subtitles.[2]

Graf reminds us that *Don Quijote* takes place against the backdrop of the wars of religion. The novel offers a satire against religious authority and coercion (p. 16), as Cervantes places freedom of religion as a foundation for the other core freedoms of classical liberalism (p. 17). The novel expresses particular disdain for religious orthodoxy and the arbitrary whims of the Inquisition (p. 22), suggesting instead a bourgeois, private, Erasmian "inner Christianity," a religion for individual self-control, rather than control of others (p. 21). Graf (p. 47) also explains that Cervantes was well aware of Spain's debts to Islam and Arabic culture, while also maintaining disapproval of Islam's treatment of women and its generally coercive nature.

Graf (p. 56) walks us through the proto-feminism of Cervantes, as the novel contrasts strong, independent women with the clumsy knights they really don't need, but who insist on saving them. In the early modern era, women need no longer fall into one of two archetypes, in the Mary-Eve dichotomy (later dubbed the Madonna-whore complex by Sigmund Freud); they can now be individuals. In fact, women are routinely portrayed as being more responsible at household and financial management than the men who are mired in chivalric fantasy (p. 68) or machismo (p. 66). Cervantes and Graf use the treatment of women as a springboard for other transformations in the post-medieval era. Just as women are now individuals (or increasingly recognized as such), society requires a transformation of the *caballero*, from a knight to a bourgeois gentleman: gentlemanly behavior, respect for women as individuals, good manners, and proper marriage, are to replace the coercion of women (p. 58). More generally, chivalric *ociosidad* (leisure) must be replaced by bourgeois work, and early modern religion must make room for women, with freedom from the oppression of both Mohammed and Luther, in Catholicism—but the Catholicism of the Scholastics, not that of the Inquisition, of course (p. 69).

Graf then turns to slavery. After a rough start, in which Sancho cooks up a plan to turn Africans into gold through slavery, the novel is optimistic (pp. 213-214). The early modern Spanish intellectuals had already attacked race-based slavery as absurd and unsustainable, while also foreshadowing modern economics, in the observation that remunerated work is more efficient than slavery (pp. 124-126; Mises 1996, XXI.9). This intellectual turn parallels Sancho's transformation from serf to independent contractor (pp. 114, 117)—a transformation that matches the bigger turn from a pre-modern world to a bourgeois world, from epic heroism to market realism. The novel abounds with descriptions of the honorable nature of work, and the move from coercion to mutual gains from trade, as governed by a wage contract (pp. 123-126).

Graf (pp. 129, 131-133) places *Don Quijote* in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century tradition of "princely advice" manuals, with their wisdom on the art of governing—an art which amounted to avoiding factionalism and sustaining the modern state. Cervantes expresses his political worries throughout the novel: skepticism of mass democracy (p. 134) and unchecked monarchs (p. 150); factionalism opposed to a cosmopolitan bourgeois order (pp. 131-132); communism, free-riding, and egalitarianism (p. 137); Platonist utopianism (p. 146); colonialism and imperialism (p. 148); and debasing of the currency to compensate for fiscal mismanagement (pp. 167-169). Throughout the novel, Cervantes advocates Aristotelian realism (p. 146), constitutionalism and legal protection of rights (pp. 152-156), rule of law (pp. 155-158), and "agrarian, autarkic aristocracy" as a bulwark "against the tyranny of urban bribery" (p. 162). Graf (pp. 137-146) also suggests that Cervantes had certain affinities for the virtues of republicanism. In this respect, the analysis of Sancho's governorship (pp. 155-156 and 159-161), with parallels to "Federalist 51," is particularly important: is Sancho a just governor, or is he corrupted by power, as we might anticipate? Incidentally, Frédéric Bastiat (2002), in his short story, "Barataria" (1864), makes Don Quijote the voice of ugly, Platonist, pre-modern thinking, with aristocrats cultivating virtue on the back of slave labor, while Sancho is the voice of classical liberal economics and liberty.

Finally, Graf discusses economics in *Don Quijote*. He deepens his discussion of earlier themes, like the move away from predatory behavior, serfdom, and slavery to wages and mutual gains from trade (pp. 174, 199-200, 222-228), or the problem of debased currency (pp. 174-175). Graf also discusses the economic revolution of the seventeenth century, a revolution that parallels the political and philosophical developments of the early modern era. The Church was still anti-capitalist (p. 176), and the Salamanca School was emerging in response to a need for new theological and catechumenal justification and guidelines for mercantile and banking activity (p. 177). New ideas were emerging about economics: subjective theory of value over labor theory of value; *doux commerce* over predatory behavior or the privileges of nobility; competition over state-protected monopoly (p. 180). Returning to Sancho's governorship, we see an early economic and Public Choice analysis of Sancho's price controls (pp. 203-204).

Graf (pp. 229-236) closes with an epilogue on the allegorical use of various animals in the novel.

3. THE BOURGEOIS VIRTUES

We now turn to Deirdre McCloskey's bourgeois virtues, a framework I will use to analyze one particular (and particularly important) element of Cervantine thought and Grafian analysis, *videlicet* the turn from the noble virtues of chivalry to the bourgeois virtues of the modern commercial age.

Over the past 15 years, McCloskey has written a three-volume study of the bourgeois turn (*The Bourgeois Virtues*, *Bourgeois Dignity*, and *Bourgeois Equality*), a 2000-page concentrate of history, economics, and philosophy. The first book is the one which concerns us here (McCloskey 2006a). As it is a beautifully crafted 600+ page assay in erudition and clarity, I will rely instead on a much shorter, synthetic work, McCloskey's initial shot across the bow before the full fleet salvo (McCloskey 2006b). I could also simply rely on the title of McCloskey's more recent synthesis: the bourgeois deal comes down to *Leave Me Alone and I'll Make You Rich* (McCloskey and Carden 2020).

McCloskey argues that capitalism is deeply intertwined with virtue. The economic miracle of the past 200 years, which saw human income per capita rise by a factor of 20 or more, "the material side of capital-

ist and bourgeois success is, of course, wonderful" (McCloskey 2006b, p. 8). But there is more (if that were not enough): "bourgeois life *improves us ethically*, and would have even if it had not also made us rich" (McCloskey 2006b, p. 9; original emphasis). Capitalism is associated with higher material well-being, less poverty, more liberty, more leisure, and more artistic creativity. But it is also associated with inter- and intra-personal virtue: just as capitalism relies on these virtues, it nourishes them; we have here, in the phrase Graf so frequently and lovingly quotes, Montesquieu's *le doux commerce*.

McCloskey (2006b, p. 10) reclaims the seven virtues—in "a jury-rigged combination" of the four pagan virtues of an Athenian freeman citizen and the three Christian virtues. She explains that, "jury-rigged or not, the Seven cover what we need in order to flourish as human beings." She clarifies that, although she is herself Episcopalian and working within her home tradition, these virtues map onto "other ethical systems—Confucianism, for example, or Talmudic Judaism, or Native American shamanism—and these can be lined up beside the Seven for comparison. There are many ways to be human. But it is natural to start with the Seven, since they are the ethical tradition of a West in which bourgeois life first came to dominance."

These, then, are the seven bourgeois virtues (McCloskey 2006b, p. 10):

> The leading bourgeois virtue is the Prudence to buy low and sell high. I admit it. There. But it is also the prudence to trade rather than to invade, to calculate the consequences, to pursue the good with competence...
>
> Another bourgeois virtue is the Temperance to save and accumulate, of course. But it is also the temperance to educate oneself in business and in life, to listen to the customer, to resist the temptations to cheat, to ask quietly whether there might be a compromise here...
>
> A third is the Justice to insist on private property honestly acquired. But it is also the justice to pay willingly for good work, to honor labor, to break down privilege, to value people for what they can do rather than for who they are, to view success without envy, making capitalism work since 1776.
>
> A fourth is the Courage to venture on new ways of business. But it is also the courage to overcome the fear of change, to bear defeat unto bankruptcy, to be courteous to new ideas, to wake up next morning and face fresh work with cheer…
>
> Beyond the pagan virtues is the Love to take care of one's own, yes. But it is also a bourgeois love to care for employees and partners and colleagues and customers and fellow citizens, to wish all of humankind well, to seek God, finding human and transcendent connection in the marketplace …
>
> Another is the Faith to honor one's community of business. But it is also the faith to build monuments to the glorious past, to sustain traditions of commerce, of learning, of religion, finding identity in Amsterdam and Chicago and Osaka.
>
> Another is the Hope to imagine a better machine. But it is also the hope to see the future as something other than stagnation or eternal recurrence, to infuse the day's work with a purpose, seeing one's labor as a glorious calling …

I use this framework because it offers a key to understanding the underlying intellectual and virtue shift in Don Quijote, in the hopes of adding insight to Graf's already rich account.

4. DON QUIJOTE AND THE BOURGEOIS VIRTUES

I will now comment on *Don Quijote* through the combined optics of McCloskey and Graf. I will explore the bourgeois virtues in three sections: (1) a shifting world; (2) lingering chivalry; and (3) the question of birth vs. action in the world order.

1. A New Code for a New World

As described above, Graf emphasizes the shifting world of *Don Quijote* and early modernity. That world is moving away from serfdom and towards wage labor, away from feudalism and towards a commercial order, and towards respect for women, other religions, serfs, and others who did not have a voice in the premodern order. Naturally, a new world requires a new code—and much of the tension in *Don Quijote* comes from the uneasiness of a changing ethical and economic world. It's not so much, perhaps, a question of one world's superiority over the other, or if this change is progress or regress—but the uncertainty of not knowing one's place in the world.

If the reader will forgive a pedestrian reference, *Don Quijote* is reminiscent of the Bellamy Brothers' 1985 country hit, "Old Hippie":

> He turned thirty-five last Sunday
> In his hair he found some gray.
> But he still ain't changed his lifestyle
> He likes it better the old way.
> So he grows a little garden in the backyard by the fence
> He's consuming what he's growing nowadays in self defense
> He gets out there in the twilight zone.
> Sometimes when it just don't make no sense.
> …
> He's an old hippie
> And he don't know what to do.
> Should he hang on to the old?
> Should he grab on to the new?
> He's an old hippie
> This new life is just a bust.
> He ain't trying to change nobody
> He's just trying real hard to adjust

On a more serious note, this is not a new theme in literature. Where does the Flyte family fit within the new order of *Brideshead Revisited*, a world of doubt, divorce without annulment, Catholicism and adultery, and long-haired Hooper rebels in need of a forced haircut? It is the world of Hemingway's lost generation, enjoying a miserable and happy *fiesta* in post-war Paris, or Camus's alienation, or the Samurai in the Meiji restoration. Increasingly, I fear it is the alienation of the college professor who still believes in education (and not decanal malarkey like "retention", "assessment instruments" or "the student experience"). While he has other reasons for his alienation (like an overactive imagination, or insanity), Don Quijote is not sure of his place in this new world of land grants, commerce, and rule of law over chivalric privilege. He laments a lost era of pastoral idyll (Cervantes 1.11; Graf 2021, p. 137). He enjoys pontificating on the virtues of chivalry, much like an old soldier who strips his sleeve and shows his scars—except the other gentlemen present no longer "think themselves accursed they were not [t]here" in the battle (Shakespeare, n.d., Act IV, Scene 3, Verse 67). For Don Quijote, knight errantry is a complete science, because it requires all matter of "well-rounded skills" (2.18)—but is he merely justifying a lost and useless craft? Don Quijote dismisses the new

class of merchants, looking down his nose at filthy lucre: the martial arts are the most noble, followed by letters, and (far below) business (1.39-41). He contrasts chivalry's weapons with the "tongue" employed by the bourgeois, the lawyer, and the woman (2.32). Of course, it is these very "habits of the tongue," as McCloskey frequently refers to them, that allowed the move to the world of early bourgeois prosperity, away from the violent and impoverished (if chivalrous—how nice) feudal world.

As Graf deftly explains, the early modern world was in flux. Don Quijote considers money to be *infra dignitatem*, much like an impoverished nineteenth-century earl refusing to work or the Japanese officer in World War II who hired an underling to touch the dirty cash of his wages. Sancho's request for wages (2.7 and 2.28) is clearly a bourgeois move, as is his intention to seek profit from his governorship (assuming, of course that he is an honest bourgeois citizen-legislator and does not acquire it by graft or extortion). A horrified Duchess retorts that his mission is justice, not profit (2.36), and Don Quijote quickly reminds Sancho that the virtues required for a successful governorship are humility, justice, mercy, and good manners (2.42 and 2.43). These, of course, smack of a Platonic philosopher-king, rather than a wise administrator of the treasury and the realm (then again, we can all long for such virtues in contemporary politicians!). Throughout the novel, we see examples of violence averted by the bourgeois virtues, as when the knights want to fight, but the squires negotiate for peace (2.14). Don Quijote, in his own transformation, suggests that idle hands (the very mark of the pre-bourgeois aristocracy) are the devil's workshop (2.70). Sancho and Don Quijote agree that work would be beneficial for Altisidora and would guide her away from the mischief of *ocio*—and towards *necocio* (a precursor, of course, to *negocio*).

In a final, ironic twist, Don Quijote calls for a public reading of Teresa's letter to Sancho (2.52). Indeed, in the pre-modern world, gentlemen don't read each other's mail. This sentiment was echoed as late as 1929, when Secretary of State Henry Stimson withdrew the State Department from the new US cryptanalysis program. Fortunately, in true bourgeois fashion, Stimson, by then Secretary of War, accepted the realities of world war, and relied heavily on cryptanalysis to defeat the Axis. Is Don Quijote still a noble gentleman, who respects the privacy of correspondence? Or is he turning into a more pragmatic bourgeois?

2. Chivalry Dies Hard

Intellectual and cultural paradigm shifts are difficult, or even painful, for an individual. For a society (or humanity), they can be sources of immense turmoil. Without the tensions surrounding the world's move to the bourgeois virtues, there would be no *Don Quijote*. Indeed, chivalry lingers; while Don Quijote increasingly moves into the modern world, he still has one foot firmly planted in the old order. Chivalry dies hard. As described above, Don Quijote pontificates on the lost Elysian world of pastoral chivalry and the superiority of the way of the warrior. There are still strict rules of chivalry (1.15), even if those rules seem to be changed arbitrarily and fluidly—whether out of convenience, or as a concession to a changing world. Don Quijote must go through an *adoubement* before he can be a knight—but he makes up the rules on the fly and ends up being knighted by an innkeeper (1.3). In a parallel to the Catholic sacrament of confirmation, Alonso Quijano renames himself. Both the *benedicto militis* and this second baptism (from the Old French, *baptiser*, to name) exhibit the tension between the two orders: the noble code of chivalry requires certain protocols and ceremonies, but Don Quijote carries them out with brazen bourgeois autonomy.

Graf discusses the problem of money and payment. On his first foray, Don Quijote carries no money (1.3); a knight is detached from such vulgar and pedestrian (and bourgeois!) considerations as money or payment for services. Although Don Quijote learns to carry money and eventually matures into bourgeois responsibility, there lingers aristocratic detachment, as he ignores filthy lucre and the consequences of his actions on others (the negative externalities of honor, perhaps) (1.30). Throughout the novel (1.8, 1.15, 2.52), it is made clear that only a knight may fight a knight; anything else simply wouldn't be proper—but it's not entirely certain if this is really noble honor or a cover story for bourgeois prudence.

Motivations throughout are unclear, because allegiances (to the old code or the new) are unclear. Don Quijote (1.25) appeals to the prudence of Ulysses and the wisdom of Aeneas—early hints of bourgeois vir-

tues—but immediately tempers it with Platonic chivalry. Throughout the novel, it is not entirely clear what ultimately moves Don Quijote—is it honor (an intrinsic good for a knight) or glory, in which the knight gets the girl, the gold, and the grounds (1.30)?

Finally, the tensions of temporal law are palpable. Don Quijote makes an early claim that knights are exempt from temporal laws (1.10), as his mission is a crusade. This claim is repeated later (1.45). Duels were prohibited by the Council of Trent, but knights seem to find a work-around (2.56). In a literal sense, Don Quijote considers himself to be an *out*-law—an irony, because the Catalan thieves follow justice and what we might today call rule of law (2.40); unlike the priest who burns books according to his whimsy (1.6 and 1.47); unlike a monarchy that grants privileges to one religion over another; and unlike the Duke, who keeps adding conditions for Sancho's governorship, in lingering aristocratic whimsy over rule of law and contractual obligation (2.41). In a possibly apocryphal saying, Thomas Mann commented that, in a sick society only the sick are well. In the evolving world of Don Quijote and early modernity, the Church, the nobility, and the crown—who are supposed to uphold the law—operate with pre-modern arbitrary whims. It is bandits—literally the outlaws—who follow modern rule of law. The knight is caught between the two orders. Interestingly, Catalonia (technically, the Principality of Catalonia) had one of the first European constitutional parliaments, limiting the power of the Crown, dating to 1283. The nod to Catalonian outlaws who follow the law may be coincidental—but, knowing Cervantes, it probably isn't. (I thank Eric-Clifford Graf for pointing this out.)

To continue the irony, Sancho, who is nothing in the pre-modern order (a peasant, the lowest of the low, above only serf and slave), becomes a governor. We learn early in the novel that he has more common sense than Don Quijote (1.20, 1.25, etc.). In Barataria, he is more of a judge than governor, and he dispenses justice with common sense and wisdom (2.45, 2.49, 2.53). Sancho (Cervantes 2004, 2.55) the illiterate peasant concludes with a tension that reflects the move from the pre-modern to the bourgeois: "Si el gobernador sale rico de su gobierno, dicen dél que ha sido un ladrón, y si sale pobre, que ha sido un parapoco y un mentecato" (If a governor comes out of his government rich, they say he has been a thief; and if he comes out poor, that he has been a noodle and a blockhead; own translation). Alas, the wise judge quickly yields to the rent-seeking legislator, who establishes price controls on select goods, but conspicuously not on others, to benefit himself, as Graf (2021, pp. 203-204) explains.

In one of the novel's most famous sayings, Don Quijote (Cervantes 2004, 2.58) reminds Sancho, in bourgeois fashion, that "la libertad, Sancho, es uno de los más preciosos dones que a los hombres dieron los cielos; con ella no pueden igualarse los tesoros que encierra la tierra ni el mar encubre" (freedom, Sancho, is one of the most precious gifts that heaven has bestowed upon men; no treasures that the earth holds buried or the sea conceals can compare with it; own translation). But, as he explains the central value of freedom, Don Quijote cannot resist the pull of pre-bourgeois virtue, as he places honor as high as freedom. He continues (Cervantes 2004, 2.58): "por la libertad, *así como por la honra*, se puede y debe aventurar la vida, y, por el contrario, el cautiverio es el mayor mal que puede venir a los hombres" (for freedom, *as for honor*, life can and should be ventured; and on the other hand, captivity is the greatest evil that can fall to the lot of man; own translation, emphasis added).

3. Birth, Merit, and Shifting World Orders

The move from a feudal order to the bourgeois order parallels the shift from the pre-modern world to the modern world of the Enlightenment. The pre-modern world can be summarized as follows: an epistemological appeal to what intellectual historian Alan Kors (quoted in Klutsey 2020) refers to as "the presumptive authority of the past," rather than reason; a static world order, rather than meritocracy; fear, rather than mastery, of nature; limited commercial exchange; and rule by the few over the many. The modern project substituted reason for tradition, meritocracy for birth, and mastery of nature through science and technology over fatalism; it added the economic miracle of property rights and free trade, as well as democracy.

Naturally, the transition did not take place overnight (and it is still incomplete, or even regressing, in much of the world). But the seeds were planted (Pippin 1999; Wenzel 2008; Hayek 1948).

As a way to relate *Don Quijote* and the bourgeois virtues, I look at that quintessential hallmark of bourgeois thinking: social mobility and meritocracy. Returning to McCloskey's (2006b, p. 10) framework, this requires a combination of temperance (to invest in oneself), the courage to take informed risk, and "the hope to see the future as something other than stagnation or eternal recurrence, to infuse the day's work with a purpose, seeing one's labor as a glorious calling."

Tensions abound within the novel. In many ways, Don Quijote himself tried to make his own life and (largely) failed, as the pull of the pre-modern world was still too strong (2.63). As Graf explains thoroughly, the novel contains seeds of feminism, as strong women make their way through the world, or attempt to, despite the lingering pre-modern norms and conventions that prevent them from realizing their bourgeois and individual potential. *Don Quijote* (2.19) asks whether marriage is ultimately an individual choice or a social choice, and it never really answers the question—but the mere asking of the question in 1605 Spain was itself an act of bourgeois rebellion.

Another question floats throughout the novel: does birth matter, and how much? Does birth make a man (as it makes a noble), or is it deeds? The question surfaces early (1.20, 1.21, 1.43), in general terms. Can just anybody own an island, or must there be a claim—whether heredity or the ability to govern (1.50)? The question continues in Sancho's argument for social mobility (2.5) and Don Quijote's thoughts on virtue versus birth (2.6). Even nobility is not exempt: does it come from birth, or can it be acquired through virtuous action and martial skills (1.16 and 2.20)? Sancho claims the prerogative, acquired through education from the duchess rather than noble birth, to advise the duke and duchess on protocol; Don Quijote is horrified (2.37). In the end, Quijote (Cervantes 2004, 2.42) appears to contradict himself—an unsurprising tension in a changing world—when he advises Sancho that "la sangre se hereda, y la virtud se aquista, y la virtud vale por sí sola lo que la sangre no vale" (blood is inherited and virtue is acquired, and virtue is worth on its own what blood is not worth; own translation).

5. CONCLUSION

Don Quijote, the first modern novel, is rich with insight. We could talk about the nature of reality and conceptions of the self (with a nod to Jorge Luis Borges) or dig deeper into epic and picaresque. But my remit in this short assay—a foreign expedition for an economist, to be sure—was to discuss Graf's book. Graf dives into liberty, and I have followed him on one aspect of this analysis, the shift from pre-modern noble virtues to the modern bourgeois virtues.[3]

NOTES

1 All references to *Don Quijote* are to this edition, by part and chapter.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all page numbers in this section are to Graf (2021).

3 I thank Charlotte Thomas, Patricia Bart, and especially Eric-Clifford Graf, for their insights, comments, and guidance. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Strange Bedfellows in the Regulatory Politics of Prostitution during the Age of Cervantes

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"Rent seeking makes strange bedfellows."
(Leeson and Thompson 2023, p. 11)

1. INTRODUCTION

According to Graf (2021), Cervantes's seminal work, *Don Quijote*, foreshadowed modern Western notions of liberty and related developments, including freedom of conscience, liberation of women, and abolition of slavery. In Chapter 5, Graf locates prostitution among the list of economic topics that bear upon Cervantes's vision of freedom—topics that also interested the late-scholastic philosophers of the School of Salamanca. Graf (2021, pp. 196-197) suggests that prostitution is an interesting "limit case" in early economic thinking about what activities are permissible in the marketplace during the transition from the old feudal order to the new world of bourgeois capitalism based on economic freedom.[1] In this discussion, he rightly zeroes in on one of the most prototypical episodes of Cervantes's book—Don Quijote's encounter in the Sierra Morena with a chain gang of convicts, one of whom is sentenced to man the oars in a galley ship for being a pimp (*alcahuete*). Exhibiting a permissive attitude towards sex work, Don Quijote argues that rather than being sent to serve time rowing in the galleys, the pimp should be in command of them as their admiral, because the office of a pimp requires the utmost discretion and is essential in any "república bien ordenada" (well-ordered republic; Cervantes 1978, 1.22, p. 269).[2] Simply put, pimping is in the public interest. Indeed, in this paper, we argue that both vested interest groups ("Bootleggers") and public-spirited moralists ("Baptists") are all vital components of "the glue that binds the body politic" (Yandle 1999, p. 7) in Don Quijote's "well-ordered republic."

Taking Graf's comments as our point of departure, this paper examines the political economy of sex markets, and specifically rent-seeking activities in the regulation of prostitution in the age of Cervantes. In the span of less than 150 years leading up to 1623, brothels in Spain went from being a reward given to vassals for loyal service to the monarchy, to becoming licensed businesses regulated by municipal authorities, and finally to being portrayed as dens of iniquity that must be closed down. We employ Bruce Yandle's (1983, 1999) notion of "Bootleggers and Baptists" to shed light on these regulatory shifts and the curious (and often tacit) coalitions that propelled them. To be clear at the outset: we are making no claim that Cervantes "anticipated" these public-choice insights—we wish to avoid such a proleptic reading of *Don Quijote*. (On prolepsis in the history of ideas,

see Skinner 1969.) We are not saying that the notion of "Bootlegger/Baptist" interactions is contained in Cervantes's text, nor that it corresponds to what the real historical Cervantes believed, meant, or intended to say in his magnum opus. We are merely speculating that Cervantes (or, more precisely, our own portrait of him for our purposes) would appreciate Yandle's analysis of the interaction of economic and political dynamics in regulatory endeavors. In this way, we hope to address one of the gaps in Graf's book. Apart from a few sporadic references to rent-seeking (pp. 160, 200, 212), Graf does not seem to have tapped into the literature on public choice even though it is highly relevant to the political economy permeating many of the issues covered in his book. Indeed, there are no references to James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, the architects of public choice theory, alongside oft-cited liberal thinkers, such as Friedrich Hayek.

Pimping and prostitution are not peripheral matters, either for Cervantes or for his knight errant. The aforementioned episode of the knight's encounter with the pimp is "intimately related to the very essence of the character of Don Quijote" (Redondo 1992, p. 690; own translation). It also tells us something about the author himself, "one of the last major representatives of the Spanish humanism that was extinguished by the Counter-Reformation" (Eisenberg 1990, p. 213). Rather than the result of a witty and burlesque outburst, Don Quijote's defense of pimping is borne of the author's own strong convictions: "Cervantes is speaking through his hero, and in all seriousness. He is thinking in terms, not of witticisms, but of the good of the state" (Green 1970, p. 195). Clearly, the topic of prostitution was far from foreign to Cervantes. As a result of his peregrinations over the years, he was familiar with the brothels of Madrid, Seville, and Valencia (Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero 2006, p. 1973). The ease with which Cervantes approaches this subject matter is reflected in his prose: "with the exception of the innkeeper, no character or narrative voice in *Don Quijote* expresses any violent reaction or discomfort in dealing with prostitutes" (Nadeau 1997, p. 13). In addition to *Don Quijote*, sex workers feature as characters in several of his other works, including the *Exemplary Novels* (1613) "Rinconete y Cortadillo" and "La Tía Fingida" (though Cervantes's authorship of the latter is vigorously debated), and the *entremés* (farcical theatrical interlude) "El Rufián Viudo" (1615). Cervantes's familiarity with prostitution may even have roots that are closer to home too: some women in Cervantes's immediate family may well have been courtesans who fostered relationships with wealthier and upper-class clients (Márquez Villanueva 2005). Martín (2008, p. 27) surmises that the sex-work-related activities of these family members "undoubtedly fostered his tolerant attitude toward such women in need." Indeed, this tolerant attitude of "the most compassionate, the most human of authors" (Armistead 2011, p. 7586; own translation) is consistent with Cervantes's more general concern for marginalized minorities, including gypsies, prisoners and *Moriscos* (i.e., descendants of Muslims who continued to live in Spain after the Reconquest and who were forced to convert to Christianity). But Cervantes's observations may not only be driven by a humanitarian concern or eye on the public interest but also by his personal stake in the sex industry: "At one point in his life Cervantes had been suspected of being a pimp, and therefore his main character's speech defending pimping has a 'personal ring' to it" (Fernández-Morera 2009, pp. 140-141).

2. YANDLE'S THEORY OF "BOOTLEGGERS AND BAPTISTS": ITS ORIGINAL CONTEXT AND INSIGHTS

In this paper, we employ the "Bootleggers/Baptists" theory of regulation ("B&B theory," hereafter) to explain the legalization and regulation of prostitution during the age of Cervantes, as well as to explain the formation of surprising political coalitions that propelled the emergence and evolution of these regulations. The "Bootlegger/Baptist" theory of regulation shows how economic interests and moral ideas interact to drive the politics of regulation. The notion was first put forward by Yandle (1983) and later elaborated by Yandle (1999) and Smith and Yandle (2014). The theory itself expands on an aspect of Stigler's (1971) and Pelzman's (1976) special-interest theory of regulation, which was proposed as an alternative to the prevailing view that regulation exists for the protection and benefit of the public at large—the "public-interest" theory of regulation. The B&B theory echoes Gandhi's famous remark that "those who believe religion and politics aren't connected don't understand either" (quoted in Sharma 2017, p. 157). The B&B theory is a posi-

tive theory of regulation that explains how the real world *is* rather than an inspirational normative theory about how the world could or should be.

The B&B theory was conveniently summarized by Yandle (1999, p. 5):

> Here is the essence of the theory: durable social regulation evolves when it is demanded by both of two distinctly different groups. "Baptists" point to the moral high ground and give vital and vocal endorsement of laudable public benefits promised by a desired regulation. Baptists flourish when their moral message forms a visible foundation for political action. "Bootleggers" are much less visible but no less vital. Bootleggers, who expect to profit from the very regulatory restrictions desired by Baptists, grease the political machinery with some of their expected proceeds. They are simply in it for the money.

The name "Baptists/Bootleggers" theory comes from the history of so-called "blue laws" in individual states in the US. These laws ban sales of liquor at legal retail stores on Sundays. Baptists grew out of English Separatism, a religious movement of dissenters from the Church of England (Jones and Gourley 2015). They have become the largest denomination of Protestant Christianity in the US and the most forceful Protestant voice in support of blue laws. They have embraced abstinence from alcohol consumption as one of the core values of Baptist doctrine, they condemn drinking alcoholic beverages as being immoral and a sin, and they have publicly advocated for the regulation of liquor to curb alcohol use.

In contrast, bootleggers were originally traffickers who illegally smuggled and sold liquor during Prohibition movements in the US in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[3] (The meaning of the term "bootlegger" has since been extended to include any illegal producer or trader in illicit goods, such as pirated music recordings.) Bootleggers supported restrictions on legal sales of alcohol on Sundays because it reduced the competition they faced from legal vendors, expanded their own marketing opportunities, and enhanced the profits they made. Bootleggers were also able to freeride on Baptists' efforts to monitor enforcement of the restrictions that benefit the bootleggers.

Through joint action, Baptists and bootleggers were able to obtain political support for the imposition of blue laws that neither interest group could have obtained on its own. "Bootleggers grease the political wheels by promising to share profits with politicians. Baptists supply a credible moral foundation for alcohol regulation" (Leeson and Thompson 2023, p. 11). Although Yandle's theory rests mainly upon anecdotal evidence, its predictions are consistent with a more systematic empirical investigation into coalition formation in support of blue laws (Horpedahl 2021).

B&B theory generates interesting types of insights or predictions, which we will label as follows:

1. The "strange bedfellows" thesis: rent-seeking generates unlikely and curious alliances among seemingly disparate interest groups (e.g., anti-alcohol Baptists and pro-alcohol bootleggers).
2. The "variegated interactions" thesis: "Bootleggers" and "Baptists" can interact in a variety of different ways—covertly, noncooperatively, cooperatively, and/or in a coordinated manner (Smith and Yandle 2014, chapters 1, 8).
3. The "masquerade" thesis: "Bootleggers" sometimes sound like "Baptists" by using "Baptist" rhetoric to pursue their self-serving political aims.
4. The "low-cost wealth transfers" thesis: A small economic interest group (i.e., "Bootleggers") can acquire a transfer of wealth from the general population at lower cost through a regulatory intervention that invokes "Baptist" appeals and that is monitored by "Baptists" (Yandle 1999, p. 5; Smith and Yandle 2014, p. 46).
5. The "persistence" thesis: durable regulatory arrangements can result from the stable coalitions of "Baptists" and "Bootleggers," so that socially costly, anti-competitive regulations can persist over time (Yandle et al. 2008, p. 1225).

6. The "two prongs" thesis: neither ideology (including moral values and public-interest arguments) nor vested economic interests alone drive political change; it takes the confluence and interaction of both (Boettke and Clark 2020).

3. "BAPTISTS" IN THE REGULATION OF PROSTITUTION

B&B theory can be generalized to many other regulatory episodes well beyond politicking over restrictions on alcohol. "The B&B phenomenon is universal" (Dudley 2020, p. 139). The theory has been applied and extended to a wide variety of regulations, such as climate-change legislation, environmental regulations, and healthcare laws. Consequently, the "Bootlegger" and "Baptist" designations become a metaphor for a much more general phenomenon, and we use quotation marks to highlight the metaphorical, generalized use of these terms. "Baptists" and "Bootleggers" become monikers for two types of special interest groups that have nothing to do with Protestant evangelicals and illegal traffickers of illicit liquor.

In the generalized model, "Baptists" are a public-interest-minded interest group, whereas "Bootleggers" are an economic interest group (Yandle et al. 2008, p. 1225). When the term "Baptist" is used metaphorically, it does not imply "a religious motivation but rather group action driven by an avowed higher moral purpose or desire to serve the public interest" (Smith and Yandle 2014, p. 12). "Baptists" take an active role in seeking regulations that support the causes they endorse and that reinforce the values they hold dear. On the other hand, "Bootleggers" seek regulations that enhance their own personal economic gains. They give money and other resources to those in power in exchange for political favors. In its metaphorical use, "Bootlegging" does not imply any illegal behavior.

In the case of the regulation of prostitution in Spain in the sixteenth century, the "Baptists" included Catholic theologians, the clergy, and the School of Salamanca who supplied the credible moral foundation to justify the legalization of prostitution and the establishment of publicly licensed brothels (*mancebías*), provided that they were highly regulated.[4] Hence, religious authorities provided the moral framework to regulate prostitution. "Baptists" invoked broad moral principles to endorse the legalization of prostitution and regulatory output restrictions (rather than outright prohibition) of prostitution. The source of their moral arguments drew from the work of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas (Carpintero Benítez 2006; Dever 1996; Ponferrada 1990). In *De Regimine Principum* (On the Government of Rulers), originally written around 1300, portions of which are often attributed to Aquinas, Bartholomew of Lucca (1997, Book 4, Chapter 14, p. 254) paraphrases Augustine with vivid, pejorative language:

> Thus, Augustine says that a whore acts in the world as the bilge in a ship or the sewer in a palace: "Remove the sewer, and you will fill the palace with a stench." Similarly, concerning the bilge, he says: "Take away whores from the world, and you will fill it with sodomy."

These arguments were taken up by the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spanish scholastics (i.e., the School of Salamanca), as well as the clergy in the Catholic church. Although they argued that prostitution is immoral, they proffered public-interest reasons for why legalized prostitution should be allowed under certain conditions. Legalized sex work in public brothels was defended as a "social prophylaxis" (Martin 2008, p. 15) that served the common good, whereas unregulated clandestine prostitution in cities was considered to threaten the stability of society. Spanish theologians argued that it was right to allow prostitutes because it avoided greater evils—much more serious vices, such as adultery, concubinage, sodomy, homosexuality, and incest (Martin 2008, p. 16). Invoking the authority of St. Augustine, they defended the new municipal laws regulating prostitution and the legal existence of public brothels by pointing to the general benefits to society, such as protecting the goodness and chastity of respectable women, the sanctity of monogamous marriage, family honour, and the purity of aristocratic bloodlines (Lacarra Lanz 2002, pp. 168-169, 183). In addition, some of the Spanish scholastics also argued that even though prostitution is immoral, it was worse to deprive women in abject poverty of an avenue to support themselves economically through sex work.

In addition, Spanish theologians held that prostitutes had a right to be paid for their work provided they charged a just price to their clients and no fraud was involved. Canonists also held that prostitutes should pay tithes to the Church out of their earnings. Since all rightful owners of their earnings should pay tithes, and prostitutes are indeed rightful owners of their earnings, it follows that prostitutes should also pay tithes.

Spanish theologians and moralists also provided moral cover for third parties to benefit economically from prostitution. They argued that it was licit for individuals and institutions (including the Church itself) to derive economic benefits from activities connected indirectly with prostitution:

> Many theologians defended the earnings of secular authorities, institutions, and private individuals who owned brothels, arguing that leasing houses or *boticas* to prostitutes was a licit business approved by the monarchy. They justified the lucrative profits on the authority of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas. *They argued that the secular powers did not consent to the prostitutes' sins, but tolerated them for the common good.* For that reason, it was licit to gain money from leasing the prostitutes' houses, because the intent was not to offend God but to provide the women with living quarters … They supported also the earnings made by brothel keepers, claiming that they were licit because prostitutes needed to be watched, protected, and kept in good health, for their own good, the well-being of their clients, and the social order. (Lacarra Lanz 2002, p. 185; emphasis added)

4. "BOOTLEGGERS" IN THE REGULATION OF PROSTITUTION

"Bootleggers" sought regulations to protect and to enhance their incomes from officially licensed brothels by restricting competition from unlicensed prostitution in inns and taverns, as well as from freelance prostitution in alleys and private lodgings. The inns (*ventas*) and taverns were a fierce source of competition because they were ideal sites for prostitution to thrive as travelers (such as tradesmen, artisans, and cattlemen) were constantly passing through. Hence, given the economic interests of municipal authorities and the Spanish Crown, it is no surprise that both city ordinances and royal laws prohibited inn and tavern keepers from allowing pimps and prostitutes into their premises (Martin 2008, pp. 32-33). Nevertheless, in the late sixteenth century, illegal prostitution outside the authorized brothels flourished (Bullough and Bullough 1987, pp. 153-155). Incidentally, Maritornes, a young Asturian woman who works as a servant in Juan Palomeque's inn (Cervantes 1978, 1.16), is emblematic of the illegal clandestine sex workers who operated outside of public brothels. In spite of Palomeque's opposition, she occasionally offers sexual services to the travelers who stay in the inn. "She skirts the regulated boundaries that society has established" (Nadeau 1997, p. 11; see Martín 2006.)

So, who were the "Bootleggers"? "Bootleggers" comprised a very heterogeneous mix of powerful organizations and individuals who had overlapping economic interests in legalized prostitution:

1. the Spanish Crown, which benefited from royal tribute and a third of the fines imposed on prostitutes for breaking the rules;
2. urban aristocratic families who owned houses in the red-light district and earned money from leasing them out;
3. factions of noble lineages (*bandos nobiliarios*), such as the Guzmán and the Ponce de León families in Seville, who fought over the most lucrative official positions in the government of the cities;
4. municipal authorities, which exercised legal authority over brothels and received local tax receipts and a share of the fines paid by sex workers;
5. cathedral chapters and religious corporations who leased out houses where official brothels were located;

6. private brothel owners who had been granted the right to establish a brothel as a royal reward (Lacarra Lanz 2002, pp. 170, 181);
7. brothelkeepers, who rented or sold essential items, such as bed linen, to sex workers at high prices together with a burdensome credit system;
8. medical practitioners who certified the health of prostitutes on a regular basis;
9. and prostitutes, who occupied last place in the ranking as far as the receipt of earnings is concerned (Zapatero 1991, p. 99).

As well as establishing most of the legal rules governing brothels, municipal authorities, including mayors (*alcaldes*), aldermen (*regidores*), city magistrates (*corregidores*), and bailiffs (*algauciles*), also received significant economic benefits, both directly and indirectly, from the operation of public brothels (Lacarra Lanz 2002, pp. 174-176). The aldermen of a municipality leased out the rights to manage the entire complex of the public brothel to the chief brothelkeeper (*el regento*, or the so-called *padre de la mancebía*), who in turn recruited underlings to manage smaller numbers of prostitutes. It should be noted that these brothelkeepers were not strictly speaking pimps or go-betweens (*alcahuetes*), though it cannot be denied that they shared many features in common with them (Muñoz de la Nava Chacón 2011, p. 7485). In Pontevedra (Galicia) the exploitation of the public brothel was given in perpetuity to the mayor (*alcalde*) (Lacarra Lanz 2002, p. 180). Bailiffs (*alguaciles*) benefited from "partridge rights" (*derecho de perdices*) in exchange for giving protection to sex workers. "Partridge rights" were the tribute that prostitutes had to pay to the municipal authorities and the Crown in order to be able to exercise their profession (see Lacarra Lanz 2002, p. 181; Gómez Moreno 2000, pp. 91-92; Muñoz de la Nava Chacón 2011, p. 748). Bailiffs and judges often reaped economic benefits from legal and illegal charges imposed on prostitutes. All monetary penalties were divided equally among three parties: the royal chamber, the judge, and the accuser, typically a bailiff (Lacarra Lanz 2002, p. 182). No doubt senior bailiffs also received bribes for giving permission to sex workers to spend the night outside the licensed red-light district (Zapatero 1991, p. 99).

Some "Bootleggers" also masqueraded as "Baptists." To use phraseology coined in a quite different context, these actors had "morality on their tongues" (Munger and Schaller 1997, p. 149) but profits on their minds. The institutions of the Catholic Church not only provided moral arguments to justify the foundation of official brothels (*mancebías*), but they also occupied a prominent place as owners of the premises for these brothels. "Bootleggers" in the church could covertly advance their own interests by using "Baptist" rhetoric to justify the church's ownership of buildings in which brothels were housed and from which they derived rental income. (For an analysis of the medieval Roman Catholic church as an economic firm that engages in rent seeking, see Ekelund et al. 1996.) For example, in Seville, the cathedral chapter (*el cabildo catedralicio*) owned a group of houses that were divided into small living spaces for one person (*boticas*) where the prostitutes conducted their work (Moreno Mengíbar and Vázquez García 1997, p. 38). In addition, aldermen (*regidores*) were "Bootleggers" who posed as "Baptists" peddling public-interest moral arguments. Aldermen conveniently justified the legalization of prostitution by adopting the Church's moral arguments. They insisted that confining sex workers to the public brothel and controlling them through the rules they issued served the common good by maintaining social order, keeping the neighborhood peaceful, and reducing violence (Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero 2006, p. 1973; Lacarra Lanz 2002, pp. 174-175).

The legalization of prostitution, and the erected legal barriers to unauthorized competition, created rents: it provided the opportunity for a reasonably secure and legitimate business enterprise, in which the urban aristocracy, including the clergy, did not hesitate to participate. In Valencia, the red-light district comprised a series of small houses which were owned by individuals, often prominent figures of the city. During the reign of Philip III (1598-1621), the Royal Treasury took, by way of taxes, a sizeable share of the funds that clients paid to the brothels (Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero 2006, p. 1973).

An illustration of the economic power of the "Bootleggers" is provided by Muñoz de la Nava Chacón (2011). Although red-light districts (*barrios de mancebía*) tended to be concentrated in a specific zone or an outlying area of a city, as was the case with the *Malvarrosa* in Valencia and the *Compás* in Seville, some

brothels found themselves located near city centers as a result of urban expansion or in sites considered inconvenient because of their proximity to religious institutions. This occurred in the case of the brothel in Logroño. In 1572, the Inquisition wrote to the municipal council protesting the proximity of a public brothel to the house of Penance of the Holy Office *(la Penitencia del Santo Oficio*) and asking that the brothel be relocated elsewhere. The fact that the council did not accede to the Inquisition's request illustrates the extent of political influence that "Bootleggers," such as brothel owners and administrators, were able to yield (Muñoz de la Nava Chacón 2011, p. 7485).

5. INTERACTIONS AMONG "BOOTLEGGERS" AND "BAPTISTS"

We have seen that the regulation of prostitution in the age of Cervantes reflected a coupling of high-minded moral values with narrow economic interests. The "Bootlegger/Baptist" coalition employed public-interest arguments linked to public morality, social order, and the defense of marriage in order to support the legalization and regulation of prostitution (sex work), which in turn yielded economic benefits to a wide range of "Bootleggers."

It should be noted that the political coalition between "Bootleggers" and "Baptists" did not have to be explicit or formal; it was most likely tacit. It was not necessary for the Crown, clergy, and municipal authorities to meet to strategize on how to form a political coalition to support legalized prostitution. By tacitly cooperating, the "Baptists" and "Bootleggers" were able to achieve political aims in the regulation of prostitution that neither group could have obtained by itself. In effect, there was an informal division of labor between "Bootleggers" and "Baptists," with members of each group doing what they do best (i.e., each performing the activity in which it has a comparative advantage). Drawing upon their reservoir of public credibility, the "Baptists" generated robust moral arguments for the legalization of prostitution and the regulation of public brothels. They framed the discourse about these interventions in the language of morality, religion, public health, and social order. Meantime, the "Bootleggers" provided economic resources for themselves, municipal authorities, and the monarchy, while cloaking their actions with public-interest adornment. The municipal authorities, the Crown, and official brothelkeepers were able to bolster the proceeds they gained from prostitution by reducing competition from unregulated brothels in the cities. "Thus, instead of responding to issues of public morality, increased legislation tacitly served to condone and possibly expand prostitution" (Martín 2008, p. 19).

In the language of game theory, we would say that "Bootleggers" and "Baptists" engaged in "team-reasoning" (Bacharach 2006)—they thought of themselves as members of a virtual or tacit coalition, adopting a "we-frame" in their reasoning and decision-making rather than adhering to a first-person singular focus (an "I-frame"). The formation of this curious political coalition of "Bootleggers" and "Baptists" arose from the pursuit of a common goal. They each recognized that the regulation of prostitution could only be brought about by coordination of their actions. In game-theoretic terms, "Bootleggers" and "Baptists" perceived that their decisions situations were strongly interdependent in that they could pursue their perceived *common interest* because each expected that together they had the causal capacity to bring the legalization and regulation of prostitution into fruition but *only* through an appropriate combination of actions in which each plays their part.

6. THE MONARCHY AS A HIGH-LEVEL COORDINATOR DURING THE COUNTER-REFORMATION

During the Counter-Reformation, the Crown passed royal decrees that prohibited all brothels, including those that had formerly been publicly licensed. But as a "Bootlegger," the monarchy did not necessarily want strong enforcement of this prohibition. The royal decrees of Philip IV (1623, 1632, 1661) prohibited public brothels and prostitution, but in practice "their effect was null" (Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero 2006, p. 1975). The prohibition of prostitution was "a legal fiction" because, owing to continued urban expansion and pop-

ulation increases, "prostitution continued to prove unstoppable: too many people had a stake in it" (Roberts 1992, p. 121). Violations of legal prohibitions continued to be commonplace because prostitution was so lucrative. We can speculate as to why this was the case by employing the logic developed by Moehring (1988, pp. 291-292). Weak enforcement of its laws enabled the Monarchy to appease the unorganized and ill-informed public at large and those religious quarters (including the Jesuits), who wanted outright prohibition of prostitution, while simultaneously satisfying its own interests and those of organized interest groups (the "Bootleggers"), who wanted no such prohibition. The Monarchy could then satisfy both groups by appearing to do one thing, while actually doing another. The Monarchy responded to the conflicting demand by showing a great deal of *de jure* moral concern (as a good "Baptist"), but in fact delivered little more than *de facto* neglect (as a good "Bootlegger").

The Counter-Reformation involved high-level political actors (the Monarchy, the papacy) taking the initiative to forge alliances among economic interest groups and public-minded groups in pursuit of their own overarching political goals. By using a mission of rechristianization and moral reformation in the Spain of the Counter-Reformation, the Monarchy aimed to re-centralize its power in the face of the centrifugal forces that had been unleashed during the political crisis of the early medieval period. In particular, it sought to rein in the aristocratic factions (*los bandos nobiliarios*). These factions jockeyed for position, often resorting to physical violence, in the principal cities in the Iberian Peninsular in order to gain control of municipal institutions, including the publicly authorized brothels (see Díaz de Durana 2009; Mantel 2009; Ortega Cervigón 2007). Aristocratic factions had private armies made up of young men, accustomed to street combat, who were often drawn from the criminal ranks of ruffians (*rufianes*) and pimps associated with clandestine prostitution and illegal brothels. The *rufianes* often enjoyed the protection of bailiffs (*alguaciles*), who themselves belonged to one or other aristocratic faction (Moreno Mengíbar and Vázquez García 1997, p. 37). Stamping out illegal brothels would thus be a means to deprive ruffians of their livelihood.

Whereas most of the Salamancans were Dominicans and mainly followed Aquinas (himself a Dominican) in his treatment of prostitution, the new ideological stance on prostitution owed much more to the ascetic mentality emanating from the Council of Trent and the Company of Jesus (the Jesuits). In particular, the Jesuit scholars at the University of Coimbra (at that time part of the Spanish Monarchy, nowadays in Portugal) openly challenged the theoretical and moral arguments that had traditionally justified the existence of public brothels as a lesser evil. Their invectives against brothels relied more on the authority of St. Augustine and his negative stance on pleasures of the flesh in order to refute the alleged lawfulness (rightness) of public brothels (Moreno Mengíbar and Vázquez García 1997, p. 48). In this manner, the Jesuits (and the *Congregacion del Espíritu Santo* in Granada and Seville) provided the moral cover for the Monarchy to abolish brothels and thereby to control the various groups and aristocratic factions.

Their success was not just an ideological victory but also resulted from the weakening of economic power of those forces aligned with official brothels and regulated prostitution. At the end of the sixteenth century, the Spanish economy was in disarray, which impacted the prostitution business. Public brothels faced declining clientele and earnings fell. Prostitutes left the public brothels to work freelance in other parts of town where the returns were higher. By 1623, the year in which Philip IV proclaimed the royal decree abolishing prostitution, the public brothels in large cities were increasingly unoccupied. In Madrid, only fourteen women were working in the public red-light district a couple of years earlier (Lacarra Lanz 2002, p. 183).

7. CONCLUSION

This paper fills a gap in Graf's account of political economy dynamics in Cervantes's era by focusing upon the public-choice insights of Bruce Yandle. We speculate that Cervantes would find Yandle's "Bootleggers and Baptists" notion congenial for several reasons. First, Yandle's approach showcases the power of words—and especially the persuasive effects that language can have on a popular audience when it taps into "Baptist"

appeals and public-interest rhetoric. As Yandle (1999, p. 7) says, "rhetoric matters a lot in the world of politics" by facilitating the enactment of public policy initiatives that favor vested special interests. Second, Cervantes might also appreciate how Yandle knits together folksy tales and narratives into economic stories that are user-friendly and easily comprehensible to a wide readership. Like Cervantes, Yandle's prose also evinces a sober worldliness and skeptical down-to-earthness that rejects romantic and utopian illusions of the nature of government and religious politics. Both writers are deeply suspicious of political authority and the coercive powers of the state. The protagonists in Yandle's tales are neither saints nor demons but ordinary people with human failings. Just as Cervantes "refuses to polarize his characters as simply good or evil" (Nadeau 1997, p. 10), so too Yandle rejects an oversimplified dichotomy that partitions economic and political actors into two separate groups of either pure "Baptists" or pure "Bootleggers": "We are all each at least a little bit Bootlegger, a little bit Baptist" (Smith and Yandle 2014, p. 134).

Third, Yandle's story of "Baptists" and "Bootleggers" explores one of the enduring themes at the core of Cervantes's novel: the relationship between appearance and reality, that is, the tension between what merely seems to be and what actually is. In particular, B&B theory shows how the details of regulation can be crafted to achieve all sorts of aims that give the public at large the impression, albeit false, that the only policy goal is to serve the "common good," when in fact these regulations also very much cater to special interests and give powerful elites an opportunity to feather their own nest. Social groups that appear fundamentally unrelated and even adversarial may actually share a common interest, working in tandem with each other to pursue a joint political aim. Religion and politics are not disparate activities but are entangled: "religion is always a form of politics, and *vice versa*" (Graf 2021, p. 13).

Finally, Yandle's approach reflects a multiperspectivism, which Cervantes would welcome. "Cervantes's art is a game of perspectives," Graf (2021, p. 2) tells us, and so too is Yandle's account of the political economy of regulation. B&B theory invites us to adopt multiple viewpoints in trying to make sense of the rules that constrain and control human relationships in a complex society. It encourages us to consider the perspectives of moralists ("Baptists"), economic interest groups ("Bootleggers"), politicians holding public office, and the observing economist who analyzes the phenomenon under study.

NOTES

1 *An important note on terminology*: we use the terms "prostitute" and "sex worker" as synonyms. Ditto for "prostitution" and "sex work." By use of the term "prostitute," we do not intend to convey any negative connotations of immorality or criminality. Although prostitutes may define their gender identity in a variety of ways, and sex work may entail a wide range of activities, our focus— like that of the late medieval historical record in Spain – is upon female prostitution involving male clients.

2 References to *Don Quijote* are by part, chapter, and page number.

3 The term "bootleg" has an interesting etymology. The "bootleg" refers to the upper part of the leg of a tall boot. In American English slang of the late nineteenth century, it came to refer to illegal liquor as a result of the practice of concealing a flask of liquor down the leg of each boot. https://www.etymonline.com/word/bootleg (accessed November 17th, 2021).

4 The irony of labeling Catholic theologians and clerics as "Baptists" (i.e., traditional adherents to the "heretical" tenets of the Protestant Reformation) would not be lost on Cervantes. Indeed, Graf (2021) himself suggests that Cervantes was a "proto-Protestant" (p. 11) who occasionally exhibits "Protestant sympathies" (p. 19) during some crucial "Protestant moments" (p. 18) of *Don Quijote*.

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Miguel de Cervantes and Juan de Mariana in the Economic Crisis of Spain at the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century

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The economic ideas of Miguel de Cervantes and his comments on the economic life of the Spanish people that the modern reader finds in his great novel *Don Quijote de la Mancha* have been the subject of many studies in recent years (Pérez et al. 2004; Galindo Martín et al. 2007). In his very interesting book *Anatomy of Liberty in Don Quijote de la Mancha*, Eric-Clifford Graf dedicates an extensive chapter to analyzing many of the references to economic topics that Cervantes makes. For anyone familiar with the economic history of Spain, it is not surprising to find in this chapter references to the inflation of the early seventeenth century and to the work of one of the most important figures in Spanish late Scholastic thought, Juan de Mariana.

Cervantes and Mariana were contemporaries. The great writer was born in 1547 and died in 1616, while Father Mariana lived between 1536 and 1624. Their lives were very different, however. Cervantes's was adventurous and restless, while Mariana's was much calmer. Cervantes, as is well known, was a soldier who fought in the battle of Lepanto (1571), in which he was left one-armed. He was held captive in Algiers for several years (1575-1580). Later, he became a tax collector and was imprisoned in Seville for several months due to the bankruptcy of a trading house related to the funds he managed. Finally, he dedicated the last years of his life to literature and became one of the most brilliant writers of all time. Juan de Mariana was a very different man, a serious scholar and thinker. After joining the Jesuit order, he studied in Alcalá de Henares and in Rome. He soon acquired a great reputation as a theologian and in 1569 was appointed professor at the Sorbonne, the most prestigious university in the world at that time. For health reasons, he had to return to Spain four years later and settled in Toledo, where he would spend the rest of his long life. A penetrating intellectual, he left behind a wide body of work covering very diverse topics, ranging from history - his *Historia General de España* (*General History of Spain*), his most famous book, which was first published in 1592, was reprinted many times in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - to a treatise on weights and measures (*De Ponderibus et Mensuris*), along with several theological essays. But his most controversial books were undoubtedly his study on the monarchy, *De Rege et Regis Institutione*, (translated into Spanish as *Del Rey y la dignidad de la institución Real* [*On the King and the Dignity of the Royal Institution*]), and a brief treatise on money, *De Mutatione Monetae* (which would later be translated into Spanish as *Tratado y discurso de la moneda de vellón* [*Treatise and Discourse on Billon Coinage*]), published in Cologne in 1609.

It is nevertheless possible to find some common points in the two men's biographies, since Mariana was also arrested and imprisoned for some time and his books were censored for defending liberal principles and, especially, for their courageous and uncompromising criticisms of the powerful men who abused their positions and privileges. A well-known fact is that in 1610 the executioner of Paris publicly burned Mariana's book on royal institutions at the stake for its defense of the legality of tyrannicide. The book had first been published in Spain in 1599, and it is notable that it did not cause a scandal there. But in 1610 Henry IV of France was murdered and the authorities tried to get the assassin, named Ravaignac, to confess that he had been induced to action by reading Mariana's book. Despite the well-known harshness of interrogation techniques at the time, Ravaignac denied this accusation and insisted that he had never read the work. But since the book's ideas were considered dangerous, it was thought that a good public bonfire was the most suitable destination for a treatise so critical of the king's privileges.

Cervantes and Mariana lived through the first years of the profound economic decline that the Hispanic Monarchy would experience in the seventeenth century. And the concern for it is present both in the literary work of the former and in the essays of the latter. Graf includes in his book numerous quotes that show how economic problems are present in the work of Cervantes, so I will not insist on this issue and will focus instead on one of these problems, the monetary crisis and the inflation that Spain suffered in the first decades of the seventeenth century. Economic historians have widely discussed the role of monetary policy in the country's economic decline. While some consider that it was one of the determining factors of the problem, for others it was just one more manifestation of a deeper cause: the insufficient resources of the monarchy to maintain a great empire with continuous wars in Europe. But, even accepting this interpretation, there is no doubt that the depreciation of the currency was an important factor in the multiple economic crises that the country suffered in that century.

Inflation had already been a problem in Spain in the sixteenth century. But it is important to distinguish between the inflation of silver and the inflation of *vellón* (billon or copper petty money). When Martín de Azpilcueta published his famous *Comentario resolutorio de cambios* (*On Exchange*) in 1556, he included in it a brilliant and original analysis of inflation, a problem to which scholars and merchants of the time could not find a sound explanation. It can be said that inflation is almost as old as the issuance of money by political powers, since kings, princes or rulers of any kind were soon aware that they could obtain substantial revenues by reducing the metal content of their coins without modifying their nominal value. By the sixteenth century, it was well known that this had already happened in ancient Rome and had been repeated on many occasions throughout the Middle Ages. The result of such policies was not difficult to foresee. If in a coin with a nominal value of X, the amount of silver used in its minting were reduced by, say, 25%, the purchasing power of that coin would necessarily decrease; or, what is almost the same thing, prices would rise.

But what the scholastics of the School of Salamanca observed was that prices were rising with a good quality currency, so that the traditional theories of inflation did not adequately explain what was happening. Azpilcueta's great contribution to economic analysis was to relate the rise in prices not to the debasement of the currency, but to the quantity of money in circulation. And, in this way, he presented the first version of the quantity theory of money, which for more than five centuries has been, and remains, the most solid model to explain inflation.

When the first edition of the first part of *Don Quijote* was published (1605) and the first edition of Mariana's book on money appeared (1609) things were, however, very different. The year 1599 is usually considered as the starting date of the new inflation –the so-called *vellón* inflation—when Philip III, not having enough silver, began to mint copper coins in large quantities. And his financial needs led him to issue 22 million ducats worth between 1599 and 1606. At the same time, the intrinsic value of the currency was substantially reduced. The small amount of silver previously contained in *vellón* was removed and the new petty coinage was minted with only copper. And the amount of copper in each coin was later reduced by fifty percent. This produced a stronlgy negative reaction by the people, which was echoed by the Cortes—the Castilian parliament—on several occasions, and tensions arose between the king and the deputies. And

this was only the beginning of a monetary policy that would create all kinds of problems and would reach its worst moments some decades later, in the reign of Charles II. This distinction between the two types of inflation is very important because, while the first was not due to unacceptable behavior by the king and his ministers and was not an attack on the rights of the king's subjects, the second type of inflation implied both. And Mariana's criticisms were clearly targeted, which would eventually lead to a criminal prosecution.

In his essay on the monarchy, Mariana analyzed the main characteristics of the royal institution and the rights and duties of princes towards their subjects. The chapter that made its author famous throughout Europe is the one entitled "If it Is Lawful to Kill the Tyrant," in which he answered this question in the affirmative. Mariana thought that tyranny is the worst form of government, since it degenerates into all kinds of vices, mainly cruelty and greed. For this reason, the tyrant is "hated by God and by men." He rejected the argument that the monarchy demanded that the reigning prince be accepted by his people regardless of his behavior. If he were unjust, an attempt should be made to correct his faults and the people would have the right to demand it, since royal authority originates from them. And if the prince rejected such observations and demands and left no room for hope, it would be lawful to kill him as a public enemy, exercising the legitimate authority granted by the right of defense.

Although this is the best-known idea in the book, it is certainly not the only relevant one. In it there are many other interesting reflections on political, religious, and economic issues. Some respond to a traditional vision of the monarchy, such as the defense of hereditary succession, considering that it is the most convenient and the one that poses the fewest problems for the people, by avoiding the "serious alterations and turbulent storms" that other systems would generate, such as that of elected monarchs. Regarding the practice of religion, Mariana defended the idea that it makes no sense to tolerate many religions in the same kingdom. The argument is interesting. He did not say that the Catholic religion should be established because it is the only true one; rather, he used a utilitarian argument to justify religious unity within a country. He thought that "nothing is so opposed to peace as that in the same state, city or region there are several religions." What would the prince have to do if disputes arose among his subjects over this? Mariana considered religion to play a relevant institutional role, since it was a link that sanctified and sanctioned pacts and contracts between men, and these would be greatly damaged if those who did not follow the same faith hated each other.

The book also includes numerous reflections on economic issues, and in the second edition, published in 1605, Mariana included a chapter on currency that contained the basic ideas of what a few years later would be his aforementioned *Tratado y discurso sobre la moneda de vellón*. He was clearly in favour of a policy of low public spending and low taxes. The king should prevent idle men with imaginary jobs from taking the public treasury as loot without rendering any services to the people. And, once superfluous expenses were eliminated, taxes should be moderated. He clearly stated that "the prince has no right over the property and goods of any kind of his subjects," and extended his criticisms to all levels of the political world. For example, it remains impactful to read his comment on the king's ministers: "We see the ministers, come out of the dust of the earth, in an instant loaded with thousands of ducats of income." And his opinion on the representatives of the people in the Cortes, of whom he says: "Most of them are unfit, as if drawn by lots, people of little concern in everything and who are determined to fill their pockets at the expense of the miserable people."

He also attacked the idea—defended by some people at the time and today—that in Spain taxes should be higher because in other countries they were. And he pointed out that such an idea, certainly, would please the rulers, since it opened new avenues for them to raise funds. But he concluded that nothing is more burdensome for the kingdom than to invent new means every day to deprive the subjects of their property.

Mariana's criticisms of the king's policy regarding the issue of currency were also very relevant. He was strongly opposed to the debasement of the currency, pointing out that what might seem a useful means to overcome financial difficulties at a specific moment generated great problems for the kingdom in the long

run, such as high prices—that is, inflation—and seriously damaged trade, which he considered the source of public and private wealth. And he did not hesitate to affirm that, in this area, "not everything our ancestors did was faultless." He held that the legal value of currency should not be separated from its intrinsic value, and that the control of prices to avoid inflation only increased the evil and prolonged famine indefinitely.

The publication of the *Tratado y discurso de la moneda de vellón* created more problems for Mariana than that of his work on the monarchy. The book is, above all, a plea against the collective greed of kings and especially against the policy of obtaining resources by lowering the value of the currency. One of its main topics is certainly inflation. But, as we have seen, Mariana was dealing with the "old" and already known inflation based on the debasement of the metallic currency. Unlike Azpilcueta's *Comentario*, there are no relevant contributions to economic analysis in Mariana's book. Its message is clear: kings must govern for their subjects and respect their rights. And, rightly, he thought that the inflation of *vellón* to finance the monarchy's expenses was not only a mistake from the point of view of the management of the economy, but also morally reprehensible.

His views on the conduct of the Spanish monarchs in the management of the currency and some indirect references to the Duke of Lerma, the powerful minister of Philip III, would cause this brief treatise to be censored as soon as its publication became known in Spain. Mariana was accused of the crime of lese-majesty, and the Pope was asked for permission to prosecute him. The elderly Jesuit was arrested and imprisoned in a Franciscan convent in Madrid. Fortunately, the situation was resolved with common sense. The theologians found no errors in the book, and the Pope did not seem very willing to accept a conviction for the crime of lese-majesty of a prestigious Jesuit, who was by then seventy-three years old. We do not know if a sentence was ever handed down. What is certain is that, after a few months of detention, Mariana was able to return to Toledo on the condition that he would modify certain pages considered offensive and be more careful in the future with his observations on the politics of the monarchy. It seems that, in order to prevent his ideas from spreading, Philip III ordered the purchase and destruction of all copies of the book found in Europe. And the essay was included in the Inquisition's Index of Forbidden Books, where it would remain until the nineteenth century.

Can the works of Cervantes and Mariana be classified as a defense of the principles that only much later would be called "liberal?" The answer to this question is not easy. Graf (2021, p. 189) is clearly in favor of a positive answer, as far as Cervantes is concerned: "So am I saying Cervantes was a capitalist? An Austrian? A free market Randian? A libertarian? An English classical liberal? In a general sense, yes, and probably to a greater degree that most readers recognize."

Mariana's work has also been seen as a clear representation of a classical liberal vision in economics. But a close reading of his works shows the complexity of his ideas. Was he really a liberal thinker in the modern sense of the term? I think the answer to this question would have to be nuanced. There is no doubt that he was a harsh critic of absolutism and a defender of the rights of the common people against their rulers; that he criticized the debasement of the currency; and that he said clearly that the origin of prosperity is in private activity and not in the spending of kings. But there is not a vision of a market economic system in his work. Some of his writings show that Mariana was in favor of state intervention in agriculture, which led Joaquín Costa to consider him a precursor of "agrarian collectivism" (quoted in Beltrán 1987, p. 14). And as far as foreign trade is concerned, his opinions were mercantilist. Mariana was concerned about the fact that the import of goods implied currency outflows from the kingdom, and he argued that imports of commodities from other countries should be subject to "very high taxes," which would encourage those who manufacture them to come to Spain, thus increasing the population and the wealth of the country.

How should an economist in 2023 read the works of these two great authors who lived in an era as difficult as it was exciting and were perceptive witnesses of a very important moment in the history of Spain? Undoubtedly, as what they were: an extraordinary writer and a brilliant scholar, who always defended the rights of the people and who did not mind criticizing the most powerful men of their times. In their works, the modern reader can see that some of the problems that concern our society today regarding the govern-

ment and the management of the economy were already discussed four centuries ago. And the most worrying thing is that many of them have still not been solved.

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Pérez, J. et al. *La economía del Quijote. CLM Economía. Revista de Economía de Castilla-La Mancha 5.*

Another Reading of *Don Quijote* Beyond the Realist-Idealist Dichotomy: Maria Zambrano's "Poetic Reason" and the Role of Liberty

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> That the moral of Don Quixote should be doubtful and that each man should be tempted to see in it the expression of his own convictions, is after all the greatest possible encomium of the book. For we may infer that the truth has been rendered in it, and that men may return to it always, as to Nature herself, to renew their theories or to forget them, and to refresh their fancy with the spectacle of a living world.
>
> —George Santayana (1956, p. 119)

It is trite and old-fashioned to speak about truth and its potential existence in literature. George Santayana, however, puts his finger on an understanding of truth that is, much to our chagrin as "moderns" who have no time for such nonsense, quite evocative. Notice that he identifies "the truth" in *Don Quijote de la Mancha* precisely because the novel does not have a clear moral teaching and because each man, upon reading it, is "tempted to see in it the expression of his own convictions." This ambiguous quality is what renders *Don Quijote* "true" in the sense that it encapsulates something undeniable about human beings and our existence on this Earth that allows us to "return" to the novel and always discover something new, refreshing—it is what renders the novel, as we say, timeless.

Santayana (1956, p. 118) goes further, writing the following:

> There is nothing in the book that suggests a premeditated satire upon faith and enthusiasm in general. The author's evident purpose is to amuse, not to upbraid or to discourage. There is no bitterness in his pathos or despair in his disenchantment; partly because he retains a healthy fondness for his naughty world, and partly because his heart is profoundly and entirely Christian. [Cervantes] would have rejected with indignation an interpretation of his work that would see in it an attack on religion or even on chivalry.

The claim is quite challenging, for it implies that Cervantes intentionally avoided inserting any of his own views into this long and complex story. Santayana is not alone on this point, however. The British Hispanist E. C. Riley (1986, p. 134) similarly tells us that it is misguided to read *Don Quijote* as a "moral or philosophical" tract. This paper af-

firms both authors' claims. That said, it is understandable that readers would like to derive moral or philosophical meaning from such a captivating story.

After all, even if Cervantes avoided any form of explicit moralizing through his writing, it should still be possible for us to assume that the author had *something* in mind when he set out to write this work. To wit, our reading of *Don Quijote* cannot be alone without some guiding idea of what the author was *doing* by writing this novel. If this is the case, then we seem to find ourselves at a crossroads: either we engage in deep biographic and historical study of the author to gain some relative understanding of what he might have been doing through his novel, or we read it without any background knowledge of the personal and historical context in which it was written and take it at face value. The problem with the former is that it defeats the entire purpose of creativity and art. The problem with the latter is that it gives us free rein to interpret however it pleases us. There is, of course, a middle way.

The intention for this essay is threefold: the first is to engage in a discussion about the trouble of reading works of great literature like *Don Quijote* with the end of deriving some sense of political-philosophical affirmation from them; the second is to elaborate on the previous claim by introducing some examples of philosophical readings of *Don Quijote* by José Ortega y Gasset and Miguel de Unamuno, both of which embody the realism-idealism dichotomy that is often imposed on the novel; the third is to explore the theme of liberty in *Don Quijote,* aptly raised by Eric-Clifford Graf in his *Anatomy of Liberty in Don Quijote de la Mancha,* using the writings of María Zambrano to propose an alternative reading of the novel and the role of liberty within it. Zambrano's conception of liberty will suggest some additional caveats that might, respectfully, problematize some of the claims in Graf's reading of the famous Spanish novel. It should be clear from the outset, however, that this essay is not, in its primary intention, a criticism of Graf's scholarship or of his argument. His book is excellent and rigorous, though, as with any book, it leaves much room for debate. Instead, this essay sets out to expand some of the questions about Cervantes and about the concept of liberty in *Don Quijote* that run parallel to Graf's book. Above all, it is a defense of the novel as a work of literature, not a literary work of political-philosophical thought.

I. THE ALLURE OF THE AUTHOR, THE AMBIGUITY OF THE KNIGHT

We should be wary of ascribing any objective moral message to a work of literature as complex and profound as *Don Quijote de la Mancha.* Yet, humans are contemplative creatures, and writers are exemplary figures of our creative faculties that seek, regardless of how hard we try to avoid it, to understand the world through some form of poetic philosophizing. The characters that spring forth from the author's mind portray distinct world outlooks through their thoughts, speeches, and actions, and putting these characters in *relation* with others within the world of a story is a feat that only the most imaginative writers can accomplish. How then, could we avoid the temptation to pierce the mind of Miguel de Cervantes, whose passionate chivalric knight will forever live in our collective literary imagination?

The mind of a literary genius beckons our attention. Surely, *Don Quijote* is a testament to Cervantes's own complexity that is itself worthy of study. It is telling enough, however, that it is not Cervantes who lives on in our minds, but his fictional character Don Quijote. Even then, this fictional character leads different lives. For some readers, Don Quijote endures as an example of a failure, a shortcoming of man. The would-be knight errant's story is an admonition for he that dares to dream too much without a grounded realization—a "realistic" understanding—of what simply can and cannot be achieved in a particular time and place. For others, Don Quijote represents our highest ideals, which, even if inadequate for this imperfect world of ours, transcend the limits of our worldly complacence with "reason." These two readings are not, moreover, mere characterizations or straw men interpretations of the novel; most readers tend to fall into one of these two camps. For example, two of Spain's most influential political and philosophical thinkers from the twentieth century, José Ortega y Gasset and Miguel de Unamuno, read *Don Quijote* in these differing ways. Ortega propounded the former, sobering interpretation, while Unamuno advanced the latter, inspirational alternative.

In his work *Our Lord Don Quijote,* Unamuno (1967, p. 4) famously claimed:

> I consider myself more Quixotist than Cervantist, and that I attempt to free Don Quijote from Cervantes himself, permitting myself on occasion to go so far as to disagree with the manner in which Cervantes understood and dealt with his two heroes, especially with Sancho. Sancho imposed himself upon Cervantes, despite his creator. The fact is, I believe that characters of fiction possess a life of their own within the mind of the author who creates them, as well as a certain autonomy, and that they obey an intimate logic of which the author himself is not altogether conscious.

At the heart of this statement is a question of literary theory: can we isolate a character from the agent of its inception? In other words, is it possible to call oneself "Quixotist" and *not* "Cervantist" when Quijote would not exist without Cervantes, and when the wider context of Cervantes's story is, arguably, set up to defeat Don Quijote's idealism? Does Unamuno not run into the danger of abstracting too much from Cervantes's creative paradigm? Unamuno (1967, Ibid.) would shake his head, for indeed he does believe "that we can understand Don Quijote and Sancho better than Cervantes, who created them (or, more correctly, extracted them from the spiritual innards of his country)."

Notice what Unamuno is telling us: Cervantes did not *create* his characters, he extracted them. That is to say, they are not his alone—they belong to everyone. To *extract*, moreover, implies prior existence: Unamuno believes Cervantes baptized two concepts which were before unnamed, meaning that his ownership over them is only partial. There is a wider context of ownership over these concepts that spans a national culture. Don Quijote and Sancho Panza belong especially to those who understand "the spiritual innards" of Spain, since the nation provides the context in which Cervantes wrote. It is a literary usufruct that is visible in the nineteenth-century Spanish readers of *Don Quijote de la Mancha*, namely those belonging to the Generation of '98, who used the novel as a trope to analyze Spain's cultural and political condition when they were turning the corner into a new century (more on this point below).

What is important to notice in these initial remarks about the legacy of *Don Quijote* is the influence of the novel and, more importantly, of its protagonist over the authority of the author. Cervantes is hardly at the center of the novel, nor does he want to be. He recognizes (Cervantes 2011, 1, Prologue, p. 3) the possibility of a similitude between himself the writer, with a "sterile and ill-cultivated talent," and his "dry, shriveled-up, unpredictable child," *Don Quijote*; but he also tells us that "tranquility, a pleasant place, the amenity of the countryside, the serenity of the heavens, the murmuring of the fountains, the stillness of the soul, make even the most sterile muses appear fertile and allow them to bear fruit that fills the world with wonder and content."[1] Cervantes declares that he has managed, through the right conditions, to create something that is more than his own, that transcends his individual condition. He goes one step further: not only does he recognize he has created a character who will take on a life of his own, but he explicitly distances himself from the natural affection that a "father" would have towards his "ugly and clumsy child" by telling us, readers, to look upon Don Quijote not with the sympathy of a father, relative, or friend—to see "his defects as cleverness and charm"—but, rather, to look upon him as if we were encountering him for the first time, without any preconceptions about what Cervantes might want.

A point of clarification is needed: this is not a defense of a Foucauldian "death of the author," but nor should we infer that all the characters in the novel, and the story itself, are orchestrated to serve the author's moral or political intentions. We can briefly turn our attention back to the argument of the book that inspired this conversation on *Don Quijote* to demonstrate this point. Graf welcomes authorial intent into his research inquiry: underlying his book is an assertion about authorial intent that argues that we can surmise the moral teachings of *Don Quijote* from what we know about Miguel de Cervantes as a historical figure. For example, Graf (2021, p. 5) writes:

> That Cervantes appreciated precursors like Plato, Giovanni Boccaccio, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Juan de Mariana suggests *Don Quijote* has something to do with symbolic caves, merchant class humor, advice to princes, and monetary policy. That Cervantes was later appreciated by María de Zayas, Thomas Hobbes, Thomas Jefferson, and Mark Twain suggests *Don Quijote* has something to do with feminism, materialism, constitutionalism, and criticism of the institution of slavery.

The first claim is plausible, the second problematic given Graf's previous emphasis on authorial intent. The interpretation of a work by another reader does not imply that the novel itself is *about* a particular theme, only that its message resonates with the reader's experience. Cervantes's influence on thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Voltaire, Burke, and Mill, which Graf rightly points out, only implies that these thinkers—who happen to be predecessors or key thinkers of the "classical" liberal movement—found something of value in *Don Quijote,* as tends to happen with great literature, not that the respective philosophical traditions which these diverse thinkers represent were the same philosophical commitments for Cervantes, even less so that *Don Quijote* is about these things. The classical liberal push of *Don Quijote* goes a tad too far, especially in wanting to claim Cervantes as a "precursor" to major liberal thinkers like Locke, Smith, Mill, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Jefferson, Madison, and Twain.

This way of thinking—that the appreciation of a literary work, even its influence on a thinker, is tantamount to the work itself objectively possessing the meaning that a reader derives from it, or of the author sharing that belief with the reader who was keen enough to pick up on it—is a slippery slope for literature. It is even more difficult to accept if we are to conceive of literary writing as a creative enterprise, of the literary writer as a creator—that is, as an artist—and of art as something wholly distinct from politics in its creative *process*. The artist is not an expository thinker who is simply out to prove a point, for the act of writing is cathartic and therefore expressive of the writer's own questions and struggles to which he has not yet found an answer. If we accept this idea of writers, then their literary works become independent entities from the author's own thought once they are created. In this sense, Cervantes's enterprise in writing *Don Quijote* is not the same as that of Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Voltaire, Burke, and Mill, despite Graf's argument otherwise. This is not to say that Cervantes himself might not have shared the same views as these political thinkers, but that *Don Quijote*, the novel, is not about Cervantes; it is not even about Don Quijote the character as an isolated figure. As with all great literature, it is about us, the readers, and our relationship with the knight.

Now, the author is still indispensable in this relationship between the reader and the story (or between the reader and the treatise if we are engaging with a political thinker like Locke, for example), because of the sheer fact that the idea is generated within the mind of the author, be he a creative writer or a political writer, and it is *the author's* idea that resonates with a striking number of people dispersed across space and time. What contextualist historical study of an author helps us to appreciate is the author's genius; it allows us to understand, since we are so curious to know, *why,* perhaps, the author wrote. In so doing, we discover another layer of our intimately spiritual relationship as human beings of a common world, which we perceive through our universal connection with an author's work, that recognizes our shared conditions within the human experience: the things we feel or yearn for, such as love, sorrow, disillusion, hope, doubt, etc. For this reason, Graf is entirely correct to identify a central theme, if not *the* central theme, in *Don Quijote* that touches on that vital component of the human experience: liberty.

A question follows: *what kind of liberty?*

II. TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY IN *DON QUIJOTE*: THE REALIST AND IDEALIST

Even if the author's mind creates the world that becomes a story, and its characters evoke a part of the author's thoughts, this is no reason to assume that the characters and the author are one and the same. Furthermore, the themes that emerge in a story might not have been at the forefront of the author's mind when he set out to write. If we are to say that liberty is the central theme in *Don Quijote*, it is because

liberty is a broad term that encompasses myriad connotations. We can take a closer look at Ortega's and Unamuno's diverging readings of the novel. To be sure, their conceptions of liberty are shaped by the novel without any concern about Cervantes's own philosophical commitments. Still, they fall into the realist-idealist dichotomy that eventually tangles itself with misleading moral-philosophical, and consequently political, implications.

For example, Graf (2021, p. 1) sees an "overarching theory of liberty" encapsulated in *Don Quijote*—and by extension Cervantes's own thought—emblematic of the early modern period that reaches out of the literary imagination. Through his "game of perspectives," Cervantes is allegedly able to offer us a "realist bourgeois solution to the confusing labyrinth of tyranny, bondage and corruption" (Graf 2021, pp. 2–3). The novel's "realist and functional bourgeois options" are pitted against the "fading idealist fantasies of feudalism," where bourgeois realism stresses "common sense" and is "deeply related to the assertion of positive themes like freedom, harmony, and progress" (Graf 2021, p. 3). Graf is precise and categorical about the specific types of liberty that most interested Cervantes while writing *Don Quijote*. He arranges his book in five sections, which he describes as "Western civilization's most important societal virtues early in the twenty-first century," and which include religious tolerance, respect for women, abolition of slavery, resistance to tyranny, and economic freedom (Graf 2021, p. 5).[2] There is a tinge of anachronism here, but, more importantly, to call these five components the "anatomy of liberty" ignores the fact that these are secondary qualities about what, precisely, liberty *is*.

In the case of Ortega, Unamuno, and Zambrano (as will be explained in the next section), *Don Quijote* is read as the muse through which they understand their nation's significance within a wider reality that demonstrated a changing—that is, modernizing—world. For example, Ortega and Unamuno are considered influential figures in the Generation of '98 movement.[3] Their thoughts are primarily responding to the problems facing Spanish society at the time: to the chagrin of the nation's political leaders, the Spanish monarchy's restoration in 1874 did not result in continued Spanish cultural preeminence in the world, and the former empire's colonies dwindled over time until the Treaty of Paris of 1898 finally ended Spain's colonial rule. Without its colonies, the national wealth of Spain stagnated. The question of how a nation could be "great" without international prowess, demonstrated by the number of colonies it held, and the shift in the conception of "power" as something more than military strength and material wealth from the exploitation of colonies, was highly relevant at the time. Ortega and Unamuno were writing about philosophy when the social reality of their day was one of widespread public ignorance (i.e., the lack of public education) and poverty. Despite these practical concerns, their understanding of liberty, though tied to extant questions about national identity, were better elucidated by literature.

The historical Spanish treatment of the concept of liberty is different from the English conception we have been handed down in the classical liberal tradition. For this reason, it is problematic to argue that Cervantes, and—worse yet—*Don Quijote,* are emblematic of the bourgeois virtues that have come from this tradition as it pertains to political-economic principles. Not only does it assume that all European thought must converge at some point or another on principles that are distinctly rooted in a classical liberal tradition, but, more seriously, it implies there is only one understanding of liberty which, again, is quite English in character. The Spanish conception of liberty, though certainly not homogenous, is less derived from political principles than it is from literary and philosophical ideals. In other words, even the most "realist" of Spanish philosophers are Romantics to an extent. It goes without saying that these previous statements are not intended as national characterizations of a concept that transcends nationality and certainly is not bound by it. Rather, they borrow from Ortega's "circumstantial" philosophical system to raise the importance of cultural context and individual "circumstance" to understand how something as broad as liberty is diversely engaged with as an idea by people of different cultural-national backgrounds.

Consider how Ortega (1963, p. 24) uses *Don Quijote*. Ortega's pithy description of his philosophy in his *Meditations on Don Quijote* (1914) is more complicated than it initially seems and is derived in large part from his reading of *Don Quijote*: "Yo soy yo y mi circumstancia" (I am myself and my circumstances). It might seem a relativistic claim, yet it could not be more starkly opposed to relativism because it is also a

call for metaphysical inquiry aimed at using the inevitable human fact of circumstance to derive broader universal meaning. In his *Meditations,* Ortega does not attempt to explain the novel, much less Cervantes's thought. Instead, Ortega's book is a work of philosophy built on an interpretation of the novel, wherein the structure of life is revealed to Ortega under the species of heroism and tragedy. As Spanish philosopher Julián Marías (1963, p. 25) notes about Ortega's thought in the *Meditations* as it relates to *Don Quijote*:

> Ortega takes care to warn us that we are all heroes in some measure, that heroism is not ascribed to certain specific contents of life, that it lies dormant everywhere as a possibility, that the will is the tragic theme. In other words, that heroism and tragedy belong essentially to man, as forms of being in which life rids itself of its merely biological condition and exhibits its true nature … Don Quijote, who is real, who belongs entirely to reality, inserts in this reality his indomitable will, which is a will for adventure … In Don Quijote human life is shown free from the elements which normally conceal it; that is the *methodical* justification of the *Meditations,* interpreted as a first approximation to a *metaphysical theory of human life*.

These sentiments sound more appropriate as a description of Unamuno's *Tragic Sense of Life* (1912), in which Unamuno uses Don Quijote's character as a symbol to reject rational explanation and raise spiritual (and religious) mystery as the guiding framework to understand human life and human suffering, the perpetual result of our fundamental imperfection. As Unamuno (1921, p. 33) writes, "[r]eason … is a social product" and the idea of the individual "an abstraction." We live between two instincts, he adds, the instinct of "personal preservation" but also the instinct of "perpetuation," in which the former is individualist and the latter social: "the instinctive preservation, hunger, is the foundation of the human individual; the instinct of perpetuation, love, in its most rudimentary and physiological form, is the foundation of human society" (Unamuno 1921, p. 34). Yet Unamuno's emphasis on love as another equally vital facet of man's "instinct" is connected to Ortega's own philosophy, for both demonstrate an interest in metaphysical inquiry, albeit in different forms. Ortega (1963, pp. 22-23) believes that philosophy is "the general science of love" and that we see in love "an extension of the individuality which absorbs other things into it, which unites them to us." Even if individuality is a fact of life, Ortega argues that the objects of our love demonstrate the need for the broadening and eventual uniting of the individual and the concept of our love, that is, the object of our perception. Marías (1963, p. 25) again explains:

> The circumstantial and vital—biographical—character of reality makes evident that concrete knowledge is interpretation, discovery of a *logos* or meaning of things, based on a vital perspective; and this leads on to a new theory of the *concept* … This notion of the concept as bound to perception, of an active vision, brings Ortega to the now famous interpretation of truth as discovery, unveiling, evidence, *aletheia,* and to something which is much more profound … the possibility… of a *vital reason*.

For Ortega, philosophy brings forth *aletheia.* Unamuno was more skeptical about this end-result in philosophical inquiry. Instead, Unamuno looked to religious faith as the preferable alternative.[4] For Unamuno, *Don Quijote* is a triumph of the "Spanish" worldview as he understood it. What makes Don Quijote great is his pursuit of immortality, and his quest to achieve his end requires resolute belief in his ability to achieve it. Unamuno saw this quality as admirable and one which a nation should pursue. However, if Unamuno "canonized" Quijote's idealism (Riley 1986, p. 134), there is a problem of either possibly misreading the novel or manipulating it. Ortega parts with Unamuno here and refutes Unamuno's argument in his *Meditations*. In Ortega's reading of the novel, Don Quijote is not a solitary knight: his idealistic ambitions have effects outside himself, introducing the importance of the social element, and Don Quijote is forced to confront the exterior (real) world outside his mind through his disillusion and, more specifically, his conversations with his trusted squire, Sancho Panza. Sancho Panza embodies the rational supplement to Don Quijote's ideal-

ism since the "pattern" of the novel often entails Don Quijote misinterpreting a "stimulus" through his idealistic mindset, and Sancho warning Don Quijote through his realistic outlook (Watt 1996, p. 53).

This disagreement matters since it demonstrates two different interpretations of the story that resulted in different visions for what Spain should do to reclaim itself within its own history and within Europe. One asserts idealism, and the other checks it with realism. Still, both thinkers are starting from a philosophic-literary analysis insofar as they place their trust, spiritual or intellectual, in the philosophical underpinnings of *Don Quijote*'s events and the wider significance of the novel to their immediate political implications for Spain at the time. Here, we have two working conceptions of liberty. Ortega's is one where reason elucidates liberty and restrains it from the wishful thinking that results in its idealistic tendencies. Unamuno's is one that embraces the idealism of liberty: his is an affirmation of the positive form of liberty that propels man to act in the world and seek self-fulfillment. Of course, these two conceptions of liberty are not incompatible, nor are they unique to the thought of Ortega and Unamuno. We have heard iterations of these versions of liberty elsewhere, across historical time and geographical space. Yet these two concepts of liberty in Ortega and Unamuno were inspired by reading *Don Quijote*. There is a third version.

III. MARÍA ZAMBRANO'S CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN HER "POETIC REASON"

María Zambrano takes a middle approach between Ortega and Unamuno. Though a younger contemporary of both thinkers, her name will be more obscure to readers, even those familiar with Spanish philosophy. She was the first female recipient of the Cervantes Prize, which she won in 1988. Her praise of reason and rationalism as a pillar of Western civilization echoes Ortega. However, Zambrano recognizes that human beings are imaginative, emotional, and spiritual people. It is a part of human nature to seek out and generate what can be best described in English as "wonder" or "enchantment." The strength of medieval literature is that it often exalted this sense of wonder and enchantment through its chivalric stories. In this sense, the world offered by fantasy is hardly idealistic. Rather, it taps into a poetic dimension that exists in every person. Emotions are real, she admits. It is not only impossible, but dangerous, to repress this tendency, for it will spring forth in other forms of idealism outside of literature and art. Zambrano's concept of "razón poética" (poetic reason) displays the combination of poetic imagination with reason, and together they form the faculty that unifies the world into an intelligible whole.

This focus on "poetic" reason shifts the methodological process of reason from philosophy to literature, from introspective to creative. For Zambrano, the worldview of the Spanish people is "embedded in literature," to borrow the apt wording of another scholar (Johnson 1996, p. 215). Poetic reason adds to our faculty of philosophical reason the importance of emotions as they relate to wonder and enchantment and identifies the source for exploring and understanding those emotions—literature. Wonder is the first step that initiates our desire to know about the world, while reason builds from wonder and starts to analyze it from our various sources of understanding. We can see why Zambrano was a close reader of *Don Quijote*, for the novel also gets at the heart of this reality about the human condition: the relationship between reason and wonder. This relationship can be antagonistic at times, but the two concepts are not always in tension. While the interpretations of thinkers like Ortega and Unamuno are inclined to see Don Quijote and Sancho Panza as embodiments of two different forms of people, thereby hinting that we are supposed to side with one or the other, there is room for the possibility that the two characters are embodiments of two parts of every individual. The broader plot of the novel, moreover, is also read as either a defense of idealism or a demonstration of its dangerous consequences; Zambrano reads the novel differently.

In her essay "La Reforma del Entendimineto Español" (The Reform of Spanish Understanding), Zambrano (1986, p. 95) remarks on *Don Quijote*'s commentary on liberty as it pertains to the Spanish condition of the early twentieth century. She begins by explaining that Cervantes, through his novel, presents readers with "the failure of the Spaniard, who implacably manifests to us that wonder of coherent will; clear, perfect, that has been left unemployed and does nothing but crash against the wall of the new age." Pure will, she adds, is detached from a real object and thus invents itself. Zambrano is echoing Kant, but

she argues that there is nothing original in Kant that we could not already perceive in our hidalgo from La Mancha.

It is important to notice what Zambrano is saying by this statement: she is arguing that Kant articulated something in the eighteenth century that Cervantes depicted in the seventeenth century through *Don Quijote*. Her purpose is not to argue that Cervantes "beat" Kant to the point. As the Book of Ecclesiastes reminds us, after all, there is nothing new under the sun, hence Santayana's statement in our epigraph, wherein he argues that the mark of truth is indicated by our ability to return to a work of art that renews and refreshes our understanding of the world. Invention, much like truth, is cyclical: we come back to it from time to time. Instead, what Zambrano means by this statement is that Cervantes thinks as a Spaniard, and, by extension, speaks to the Spanish people through literature, that which best resonates with the Spanish cultural-epistemic framework. She writes, for example, that Cervantes *could* have presented his thoughts through a philosophic system like Kant's, but this type of presentation would not have resonated with Spanish society. She adds, more importantly, that Cervantes had much more to say in his novel than to present an exposition of the pure will.

"The end of [Cervantes's] work was another: failure;" that is, the "resigned" and "realistic" but also "hopeful" acceptance of failure (Zambrano 1986, p. 95). Zambrano (1986, p. 95) adds an essential sentence after this statement that begins to open our discussion to the "political" implications, though very limited in scope, of Zambrano's concept of liberty in her reading of *Don Quijote*: "Neither philosophy nor the state are based on a conception of human failure such as the one presented in this novel. That is why [*Don Quijote*] needed to be for the Spaniards what philosophy was for Europe." Per Zambrano's reading of *Don Quijote*, the search for liberty necessitates the existence of failure. In her acceptance speech for the Cervantes Prize, Zambrano describes her conception of liberty through an anecdote of her years spent teaching in Mexico while exiled during the Spanish Civil War. She focused her lessons on the birth of the "idea of liberty" in Ancient Greece.[5] Teaching the idea of liberty, Zambrano reminisces, "was a natural way of remembering Spain and its already melancholic, resigned, and hopeful failure" because it had "gone beyond its time," presumably in attempting to establish and maintain a Republican government when there still remained a substantive constituency of conservative, pro-monarchical "nationalists" in Spain. Everything that gets ahead of itself, she noted, is condemned to failure by history's "inexorable rhythm." Zambrano, however, sided with the Republicans against the Nationalists, hence her decision to go into exile when the Republicans were defeated in 1939.

Zambrano's treatment of liberty is necessarily combined with failure. As she writes (1986, pp. 96-97), "in failure appears the greatest measure of man." What's more, failure provides the "guarantee of a more complete rebirth." In Zambrano's reading of *Don Quijote,* it is telling that Cervantes makes Don Quijote set out on his journey at dawn, since dawn represents a complex interplay between "the certainty of time and light" and the "uncertainty of what time and light will bring." After all, she writes, the dawn we see in nature is an analogy for man's own nature, wherein he seeks out to find and actualize "his indecisive, half-illusory freedom." Don Quijote represents, in an "exemplary" manner, "the dream of liberty," the achievement of which is both certain and uncertain. Such a view of liberty provides a picture that combines both idealism and realism, though not in the way we might initially conceive. There is a tension between these two ways of understanding the world, sure enough, but this tension posits a dualistic conception of liberty as consisting of failure and hope. The following statement must also be stated in her own words:

> The very clear mystery of the coexistence between Don Quijote and Sancho is something that has not yet been revealed in all its significance, because it is a prophecy without petulance, of a type of human relationship that has not yet been realized. The novel supposes a much greater human wealth than philosophy, because it supposes that something is there, that something persists in failure; the novelist does not build or add anything to his characters; he does not reform life, while the philosopher reforms it, creating over a spontaneous life a life according to thought; a created, systematized life. The novel accepts man as he is in his failure, while philosophy advances alone...

The fact that there are "idealists" for whom Don Quijote resonates and "realists" who see in Sancho Panza the necessary balance to idealism (such as Ortega's reading of the novel) does not home in on the importance of their relationship beyond serving as intellectual complements. After all, these characters do not intellectualize their interaction to broader philosophical principles. Both Ortega and Unamuno derive their interpretations of *Don Quijote* based on a philosophical analysis of the novel and its characters, resulting, as philosophy tends to do, in contrasting readings that try to make sense of the course of events in the novel as hinting at some form of moral teaching. Zambrano rejects this method, since it removes the sheer simplicity of Cervantes trying to depict the world as it is: dually ideal and real, hopeful and disappointing.

From this statement we can glean some final thoughts on Zambrano's conception of liberty. In her work, *Filosofia y Poesia,* (*Philosophy and Poetry*), Zambrano critiques philosophy's tendency towards unity. Philosophy and poetry are different, she writes, because of the type of unity that they aim to achieve. She asks (1993, p. 19): "Does the poet not care about unity? Is he carelessly ("vagabundamente") attached—immorally so—to apparent multiplicity, out of unwillingness ("desgana") and laziness, for lack of ascetic impetus to follow the goal of that lover of philosophy: unity?" Not so, she answers. What poets (i.e., artists) see as unity and depict in their works is the "unity of creation" that accepts heterogeneity as a fact of life, and then they depict it. This unity uses "the dispersed and fleeting" elements of our varied experiences to create "something whole, eternal" (Zambrano 1993, p. 21). The artist creates unity through art with words, image, or music, but he does not "exert violence whatsoever over heterogenous appearances," yet still achieves unity (Zambrano 1993, p. 22).

There is a catch. For the poet, the unity achieved in his art is "always incomplete;" the poet knows this, and "therein lies his humility:" he is content with his "fragile unity" (Zambrano 1993, p. 22). This understanding of unity mirrors Zambrano's conception of liberty as something rooted in failure because of the diversity of thought and aspiration, which produces something timeless through its reminder of our collective, contradictory march towards liberty as being met with repeated failure. As she notes in the above excerpt, Cervantes' novel "supposes" something greater than philosophy: "that something persists in failure," which is eventual wisdom from recognizing the inescapability about the unknown elements of our pursuit of liberty. Of course, like Don Quijote, men are disposed to get ahead of themselves, which results in failure. Riley's and Santayana's readings of the conclusion of *Don Quijote* emphasize the knight's balance of mind by the end of his journey as a result of his ability to reflect on his mistakes.

Zambrano's meditation is a parallel for the failure of the Spanish Republicans. Many saw reason as the most important element of political life—as a number of readers of *Don Quijote* would like to believe—but were met with failure. As Zambrano (1986, p. 99) writes, "reason, in its march, does not walk alone, but in connection with other human realities." She adds, in reference to the Spanish Civil War, "Our [the Republican's] failure to carry out a reform, the reform of thought and of the State that we needed, made our clearest understanding retreat to the novel and our best model of man, to remain a fictional entity" (Zambrano 1986, p. 99). Zambrano is lamenting that Republicans did not realize that with a "modern" political-philosophical outlook there needed to be a widespread sharing of this mentality. It did not exist, and so it rendered their project as fictional as *Don Quijote*.

IV. THE LIBERTY OF FRAGILE UNITY IN *DON QUIJOTE*

By way of conclusion, we must tie this all back to Cervantes. Cervantes's use of the chivalric trope in *Don Quijote* is a representation of "the most essential values in both the classical and the Christian heritage of Western civilization" (Watt 1996, p. 53). Even if these values were changing at the outset of the seventeenth century, however, we must not assume that Cervantes was seeking to subvert them. Cervantes's novel and creative use of this common literary genre can also be a form of praise—a tipping of the hat, so to speak—for a literary convention that was on its way out. This connection between imitation and creativity is not surprising. As Allan Bloom (2010, p. 3) notes in his study of *Don Quijote,* it was common in the Renaissance to "invent" through imitation:

> In the Renaissance invention was many times perceived as synonymous with imitation. The link between *inventio* and *ingenio* is put forth by the sixteenth-century prose writer Juan de Valdés: "'invention' and 'disposition' (disposición, ordenación) are the two principal parts of rhetoric; the former corresponds to the ingenio, the latter to the juicio." Robert Edwards explains, "The purpose of invention, as the etymology (*invenire*) suggests, is discovery, and one rhetorical issue that bears directly on poetry is whether such discovery entails original creation or the employment of existing commonplaces.

Bloom agrees that by juxtaposing imitation and invention, Cervantes is playing a game of meaning that likely results in his rejection of imitation, preferring invention. His protagonist, however, embodies the older outlook—imitation—and, by creating a character who displays all the qualities of this old outlook, Cervantes is, quite literally, placing (or rather, displacing) a convention outside of its time. In this reading, Don Quijote is read as a representative of the "old" world, and Sancho Panza of the "new" and modern world (Da Silva 2004, p. 353).

This reading, though also compelling, takes away the agency that Cervantes wants us to give to his errant knight, who belongs to us all. Furthermore, it attributes to Cervantes a level of perspicacity that we constantly attribute to thinkers in the past as a way to explain to ourselves why we are where we are today. Take, for example, Thucydides, whose *History of the Peloponnesian War* supposedly marks a break from the Homeric tradition of narrating history in verse and whose accounts and reasons for the events of history also imply a methodological disagreement with historians like Herodotus, for whom the gods could still play a role in the development of human events. Fast forwarding a couple of centuries, we say that Machiavelli was the first "modern" political philosopher, who infamously divorced politics from ethics; some scholars even argue that Shakespeare was himself interested in marking the influence that Machiavellianism had on political society such that his *Henry IV* trilogy is meant to display this shift in the historical development of English politics during the Wars of the Roses (Manheim 1973; Grady 2000). So too, we say, does Cervantes break with the medieval worldview in *Don Quijote*, granting it its final swansong before ringing in a new age—the Renaissance. Cervantes may plausibly have been this keen, but a fair level of skepticism and intellectual humility from our modern standpoint would ask whether we are not simply telling ourselves a story we would like to believe about ourselves by reading this ideal into our inquiry of the past.

Don Quijote serving as an embodiment of an old way of life does not imply that the novel itself is solely about demonstrating how idealistic or antiquated he is. More central is the issue of actualizing one's ideals in a constantly disappointing world. As this essay has tried to demonstrate, the reading of *Don Quijote* that Zambrano espouses is one of hope about the nature of liberty as an ideal that propels history forward, but also one of wholehearted admittance, from her personal experience, that liberty is bound to be met with failure. Moreover, liberty cannot be leveled by reason alone, because it ignores that poetic tendency in all of us that seeks some form of higher actualization. We can seek to achieve this actualization through philosophical unity, but it will leave us with a false picture of the world; or, we can seek to gradually achieve liberty—however we may define it—by reading the works of literature that showcase to us the reality of the world, which is the reality that Cervantes encapsulated in his novel. This is the "fragile unity" that Cervantes achieves in an unstable world—his and ours alike—that renders *Don Quijote* a source of "truth" as Santayana expressed it. It is the reason why "world" literature—where *Don Quijote de la Mancha* incontrovertibly holds a high place—can have its home in the literary imagination of its culture or nation (often both), as well as in the broader imagination of our creative humanity.

NOTES

1 References to *Don Quijote* are by part, chapter, and page number.

2 The moments in the novel where Catholicism is derided supposedly demonstrates Cervantes' disdain "for religious formality and metaphysical belief" (Graf, 2021, p. 13). This statement is dubious (cf. Riley and Santayana). Graff associates religious tolerance with quasi-Protestant, Erasmian (i.e., reformist) conceptions on the topic. While I do not wish to comment in this essay on the religious elements in Don Quijote, there are certainly scholars who see a positive connection between Cervantes' emphasis on individual liberty and also read the novel through a spiritual lens inextricably connected to Catholic theology (cf. Sullivan 1996). While Graf makes Cervantes out to be more Erasmian in his theological influence than Jesuit, this question is certainly open to debate: there are also works that read Don Quijote's character as type of saintly figure whose actions represent elements of Catholic theology rooted in his Jesuit educational upbringing (see McGrath 2020).

3 Some scholars consider de Unamuno as a "precursor" to the Generation of '98, not a member. I have no strong stance on this particular debate, but consider his thought influential for the movement, nonetheless.

4 Graf also mentions the Generation of 1898, but he argues that Unamuno saw in Don Quijote a possible "grounding, rationalizing effect on what was still a mystical and metaphysical culture at the turn of the twentieth century"(Graf 2021, p. 8). This statement is not quite correct.

5 Quotes from Zambrano's Cervantes Prize speech are translated by the author of this article. The original Spanish text can be found here: https://cope-cdnmed.agilecontent.com/resources/pdf/1/0/1542312863201.pdf

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Margins of Freedom: The Latin Sayings in the Prologue to *Don Quijote,* I

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For decades, Luis Rosales's (1985 [1960]) massive study, *Cervantes y la libertad*, has remained as the classic work on the subject. Now, in *Anatomy of Liberty*, Eric-Clifford Graf audaciously returns to the topic in order to imbue it with contemporary perspectives, concurring with his source on "el radicalísimo sentido de la libertad que tiene nuestro autor" (the heightened radical sense of liberty that our author has; Graf 2021, p. 5; Rosales 1985, p. 33). In order to accomplish this task, Graf (2021, p. 5) foregrounds five key elements that correspond with critical concerns of our times: "(i) religious tolerance, (ii) respect for women, (iii) abolition of slavery, (iv) resistance to tyranny, and (v) economic freedom." The subject matter is so vast and Graf's arguments so multifaceted, that it would be impossible in this short piece to provide an account of it. Indeed, he turns to writers throughout the ages to explain Cervantes's concept of liberty. Furthermore, Graf (2021, p. 8) invokes relevancy by reminding us that the novel has resonated in the United States since its founding: "Among early US presidents, George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and John Quincy Adams were all avid readers of Cervantes's great novel." My purpose here is to add to his findings on freedom in a very minor key. Inspired by Graf's explanation of the maxim "Non bene pro toto libertas venditur auro" (Cervantes 1978, 1, Prologue, p. 55; 1998, p. 18),[1] I would look at the Latin sayings recommended by the fictive friend to the author in the Prologue to the first part of *Don Quijote*. These sayings would then produce notes on the margins, thus enhancing the apparent erudition of the writer. Is freedom/liberty propounded in these sayings and their would-be authors?[2] Are these sayings wrestling "epistemic independence from overwhelming concentrations of power"?[3] Moreover, what are the margins of freedom?

As Don Quijote and Sancho depart the home of the duke and the duchess in Chapter 58 of the second part of the novel, the knight delivers a paean on liberty as one of the most priceless gifts given to humanity by the heavens: "La libertad, Sancho, es uno de los más preciosos dones que a los hombres dieron los cielos; con ella no pueden igualarse los tesoros que encierra la tierra ni el mar encubre; por la libertad, así como por la honra, se puede y debe aventurar la vida" (liberty, Sancho is one of the most valuable gifts heaven has bestowed upon men: the treasures which the earth encloses, or the sea covers are not to be compared with it. Life may, and ought to be risked for liberty, as well as for honour; Cervantes 1978, 2.58, p. 470; 1998, p. 839). This laudation of liberty, as stated, takes place as the knight and his squire leave the house of the duke and duchess, who have manipulated Don Quijote's chivalric spirit for their own

amusement. More importantly, the knight is fleeing the love-crazed Altisidora, a creation of the duke and duchess, who constantly impinged upon the knight's freedom. Indeed, as she intones her last lament (and curse) of knight and squire, even the duchess is amazed at how far she goes: "Quedó la duquesa admirada de la desenvoltura de Altisidora , que aunque la tenía por atrevida, graciosa y desenvuelta, no en grado que se atreviera a semejantes desenvolturas" (The duchess was surprised at the liberty Altisidora took; for though she knew her to be bold, witty and free, yet not to the degree as to venture upon such freedoms; Cervantes 1978, 2.57, p. 469; 1998, p. 837). Notice here how the translator plays with the term freedom/liberty to refer to: a) the ability to be free and do as one pleases; and b) the excesses in social behavior and decorous language. In this passage, Don Quijote's high-minded praise of liberty has been triggered by a rather comic and innocuous topic—the annoying importunities of a love-crazed woman. The lofty tone is thus undermined by its cause.

Graf (2021, p. 2) approaches this paean from a different perspective, tying it to the first Latin saying in the Prologue to the first part of the novel:

> When Don Quijote calls liberty priceless, he echoes the first Latin phrase of the novel, which the first prologuist's friend had attributed to the Roman satirist Horace: 'Non bene pro toto libertas venditur auro' 'Liberty is not sold for all the gold in the world'.... But the squire intrudes on such idealism by noting that large sums of money have been exchanged and that obligations linger. Moreover, from Sancho's point of view, liberty actually can be priced.

Graf points to the clash between gold (the two hundred gold coins given by the duke and duchess to the chivalric pair) and freedom in both the text and the Prologue. In addition, he emphasizes that "in the early modern novel, realist and functional bourgeois options displace the fading idealist fantasies of feudalism … I will emphasize, however, that bourgeois realism is also deeply related to the assertion of positive themes like freedom, harmony, and progress" (Graf 2021, p. 3). However, he neglects to foreground here one of the most important undercurrents of the book, the pronouncement, contained in the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution, prohibiting abridgements of the freedom of speech or of the press. Although this freedom runs as an underground river throughout Graf's volume, nourishing its many pages, it is important to return to the saying in the Prologue of the 1605 *Quijote* and consider its role within this paratext. Indeed, the Prologue and its five Latin sayings can be seen as part of a declaration of freedom, and even as a moment of epistemic independence.

At the inception of the Prologue, the (fictional) Cervantes, in a melancholy pose, bemoans the fact that this section, as well as the novel as a whole, lacks the necessary adornments that are required in such books. It lacks notes on the margins and footnotes dealing with biblical, historical, and mythological figures, as well as poetic and philosophical figures and authorities that ought to be referenced in the work: "poque ni tengo qué acotar en el margen, ni qué anotar en el fin, ni menos sé qué autores sigo en el" (for I have nothing to quote in the margin nor to make notes on at the end; nor do I know what authors I have followed in it; Cervantes 1978, 1, Prologue, p. 53; 1998, p. 16). A list of works cited would also be seen as properly adorning the book and making it more acceptable in its erudition. As the author grapples with this dilemma, a (fictive) friend comes to his aid and simply tells him to sprinkle the novel with names, texts, and even places that would call for such notes. As for the works cited, just take them directly from another book that displays an abundance of them. While some have argued that the Prologue constitutes an attack on his contemporary, the playwright Lope de Vega, who was constantly displaying figures of authority to authorize his own work, others see it more generally.[4] Robert B. Alter (1975, p. 3) asserts, "the novel begins out of an erosion of belief in the authority of the written word." It is as if Cervantes wants to break the conventions, not only on how to write a Prologue, but on the uses of authority. He would challenge others to accept a kind of epistemic independence. The author seems to want to remove the shackles of accepted ways of thinking in order to ponder, envision and write with utmost freedom. In order to attain to this freedom of thought and writing, Cervantes develops a series of games in order to disorient the reader as to which (if any) authorities

should be followed and what are his true intentions. At one point, Graf (2021, p. 3) rejects such "perspectivism" (equating it with "light hearted entertainment"),[5] arguing that it is better to search for the author's intention in a work that is mired with traps, slippery contradictions, and clashing voices. At the same time, as if mimicking Cervantes, he uses the term perspectivism to deal with at least five issues: the preference of realism over fantasy; the uses of miscegenation (Graf 2021, p. 73); the implications of feminism (Graf 2021, p. 81);[6] modes of government (Graf 2021, p. 163); and political and economic perspectives as portrayed through animals.[7]

So, let us return to the games Cervantes initiates when writing the Prologue. Here, the friend recommends that he use figures such as the mythical thief Cacus,[8] the historical Alexander the Great,[9] and Julius Caesar.[10] He tells the author that he should also add classical writers and philosophers such as Horace,[11] Homer,[12] and Plato,[13] to enhance and authorize his work. A careful reader will find these names in the text as if the Cervantes of the Prologue had followed the fictive friend's advice. Nothing could be further from the truth since prologues are customarily written last. In this case, the author takes elements from his novel, and perhaps even from the projected 1615 continuation, to enhance the illusion of accepting the friend's advice. Utilizing figures from the Prologue, Carolyn Nadeau (2002) has written an enticing book on the women of the prologue (including mythological figures, courtesans, and prostitutes) and their importance in the text. Anthony J. Cascardi (2011), on the other hand, delves into Platonic indirections and contradictions; the banishment of the poet from the Republic; the presence of a mendacious historian—all in order to tease out Cervantes's techniques. While the Prologue mocks the authority of the written word, the text evinces, on the other hand, that such "authorities" are useful in games of thought. They establish a kind of dialectic imitation where a previous author, the present author, and new readers engage in finding ways of thinking, writing, and understanding by considering allusions, models, and modes of ideation.[14] By misdirecting, contradicting, and satirizing accepted authorities, Cervantes creates an epistemic challenge, and dares his readers to think in new ways. The freedom granted in the Prologue extends to the rest of the novel as a series of games are enacted, including that of narrative voices.[15]

Having considered some of the general aspects of the Prologue in regards to freedom of thought and writing, let us turn more specifically to the utilization of the Latin *sententiae* from the Prologue. These were most often brief moral sayings, proverbs, or maxims taken from traditional or cultured sources in order to make a point. Cervantes's fictive friend suggests five of them to the author. As noted, Graf briefly studies the first one. After all, it deals with liberty, the central element in his book. He points out (2021, p. 5) that although the fictive friend seems to attribute it to Horace, it is in reality by someone else:

> For example, the source of that first Latin phrase about liberty found in the first prologue of *Don Quijote* is not the Roman satirist Horace, as the narrator's friend erroneously claims but, rather, the Greek fabulist Aesop, a slave who rose to become a counselor to princes. And that is the point. Cervantes is from the outset signaling that we should think about his textual contrasts between freedom and slavery.

However, this is but just one of the fictive friend's multifaceted games when dealing with this saying. First and foremost, we cannot fully ascertain that Aesop was the author of this particular tale within the *Fables*, an amorphous collection started in antiquity that foregrounds a series of anthropomorphic animal characters—there is a reference to this tale in Archilochos, long before Aesop could have invented it. Indeed, Aesop's fables were not collected under his name until some three centuries after his death. Many may have been his own, although even his existence as an author has been put into question in modern times, with the concomitant notion that there was no such ugly and deformed slave who gained his freedom and achieved great fame through his stories. Furthermore, as time went on, new tales were added; others were changed or deleted. Cervantes certainly knows some of these collections and invokes Aesop, for example in one of the *Novelas ejemplares* (*Exemplary Novels*), when, upon hearing of two talking dogs, a licentiate exclaims that we are returning to ancient times when animals could talk (2005, p. 645). Would Cervantes have

read *La vida de Ysopet con sus fabulas historiadas* (*The Life of Aesop and a Narrative of his Tales*), first published in Spain in 1489?[16] Would he have read one of the many versions that circulated in the Renaissance and early modern periods? Would he have found it in a compilation without attribution? It is as if the fictive friend in the Prologue is once again laughing at authority.

What is not in doubt is the uses of the fable itself, "Of the Wolf and the Dog." Here, a lonely and starving wolf watches from the woods as the dogs in a village prance about very well fed. He approaches one of the canines and inquires as to the secret of their well-being. The Dog answers that he is constantly fed and cuddled and only has to bark at beggars and fawn at people in the house where he abides. Delving deeper into this mystery, the wolf discovers that the dog's skin is chaffed because a chain often holds him back. In horror, the wolf runs back into the woods. Thus the moral of the tale: "*There is not gold enough to buy liberty, since it exceeds all the wealth in the world*".[17] Such has been the sustained popularity of this fable that it appears in James Caxton's medieval collection; while Jean de La Fontaine included it among his own French fables in the seventeenth century. Countless versions circulate even today and many are displayed on the internet. Indeed, Eric Blair (2004) published a children's book on the subject, lavishly illustrated by Dianne Silverman. While the wolf refuses to compromise, the characters in Cervantes's novel, as Graf shows through a number of examples, often jeopardize their freedom. Any social structure, Cervantes reminds us, is constituted through the relegation of some freedoms to those in power. Gold is but a manifestation of the rewards offered by society; while slavery is the extreme surrender of liberty. We are left with the question: Is the dog, then, a slave to his master? Is Sancho, then, dangerously compromised by his "slavish" acceptance of his master's orders and beliefs; or by the rewards he expects from the knight? And is the knight, who wishes to free himself from the very walls of his own home, constrained by the structures of the books of chivalry? What are the margins of freedom? Already in the early nineteenth century, the edition of the *Fables* by Thomas Bewick (1818, p. 288) warns: "But liberty in a state of society does not consist in doing whatsoever we please: but only permits those actions by which we do no injustice to our neighbour or to the community." On the other hand, Bewick (Ibid.) also cautions that too many sacrifices of our liberty can lead to "slavery and degrades the people who submit to it." We can then ask with some degree of certainty as to the answer, if the duke and the duchess have degraded Don Quijote and Sancho. The Prologue, then, has hidden deeply urgent questions by changing the name of the author.

On the other hand, accepting Horace as the "author" of this saying provides a more authoritative source, and this may be the reason why the fictive friend does not hesitate to alter attributions. Furthermore, the apparent deletion of the actual author is a way to express freedom at a time of censorship and persecution. Leo Strauss (1988, pp. 24-25) has foregrounded this kind of "miracle" in writing: "For the influence of persecution on literature is precisely that it compels all writers who hold heterodox views to develop a peculiar technique of writing, the technique of writing between the lines … But how can a man perform the miracle of speaking in a publication to a minority, while being silent to the majority of his readers?" Perhaps, as Cascardi (2011, p. 240) argues, in Cervantes the "exoteric text responds to the well-established circumstances of a *converso* with Erasmian-humanist leanings." Nevertheless, Cervantes's text is not just meant for a minority. It is a book enjoyed by casual readers as well as by discriminating thinkers. The satire serves all, as Graf (2021, p. 6) acknowledges: "Cervantes's work is often classified as a universal satire due to its tendency to deride a wide range of attitudes and behaviors." The change in author from Aesop to Horace points to a technique of writing between the lines. Furthermore, we notice that the fictive friend does not provide a certainty of authorship. He states: "en el margen citar a Horacio o quien lo dijere" (in the margin cite Horace, or whoever said it; Cervantes 1978, 1, Prologue, p. 56; 1998, p. 18). Beneath the cloak of Cervantes, we discover a careful modulation on questions of freedom and slavery, ones that are found throughout the novel, and that would go against many of the tenets of the times. However, if the readers accept Horace's authorship, they can also enter into a conversation with the classical poet. After all, his work straddles the great transformation in Rome from Republic to Empire. Although Horace fought for the former and was defeated in the battle of Philippi, he was still able to turn to the imperial side with the aid of his patron, Maecenas. Very much like Cervantes, he developed a satiric vein; and like the protagonist of Cervantes's

novel, his poetic persona is portrayed as weak and ineffectual. While his supposed bumbling is related to his role as critic of customs and mores, that of Don Quijote is not so different. He appears as a bumbling would-be knight who would return the world to a mythical Golden Age.

No attribution is given to the second Latin saying, "*Pallida mors aequo pulsat pede pauperum tabernas, / Regumque turres*" (Pale death, with impartial foot, knocks at the cottages of the poor and the palaces of kings;" Cervantes 1978, 1, Prologue, p. 55). It may well be linked to the first since the fictive friend has stated that the initial one should include in the margin Horace or whoever said it. This time, playing once again with authority and misdirection, we discover that the maxim does belong to Horace, deriving from his *Odes*, Book 1, Ode 4. Although it commences with a praise of coming spring, the Ode, as William S. Anderson (1992-93, p. 116) reminds us, moves from "springtime liberation … to his shocking mention of pale Death, which pounds at the doors of poor and rich alike." The addressee of the poem is Sestius, Roman Consul in 23 BC. Anderson (Ibid.) explains: "Sestius the affluent consul stands for all those who in middle age and relatively comfortable circumstances need to remember how close death is." While the first saying contrasts wealth/comfort/a civilized society with radical liberty (as enjoyed by the wolf), the second, albeit cautioning also the poor, centers on the addressee whose relative wealth and power provides him a high degree of freedom that will soon be threatened by death. The coming of spring relieves the tyranny of winter and allows the freedom of earthly things "aut flore, terrae quem ferunt solutae" (the blossoms that the unfettered earth brings forth; Horace 1968, *Ode* 1.4, line 10). This freedom, then, is in opposition to the fear of pale death. While Cervantes only presents the fears, his text will go on to invoke Don Quijote's desire for a new spring-filled Golden Age that he wishes to bring about for humankind. It is just that the knight fails to remember his time of life, a time that is no longer suited for knight errantry, and one when death could soon be knocking at his door. Thus, this saying, while appearing to be about being captured by death, also includes, in the sections not quoted, a paean for spring, freedom and liberation.

As if death calls for contrition, the next two maxims are religious in nature: "*Ego autem dico vobis: diligite inicmicos vestros*" (But I say to you, love your enemies); "*De corde exeunt cogitationes malae*" (For out of the heart come evil thoughts; Cervantes 1978, 1, Prologue, p. 55). They derive from the apostle Matthew, thus veering away from classical poetry (and fable) to the New Testament. Cervantes foregrounds the first of the gospels for at least two reasons. First, because in contrast to Mark's, it "records many more sayings" (Kermode 1987, p. 377). This abundance of maxims may thus have led the friend to recommend this gospel to the fictional Cervantes. More importantly, it is curious that Matthew was the one translated into Spanish with commentary by Juan de Valdés. Valdés was an Erasmian, reformist, and heterodox writer who fled Spain to escape from the Inquisition. Indeed, we know that Cervantes takes a passage from his well-known *Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón* (*Dialogue of Mercury and Charon*) when Don Quijote advises Sancho Panza on his governorship of Barataria. There are numerous citations to Matthew in the text of the novel, thus "validating" the fictive friend's advice to use him. Alvaro Molina suggests that Cervantes cites Matthew in Chapter 58 of the second part of *Don Quijote*, the very same chapter where the knight declaims his paean on liberty. Immediately thereafter, the chapter turns to the portrayal of saints. Molina (2012, p. 73) claims: "Using a passage from the gospel of Matthew (11:12), 'heaven suffers violence,' the protagonist seems to be saying that these saints were sufficiently violent—'a fuerza de brazos' and the use of their sword—to conquer heaven, while he is currently lacking the strength even to free Dulcinea." Molina (2012, pp. 79-80) then ties this moment to our reformist humanist:

> It was precisely a Spanish humanist from the 16th century, Juan de Valdés (1509-1541), who approached this particular instance of the term violence in Matthew's gospel … Valdés translates the original (*bia*, *vis*) directly as 'violencia' instead of 'fuerza,' and then he proceeds to assign to that term the exact opposite meaning of the one used by Don Quixote … One thing that seems clear to Valdés is that the violence mentioned by Jesus is not meant to be that of conventional military force or holy war, but rather its opposite. He links 'violentado' and 'fuerza' to the strength required to bring one's will and understanding under the obedience of faith.

As Alvaro Molina shows, when dealing with Matthew, Cervantes's text uses misdirection. This is what we have found repeatedly in the Prologue. As with the rest of the sayings, the passages by Matthew guard games of meaning. They may seem rather innocuous and are given in Latin rather than in the questionable translation by Valdés. And yet, it serves to contrast the knight's violence with its Christian sense. The question is equally urgent as those that have come before: Can violence bring about a Christian peace, a time of freedom? At the same time, references to the gospel soothes some readers who worry about hidden and heterodox material. Yet, there may be enough clues to point to a new attack on authority—authorized versions of the gospels versus translations that do violence to certain meanings.

The fifth and last maxim recommended by the fictive friend, "*Donec eris felix, multos numerabis amicos, / Tempora si fuerint nubila, solus eris*" (So long as you are secure you will count many friends; if your life becomes clouded you will be alone; Cervantes 1978, 1, Prologue, p. 55), is said to derive from Cato. This would make sense, since a long tradition had him as expert in pithy sayings; and both Don Quijote and Sancho will refer to him throughout the novel.[18] The tranquil reader of Matthew's gospel could be once again assaulted by doubts. After all, Cato was often called Cato the Censor. Is there material for censorship here? Or is the Prologue once again promoting a secret language of liberty that stands against censorship of word and thought? The modern census derives from the ones that were conducted in the ancient Roman Republic by two magistrates called *censores*.[19] As their duties expanded over time, they were charged with evaluating Roman character and moral habits. They would give a letter or mark (*nota*) to those who violated proper conduct. The term *censere* (to assess) was used in this context, thus linking the census with censorship. Are readers to delve into Cato's writing to further tease out meanings? As it turns out, the fictive friend is once again enjoying the freedom of misdirection. This particular *sententia* comes from Ovid rather than from Cato. The two verses derive from *Tristia*, Ovid's meditations on exile: "So long as you are secure you will count many friends; if your life becomes clouded you will be alone" (Cervantes 1978, 1, Prologue, p. 55; Ovid, *Tristia* 1.9, 5-6).[20]

Cervantes, aware of the censorious nature of Cato, who lived a simple life while railing against the lifestyle of others, places his name in the Prologue so as to camouflage the name of Ovid. After all, Ovid had been banished from Rome by Emperor Augustus for *carmen et error* (*Tristia* 2.207), something he had written and something he had done. While Cervantes openly compares his book to Ovid's *Metamorphoses* in the introductory poems to his novel (1978, 1, Preliminares, p. 64),[21] he hides the Roman poet in this second citation since the *Tristia* belonged to the censored Ovidian works. The reader may want to consider that Cervantes is writing to those who, like Ovid and himself, were without friends in high places, abandoned at the edges of empire, censored and seeking solace. A very successful writer in Augustan times, Ovid had enjoyed the favor of the emperor, a patron of the arts, for most of his life. Later in life, he was banished to Tomis, a town on the Black Sea.[22] Ovid's works in exile are typified by a lament of his relegation to a "barbarous" and frozen land and a desire to regain the emperor's good will, which would allow him to return to Rome. Thus, bursts of praise are accompanied by laments that may border on subversive complaints.[23] By censoring Ovid, Cervantes hides his book of exile as a dangerous text, while at the same time creating a secret space for meditation on censorship. The need for such spaces underlines Cervantes's desire for more open conversations.

One final question must be addressed: what is the tenor of Cervantes's hidden material as hinted to in the Prologue? To attempt an answer to this question we must return to the fictive Cervantes's pose while deliberating how to "adorn" his Prologue and his book. Writing the *Quijote* later in life, when he was in his late 50's, Cervantes was still a fairly unknown and, we could even argue, a failed author. He could not, like others of his time, aspire to Parnassus and the benevolence of Apollo. By placing himself outside of Parnassus, outside the realms of the Sun god and in contrast to the famed figures of his time, Cervantes embraces his shadowy presence and marks his work as different, as other.[24] The fictive author depicts himself in a moment of despair: "Muchas veces tomé la pluma para escribille, y muchas las dejé por no saber lo que escribiría; y estando una suspenso, con el papel delante, la pluma en la oreja, el codo en el bufete, la mano en la mejilla, pensando en lo que diría" (I often took pen in hand, and as often laid it down, not knowing what

to say: and once upon a time, being in deep suspense, with the paper before me, the pen behind my ear, my elbow on the table, and my cheek on my hand, thinking what I should say; Cervantes 1978, 1, Prologue, pp. 50-51; 1998, pp. 5-6). The text thus draws upon the traditional pose of the thinker, most often considered as a melancholy figure. He had already confessed that his child or book is dry. This is because the melancholy humor shares two qualities, dryness and coldness. This quality and temperament not only echoes those of the author but also those of his main character. From the very start of the novel, we discover that Don Quijote's brain has dried up from too much reading. The knight's emaciated body is also a reflection of his dryness.

Melancholy figures were known to suffer from visions, be they celestial or demonic, providing ecstasy or severe distress. And thus Cervantes shows his child or book as "lleno de pensamientos varios y nunca imaginados" (various wild imaginations, never thought of before; Cervantes 1978, 1, Prologue, p. 50; 1998, p. 15), which at times seem closer to the demonic than to the celestial.[25] If we add to all this that the fictive Cervantes claims that his book was born in a prison, we come to realize that he is rejecting the commonplace of being an author who strives for Parnassus in order to become an artist under Saturn. We know from the extensive labors of Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl (1964) that, according to ancient and Renaissance authorities, the conflictive nature of melancholy actually derives from Saturn, a planet which was said to rule melancholy, but was also considered the most malefic of celestial bodies, often afflicting the bearer with incarceration and other forms of torment and suffering. As someone outside the literary centers of his time, Cervantes consciously crafts a new persona for himself. He may be rejected by Apollo in Parnassus; he may not be under the influence of a solar ruler and his court. He need not be part of the great masses of poets that cluster around the Sun. Instead, he is a solitary figure that writes under Saturn. As an individual apart, he can write of the wild imaginings of a would-be knight. As toiling under the planet of esoteric knowledge, Cervantes can also hide his wisdom. And his is the highest form of knowledge, since Saturn, according to the Ptolemaic astrologers, was the highest of planets. Although the most malefic, this planetary entity bestows upon his followers the greatest gifts of wisdom.[26]

The Prologue, then, opens a way for reading *Don Quijote* as a book that hides "censored" thoughts; that obliges the reader to read between the lines to discover traps in reading, to be alert for misdirection. In its quasi-universal satire, the work is far from proposing one specific reading, but invites an open consideration of a series of topics as well as the rejection of a specific ideology. *Don Quijote* is a book that brings us together, rather than divides us, since it shakes the shackles of authority, disallowing, as Eric-Clifford Graf (2021, p. 235) states, the indoctrination of "students with the new religion of revolt." This new religion of revolt cancels all questions about culture. As Mathew Matheson Miller (2021) states, "One of the hallmarks of ideology is the suppression of questions. Intellectual coherence no longer matters when ideology reins." *Don Quijote*, as the first modern novel, continues to be a bulwark against any kind of censorship, since through many humane conversations between knight and squire, between author and readers, we come to rediscover that philosophy is a multifaceted conversation whose aim is a desire to know. Cervantes's novel leads us to consider the margins of allowable freedom as the writer turns away from slavish imitation, proposing new experiments in genre, new ways of thinking. The sayings in the Prologue open up new margins for discussion. Aesop, Horace, Matthew, and Ovid allow the readers to think anew. This opening of the conversation destroys any kind of polarization among opposites; it frees the reader to interrogate the margins of freedom. The wolf, free from society's constrictions, has wandered into the woods. There he watches the house dogs and considers the compromises they make.

NOTES

1 For *Don Quijote*, I am providing the part, chapter, and page as it appears in Andrés Murillo's edition, followed by the page number in the Jarvis translation.

2 Freedom and liberty are often considered to be synonyms. However, there are those who think of freedom as the responsible use of liberty. I am using the terms interchangeably.

3 These words are taken from the introductory material to the journal *Cosmos + Taxis*.

4 Although dealing with works by Lope written long after Cervantes's Prologue, it is worth recalling that Pedro Conde Parrado and Sonia Boadas (2019) have discovered that the playwright turned to Andreas Eborensis's collection of *Sententiae* (Lyon 1557) to adorn his texts with Latin sayings. In other words, Lope simply used this manual of sayings rather than having recourse to his own readings of the classics.

5 For Leo Spitzer (2015), perspectivism is far beyond a way of producing entertainment. He sees in Cervantes a reflection of the immutable power of the divine and even the glorification of the artist as pseudo-divine as he masters his materials. In many ways, I agree with Spitzer in that, as will be seen, Cervantes takes on the guise of a "saturnine" artist, close to the divine.

6 "On its own, the feminist trajectory of *Don Quijote* indicates a way in which Cervantes endorses Christianity over Islam … the more radical and leftist your defense of the Third World, the more you should be made to consider what to do about the repression of women there" (Graf 2021, p. 81).

7 While Sancho's flight on Clavileño instils cosmic perspectivism, "Sancho's time as governor then involves a series of royal judgments and decrees rendered with varying degrees of prudence and despotism" (Graf 2021, p. 163).

8 In the Spanish edition, allusions to Cacus appear in the following moments: 1, Prologue, p. 56; 1.2, p. 84; 1.6, p. 113; 2.49, p. 407.

9 In the Spanish edition, allusions to Alexander appear in the following moments: 1, Prologue, p. 56; 1, Prologue, p. 60; 1.1, p. 76; 1.48, p. 567; 1.49, p. 578; 2.2, p. 57; 2.59, p. 489; 2.60, p. 491. See also Frederick de Armas's (2016) essay on the subject.

10 In the Spanish edition, allusions to Julius Caesar appear in the following moments: 1, Prologue, p. 56; 1.48, p. 567; 1.49, p. 578; 2.2, p. 57; 2.8, p. 96; 2.8, p. 97; 2.24, p. 228; 2.43, p. 361.

11 In the Spanish edition, allusion to Horace appear in the following moments: 1, Prologue, p. 55; 2.3, p. 65; 2.16, p. 154; 2.16, p. 156. According to Graf (2021, p. 13), "Cervantes signals satire again in *DQ* 2.16-17, when the mad knight heaps enormous praise on the poetry of Horace and Ovid and then attacks what appears to be the king's money cart. This sequence reveals part two as a more overtly political novel that takes particular aim at the Crown's monetary policy." See also Graf (2021, pp. 162, 167).

12 In the Spanish edition, allusions to Homer appear in the following moments: 1, Prologue, p. 56; 1.6, p. 115; 1.18, p. 221; 1.25, p. 303; 2.3, p. 61; 2.3, p. 65; 2.16, p. 154.

13 In the Spanish edition, allusions to Plato appear in the following moments: 1, Prologue, p. 52; 1.25, p. 311; 2.3. p. 60; 2.38, p. 333. Platonic concepts can be found throughout the novel.

14 According to Greene (1982, p. 45), we move to dialectic imitation when there is a current of mutual aggression as the modern text exposes the "vulnerability" of its model, "while exposing itself to the subtext's potential aggression."

15 On the many narrative levels in the novel and on the role of the meta-narrator and of Cide Hamete, see James Parr (1988).

16 Spurgeon W. Baldwin (1964, p. 762) explains: "Although the Zaragoza edition is a translation of a volume printed in Germany, it occupies an important place in Spanish literary history for two reasons: first, it was probably one of the most widely read books of the time, judging from the large number of editions; second, it is the first known Spanish version of these fables, and served as model for a series of collections of Aesopic fables, having a popularity in Spain lasting almost down to the present time."

17 I am citing from John E. Keller's edition (1993, pp. 102-103).

18 Although his *sententiae* were widely known in the Middle Ages, many were probably not penned by him. The friend, by falsely attributing a maxim to Cato, provides an added element of satire on those who revel in a show of erudition, while knowing little.

19 Numerous controversies arose out of the 2010 Census conducted in the United States as mandated by the Constitution. Some argued that illegal aliens were counted and thus it: "will unconstitutionally increase the number of representatives in some states and deprive some other states of their rightful political representation" (Baker and Stonecipher 2009). Others argued that the census failed to have a fair count of minorities; while others considered some of the questions in the form to be an invasion of privacy.

20 A section of *Tristia* was first translated into Spanish in 1692 by Antonio de Solís y Rivadeneyra. He only includes 5.1 (Beardsley 1970, p. 98).

21 I do not include the page number from the Jarvis translation since it does not contain the preliminary poems where Ovid is cited.

22 The decree came directly from the Emperor and was not examined by the Senate or by a judge. As Gareth William (2002, p. 233) explains, his "relegation" to Tomis was less severe a punishment than *exilium*, "which would have deprived him of Roman citizenship and property." In a terse remark, Ovid points to the reasons for his exile: *Carmen et error* (*Tristia* 3.5.49-52, 3.6.29-36, *Pontus* 1.6.21-6). In other words, one of his works and a mistake were the cause of his banishment. In spite of the many theories on the subject, the facts of the case are not known. An assessment brings up the question that the Augustus of Horace and Vergil is very different from the late ruler, when the influence of Tiberius was being felt. During the last decade of Augustus's life Tiberius was a de-facto co-regent, and he would become famous for his trials of historians and writers (Knox 2004, pp. 3-4). Peter Knox (2004, p. 5) asserts: "In contrast to the traditional portrait of the tolerance of Augustus, Tiberius' zeal in prosecuting individuals who spoke ill of the emperor had to be restrained from an early age." Ovid was then banished by a weakened Augustus and his chances of forgiveness decreased as Tiberius's power increased.

23 Ovid imagines the emperor as a new Jupiter striking him down with his thunderbolt, relegating him to Pontus. There are many references to Jupiter as Augustus in *Tristia*. See, for example: 1.4.26; 2.34; 2.69-70; 2.216; 2.333; 3.1.38; 3.5.7.

24 Ellen Lokos (1991, p. 24) explains: "Cervantes knew that he could not expect the kind of rewards he was entitled to in the society he was living in … the poet had renounced the possibility of satisfaction in the earthly realm, or even on Parnassus."

25 In his *Anatomy of Melancholy*, Robert Burton (1938, p. 174) affirms that "that the Devil, being a slender and incomprehensible spirit, can easily insinuate and wind himself into human bodies, and cunningly couched in our bowels, vitiate our health, terrify our souls with fearful dreams."

26 On Cervantes as a figure under Saturn see Frederick A. de Armas (2017).

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Don Quijote: Cervantes's Liberal Comedy

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Deirdre McCloskey (2019, p. 8) observes that "[i]n the eighteenth century the liberal idea aborning was that every person regardless of age or gender or ethnicity or position in the hierarchy should have equal rights." Similarly, Peter Boettke (2017-2018, p. 31) defines what he terms the "liberal order" as a conceptual framework predicated upon "basic human equality" that promotes "the mutually beneficial interaction with others of great social distance—overcoming such issues as language, ethnicity, race, religion and geography." If we therefore think of liberalism as a socially levelling, egalitarian cosmopolitanism, then it is evident that its premises were inoperative in pre-Enlightenment European societies organized according to a rigidly stratified "harmonious inequality" conceived as a metaphorical reflection of the cosmic order created by God.[1] In this regard, early modern Spain was no different. "La realidad política y social que imperó en la España de los siglos XVI y XVII se fundó sobre la idea de que la armonía social residía en la desigualdad funcional" (The prevailing socio-political reality in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain was based on the idea that social harmony stemmed from functional inequality; Rivero Rodríguez 2005, p. 55).[2] The literature produced in Spain and other early modern European cultures largely accepted the illiberal suppositions of the age, and the corpus of theoretical writings of the period codified and reinforced the pre-existing social structures. On the basis of precepts exposited by Aristotle and Horace, and systematized into elaborate rhetorical structures by Cicero and Quintilian, literary theory prescribed hierarchical compartmentalization of genres and character differentiation determined by essential qualities of collective identity, such as age, sex, social class, profession, race, religion, nationality, and so on. The compositional principle *inventio* governed the selection of these pre-established *loci* or *topoi* (commonplaces).[3] Authors and theorists recognized that these categories represented stylized typologies, but the principle of decorum, an indispensable requirement of an appropriate imitation (i.e., work of literature), dictated that characters within each classification speak and act according to an accepted understanding of their common nature. Any deviation from these standards was regarded as unnatural by definition and therefore relegated to the realm of the comic. One of Miguel de Cervantes's greatest achievements in *Don Quijote de la Mancha* (Part one, 1605; Part two, 1615), and one that legitimately qualifies him as liberal thinker, was to invest fundamentally comic characters with a particularity and dignity that his contemporaries typically denied them.

The dominant representational aesthetic of Cervantes's Spain judged commoners (in the sense of both non-noble and ordinary) as inherently comical and unfit for the heroic genres of epic and tragedy, and it prescribed the use of exaggerated character types to better extol virtue and reprove vice. In other words, it mandated a hierarchical taxonomy of essentialist character traits for fundamentally didactic purposes (López Pinciano 1998, pp. 117-123, 137-138).[4] In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, all theorists of comedy followed Aristotle in defining comic characters as worse than average and Cicero in arguing that comedy was predicated upon moral baseness and physical ugliness (*turpitudo et deformitas*; *torpeza y fealdad* in Spanish). In this tradition, laughter was "moralizante y aristocrática" (moralizing and aristocratic) and based upon the idea that only the lower social classes were fit for comedy (Roncero López 2006, p. 325).[5] The Spanish humanist physician Alonso López Pinciano (1998, p. 343), whose *Philosophía antigua poética* (*Ancient Philosophy of Poetry*) of 1596 was both the first complete treatise on literary theory written in Spain and one that Cervantes certainly knew at first hand, describes the nature of comedy and comic characters by first quoting and then explicating Aristotle:

> 'La comedia … es imitación de peores y no según todo género de vicio, sino según el vicio que es ridículo y mueve a risa, de manera que comedia es imitación del ridículo; y tragedia, del grave.' ¿No veis las oposiciones manifiestas y que el Philósopho, por buenos y malos, entiende aquí las personas, o graves o ridículas? ('Comedy … is an imitation of worse people, not in all manner of vices, but in those that are ridiculous and cause laughter. Therefore, comedy is an imitation of the ridiculous, and tragedy, of the serious.' Do you not see these manifest opposites, and that by good and bad people, the Philosopher [Aristotle] means those who are either serious or ridiculous?).

The definition of "ridiculous" in the sixteenth century was precisely that which induced laughter. It was the standard adjective to mean comic, before it was displaced in the seventeenth century by *cómico*, derived from *comedia* (both a comic play and theatre in general, including tragedy) (Jammes 1980, p. 4). López Pinciano (1998, pp. 389-390) defines laughter tautologically, "la risa es risa" (laughter is laughter), but he is clear as to the *causes* of the risible: "fealdad y torpeza," moral and physical ugliness. For example, a person's face: "como un rostro hermoso mueve a admiración, uno muy feo mueve a risa" (just as a beautiful face causes astonishment, a very ugly one causes laughter). Note especially the high/low framing (beautiful/ugly), a practical illustration of the "manifest opposites" of the serious and the ridiculous that López Pinciano, following Aristotle, defines as the essence of comedy. Other examples of bodily humour are groan-inducingly scatological, but they are worthy of consideration because they render the high/low dynamic physically explicit. To wit: wind that is expelled through the mouth (i.e., a belch) is not funny at all, whereas if it escapes "por la parte contraria, ¿quién hay que no se mueva a risa, especialmente en tiempo y en sazón?" (through the opposite end, who does not laugh, especially at the right time?; López Pinciano 1998, p. 392). The "right time" is not, as we might expect, in a schoolyard. López Pinciano (1998, pp. 392-393) references the widespread but apocryphal story of the poet Juan Boscán, who inadvertently broke wind before the lady he was courting, for which mortifying indiscretion he was said to be more famous than his poetry. A further example is the case of an actor playing a ruffian in a comic farce staged in the home of a grandee. When threatened with death on stage, the actor let slip a thunderous fart that caused the aristocratic audience to dissolve in hysterical laughter and subsequently to shower the thespian with gifts for his lifelike portrayal of a terrified person. Importantly, both anecdotes take place in public and derive some of their humour from the humiliation felt by the objects of laughter, which illustrates the derisiveness of contemporary comedy and is fundamentally another expression of the standard high/low paradigm.[6]

This same dynamic structures the expression of moral ugliness, which, following Aristotle, was not evil but the normal foibles of common people. López Pinciano (1998, p. 391) gives an example that neatly illustrates both the physical and non-physical aspects of *turpitudo et deformitas*:

> Pregunto: ¿Hay algún hombre, o mujer, que caiga hermosamente?; si la caída es sin culpa del que cae, trae consigo fealdad en el cuerpo y descompostura dél; y si cae por culpa suya y falta de aviso, lo cual es más ordinario, allende de la fealdad del cuerpo, trae otra del alma, que es la ignorancia (I ask you: does any man or woman fall gracefully? If the fall is not the person's fault, it produces ugliness and inelegance of the body. And if it is the person's fault, because of inattention, which is more usual, beyond the ugliness of the body, it shows ugliness of the soul, which is ignorance).

For a modern reader, the humour of slipping on a banana peel is unlikely to be enhanced because the person who takes the spill is not paying attention, but in the early modern comic ethos, the victim's perceived culpability in his own misfortune heightens the risibility. One further anecdote, taken from folklore and widely known in the period, demonstrates the point. A farmer riding a mule was eating a meat pie when he was approached by two students, one of whom distracted the man while the other stole the meat from the middle of the pastry. The farmer rode on a few steps and, when he noticed the meat missing from his pie, he looked incredulously to the sky as if a bird had taken it. The students went away roaring with laughter, in which they were joined by a group of onlookers. López Pinciano (1998, p. 392) explains: "Cuento es ridículo ése … y mucho, porque tiene lo feo doblado: fealdad de parte del labrador, que fue la ignorancia, y fealdad de parte de los estudiantes, que fue picardía" (That is a ridiculous story … and especially so because it is doubly ugly: ugliness on the farmer's part, which is ignorance, and the ugliness of the students, which is trickery). The protagonists of this story are paradigmatic of their comic types, the rustic bumpkin and the cunning students. Of particular interest is López Pinciano's reaction to the trick: he wastes no sympathy on the dupe, but neither does he fully identify with the pranksters, who are, after all, thieves. He appreciates the wit of the jest, but he ascribes moral culpability to both the perpetrators and their butt. This complex perspective, which both admires and reproves an act of comic immorality, is quite alien to a modern reader, who tends to a more empathetic response and typically seeks to identify with either the malefactor or (more typically) the victim. It is important, however, for understanding how Cervantes's readers could have laughed at and loved Don Quijote and Sancho Panza as comic characters, without necessarily identifying intellectually or emotionally with them.

Those characters were immediately recognizable to Cervantes's contemporaries in a way that time has obscured for modern readers. Precisely because he was so readily identifiable as a traditional *figura*, a comically exaggerated physical and/or moral grotesque, Don Quijote was immediately assimilated into the frequent public festivals of the period, where his presence was a source of mirth (Cabanillas Cárdenas 2006, pp. 27-32). Agustín Redondo (1980, p. 51) has shown that "Don Quijote se inserta en una tradición que se remonta hasta el loco medieval" (Don Quijote belongs to a tradition that dates to the medieval madman). Much of his characterization (his name, including its multiple possible variants, his gaunt physical appearance, his restless wandering, his loquaciousness, etc.) is based on popular types and was associated in the period with lunacy. The same is true of two of the most iconic images related to the crazy knight, the windmills at which he tilts and the barber's basin that he wears as an improvised helmet, both of which symbolized wind and thus empty-headedness, i.e., insanity.[7] Even his lucid intervals, during which he speaks and acts with the wisdom and reserve appropriate to his age, education, and station in life and which become increasingly frequent, lengthy, and complex throughout Part two, were for early modern readers simply markers of his madness that served as comic contrasts to his insane words and deeds (Russell 1969, pp. 315-316; Cabanillas Cárdenas 2006, p. 30). This is precisely what we would expect in a cultural context in which genres were defined by the "manifest opposites" of high and low content and characters, as López Pinciano explains.

Don Quijote's name is a good example of this principle. The name was a traditional *locus a persona* that corresponded to a character's basic attributes. In this case, it is also a comic application of the rhetorical device antonomasia. Specifically, it is a humorous variant of *antonomasia vossiana*, which is used to describe a personage with the name of a famous individual who exhibited the same qualities (Azaustre and Casas 1997, p. 88).[8] For instance, Alexander the Great was proverbially associated with generosity, so to

call a character an Alexander the Great (as Cervantes, hyperbolically and humorously, terms Don Quijote; 2016, 1, Preliminares, p. 15; 1.52, p. 526) is to emphasize his magnanimity.[9] In keeping with Don Quijote's self-image and aspirations, his (self-applied) name recalls the greatest of the Arthurian knights, Lanzarote (Lancelot), while the toponymic de la Mancha references the chivalric knight par excellence, Amadís de Gaula. But a *quijote* is a thigh guard in a suit of armour (thus approximating "Don Quijote" to something like "Sir Codpiece"); the suffix -ote sounds ridiculous in this context (a fact that Cervantes exploits for great humour at his hero's expense; 2016, 1.26, pp. 250-251); and La Mancha is not a faraway, fantastical land filled with knights, giants, and enchanters, but a hot, sparsely populated plain (Cervantes underscores the July heat to emphasize the character's madness; 2016, 1.2, p. 34).[10] The name Don Quijote is thus a burlesque inversion, the manifest opposite, of the chivalric heroes that the character intends to evoke.[11]

Some of the basic folkloric or archetypal attributes of the old and insane were compiled in the form of humorous anecdotes and jokes in the popular miscellanies of the sixteenth century, such as Melchor de Santa Cruz's 1574 *Floresta española* (*Spanish Forest*; 1947, pp. 100-102, 179-182). They were also codified in the treatises on literary theory that proliferated in Spain around the turn of the seventeenth century. Recall that the principle of decorum dictated that literary imitations represent people according to their natural (stereo)type. In *Cisne de Apolo* (*Apollo's Swan*, 1602), Luis Alfonso de Carballo (1958, vol. 2, p. 114) defines decorum as "vna decencia y consideración que se ha de tener a toda la obra, y a cada parte della, a las personas, cosas, y palabras" (an appropriateness and consideration that must be taken of the whole work and each of its parts, people, things, and words). So, for example, in Santa Cruz (1947, pp. 179-180) we read: "Decía un caballero: El hombre de cincuenta años arriba, más ha de ocupar los pensamientos como ha de recibir la muerte, que no en buscar regalos para alargar la vida" (A gentleman said: A man over fifty should occupy his thoughts in how he should receive death, rather than in seeking comforts to extend life). Note the age at which one becomes typologically old, fifty, an assumption that Alfonso de Carballo (1958, vol. 2, pp. 118-119) reflects in his description of the decorous presentation of an old man in a literary text:

> Al viejo que ya passa de los cincuenta, pintaremos padeciendo muchas miserias, enfermedades, y trabajos, auariento quexoso, malacondicionado, y todo su cuerpo sin prouecho ni agilidad, si no es la lengua, con la qual se jata siempre de las cosas de su mocedad, loando las cosas de otros tiempos, corrigiendo y reprehendiendo a todos (An old man over fifty will be portrayed as suffering from many infirmities, illnesses, and pains; a quarrelsome miser, irascible, and his whole body without benefit or agility, save for his tongue, with which he will forever brag about the things in his youth, praising the way things used to be, correcting and finding fault with everyone).

Not coincidentally, Don Quijote "[f]risaba … con los cincuenta años" (was nearly fifty years old; Cervantes 2016, 1.1, p. 28) when he lost his mind. Francisco Cascales (1975, pp. 216-217), in his *Tablas poéticas* (*Poetic Tables*, published in 1617 but written circa 1604), copies a long list from the Italian theorist Minturno setting out "las propriedades y condiciones de las personas y naciones" (the attributes and conditions of persons and nations) in comedies. Among the comic characters he includes *el viejo*, the old man, who can be quite variable, from wise, serious, and courtly to foolish, profligate, and lecherous. Of particular interest is Cascales's (1975, p. 215) exclusion of married old men from comedy, on the grounds that their affairs bring dishonour on their wives and children. "Pero si el tal viejo fuere soltero, no le excluymos, pues sin perjuizio de parte causa contento y risa con su requiebro y amor" (But if that old man were single [like Don Quijote], we wouldn't exclude him [from comedy], since without causing harm to others his wooing and courting give pleasure and laughter).

López Pinciano's comments on the relationship between real people and literary personages in the context of comedy are particularly developed and important in ways that are quite illuminating of Don Quijote's character. Like Cascales and Alfonso de Carballo, López Pinciano (1998, p. 211) recognizes that fictional representations are, of course, stylizations. According to the character El Pinciano, the author's alter ego:

> los viejos todos no son … avaros, indeterminados y espaciosos. Veo yo en las comedias algunos pródigos determinados y, más que unos niños, ligeros en las acciones corporales y aun espirituales, que no parecen mal (not all old men are miserly, indecisive, and sluggish … I have seen some in comedies who are incorrigibly profligate and quicker than children in their movements and decisions, and they are not bad at all).

The more learned character Ugo responds (Ibid.) by drawing an Aristotelian distinction between the general and the particular, the latter of which is fit for comedy:

> en cosas graves conviene que el viejo se pinte guardoso, indeterminado y espacioso, porque es la común y natural acción suya; mas, en cosas de burlas y de pasatiempo, está muy bien pintar a un viejo de la manera que decís haber visto (determinado, colérico y aun enamorado, si queréis) por dar más causa de reír y más sal a la comedia (in serious matters, an old man should be shown to be frugal, hesitant, and slow, because that is their common and natural behaviour; but in facetious or entertaining subjects, it is quite proper to portray an old man like you have seen (decisive, choleric, and even in love) to cause more laughter and sharpen the comedy).

This description of a comic old man is notable for how precisely it maps onto the basic contours of Don Quijote's character. Acting out of madness, he is rash, hot-tempered, profligate (he wastes his money first on books of knight errantry, and then on financing his own adventures), and in love. In fact, he is only pretending to be in love, with a figment of his own imagination, no less, because as a (literary) knight he must necessarily be so. His professions of love for Dulcinea are therefore especially ridiculous, and especially befitting of a bizarrely aberrant comic character.[12]

The basic attributes that López Pinciano, Cascales, and Alfonso de Carballo associate with old men in comedies (unnaturally quick to action, absurdly spendthrift, and preposterously in love) are all descriptive of Don Quijote. These traits, explicitly deemed uncharacteristic of a serious person, are the direct expression of his insanity, and they signaled unmistakeably to contemporary readers that he was a figure of fun. For them, the comic elements of his character were so strong as to overwhelm any seriousness in his lucid moments, which in any case were understood to function as contrasts that heightened his lunacy. Because the passage of time has obscured the character's underlying comic paradigm, modern readers, in a curiously ironic inversion of their early modern predecessors' response, are apt to disregard the comedy as mere camouflage for an epistemologically serious or politically subversive message, if, indeed, they perceive the comic material at all. I do not deny the presence of such serious subject matter in *Don Quijote*; the Horatian maxim *ridentem dicere verum* was, after all, a Renaissance commonplace. Rather, I subscribe to Anthony Close's (2002, p. 7) argument that "one cannot treat the comicality of Cervantes's fiction as simply an obvious and superficial layer, detachable from more thought-provoking layers that lie beneath. It pervades and conditions the whole work, and if we neglect it, our understanding of the work is basically skewed." Cervantes (2016, 1.28, p. 274) declares *Don Quijote* a tonic for his age, "necesitada de alegres entretenimientos" (in need of comic entertainments). I conclude that he deemed the writing of good comedy to be both a serious and socially useful endeavour, and that a full accounting of *Don Quijote*'s richness is best developed from that premise.

Sancho Panza, Don Quijote's portly squire, is subject to the same interpretative disjunction as his master. His fundamental characterization is based on an immediately identifiable archetype common to Spanish and European folkloric traditions, the "tonto-listo" or clever fool (Molho 1976, p. 248). He is first introduced as a paradigmatic *simple* or simpleton, a poor farmer ironically described as honourable but with very little between the ears ("de muy poca sal en la mollera;" roughly, with very little salt in the shaker; Cervantes 2016, 1.7, p. 72). For Cervantes's contemporaries, Sancho represented a basic character type, and *Don Quijote*'s original readers recognized in him a cluster of comic attributes:

> su simplicidad e ingenuidad sin límites, su socarronería y actitud burlona, las exigencias y quejas con que a menudo asaetea a su amo, su glotonería, la cobardía y poquedad que a menudo exhibe, su materialismo e inclinación escatológica, sus infundadas ilusiones, y los frecuentes dislates lingüísticos en que incurre (his simple mindedness and unbounded gullibility, his sarcasm and sardonic attitude, the demands and complaints with which he frequently harasses his master, his gluttony, the cowardice and timidity that he often displays, his materialism and scatological tendencies, his baseless dreams [of wealth], and the verbal absurdities that he repeatedly spouts; Salazar Rincón 2004, p. 213).

Just as Cervantes develops Don Quijote's character through the inclusion of increasingly extended lucid intervals in contrast to his basic insanity, however, he gradually emphasises Sancho's cleverness in explicit counterpoint to his simple mindedness. Also as with Don Quijote, this contrapuntal dynamism constitutes a progressively complex manifestation of pre-existing traits within the overarching representational framework of the "manifest opposites" of high and low subject matter.

As with the case of the old man in love, this popular comic type was also codified in literary theory. López Pinciano (1998, pp. 403-404) claims that the "simple" (simpleton) is the prototypical comic character in whose creation the Spanish exceed all others:

> es una persona la del simple, en la cual cabe ignorancia, y cabe malicia, y cabe también lascivia rústica y grosera. Y al fin es capaz de todas tres especies ridículas, porque, como persona ignorante, le está bien el preguntar, responder y discurrir necedades; y, como necia, le están bien las palabras lascivas, rústicas y groseras; y, en la verdad, por le estar bien toda fealdad, es la persona más apta para la comedia de todas las demás, en cuya invención se han aventajado los españoles a griegos y latinos y a los demás; todos los cuales usaron de siervos en sus comedias para el fin de la risa y a los cuales faltaba alguna y algunas especies de lo ridículo, porque, o no tenían más que la dicacidad, o la lascivia y, cuando mucho, las dos juntas, de manera que carecían de la ignorancia simple, la cual es autora grande de la risa ([The simpleton] is a person full of ignorance, and malice, and also coarse and crude lechery. Above all, he can express all three kinds of ridiculousness because, as an ignorant person, it suits him to ask, answer, and reason with foolishness; and, as a fool, he is suited to lewd, coarse, and crude language. And, in truth, because he is apt to all manner of ugliness, he is the character most suited of all to comedy, in whom the Spanish have outdone the Greeks and Romans and everyone else. They all used servants in their comedies to cause laughter, and they were all lacking in some kinds of ridiculousness, because they were limited to caustic wordplay, or lewdness, or, at most, both of them together, so that they lacked simpleminded ignorance, which is a great source of laughter).

Sancho, the simpleton servant, repeatedly demonstrates every one of these characteristics, from foolish ignorance (his core attribute) to malicious wit and bawdiness.[13]

As characters, therefore, Don Quijote and Sancho were both drawn from a longstanding and pervasive comic tradition within popular and literary culture, and both characters remain expressions of their basic comic types, old madman and clever simpleton, until the end of the story (Martín Morán 1992). Cervantes's contemporaries recognized Don Quijote and Sancho as such and responded to them as the typologically stylized figures that they were. Their reaction was not, as has been claimed (González Echevarría 2015, p. 11), "obviously a misreading." Adrián Sáez (2012, p. 240) reminds us that "[e]l marco genérico y el contexto son capitales para la hermenéutica, pues activan o anulan determinados significados" (genre and context are crucial to interpretation, since they enable or preclude certain meanings). The expectations of Cervantes's readers, who, after all, shared his language and culture, helps explain their response to *Don Quijote*. This is true, not just of the anonymous public who made *Don Quijote* a popular success, but also of some of the preeminent authors of the period, including Tirso de Molina, Guillén de Castro, Alonso Jerónimo de Salas

Barbadillo (a close friend of Cervantes), Pedro Calderón de la Barca, and Francisco de Quevedo (Cabanillas Cárdenas 2006, pp. 32-36; Sáez 2012). Nevertheless, it would be quite incorrect to conclude that, in *Don Quijote*, Cervantes did no more than deploy the tropes of traditional comedy. While he made use of comic commonplaces based on physical and moral grotesques and verbal ribaldry to a greater degree than critics sometimes acknowledge (Brewer 2022; Redondo 1984), the comedy in *Don Quijote* is qualitatively more sophisticated than the slapstick and scatology that López Pinciano and other theorists defined as the essence of the risible.[14] Indeed, Cervantes insistently emphasises the intelligence necessary for great comedy (i.e., his own), particularly throughout Part two. Don Quijote himself declares: "Decir gracias y escribir donaires es de grandes ingenios: la más discreta figura de la comedia es la del bobo, porque no lo ha de ser el que quiere dar a entender que es simple" (Speaking and writing with humour and wittiness is for great wits: the cleverest character in a comedy is the fool, because only one who is not foolish can convincingly play a simpleton; Cervantes 2016, 2.3, p. 572). The duchess subsequently uses exactly the same language ("gracias," "donaires," "discreto," ingenios") to (somewhat ironically) describe Sancho:

> De que Sancho el bueno sea gracioso lo estimo yo en mucho, porque es señal que es discreto, que las gracias y los donaires, señor don Quijote, como vuesa merced bien sabe, no asientan sobre ingenios torpes; y pues el buen Sancho es gracioso y donairoso, desde aquí le confirmo por discreto (I value good Sancho's humour greatly, because it is a sign that he is clever. Humour and wittiness, as you well know Sir Don Quijote, do not come from dull wits, and since good Sancho is humorous and witty, I hereby confirm that he is clever; Cervantes 2016, 2.30, pp. 782-783).

Don Quijote further emphasises both facets of Sancho's increasingly complex "tonto-listo" characterisation when describing his squire to the duke and duchess:

> quiero que entiendan vuestras señorías que Sancho Panza es uno de los más graciosos escuderos que jamás sirvió a caballero andante: tiene a veces unas simplicidades tan agudas, que el pensar si es simple o agudo causa no pequeño contento; tiene malicias que le condenan por bellaco y descuidos que le confirman por bobo; duda de todo y créelo todo; cuando pienso que se va a despeñar de tonto, sale con unas discreciones que le levantan al cielo (I wish your lordships to understand that Sancho Panza is one of the funniest squires that ever served a knight errant. Sometimes he comes out with such sharp simplicities that pondering whether he is simpleminded or quick-witted causes no small amount of enjoyment. He lets fly malicious sayings that expose him as a rogue and shows carelessness that confirms him for a fool. He doubts everything and believes everything. Just when I think that he is going to fall into the abyss of foolishness, he shows discretion that raises him to heaven; Cervantes 2016, 2.32, pp. 802-803).

These statements reflect Cervantes's increasing focus on the characters' elaborately refined psychologies, which build progressively on their traditional comic origins. The extraordinary chiaroscuro quality that Don Quijote and Sancho demonstrate, manifested through the former's mix of madness and lucidity and the latter's combination of foolishness and intelligence, are initially expressions of the kinds of "manifest opposites" described by López Pinciano, but Cervantes goes much further than merely juxtaposing comic dichotomies. Rather, he portrays complex cognitive processes as emerging organically from within each character's basic typology. This development is especially in evidence throughout *Don Quijote*, Part two, but it is equally well attested by an episode near the end of Part one. In an effort to return the mad knight to his home for rest and recovery, the priest and barber from his village, in concert with several other characters staying at a roadside inn, disguise themselves in masks and cloaks, tie up Don Quijote while he is sleeping, and put him in a wooden cage in the back of an oxcart, claiming to be enchanters who have cast a spell on him. The scene is a burlesque restaging of similar sequences in the chivalric romances that drove Don Quijote mad, but he is astonished by the unprecedented particularities of the adventure:

> Muchas y muy graves historias he yo leído de caballeros andantes, pero jamás he leído, ni visto, ni oído que a los caballeros encantados los lleven de esta manera y con el espacio que prometen estos perezosos y tardíos animales (I have read many serious chronicles of knights errant, but I have never read, seen, nor heard of enchanted knights being carried away in this manner and at the slow pace of these sluggish and slothful beasts; Cervantes 2016, 1.47, p. 482).

He concludes that "quizá la caballería y los encantos de estos nuestros tiempos deben de seguir otro camino que siguieron los antiguos" (perhaps knighthood and enchantments in our times must follow a different path than the old ways), or perhaps new forms of enchantment have been devised just for him (Cervantes 2016, 1.47, p. 483).

This line of reasoning reveals the dual mechanism of the character's psychological development. On the one hand, the anchoring constant of literary delusion, the infallible historicity of the books of chivalric romance; on the other, the concession to reality requiring a new explanation, that modern knight errantry may function according to a different set of rules. These two poles, static insanity and dynamic adaptability, structure Don Quijote's peculiar yet recognizable process of cognition, which neutralizes cognitive dissonance by incorporating empirical evidence into his elaborate madness. His carefully reasoned arguments lead to ridiculous conclusions, not because they are irrational in themselves, but because they derive from the preposterous premise that he is a knight errant like his literary heroes. Thus, he explains his inability to extricate himself from a flimsily improvised wooden cage through the strict formality of a comic syllogism: only an enchantment could prevent a real knight errant such as he from escaping the cage; he cannot escape the cage; ergo, he must be enchanted. This is not the on/off binary of insanity/lucidity implicit in the high/low antitheses of the "manifest opposites" described by López Pinciano, but a sophisticated synthesis illustrative of actual psychological functions. For all its bizarre singularity, Don Quijote's mind works in fundamentally human ways.

A similar process defines Sancho's reasoning in the same episode.

> ¡Ah, señor cura, señor cura! ¿Pensaba vuestra merced que no le conozco y pensaba que yo no calo y adivino adónde se encaminan estos nuevos encantamentos? Pues sepa que le conozco, por más que se encubra el rostro, y sepa que le entiendo, por más que disimule sus embustes (Oh, my lord priest, my lord priest! Did your grace believe that I do not know you and that I do not see through and deduce the purpose of these new enchantments? Well, know that I recognize you, however much you cover your face, and know that I understand you, however much you cover up your tricks; Cervantes 2016, 1.47, p. 488).

This perceptiveness is immediately undone, however, by the motives that Sancho ascribes to the priest's actions: "En fin, donde reina la envidia no puede vivir la virtud, ni adonde hay escaseza la liberalidad" (So be it, where envy reigns virtue cannot live, nor can there be generosity where there is meanness; Ibid.). He subsequently tries to convince Don Quijote that two of the masked figures are really the village priest and barber, who have conspired to carry the knight home in a cage "de pura envidia que tienen como vuestra merced se les adelanta en hacer famosos hechos" (out of pure envy that they have for the way your grace is getting ahead of them in the doing of famous deeds; Cervantes 2016, 1.48, p. 499). This is a deceptively complex form of reasoning. It reveals Sancho's Theory of Mind, the ability that "enables humans (and advanced primates) to predict what others are likely to do, feel, think, and believe; this capacity is a necessary precursor to a wide variety of human interactions—both positive and not—including projecting and empathizing as well as lying and cheating" (Simerka 2013, p. 5). The greatest demonstration of Sancho's Theory of Mind comes early in Part two, when he uses his knowledge of Don Quijote's peculiar logic to successfully convince his master that a homely and uncouth peasant girl is really Dulcinea in enchanted form (which, as if on cue, the madman takes as further evidence that there are new types of enchantment applicable only to him), but here he reveals the same mental process. Unlike Don Quijote, Sancho is not insane and is eas-

ily able to recognize that two of the pretend enchanters are just the priest and barber in disguise, while his Theory of Mind allows him to devise what seem to him like plausible motives for their actions. Because he remains fundamentally a typological simpleton, however, his reasoning is predicated on his absurd belief that Don Quijote is a real knight errant who will earn fame through great deeds. From that preposterous premise he proceeds, quite logically, to the nonsensical conclusion that the priest and barber are motivated by envy of their neighbour's heroic exploits, even though he has by this point repeatedly witnessed Don Quijote mistake the mundane for the marvelous and suffer numerous falls and beatings as a result.

Sancho's attempt to convince Don Quijote that he is not, in fact, enchanted, refines this comic psychology still further. Nonplussed by Don Quijote's insistence that the enchanters in question only *appear* to be the priest and barber, Sancho changes tack and euphemistically enquires if his master needs to "hacer aguas mayores o menores" (make large or small water; Cervantes 2016, 1.48, p. 500). When Don Quijote exclaims that he does, and urgently, Sancho springs the rhetorical trap:

> ¿podría negar lo que comúnmente suele decirse por ahí cuando una persona está de mala voluntad: 'No sé qué tiene Fulano, que ni come, ni bebe, ni duerme, ni responde a propósito a lo que le preguntan, que no parece sino que está encantado?' De donde se viene a sacar que los que no comen, ni beben, ni duermen, ni hacen las obras naturales que yo digo, estos tales están encantados, pero no aquellos que tienen la gana que vuestra merced tiene, y que bebe cuando se lo dan y come cuando lo tiene y responde a todo aquello que le preguntan (could you deny the common saying about someone who is out of sorts: 'I don't know what's wrong with so-and-so, he doesn't eat, or drink, or sleep, or respond to questions with any sense, and it seems like he must be enchanted?' From which I conclude that those who don't eat, or drink, or sleep, or do their business are enchanted, but not those who have urges like your grace, and who drink when offered and eat when they have food and answer every question they're asked; Cervantes 2016, 1.49, p. 501).

The humour stems, not from the scatological, but from Sancho's transference of the popular, figurative meaning of *encantado* (out of sorts) to the absurdly literal plane of his master's literary enchantment. Rather than show Don Quijote soil himself, Cervantes displaces the focus from the bodily act to the thought processes of the characters regarding its possibility and implications. Don Quijote is forced to admit the truth of Sancho's argument, but he retreats into a reiteration of the unfalsifiable assertion that he is subject to a new kind of enchantment.

Sancho's failure to convince his master is illustrative of a larger pattern that is consonant with the madman's own specific psychology: arguments exogenous to Don Quijote's literary insanity never persuade him, while those that are endogenous to it do so easily. In fact, it is the priest and barber, not Don Quijote himself, who initially introduce the subsequently ubiquitous idea that the erstwhile knight is pursued by enchanters, after the curate burns most of his parishioner's library in Part one, chapter 6. Other such examples abound, none more salient that Sancho's own enchantment of Dulcinea in Part two. Just as that episode reveals the squire's astonishing amalgamation of typological simplemindedness (he continues to believe that Don Quijote is a real knight errant who will bestow upon him the governorship of an island) and highly developed Theory of Mind, it demonstrates that Don Quijote's own progressively complex cognitive processes continue to reflect the peculiar delusion that is the basic comic attribute of his character. In neither case does the unprecedented psychological sophistication transcend the characters' traditional comic origins; rather, it develops directly from within them.

The same is true of the general aesthetics of the whole episode, which gestures toward a conventional scene of scatology and public humiliation in Don Quijote's need to relieve himself before abandoning that comic cliché to focus on the dialogue and psychological evolution of its two protagonists. To be sure, Cervantes employs copious amounts of excrement, vomit, and other corporeal effluvia for humorous purposes earlier in *Don Quijote*, Part one, but here he adopts the much more sophisticated approach of using it as a means to reveal the inner workings of his protagonists' minds. In this way, the scatological becomes

the analogue of the characters' comic typology (crazy old man and simpleton): an element of coarse traditional comedy that Cervantes retains but refines in unprecedented ways. The degree of originality in this approach becomes clear in contrast to the inclusion of similar material in contemporary monuments of comic writing, Mateo Alemán's *Guzmán de Alfarache* (Part one, 1599; Part two, 1604) and Francisco de Quevedo's *El buscón* (circa 1605), both of which subject their picaresque protagonists to degrading physical abuse, including repeatedly covering them in excrement (their own and others').[15] Cervantes's treatment of Don Quijote and Sancho, while sometimes harsh by modern standards – Vladimir Nabokov (quoted in Hart 2009, p. 228) famously considered *Don Quijote* "a veritable encyclopedia of cruelty"– is by comparison both mild and dignified.

I have previously noted Victoriano Roncero López's description of early modern comedy as moralizing and aristocratic. López Pinciano (1998, p. 385) aptly demonstrates that perspective by differentiating between deaths that occur in tragedies (and thus, by definition, befall nobles) and those that might happen (to commoners) in comedies:

> las muertes trágicas son lastimosas, mas las de la comedia, si algunas hay, son de gusto y pasatiempo, porque en ellas mueren personas que sobran en el mundo, como es una vieja cizañadora, un viejo avaro, un rufián o una alcahueta (tragic deaths are pitiable, but in comedies, if there are any, they are pleasant and entertaining, because in [comedies] the people who die are useless in the world, like a gossipy old woman, a miserly old man, a ruffian or a procuress).

This statement, unremarkable in the late sixteenth century, is entirely alien to Cervantes's aesthetics, and it underscores what a radical proposition it was in 1605 to treat a lunatic old man and a rustic bumpkin as intrinsically deserving of the attention and refinement that Cervantes dedicates to them. Don Quijote and Sancho remain fundamentally comic characters (Alonso Quijano, his wits recovered, dies an exemplary Christian death, not Don Quijote); no matter how far they deviate from their original types, there is always regression to the comedic mean. But precisely therein lies one of Cervantes's deepest contributions to the historical development of liberalism: his willingness to portray Don Quijote and Sancho, not as stereotyped representations of collective attributes, but as meticulously particularized individuals with idiosyncratic personalities who exist for their own sake. Freed from the determinism of a reductive group identity, they emerge as revolutionary creations, comic figures imbued with psychological complexity, emotional depth, human pathos, and individual dignity unlike any afforded to such characters before.

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"Liberals like laughter. They are anti-anti-laughter."
— Cass R. Sunstein. *New York Times,* November 20, 2023.

NOTES

1 Two of this ideology's controlling metaphors were the theatre and chess, in which the actors or pieces play their assigned part (king, knight, servant, pawn, etc.) but are then equalized at the end of the play or game (i.e., death). See Cervantes (2016, 2.12, pp. 631-632).

2 On the dynamic matrix of religious beliefs, cultural values, and material interests that formed the "economía moral" (moral economy) of early modern Spanish society and that conditioned the attitudes and behaviours of the nobility in the period, see Yun Casalilla (2004, pp. 528-554; 2005). Yun points out that none of the ostensibly anti-bourgeois, "aristocratic" values that traditional historiography has proffered as causes of Spain's presumed cultural backwardness and economic stagnation were exclusive to it. Similar social norms were prevalent throughout Europe, even in England and the Netherlands. All translations from Spanish are my own.

3 *Inventio* did not, as it might seem, refer to what we today understand as the "invention" of an original character, but to the "discovery" (in the author's memory or commonplace book) of the appropriate commonplaces for a given subject matter. Cicero (*De Inventione*), the most influential rhetorician for the Renaissance, outlined nine such general *loci a persona* (with multiple subcategories), which Quintilian (*Institutio Oratoria*) expanded to fifteen. There were many other *loci* related to cause, time, place, etc. See López Grigera (1995, pp. 17-32, 179-182) and Azaustre and Casas (1997, pp. 23-69), who provide numerous examples drawn from medieval and early modern Spanish literature, including *Don Quijote* and other works by Cervantes.

4 Cervantes makes two direct, comic references to this tradition. The first is in Part one, when Don Quijote announces to Sancho his intention to imitate his hero, the (fictional) knight Amadís de Gaula, drawing a parallel with Ulysses and Aeneas, whom Homer and Virgil portrayed, not as they were, but as they should have been, to serve as examples to future generations (2016, 1.25, p. 234). The second is early in Part two, when Sansón Carrasco brings news of the publication and reception of Part one, giving rise to a discussion of its inclusion of the many beatings that Don Quijote suffers and prompting Don Quijote to again reference the exaggeratedly favourable depiction of the Greek and Roman heroes, while Sansón appeals to the Aristotelian distinction between writing (factually) as an historian and (verisimilarly) as a poet (2016, 2.3, p. 569).

5 On comedic theory and practice in early modern Spain, see Jammes (1980, pp. 3-11); Close (2002, pp. 179-276); Roncero López (2006, pp. 285-328).

6 Flatulence humour continued to be practiced by great wits long after the age of Cervantes. See, for example, Benjamin Franklin's (2003, pp. 13-17) satirical "Letter to a Royal Academy" of 1781, popularly known as "Fart Proudly," in which the Founding Father proposes a prize for the discovery of a drug that will perfume flatus. Note, particularly, the concluding pun, that other lines of scientific enquiry are "scarely [sic] worth a FART*hing*" (2003, p. 17). This kind of scatological word play was also characteristic of humour in early modern Spain and occurs in *Don Quijote*.

7 The connection between wind and windmills is obvious. In the case of the basin, it stems from a pun on the word in Spanish, *bacía*, phonetically indistinguishable from the adjective *vacía*, "empty."

8 Cervantes makes joking reference to this precept in the character of Princess Antonomasia (2016, 2.38, p. 842).

9 I cite *Don Quijote* by part, chapter, and page number.

10 Don Quijote's madness is described in physiological terms, based on the ancient (but still current) theory of the four humours. His dominant humour is choler (hot and dry); when his passion for reading chivalric romances deprives him of the restorative, humidifying function of sleep, "se le secó el cerebro de manera que vino a perder el juicio" (his brain dried up so that he lost his mind; Cervantes 2016, 1.1, pp. 29-30). The summer heat exacerbates his insanity. See Green (1957).

11 Sancho Panza's name was equally evocative for Cervantes's contemporaries (Molho 1976, pp. 249-255).

12 The degree to which this is so is attested by the satirical "Diálogo entre Babieca y Rocinante" (Dialogue Between Babieca and Rocinante), included among a number of similar poems in the preliminary materials of Part one. Babieca, steed of the great Castilian hero El Cid, asks Rocinante, Don Quijote's emaciated nag (his name is literally Used-To-Be-A-Nag, a portmanteau of "rocín," "nag," and "antes," "before"), why he is so skinny, to which Rocinante replies that his master does not feed him:

B. Andá, señor, que estáis muy mal criado,
pues vuestra lengua de asno al amo ultraja.
R. Asno se es de la cuna a la mortaja.
¿Queréislo ver? Miraldo enamorado.
B. ¿Es necedad amar?
R. No es gran prudencia (Cervantes 1, Preliminares, pp. 24-25).
(B. Fie, sir, you are very ill bred, / since your ass's tongue slanders your master. R. An ass is an ass from cradle to grave. / Want to see what I mean? Look at him, in love. B. Is it foolish to love? R. It's not very wise.)

The exchange includes some untranslatable wordplay on "criado" ("bred" or "reared" and "servant"); and "amo" ("master" and "I love"), "enamorado" ("in love"), and "amar" ("to love"), which was very typical in the period and which López Pinciano (1998, p. 403) and Cascales (1975, pp. 221-223) associate specifically with comic writing.

13 On Sancho's ribaldry, see Joly (1992).

14 There is an exactly contemporaneous example of such a traditional treatment of Don Quijote and Sancho, in the pseudonymous Alonso Fernández de Avellaneda's (2005) apocryphal continuation of Part one, published in 1614. Here, the humour is coarse and crude, Don Quijote's madness is uninflected, and Sancho is every bit the typological *simple* described by López Pinciano. Cervantes reacted to Avellaneda's churlish presentation of his characters with withering contempt. See Cervantes (2016, 2.59, pp. 998-1002; 2.62, p. 1033; 2.70, pp. 1079-1080; 2.72, pp. 1089-1093).

15 For a discussion of scatological comedy in *Guzmán de Alfarache*, see Roncero López (2016). On *El buscón* as a work of comedy, see Tobar Quintanar (2012).

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Tocqueville's Cervantine Federalism: The Hybrid French Art of Exiting the New World

ERIC-CLIFFORD GRAF

"Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob."
—James Madison
Federalist 55

"In the United States, society had no infancy; it was born a fully grown man."
—Alexis de Tocqueville
Democracy in America 1.2.9

Fig. 1: Salvador Dalí, *Geopoliticus Child Watching the Birth of the New Man* (1943)

Aside from the doctrinaire liberals of his era (Guizot, Constant, Royer-Collard), two great currents of political philosophy dominate Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* (1835/40), arguably the *sine qua non* of both classical liberal and romantic political theory. One of these is obvious; the other, if I'm not mistaken, has not yet come fully to light. In this essay, I'll advance the idea that *The Federalist Papers* (1787–88; hereafter abbreviated F) are to the first volume of *Democracy in America* (hereafter DA) what *Don Quijote de la Mancha* (1605/15) is to the second. Before considering the utility of this analogy, it will be helpful to compare the two volumes according to what I argue are their most important philosophical sources.[1]

MADISON AND HAMILTON'S MONSTROSITY

The first major source of philosophical influence in DA is obvious. Tocqueville studied the political theories, structures, and institutions advocated by the American Founders. There are exceptions, such as his interests in Puritans, Catholics, pirates, women, Indians, blacks, and Latin Americans, but

the crux of DA1 consists of a meditation on the Constitution of 1787 and its presentation in *The Federalist Papers*. In this regard, the earliest important quotation in DA (1.1.8n8) is from Madison's *Federalist* 45, where the Virginian emphasizes the limited power of the central government as opposed to the unlimited sovereignty of the states. A few pages later (DA 1.1.8n35), the longest quote from any of the Founders is from Hamilton's *Federalist* 71, where the New Yorker argues for a decisive executive. Hamilton's position contrasts with Madison's because it implies greater political centralization. At the end of DA 1.2.7, however, Tocqueville returns to Madison's defense, brandishing a lengthy quote from *Federalist* 51, the famous passage in which America's most important constitutionalist asserts that two dominant factions should be incentivized to protect the rights of a third super minority (cf. Kelsen pp. 67-78). No footnotes now; underscoring his bias toward Madison, Tocqueville puts the quote in the body of his text. Subsequently (DA 1.2.7), he pays homage to another Virginian, calling Jefferson—Madison's friend and mentor—"the most powerful apostle democracy has ever had."

Tocqueville thus indicates he has understood both Hamilton's nationalist bent—insisting on maximum power for the presidency to preserve the union—and Madison's federalist bent—insisting on electoral asymmetry to preserve the power of the states. In this formulation of the political dialectic of the early U.S. republic, Tocqueville highlights the conflict between the free, industrial North and the slaver, agricultural South (see Hamilton 2015, F12, F35, F36), a conflict which *The Federalist Papers* sought to remedy by way of the mixed, divided, adventurous, and monstrously innovative government of the Constitution of 1787.

This monster metaphor—signaling ambivalence and imperfection—plays a critical role in the constitutional discourse of America's Founders (see Graf 2021b). In many respects the Constitution of 1787 is an antidemocratic monstrosity, as seen in such concepts as the lifetime appointment of a hierarchy of judges, the three-fifths political weighting of slaves, the division and separation of powers among three branches of government and between national and state levels, and above all else the Senate. For the Founders, the far more important question was the relative one, i.e., whether the Constitution contained fewer monstrous aspects than it did natural and human ones. By this same reasoning, the most weirdly inhuman of these monstrosities, the least tenable and most requiring of attention, is clearly the three-fifths political weighting of slaves. I would argue that the one-tenth excess of humanity in this compromise was also designed to force the future expansion of the franchise in their direction.

Other monsters play roles in *The Federalist Papers*. On the one hand, Hamilton (2015, F29) claims the Constitution's enemies hallucinate and see monsters everywhere: "In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written tale or romance, which instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind nothing but frightful and distorted shapes—'Gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire'; discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming everything it touches into a monster." Hamilton cites the fall of Satan according to Milton, the great seventeenth-century Reformed poet; and he gives the phrase an odd Cervantine spin, since now his political rivals are not just Satan's minions but the authors of cheap novels that too often refer to nonexistent monsters.

By contrast, Madison—the most philosophical of the three authors of *The Federalist Papers*—admits that the new mixed and divided government looks surreal because certain aberrations could not be avoided in the new republic's constitution. As with Hamilton, his deployment of monstrousness is intentional and reflects conceptual precision. For example, the new U.S. government is founded federally, derives its powers nationally, has competing federal and national legislatures, operates mostly nationally, though not exclusively so, and has both a nationally and a federally elected executive, who for his part appoints federally confirmed lifetime judges. Madison (2015, F39) sums this up with a monstrous understatement of the imperfection: "the national countenance of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan."

Now, the most contentious political issue at the end of the eighteenth century was abolition, which had already marched through northern states in a hodgepodge manner, and would continue to do so through to the Civil War: Pennsylvania in 1780, Massachusetts and the rest of New England starting in 1783, all new states north of the Ohio River in 1787, New Jersey in 1804, New York in 1828, etc. Like many of the

Founders, Hamilton had reason to expect, through a combination of sociopolitical and economic forces, that abolition would prevail at the national level due to the eclipse of power in the South by the demographically, commercially, and industrially expansive North. This is a big reason why, at the end of *The Federalist Papers* in the section devoted to the judiciary, Hamilton (2015, F80) argues that the central government ought to maintain absolute authority in any conflict that affects all citizens: "What, for instance, would avail restrictions on the authority of the State legislatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance of them? The States, by the plan of the convention, are prohibited from doing a variety of things, some of which are incompatible with the interests of the Union, and others with the principles of good government." His argument sounds technical, but the state legislatures in his crosshairs are especially those that held out in defense of slavery.

According to Hamilton, then, those who defend the sovereignty of the states and see hydras everywhere in the Constitution of 1787 are themselves the true hydra, i.e., the hydra threatening the Union under the pretext of the independence of the state legislatures. At decisive moments and regarding serious issues, his idea is to have national power cut that hydra's throats. Tariffs (F30–36), the executive (F67–77), and the judiciary (F78–85) will contribute money, force, and constitutional authority to the cause of the national legislature against that hydra: "If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a government being coextensive with its legislative, may be ranked among the number. The mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws, decides the question. Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed" (Hamilton 2015, F80).

The metaphor of monstrous disfiguration shared by the Founders has both Miltonian and Cervantine configurations: (1) Hamilton sees the dramatic, legalistic struggle for the future of the U.S. evolving according to the abolition of slavery against the will of the hydra of specific state legislatures; (2) Madison sees that same future hinging on the nation's own disfiguration created by the awkward balance between provincial power and that of the central government.

Moreover, their respective idioms and tones reveal the nature of the rival parties involved in the Founding. A southerner, Madison is more ambivalent and brooding than his northern abolitionist counterparts. Like Hamilton, he notes (2015, F39) the epic conflict between the national government and the states: "In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." But Madison (2015, F39) considers that the state legislatures have been sacrificed at the altar of final national judicial authority: "It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact." Six essays later, Madison (2015, F45) yields again with a heavy voice, noting that it remains to be seen what will have been gained in exchange for the sacrifice of the freedom of the thirteen independent republics:

> Were the plan of the convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would be, Reject the plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public happiness, it would be, Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter. How far the sacrifice is necessary, has been shown. How far the unsacrificed residue will be endangered, is the question before us.

The Federalist Papers are no doubt a sacred document. The root of the word sacrifice occurs 42 times, Madison using the term four times in one paragraph in F45, and in one case via the excruciatingly rare term "unsacrificed." Such is the southern perspective.

For his part, Hamilton (2015, F78-85) accepts Madison's sacrifice and starts a clock against the notion that state legislatures will be permitted to resist the national judiciary forever. The concession by Hamilton (2015, F85), admitting that the Constitution is an "imperfect thing," is important but always provisional, both formally because the new document admits amendments and socio-politically because the northern majority will now grow and impose its will. That is, at least regarding the abolition of slavery, the Founders believed the hydra of the states would die in a few decades (see Hamilton 2015, F6; Madison 2015, F38, F42).

Fig. 2: Portraits of Madison by Vanderlyn (1816) and Hamilton by Trumbull (1792)

But what of other yet unimagined hydras after that? The institutional bounty of the sacrifice of the states consists of the Constitution's other brakes on democracy, especially the Senate, that archaic relic of the patricians of Rome. This is the essence of the institutional trade-off between competing interests at the Founding. In sociopolitical terms, Hamilton and Madison, and their respective constituencies, are merging but also already trading places in *The Federalist Papers*. Like Don Quijote, Virginia is on the decline, and like Sancho Panza, New York is on the rise. Paraphrasing Tocqueville, demography is destiny in a democracy. The eclipse of the southern aristocracy by the northern bourgeoisie is inevitable. Political power from the North is entering its golden age as the sun sets on the remnants of a landed gentry in the South. Hamilton perhaps more than anyone knows this, and he is duplicitous about it in several of his contributions to *The Federalist Papers*. It is no secret that the North will have the army, the votes, the tariffs, the presidency, the judiciary, and that in the end it will also gain control of the two chambers of the national legislature. This is also to say, however, that already a new hydra grows in the North.

With that next hydra in mind, Madison has indeed gained something for his sacrifice (cf. Hunahpú and Xbalanqué in the *Popol Vuh*). Like every great founder (see Ceaser 2021), Madison has looked both deep into the human soul and far into the future, and he has perceived that it will always be necessary to resurrect the concept of liberty in order to weather the tyranny of the majority. In the short term, Americans will abolish the barbarity of race-based slavery one way or another. In theory, the 1787 Constitution put mechanisms in motion to ensure that happened. From a longer-term perspective, however, tyranny assumes many

guises. In Ayn Rand's (1964, p. 126) words: "Racism is the lowest, most crudely primitive form of collectivism." New forms of tyranny will be far more sophisticated than chattel slavery or even racism. One of Tocqueville's greatest insights is that subsequent tyrannies are potentially more sinister because they will arrive under the auspices of democracy. He and his French compatriots experienced firsthand the nightmare of a modern imperial and militarized democracy (see DA 2.3.18–26, 2.4.1–8). Circa 1787, the U.S. legislature was expected to solve the slavery problem; going forward, however, tools will always be needed to protect against even the best of all possible mobs. As Madison (2015, F55) put it: "Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob." There will arise mobs motivated by causes we have yet to imagine, and there will be mobs that we can never hope to understand. Even the most angelic of mobs will be driven mad by confidence in its own perfections.

Anticipating this, what Madison wins and Hamilton grants in the form of the Senate is geographic, moderating, and elitist representation at the cost of demographic, emotive, and bourgeois representation. That is, he wins an asymmetrical provincial mechanism to defend liberty against the urban excesses of equality. Hamilton (2015, F60) did not mince words; he saw that his enemies held the Senate:

> In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land, where the rules of an equal representation obtain, the landed interest must, upon the whole, preponderate in the government. As long as this interest prevails in most of the State legislatures, so long it must maintain a correspondent superiority in the national Senate, which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities of those assemblies. It cannot therefore be presumed, that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class will ever be a favorite object of this branch of the federal legislature.

But to his credit, Hamilton also saw longer-term benefits in the same governing principle that impeded him. He grasped the risk of unforeseen outbreaks of fanaticism. Jay (2015, F64) summarizes this view when discussing the Senate: "They who have turned their attention to the affairs of men, must have perceived that there are tides in them; tides very irregular in their duration, strength, and direction, and seldom found to run twice exactly in the same manner or measure" (see Ortega y Gasset 2010; Hoffer 1951; cf. Cervantes 1998, 2.25–27). Today's anti-racists commit the "genetic fallacy" when they denigrate institutions or ideas useful against tyranny on the grounds that they originated in defense of rebellious southern slave states. By contrast, both Jay and Hamilton had embraced the broader utility of the Senate before the Constitution was even ratified.

Throughout DA, Tocqueville echoes the dialectic between Madison and Hamilton. Favoring Madison, Tocqueville grasps the monstrous imperfections and ambivalences embedded in the American political experiment. His honesty about democracy's flaws and his consistent—if not insurmountable—warnings about its future risks undergird his realism. He understands that the South is the paradox of one group's freedom to enslave another, but he also sees that the North is an irresistible egalitarian force that promises its own tyrannical dangers. However, he maintains that American intellectuals—mostly liberal lawyers, many from the South—have built a natural constitutional bridge that will restrain both slavery and populist imperialism.

But Tocqueville also agrees with Hamilton that a social revolution is inevitable, that the logic of equality will overtake the monstrous right to own slaves still defended by the state legislatures (see F35, F80). The arch indication of this is his description (DA 1.2.10) of the two banks of the Ohio River at the end of DA1. The bustle on the northern bank reflects the utilitarian logic of abolition. DA's longest chapter foregrounds this *costumbrista* sketch, which for its part evinces Adam Smith's (1776, 1.8) thesis that slavery would be made obsolete by the efficiency of the labor market: "It appears, accordingly, from the experience of all ages and nations, I believe, that the work done by free men comes cheaper in the end than the work performed by slaves." But Tocqueville's genre is also the moral essay in the tradition of Montaigne. Hence, in the climactic chapter of DA2, he asserts (DA 2.3.18n3) that to its great shame and without such a free labor market, the South can consider itself neither democratic nor honorable: "Here, I am referring to Americans who live

in regions where slavery does not exist. These are the only ones who can present the complete picture of a democratic society."

Similarly, in the final chapter of DA1, Tocqueville forces readers to face the political reforms that remain to be carried out. Classical liberalism implies continued expansion of the franchise; although not immediately, its irresistible drive will incorporate women, Indians, blacks, and Hispanics. The process also implies a transfer of power, that is, the eventual sacrifice of the sociopolitical authority of the white male aristocracy to the benefit of the motley masses. Hence the importance in DA of pedagogy to preserve and advance the art of democratic governance. For democracy to work—that is, for the franchise to spread without society devolving into one of its majoritarian nightmares (see DA 2.4.1-8)—citizens and readers must be able to recognize and apply the political principles of republican democracy. Ergo, Tocqueville's emphasis in DA on the habits and responsibilities that accompany a range of self-governing principles, institutions, and activities, such as municipal practices, trials by jury, free markets, associations, churches, corporations, migrations, freedoms of the press, religion, assembly, etc.

Nevertheless, Tocqueville also grasps Madison's logic at the heart of *Federalist* 51 where the Virginian defends the isolated spirit and self-esteem of an aristocratic notion of liberty inherited from the Middle Ages (see Liggio 1990). In the future, when the principle of equality triumphs and becomes the dominant mode of society, there will be even greater need to resist the egalitarian urge to confound individual freedom. Thus, America must cultivate a natural aristocracy of merchants, industrialists, investors, artists, adventurers, etc. Tocqueville's most optimistic thesis in DA is that the experience of self-governance promotes freedom among a democratic populace and allows people to develop their own individual responsibilities, skills, plans, and even quirky personal characteristics, all of which might prove necessary to check populist tyranny.

DON QUIJOTE AND SANCHO'S DIALOGICAL REVOLUTION

Fig. 3: Gustave Doré, *Don Quijote 1,8* (1863)

In a letter to his friend Gustave de Beaumont on March 21, 1838, that is, as he was putting the final touches on DA2, Tocqueville (1861) describes himself as an aristocrat alone in a vulgar world already under the sway of bourgeois masses. He uses a precise literary analogy to describe how a recent brush with Plutarch

has affected him: "This reading has captivated my imagination to such an extent, that I sometimes fear that I shall go mad, like a second Don Quixote. My head is crammed full of heroics which are by no means suited to the present day; and life seems very flat when I wake from my dreams." A month later, on April 22, still working on DA2, Tocqueville wrote another letter to his friend in which he cited seven books on his desk: "You would laugh to see the odd heterogeneous pile of books on my table, almost all of which I have devoured within the last four months: Rabelais, Plutarch, the Koran, Cervantes, Machiavelli, Fontenelle, St. Evremont, &c. &c. I have put all this pell-mell, and without any arrangement, into my head."

For readers familiar with *Don Quijote* (Cervantes 1998; hereafter DQ), in addition to his two letters to Beaumont, Tocqueville alludes to the novel at three key points in DA: (1) he cites the Inquisition as an example of the repression of freedom of thought (DA 1.2.7); (2) he attributes a shift in relations between servants and masters as a social effect of the new democratic spirit (DA 2.3.5); (3) he expresses his theory of cultural formation as a function of what we would today call "cognitive dissonance" experienced by two castes of people, and he offers as one of its consequences the astonishing transformation of aristocratic honor into democratic patriotism (DA 2.3.18).

It's not as if France did not have literary, philosophical, and historical models for thinking about the decline of the aristocracy—Rabelais is also on Tocqueville's table, and he evokes Montaigne, Corneille, Pascal, Descartes, Rousseau, and the history of Louis XIV in key passages of DA. He relies on a Francocentric explanation when he notes that the term *patrie,* "fatherland," dates from the sixteenth century. The body of evidence, however, points to Cervantes as the main source for Tocqueville's liberal characterizations of society and politics in DA2. Aside from the hidalgo's obvious, personal psychological appeal for a French count after 1789, DQ's international success made it a logical creative point of reference for Tocqueville's universal and dystopian turns in DA2. Specifically, DA 2.3.18 remains to my mind one of the greatest essays ever written about DQ, interpreting the first modern novel as nothing short of an early articulation of liberal and romantic perspectives on politics.

Two decades ago, Aurelian Craiutu (2005, p. 609) described Tocqueville as a "modern Don Quixote," arguing that history's most important theorist of democracy projected himself onto Don Quijote in sentimental fashion due to his immoderate nostalgia for the fading aristocracy. But how does Cervantes's novel structure DA's political theory? Readers should recall that Don Quijote is intimately associated with Hercules, the great slayer of mythical hydras and the classical hero most associated with Spain.

The liberal and romantic approach to DQ has not been popular of late. One of the few to consider this approach has been Mario Vargas Llosa (2005). The last Latin American Boom novelist sensed in DQ a bourgeois critique of authoritarianism. By his reading, the merchant class approves of DQ because it is nostalgic for a strong nobility that might resist an expansive, centrist monarchy. Tocqueville is, I think, even more precise, more structural. The French icon of classical liberalism read Cervantes's novel as a projection of the triangular and dialogical principles of political theorists from Montesquieu to Polybius. This, then, allowed him to read the hidalgo as the incarnation of a liberal mechanism for decoupling the dangerous alliance between a tyrant and the masses.

The grandfather of the Latin American Boom was also of the liberal persuasion. Jorge Luis Borges (2001, vol. 2, p. 353) was asked in an interview in the summer of 1945, for example, what he was writing. He replied: "For the remote and troublesome future, a long narrative or short novel, which will be entitled *The Congress* and which will reconcile (at present I cannot be more explicit) the habits of Whitman and those of Kafka." Borges has gradually emerged as one of a handful of liberal rebels in the modern Hispanic world. This is a more sophisticated truism than many recognize. Here, for example, reconciling the habits of Whitman (a saccharine apologist for democracy's egalitarian steamroller) and Kafka (a melancholy skeptic of democracy's torturous conformity), Borges signals the agonizing quest to conjugate equality and freedom, i.e., the very goal of modern Western jurisprudence according to *The Federalist Papers* and *Democracy in America*. In "El Congreso," Borges (1989) goes a step further by insisting that the history of the extension of the franchise is in fact the history of humanity.

Like Borges, Tocqueville uses literary concepts to comment on the evolution and practice of parliamentary politics, alluding to DQ as a way of understanding not only the peculiar social circumstances of the U.S. but also the philosophy of classical liberalism. It is as if he decided to write for two types of audience, the one historical and legalistic, the other novelistic and visionary. Reviewing the technical aspects of *The Federalist Papers* in DA1, Tocqueville addresses ministers, liberal lawyers, and constitutional theorists; deploying DQ in DA2, he pivots to address continental philosophers, enlightened aristocrats, and modern sociologists.

There are exceptions—for example, its dystopian futuristic denouement in the manner of Huxley or Orwell—but DA2 consists mostly of Tocqueville's musings on the metamorphosis of the old European aristocracy into the new American industrial class and the parallel transformation of the caste of serfs into the modern working class. These social shifts accompany the transfer of political power from the leaders who dominated ancient and medieval times to the masses in control of modern democracies. In the more imaginative context of DA2, specific jurisprudential structures fade away; likewise, in DQ2, the Kingdom of Barataria and "The Constitutions of the Great Governor Sancho Panza" muddle positive and negative examples of governance (see DQ 2.45-51). From a liberal perspective, however, the squire's virtue lies in his attempt to rule in DQ2 according to the textual legacy of his master. Likewise, what matters in DA2 is the pedagogical transmission of virtues between successive generations and castes. In the early seventeenth century, Cervantes foresees a mode of mass rule whereby a man akin to Sancho Panza will rise to the helm of a transatlantic superstate. Tocqueville then lives that event.

Fig. 4: John Gilbert, *Don Sancho Panza, Governor of Barataria* (1875)

Let us review DA's three most explicit allusions to Cervantes's novel:

(a) In the chapter entitled "The Majority in the United States Is All-Powerful and the Consequences of That," under the subtitle "The Power Exercised by the Majority in America over Thought," Tocqueville (DA 1.2.7) insinuates that his project bulwarks freedom of conscience, except now the struggle is more serious and takes place at scale:

> The Inquisition was never able to stop the circulation in Spain of books hostile to the religion of the majority. The power of the majority in the United States has had greater success than that by re-

> moving even the thought of publishing such books. You come across skeptics in America but skepticism cannot find an outlet for its views (see DQ 1.6-7, 2.63).

This metaphorical use of censorship by the Spanish Inquisition allows Tocqueville to assert what is arguably his most impressively counterintuitive axiom: democracy legally protects freedom of conscience while sociologically repressing it. The extreme social conformity imposed by equality means that the more equal a nation becomes, the more important it is to protect freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press.

(b) Five years later in DA2, in the chapter entitled "How Democracy Modifies the Relations that Exist Between Servant and Master," Tocqueville (DA 2.3.5) underscores that "bizarre muddling of two lives" which must be negotiated in the transition from medieval feudalism to modern capitalism:

> We have never seen societies with such equality of social conditions that neither rich nor poor exist and, consequently, neither masters or servants. Democracy does not prevent the existence of these two classes of men but it changes their attitudes and modifies their relationships … They recede together from our view and daily slip into the darkness of the past, together with the society which engendered them. Equality of social conditions turns servants and masters into new beings and establishes a new relationship between them.

Examining the shift from aristocracy to democracy, Tocqueville (Ibid.) saw the binary relationship at the core of DQ as a point of reference for a new political theory:

> In aristocratic nations the master comes, therefore, to view his servants as an inferior and secondary part of himself. He often concerns himself with their fate through a final effort of selfishness. From where they stand, servants are not so far from seeing themselves in the same light and sometimes adopt an identity from their master to such an extent that they end up as his appendage in their own eyes, as in his.

Echoing the struggle between Don Quijote and Sancho Panza in DQ 2.60, Tocqueville (Ibid.) notes the new volatile reality of compensated employment in lieu of faithful service:

> At any moment, the servant may become a master, and he has the ambition to do so; the servant is, therefore, no different from the master. Why, therefore, has the latter the right to give orders and what forces the former to obey? A temporary and freely made agreement. They are not inferior to one another by nature; they become so temporarily only by contract. Within the terms of this contract, one is servant, one is master; beyond that they are two citizens, two men … Already law and, in part, public opinion are declaring the end to any natural and permanent inferiority between servant and master. But this newly founded faith has not yet seeped into the latter's mind, or rather his heart rejects it. In the secret recesses of his mind, the master still considers that he belongs to a special and superior species but dares not say so; with a shudder he allows himself to be drawn down to the same level.

According to Tocqueville (Ibid.), the end of the master's quixotic isolation from the servant class coincides with the rise of revolutionary social conditions at the end of the eighteenth century:

> But in the transition between these two conditions almost always a turning point occurs when men's minds hesitate between the aristocratic notion of subjection and the democratic one of obedience. At that point, obedience loses its moral basis in the eyes of the man who obeys; he stops

> treating it as some sort of divine obligation and he does not yet see it in its purely human light; it is in his yes neither holy nor fair; he submits to it as he would to a degrading though useful condition.

Even Tocqueville's attention to the abject nature of the "soul of a lackey" recalls the role of Tosilos in DQ 2.56.

(c) Tocqueville's third allusion to DQ is the most important for his overarching thesis. In the longest of the chapters in the 1840 volume—"Honor in the United States and in Democratic Societies" (DA 2.3.18)—he explains that the collapse of differences among the citizens of a democracy erodes the aristocratic concept of honor in the Ancien Régime and transduces it into the patriotism of the modern nation state. The new sociopolitical meaning that Tocqueville assigns to DQ in DA2 allows democracy's greatest theorist to project an image of himself as a modern hidalgo, exactly as he had represented himself in his two letters to Beaumont in 1838 (see Craiutu 2005). Don Quijote represents liberal salvation for the rebellious aristocratic animus because at the end of the day he marshals liberty in response to equality. In similar fashion, the aristocrat's modern role can now be in the service of his nation and he can also be an antidote to the dangers of pure democracy. To be allowed to assume this new role, however, he must learn to kill what was once his own hydra, a hydra he had favored according to his now antiquated form of aristocratic honor.

Now let us consider some of the most specific ways Tocqueville deploys *Don Quijote*. Throughout his novel, Cervantes marks the inevitable absurdity of different codes of behavior for knights and commoners (DQ 1.8, 1.15, 2.14, 2.52, 2.56, *passim*). The hidalgo is distinguished by his confusing, archaic language and his random explosions of violence toward other characters. In sum, he embodies the strange values of an outmoded caste devoted to warfare. For Tocqueville, this is what makes the hidalgo a symbol of the fallen aristocrat who remains incompatible with modern society.

Don Quijote also serves the most important theorist of modern democracy as the prime example of his theory of sociocultural formation. The aristocrat is a subspecies of humanity whose unique origins, attitudes, and behaviors distinguish him from the masses:

> Within the vast community of mankind, narrower associations have been formed and called nations within which still smaller groups have assumed the name of classes or castes. Each of these associations represents, as it were, a particular species of the human race and, although no different essentially from the mass of men, stands to some extent apart with needs of its own. These are special needs which alter, to some degree and in certain countries, the way of looking at human behavior and the value attached to it (DA 2.3.18).

Tocqueville (Ibid.) also grounds his theoretical-novelistic (*costumbrista*) vision of the transformative power of the American honor code in the dialogical contrast between Don Quijote and Sancho Panza:

> Mankind has the universal and permanent interest that men should not kill one another, yet a nation or class might, in special instances, adopt the peculiar and temporary interest of excusing or even honoring homicide. Honor is nothing but this particular rule founded on a particular state of affairs, by means of which a nation or class allots praise of blame. Nothing is a greater waste of effort for the human mind than an abstraction. So, I hasten on to reveal the facts. An illustration will make my meaning clear. I shall choose the most extraordinary example of honor that has ever been seen on this earth and the one we know best: that aristocratic honor residing at the heart of feudal society.

Anticipating Tocqueville's reference to the lowly Tosilos, the caste distinction echoed by a nobleman's right to vengeance drives the attempted homicide committed by the mad knight in DQ 1.9, as well as his squire's subsequent use of the word *omecillo* in DQ 1.10 (see Byrne 2012, pp. 84-85). Of course, Don Quijote consid-

ers himself above any law against murder, and it is in this particular light that we can see how Tocqueville (DA 2.3.18) counts among history's greatest interpreters of the sociological significance of Cervantes's novel:

> When these distinct opinions arose, the nobility formed a separate body within the nation, which it dominated from the inaccessible heights to which it had withdrawn. To sustain this special position which constituted its strength, it not only required political privileges but needed rules of right and wrong tailored for its own use. That some particular virtue or vice belonged to the nobility rather than to commoners, that such and such an action was neutral when it affected only a peasant and punishable when it had to do with a feudal lord, these were what were often arbitrary matters. But whether honor or shame should attach to a man's actions according to his social status, that was the result of the very constitution of an aristocratic society.

On multiple occasions, Tocqueville also describes and explains Don Quijote's insanity better than any modern psychologist or literary critic:

> In certain instances, feudal honor insisted on revenge and condemned any forgiveness of insults; in others, it loftily ordered men to rein themselves in and to forget their own desires. It did not make human kindness or gentleness its general rule but praised generosity; it valued liberality more than charity; it allowed men to grow rich from gambling or war but not from work; it preferred great crimes to small earnings. Greed was less a source of disgust than concupiscence; it often sanctioned violence while it always viewed cunning and treachery as contemptable. These strange ideas did not solely arise from the whim of those who invented them (Ibid.).

Reading Tocqueville, Don Quijote's random outbreaks of madness recover the aura of their caste, that is, they reflect the explosive volition that is the essence of the noble character:

> Such a class of men is not afraid to upset the natural order of conscience by placing those virtues before all others. It may even be easy to imagine that they will raise certain bold and brilliant vices above virtues which are quiet and unpretentious. To some extent such a class is hemmed in by its social condition to adopt such principles. Noblemen of the Middle Ages reckoned military valor as the greatest of all virtues and one which pushed many of those virtues aside. Feudal aristocracy was born of warfare and for warfare. Its power had been founded by arms and arms maintained it. Nothing, therefore, was more necessary than military courage; it was natural that such courage was glorified above all other virtues (Ibid.).

Likewise, Tocqueville (Ibid.) helps us appreciate how a range of Don Quijote's odd behaviors stem directly from the sociopolitical conditions of medieval Iberia:

> That a man should look upon a blow on the cheek as a great insult and should feel obliged to kill in single combat the person who has struck him so lightly is an arbitrary rule; but that a nobleman should not peacefully tolerate an insult and would be dishonored if he allowed himself to be struck without fighting back, that was the result of the very principles and needs of a military aristocracy.[2]

In the shadow of Don Quijote's glory, Cervantes forces readers to consider the matter of Sancho's salary (DQ 2.7, 2.28, 2.71; see Johnson 2000). This occurs in concert with the novel's consistent bourgeois advice against leisure (DQ 1.1, 2.16, 2.70). Tocqueville's (DA 2.3.18) use of Cervantes echoes this same mangled transfer of values from old aristocrats to new materialistic men:

> "Amidst these half-obliterated notions of some exotic honor, some new opinions appear on the scene to form what might be termed the American honor of our time;" … "Americans make an equally arbitrary classification of men's vices. Certain tendencies which appear condemned by common sense and the universal conscience of mankind are in agreement with particular and temporary needs of the American community which blames them only feebly and sometimes praises them; I shall cite particularly the love of money and the secondary tendencies connected to it;" … "The American calls noble and praiseworthy that ambition which our medieval ancestors used to describe as slavish greed, just as he considers as blind and barbarous frenzy that burning desire for conquest and that warlike spirit which hurled them daily into new battles;" … "In a democratic society such as that of the United States, where fortunes are small and insecure, everyone works and work opens all doors; this has turned honor inside out and set it against idleness. In America I have sometimes met some rich young men, temperamentally hostile to any difficult exertions, who were obliged to adopt a profession. Their nature and fortune allowed them to stay idle, public opinion forbade it and its imperious order had to be obeyed" (see Lukács 1971).

Finally, Tocqueville (DA 2.3.18) draws heavily on Cervantes's contrasts between the knight and his squire in the double duels of DQ 2.14:

> In aristocratic countries, identical codes of honor are only ever accepted by a few men who are often limited in number and always separated from the rest of their fellow citizens. Honor, in the minds of such men, is associated and identified with the very conception of their own distinctiveness. It is, in their eyes, the peculiar trait of the face they present to the world. They apply its various rules with the enthusiasm of personal involvement and, if I may be permitted the expression, they are passionate about complying with its dictates. The truth of this becomes clear on reading the medieval law books dealing with trial by combat. There we find that the nobles were bound to use lance and sword in their quarrels whereas peasants used sticks, 'seeing as,' state the old law books, 'peasants have no honor.' That did not mean, as may be imagined today, that these men were to be despised but simply that their actions were not judged by the same rules as the aristocracy. The first and astonishing fact is that, when honor has so powerful a place, its rules are generally very peculiar, so that men appeared to be the more prepared to obey these rules, the further they appear to depart from common sense. From this, some people have drawn the conclusion that honor derived its strength precisely because it was extravagant.

QUIXOTIC LIBERALISM

Keeping in mind DA's dependence on DQ, we better understand the sociopolitical meaning of the central trio of texts Tocqueville signals in his letter to Beaumont. *The Prince*, *Don Quijote*, and the *Quran* press Don Quijote into a solitary struggle against the sinister alliance between Machiavelli's calculating tyrant and Muhammed's impassioned masses. This locates modern individualism at the intersection of our social and political selves. Historically speaking, in the twilight of the medieval world, a ghostly aristocrat lays a feeble claim to his privileges. Tocqueville (DA 1.1.5) reminds us that the French Revolution went to such extremes precisely because the upper estates—the clergy and the aristocracy—couldn't resist the momentous accord between the tyrant and the mob:

> "I think that provincial institutions are useful to all nations but they are never more needed than in a society which is democratic. In an aristocracy, one can always be sure that a certain degree of order will be maintained in freedom. The ruling class has much to lose and, therefore, order is a main concern for them. Equally, one can say that, in an aristocracy, the nation is sheltered from the excesses of tyranny because organized forces exist ready to resist a despot. A democracy with-

> out provincial institutions has no guarantee against such ills;" … "Those who fear anarchy and those who are afraid of absolute power should, therefore, share the desire for a gradual development of provincial liberties. Moreover, I am convinced that no nations are more liable to fall beneath the yoke of administrative centralization than those with a democratic social order;" … "The Revolution announced itself as opposed both to royalty and to provincial institutions. It directed its hatred indiscriminately against all that had gone before, both absolute power and those elements which could mitigate such power. It was simultaneously republican and centralizing" (see Burke 2003; Dawson 2015).

Ultimately, Tocqueville's quixotic liberalism exhibits maximum anxiety regarding that pact deemed so dangerous by Polybius (1889, 6.11-18), the one put into motion by Caesar and then resurrected by Louis XIV and Napoleon. By the nineteenth century, the situation is dire. A tyrant all too easily becomes a warmongering dictator at the head of a mass movement. More ominous still, the new despot is an unwitting player, a tiny rider atop an elephant stampeding into the vacuum of a decaying sociopolitical order: "Now men engage in great battles and, as soon as they have a free path before them, they rush upon the capital so as to end the war with a single blow. Napoleon is said to have discovered this new tactic but it did not depend upon one man, whoever he might be to create this idea. Napoleon's method of conducting a war was suggested to him by the social conditions of his day and succeeded because it was wonderfully suited to those conditions and he was the first man to put it into practice. Napoleon is the first man to have traveled at the head of an army from capital to capital along a route opened before him by the ruins of feudal society" (DA 2.3.25). "Napoleon should be neither praised nor blamed for having concentrated almost the whole administrative power in his own hands for, after the sudden disappearance of the nobility and the upper levels of the middle class, these powers devolved upon him automatically; it would have been almost as difficult to reject as to accept them" (DA 2.4.4; see Hoffer 1951; Dawson 2015; cf. Derrida 1991).

Two letters to Beaumont and three explicit allusions to DQ in his magnum opus (DA 1.2.7, 2.3.5, 2.3.18) reveal that Tocqueville was reading Cervantes's novel with philosophical precision. The hidalgo embodies that super minority who must be protected according to Madison in *Federalist* 51. This not only accords with the liberal mantra of the medieval aristocracy as the origin of modern individual rights; it asserts that a new variation of that aristocracy—perhaps fallen or modified, yet from now on tenuous and marginalized—are those few remaining citizens with enough self-esteem to reject democracy's tyrannical inclinations. Tocqueville (DA 1.2.9) understands that the world now belongs to Sancho, but he hopes the squire-governor can learn something from the knight-errant, irrespective of the latter's incoherence. The only way left now to preserve liberty is to moderate the rebellion of the masses:

> I think that if we fail to introduce and gradually set up democratic institutions in France, and that if we abandon the attempt to inspire all citizens with the ideas and feelings which first of all prepare them for freedom and consequently allow them to enjoy it, there will be no independence for anyone, neither for the middle classes, nor for the nobility, nor the poor, nor the wealthy, but only an equal tyranny for all; and I foresee that if we fail to establish among us the peaceful authority of the majority in time, sooner or later we shall arrive at the *boundless* power of one man.

Don Quijote, let us recall, insists that honor be esteemed on par with liberty: "por la libertad así como por la honra se puede y debe aventurar la vida" (for liberty, as well as for honor, one can and should risk one's life; Cervantes 1998, 2.58). Think of it this way: the last knight still defends his honor and votes against sacrificing liberty in order to satisfy the majority. This solitary tragic individual who still holds out against the murderous mob is surely among the major meanings attributed to Cervantes's novel by Borges (1956) in "Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote."[3]

Tocqueville's grasp of Cervantes is more than a matter of the novel influencing the greatest political theorist of modern democracy. In DA political science and the origins of sociology coopt the study of litera-

ture. DQ is undoubtedly a fallen, tragic figure, in all the sentimental, aesthetic, and poetic senses attributed to him by the Schlegel brothers, Richter, Schelling, Heine, Chateaubriand, or Hugo. But it is Tocqueville who lets us see that the deepest reason for the Romantic appreciation of DQ is Cervantes's anticipation of the sociopolitical contours of modern democracy. Anthony Close, Peter Russell, Leo Spitzer, Erich Auerbach, and others have charged that the romantic vision of DQ is a clumsy anachronism. Failing to appreciate the profound influence of Cervantes's novel on Tocqueville, and hence on modern political thought more generally (see Schmitt 1949), such critics can be forgiven for seeing DQ as either comedic or divine. Tocqueville, however, reminds us of the weighty political issues on display in DQ2. And mine is not a *sui generis* argument. Besides Tocqueville, enlightened and classical liberal thinkers of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, including authors, leaders, and philosophers like Voltaire, Montesquieu, Jefferson, Burke, Adams, Hobbes, Locke, and Bastiat all read DQ as a font of sociopolitical wisdom (see Graf 2021a, pp. 1-13).

Given the importance of DA and given Tocqueville's heavy use of DQ in that book, I now believe that the French theorist is among history's greatest missing links between Cervantes's novel and Romanticism. Anthony Close (1977), who at times mocks their overdetermined readings of the novel, wonders why the Romantics were so attracted to the mad knight. He attributes this to whim on the one hand and Cervantes's artistry on the other. The second point is unassailable, but the first could not be further from the truth. It was not caprice but the historical fact of the French Revolution that made Don Quijote into the precursor of the fallen liberal aristocrat and made Sancho Panza symbolize the rebellious masses flirting with modern dictators.

An equally important aspect of Tocqueville's genius was his grasp of how DQ bridges the troubled waters between Madison and Hamilton. The French theorist argues in DA that any lasting national constitution is an arduous pact between two internal nations, two groups with radically different worldviews, different enough such that they are often like two medieval castes who can't fully understand each other. A handful of authors, such as Donoso Cortés, Ortega y Gasset, and Vargas Llosa have argued that the inspiration for Romanticism was both aesthetic and political (see Schmitt 2005). But it is Tocqueville who best signals the Romantic scope of the first modern novel, which we can also call the first liberal novel. Beginning when a medieval Manchegan knight defeats his Basque rival and then fails against a modern mechanical invention, and climaxing when a man as common as Sancho Panza governs the Isle of Barataria, the novel traces the fall of the aristocracy and the rise of democracy in the same generalized sociopolitical and even economic senses stressed by Tocqueville.[4] Historically, this makes sense. By 1615 early tremors had already been felt in the Ancien Régime in Spain—the Revolt of the *Comuneros* of Castile (1520-22) or the *Alteraciones de Aragón* (1591)—and reverberations would continue to be felt 200 years hence in 1776, 1789, 1830, 1848, 1861, 1917, and beyond.[5]

To conclude, I confess to a certain awe at Tocqueville's culturally bivalent achievement, which is far more impressive than it might seem at first glance. By pairing *The Federalist Papers* and *Don Quijote*, he forges a new world epic. In a generic sense, *Democracy in America* already deploys heroes, journeys, enemy tribes, visions, prophecies, and social compacts sanctioned by mutual sacrifices, also known as national compromises or constitutions. All this and liberal political philosophy to boot. But *Democracy in America* is perhaps most epic in the sense of a kind of bequeathed manual which can guide many generations of Americans to come. Two volumes, and such that the most efficient way to grapple with the totality of the work would be to study *The Federalist Papers* as the basis for volume one and *Don Quijote* as the basis for volume two. It is an audacious gesture, a glorious French salute upon exiting the New World. It is brilliant marketing too in terms of Tocqueville's potential readers. It is a kind of double map, a map for two regions, North and South, two cultures, Anglo and Hispanic; two constitutions which are destined, even bound to converge with one another. Bidding us farewell, he conducts a final diplomatic ceremony, which we might paraphrase as follows: "Federalism and individual rights, Anglos you do these well, but you should study Cervantes because you have a blind spot regarding how to overcome race and caste. Novels and collective rights, Hispanics you do these well, but you should study Madison, because you have a blind spot regarding how to activate individualism and provincial independence. *Au revoir et bonne chance*."

NOTES

1. This essay supplements my book *Anatomy of Liberty in Don Quijote de la Mancha*, where I relate Cervantes to such classical liberals as Locke, Hobbes, Voltaire, Hume, Jefferson, and Bastiat. Like other Cervantes scholars, my blind spot has been Tocqueville, who is more subtle than his bourgeois contemporary. Specifically, the difference between Bastiat—whose reframing of the Isle of Barataria repudiates Don Quijote and vindicates Sancho—and Tocqueville—who is ever nostalgic for the hidalgo and worries about the squire's principles—reflects perspectives on opposite sides of the barricades during the June Days uprising of 1848. Bastiat embraced revolt in the streets of Paris; Tocqueville backed General Cavaignac's counterrevolutionary measures.
2. The ability of the Castilian nobility to field armies well into the fifteenth century represented a serious obstacle to late-medieval attempts at royal authoritarianism in Spain (see Gómez 2021).
3. One might legitimately ask why Ortega (2010 [1929]) did not mention Tocqueville in *La rebelión de las masas*. This might owe to indignant nationalism. The Spanish-American War of 1898 marked at least two generations of Spanish artists and intellectuals.
4. In his *Tesoro de la lengua* (1611), Sebastián de Covarrubias's definition of the verb *revolver* has political implications for the windmill in DQ 1.8: "es ir con chismerias, y quistiones y a este llamamos rebolvedor, y reboltoso, revuelta, la question: rebolución, alteracion" (to go about spreading rumors and quarrels, and those who do so we call rebels and rebellious, we call the dispute a revolt: a revolution, an alteration).
5. Historians such as José Antonio Maravall (1963) and Stephen Haliczer (1981) have noted the populist parallels between the Revolt of the *Comuneros* (1520-22) and the French Revolution (1789). As for the events of Aragón in 1591, they were a type of counterrevolution in the sense of a regional aristocratic insurrection against the increasingly imperialist Habsburg Crown. Aragón also represented the last resistance offered to the rise of the modern nation state in Iberia by the remnants of the medieval aristocracy.

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Response to Essays in *Cosmos + Taxis* on *Don Quijote de la Mancha*

ERIC-CLIFFORD GRAF

It's an honor to have moved the editors of *Cosmos + Taxis* to invite such creative and eminent scholars to contribute to a volume on liberty in *Don Quijote de la Mancha* (1605/15). I've been asked to pen a few words about each essay, offering my impressions of their arguments and their more salient points. I've also tried to locate those ideas that best challenge my own. We all have biases. Mine are legion. When I write, I fancy I'm articulating significant patterns. In the end, however, we all know it's only through dialogue that we manage a coordinated response to the often-dubious production of human knowledge. Such is the first modern novel's greatest legacy according to everyone from Mikhail Bakhtin to Harold Bloom. Or, if we prefer the symbolism of Miguel de Cervantes or Jorge Luis Borges: only dialogue can free us from our respective labyrinths. Related to Friedrich Hayek's vision of the pretentiousness of the global knowledge required for a planned economy is the blinding nature of isolated knowledge. If we don't check our ideas against others, our individual mistakes will consume us, eventually robbing us of our ability to change course and navigate what's before us (see Javier Cercas's *El punto ciego*, 2016).

(1) "DON QUIXOTE AND THE BOURGEOIS VIRTUES"

The personal approach by Nikolai Wenzel reminds us that we gain insight by assessing our most intimate reactions to great literature (see Stanley Fish's *Is There a Text in This Class?*, 1980). A novel might have an agenda, but if it can't move its readers, any objectives harbored by its author will flounder. Keeping this in mind is an antidote to the academic tendency to reduce literature to a set of camouflaged thesis statements. Wenzel's piece models this remedy.

For instance, when Wenzel confesses to "suffering through the long, dense, repetitive, sometimes boring novel" in order to unearth its "gems of wisdom, historical insight, and humor," he signals the dilemma of contemporary education. We earn the lesson of intellectual humility by working through our incomprehension. But we sacrifice this personal skill and its public good when we opt for five-minute presentations on some website over the slow burn of a big book. Likewise, we gain perspective on our personal and social problems by attending to the complexity of the past. But this takes time, effort, and willpower—i.e., luxuries we lose when we live in the here and now.

Wenzel also indicates relations between the personal and historical trajectories on display in *Don Quijote*; and then he universalizes them. As we age, we experience uncertainty and frustration regarding our places in society.

We end up "old hippies" who "linger" between the past and the present. This tension underwrites a sense that society itself is unmoored, but "this is not a new theme in literature." Indeed, generations prior to Cervantes's masterpiece, Fernando de Rojas's *La Celestina* (c.1499) and Diego Hurtado de Mendoza's *La vida de Lazarillo de Tormes* (c.1554) epitomized the early modern paradigm of an aristocracy giving in to unruly servants and serfs.

Wenzel rightly pushes back against the overdetermined aspects of my book, insisting that *Don Quijote* leaves serious questions unanswered. For example, is the marriage contract an individual or social decision? That institution's success might hinge on how we think about it. And can noble virtues be acquired or must they be inherited? Wenzel asserts that "the mere asking of the question in 1605 Spain was itself an act of bourgeois rebellion." The absence of Viedma's entrepreneurial brother in "The Captive's Tale" (DQ 1.39–41) now strikes me as a problem that still haunts our own world. A businessman's absence also justifies Wenzel's use of a set of bourgeois virtues to evaluate Cervantes's achievement. From a more overtly political point of view, I most welcomed his precise clarification of Bastiat's vision in 1864 of Don Quijote as an aristocratic menace and Sancho Panza as "the voice of classical liberal economics and liberty." Wedding economic and psychological perspectives, Wenzel also points out that readers enamored of the hidalgo tend not to see that the novel displays both negative and positive "externalities of honor." Similarly, Sancho flits between being a wise judge and a rent-seeker. These are just a few of the ways in which Wenzel's economic vantage reifies what many readers take for granted.

(2) "STRANGE BEDFELLOWS"

Echoing the bounty of Wenzel's reading, David Harper and Félix Muñoz show again why more economists must discuss literature and why more literature specialists must discuss economics. Their essay reminded me of the affinity between Austrian economic theory and novels, which is their shared insistence on the organic complexity of life. I was struck too by the implication that the persistent codependence of economic and moral modes of thinking somehow echoes the simultaneous evolution of group rights and individual rights in the sixteenth century. In other words, the religious and communal sensibilities expressed by Bartolomé de Las Casas and the princely self-interest and dastardly pragmatism advanced by Niccolò Machiavelli have always competed for our attention. We are social individuals, both then and now.

Harper and Muñoz deftly explore the complex social foundations and awkward intellectual implications of what happens when "public-spirited moralists" ("Baptists") and "vested interest groups" ("Bootleggers") form political coalitions. The irony is that all societies do this to some degree. Our only consolation is that recognizing these often-sinister arrangements allows us to evaluate them. We can then decide whether to attend to them or move on to other issues.

As a philological sidebar, this essay's reference to Bartholomew of Lucca, who cites Augustine to describe prostitution as a "sewer in a palace," clarifies Sempronio's phrase "¡Qué imperfición, qué aluañares debaxo de templos pintados!" in Rojas's *La Celestina*. This is one of many details by which Harper and Muñoz unveil the novel form as an exercise in political and economic realism. But they achieve far more than that. They've homed in on one of the most persistent themes in the genre's early evolution. Rojas, Mendoza, and Cervantes wrote against the rise of religious orthodoxy in Renaissance Spain. Indicating this rise, brothels were transformed from sinecures for loyal vassals into diabolical manifestations of moral decay. Such ruptures in social values always disclose hypocrisy, and Harper and Muñoz show how in the later stages of its regulation in Spain prostitution became a matter of cooperation between brothels and a Church that railed against them while also collecting rents as the owner of their premises. This explains why prostitution is a running metaphor for the satirists of Inquisitorial Spain. It also shows that both purity and duplicity are amplified by politics and religious schisms.

As a version of this thesis, we might imagine sixteenth-century Inquisitors and *converso* swineherds participating in a conspiracy to increase the consumption of ham. If you've ever tasted *jamón ibérico*, you'll forgive the treacheries of each group. Harper and Muñoz's analysis of the politics of prostitution is just as

savory. However, since Cervantes makes the deceptions and exploitations of whoring analogous to the actions of government officials in texts like *El coloquio de los perros* or *Rinconete y Cortadillo*, I found Harper and Muñoz's concerns for the intentionality problem and the sin of prolepsis to be needless ingredients in their work.

Indeed, complex thinking about how political power and economic interests interact is the source of an irony that has driven novels from Apuleius to Cervantes to Bolaño. This irony signals how the world really works. Towards that end, Harper and Muñoz apply the precision of economics. They show how morality and regulation in concert are protectionist and will lower costs for certain market participants. Adding another layer of realism, solutions to social problems have consequences unforeseen by most of us. The result can be a situation that's even more corrupt or costly than the original problem. In this case, the Habsburg monarchy (much like modern politicians) pandered to all parties. A combination of strict laws and weak enforcement allowed them to satisfy both moralizing Jesuits and more traditional rent-seeking minions.

From yet another perspective, realism about incentives and behaviors clarifies the nature of debates over the issue of prostitution within the Church itself. Dominicans (following Aquinas) and Jesuits (following Augustine) locked horns over the social costs and benefits of the oldest profession. At what point do we tolerate for the sake of the public good something we deem immoral? At what point does a necessary evil become too evil to be necessary? In the context of such questions, Maritornes represents a special kind of proto-feminist victim. She is perhaps the true Dulcinea. Her ambivalent presence calls for realistic thinking if we want to understand her motives and the deeper meaning of her role at Palomeque's otherwise respectable inn.

(3) "MIGUEL DE CERVANTES AND JUAN DE MARIANA"

Francisco Cabrillo's level-headed assessment of the parallels between the inventor of the modern novel and one of the greatest and most combative of the late scholastics is a tight presentation of how they are mutually informative, including the contrast between their respective personalities: "Cervantes's was adventurous and restless, while Mariana's was much calmer." The economic decline that marked the turn of the seventeenth century looms large as a factor motivating both the first modern novel and the late scholastics. Among the issues related to that economic decline, monetary policy was heavily debated at the time. Same as it ever was. If you make enough war, you're bound to cause a bout of inflation. Cabrillo underscores that from Philip II to John Maynard Keynes, paying for wars with devalued currencies is among the oldest tricks of government.

Cabrillo's is also a refreshingly balanced view of Mariana. Mariana was not an intellectual theorist but, rather, a synthesizer and a powerful voice of political dissent. On the other hand, even at his most controversial, he was pragmatic not dogmatic. For example, in the same treatise that was burned across Europe for its defense of regicide, Mariana endorsed a monarchy's hereditary succession as the best way to avoid "serious alterations and turbulent storms." This contrasts, by the way, with Thomas Jefferson's radical quip that he liked "a little rebellion now and then. It is like a storm in the atmosphere" (Letter to Abigail Adams, 22 February 1787). Also pragmatic, when Mariana defended religious unity, Cabrillo notes that he deployed a "utilitarian" argument along the lines of Adam Smith's case for shared moral sentiment as the basis for civil society. And if vehemently in favour of commerce, Mariana was also mildly mercantilist. Regarding this ambivalence, Cabrillo does well to observe that the Aragonese liberal reformer Joaquín Costa echoed some of Mariana's ideas when arguing for the modernization of Spain after the Spanish-American War.

Finally, although it sounds prosaic, it's essential to recognize that Mariana argued for low taxes and small government. He knew government doesn't produce wealth and is only adept at wasting it. Likewise, he knew inflation harms prosperity by reducing the efficiency of markets and trade, and so there are few policies so pernicious to society as government spending and its reliance on monetary devaluation to pay for it. Voicing these criticisms, Mariana's treatise on the infamous billon coins of Philip III and the Duke of Lerma was placed on the Index of Forbidden Books for nearly two centuries. (I had no idea it was for so

long.) His brief arrest and the attempt to put him on trial indicate royal anxiety about his views. Cabrillo's conclusion signals the tragic relevance of both Mariana's treatises and Cervantes's novels with respect to problems faced everywhere today: "the most worrying thing is that many of them have still not been solved."

(4) "ANOTHER READING OF *DON QUIXOTE*"

Nayeli Riano's contribution exhibits further skepticism regarding the reduction of great literature to thesis statements. Hers is the most philosophically dense of these essays. Almost as an aside, in her third footnote, she spies one of the principal blind spots I had while writing my book. She observes—too politely, I think—that my summation of Unamuno's sense of Cervantes's novel is "not quite correct." Unamuno is reactionary, mystical, and nationalistic; whereas Ortega is modern, rational, and European. In my haste, I subsumed them both under the rubric of modern analogues for Cervantes's quest for national reform. But they aren't the same. Unamuno's efforts to relate the hidalgo to Saint Ignatius of Loyola embody the distinction. While reading Riano's essay, I also looked again at Unamuno's famous drawing of Don Quijote nailed to a tree with Sancho sitting sadly at his side. What about that lance? It looks like Unamuno's *Don Quijote crucificado* might be Longinus. This makes sense; Imperial Spain was sacrificed around 1898. So, I can personally attest that Riano's presentations of Ortega's and Unamuno's views, as well as María Zambrano's dialectical combination of them, are rewarding.



Fig. 1: Miguel de Unamuno, *Don Quijote crucificado* (c.1904)

Ultimately, Riano's piece is a reassessment of the intentionality problem. As proofs of his Erasmian agenda, I remain perhaps too convinced by the "exemplary" tactics of Renaissance fiction and that cryptic, anti-inquisitorial self-portrait by Cervantes in DQ 2.62. I'm also more inclined than Riano to think certain readers who have interpreted the novel before us can be useful. But she reminds us that good fiction is more a matter of art than ideological campaign. I especially liked her distinction between the English tradition of thinking about liberty as a function of "political principles" and the Spanish view of liberty as deriving from a set of "literary and philosophical ideals." This contrast complements my own reading of Tocqueville's modern coupling of *The Federalist Papers* and *Don Quijote* in his epic *Democracy in America*.

(5) "MARGINS OF FREEDOM"

I marvel at Frederick de Armas's musings about how the topic of freedom distributes itself among the Latin *sententiae* of *Don Quijote*'s first Prologue. He shows how my own work barely scratches the surface of what is there. On a personal level, I owe Frederick more than he can ever know. The wisdom of nineteenth-century novels flows like "underground rivers" through this man. His Caribbean and Iberian ancestors would be proud. Regarding the novel itself—whether Cervantes's *sententiae* are thinly veiled or overtly twisted—Frederick reveals its playful thievery as a textual game for the ages. But is this the work of a self-conscious author? Or does it result from the unstable nature of language itself? For example, I tried to use Aesop to help locate Cervantes's meaning, but de Armas reminds us we don't know whether there ever was any such "ugly and deformed slave who gained his freedom and achieved great fame through his stories."

We do know from the *Colloquy of the Dogs* that Cervantes had Aesop in mind around 1605 (see Thomas Jefferson, Query VI). De Armas supplies the crowning detail that the fable "Of the Wolf and the Dog" is the source of that Latin phrase about the worthlessness of gold versus liberty which I highlighted in *Don Quijote*'s first Prologue. There's a modern irony to this system. It suggests that in a free society there can be no complaint by those who feel themselves unjustly rejected by the status quo. On the one hand, freedom is its own reward; on the other hand, no status is free. In this light, de Armas and I practically embody each other's opportunity costs. But there's no horror in this. Today, I'm not so convinced I'll die in the woods; nor do I think Frederick is resigned to Chicago. Besides, we meet at the fence, as it were, or the shore, precisely where we're most useful to each other. A post-colonialist might object, but Frederick always teaches me more than I can him. Even so, I suspect that without ignorant people like me around, he'd be like a colonel without a pen pal.

How has this happened? Simple. We speak the same language(s). Thus, de Armas can wade into the field of political theory—a field I'd like to think I know better than he does but don't—and ask exactly its most important question: "What are the margins of freedom?" He knows—he's older and wiser than me—that just as an economist would say there's no price equilibrium in a marketplace, so there's no political equilibrium in a free society. Such a society is always on the move, always groping about for answers to those "deeply urgent questions" that distinguish wolves from dogs. Moreover, none of us can claim to be all one or the other, even though an aversion to canine slavery (Archilochus and Aesop) is not quite the same thing as an aversion to lupine death (Horace). De Armas's analysis suggests—counterintuitively, it seems—that the first fear drives city states and republics and the second, empires. Does this mean an empire is potentially freer and more egalitarian than a republic? I'll have to watch the *Star Wars* saga again with this in mind, and reread *The Federalist Papers* while I'm at it.

As another example of my need for de Armas's skepticism, this time on a philological level, I'd never considered Leo Spitzer to be an idealist reader of Cervantes. I'd always taken his seminal linguistic analysis of the novel's irony as dismissive of grander schemes. I'll have to rethink Spitzer's point, or else consider that a literary critic is a human being whose opinions change over time. Or does Spitzer's ambivalence imply that Aesop and Horace played the same game? As de Armas notes, Horace fought for the Roman Republic, but his patron helped fold him back into the Roman Empire. Though de Armas doesn't say so outright, there are echoes of the eternal lessons of Northrop Frye here. Winter always implies spring, and vice versa. Perhaps a republic is always potentially an empire, and vice versa (see *Federalist* 10).

The fifth and final misdirection among the *sententiae* in question is the melancholiest. The vacillation between Ovid and Cato in favor of the prior suggests that silence, anonymity, and exile are the downsides of empire. There are intimations of Tocqueville's critique of democracy inhabiting Ovid's idea that whereas security allows friendships to flourish, "if your life becomes clouded you will be alone." One's "desire for more open conversations" often confronts a giant wave of conformity, especially if one's empire is a hyper-democracy in which two rival parties demand juvenile agreement in lieu of freedom of thought and expression. And so, like Cervantes, de Armas leans into melancholy as the outcome of philosophical enquiry. Saturn, that "planet of esoteric knowledge," is also that "most malefic of celestial bodies." And Saturn is an apt sign

for freethinkers who cannot be heard because we are devoured by everyone else's bourgeois satisfaction (see Buñuel's *Menjant garotes*, 1930). A melancholy paradox: when conformity and consumerism displace a people's desire to know, converse, and create, then we've attained maximum freedom and maximum solitude at the same time. At which point, a self-respecting tiger returns to the jungle and a self-respecting cat tends to her garden (see Quiroga, "Juan Darién," 1920 and Voltaire, *Candide,* 1759).

(6) "CERVANTES'S LIBERAL COMEDY"

Brian Brewer presents classical liberalism as an echo of an ethical shift in early modern comedy. The genre moved beyond temporary, grotesque subversions of social hierarchies followed by their often-sadistic restorations, and it began to approach the idea of empathy for marginal characters who were once no more than sources of laughter. Accordingly, what made Cervantes a precursor to eighteenth-century liberal thinkers was his willingness "to invest fundamentally comic characters with a particularity and dignity that his contemporaries typically denied them." Brewer extends the work of such Cervantes scholars as Anthony Close or Laura Gorfkle in order to more fully embrace the modern ideological implication that granting humanity to peripheral people is the essence of social progress. Against the overly technical, economic, and political emphasis of my book as well as the contributions to this volume, Brewer's refreshing point is that literature can improve society by being *literature*—i.e., by showing us that other people are as human as we are, and vice versa.

Brewer pushes beyond an essentially Bakhtinian vision of the modern novel as a combination of high and low elements. He does this by offering examples of how Don Quijote and Sancho Panza are more than stock comedic characters. The old lunatic and the simpleton undergo scatological humiliations, yes, and they invade each other's realms and switch social roles. But what distinguishes Cervantes's humor is that it highlights the convoluted reasoning of individuals who want to repress facts that run counter to their preferences. Don Quijote and Sancho justify their childish and clichéd (mis)readings of reality by way of some very complex mental gymnastics. These must remind us of the cognitive dissonance we all deploy when defending our views come hell or high water. Rather than the medieval slapstick associated with "The Three Stooges," Cervantes pens an anticipation of the tortuous, neurotic musings of *Seinfeld*.

According to Brewer, liberalism acknowledges human fallibility by grasping our complex intellectual efforts to distract ourselves and others from said fallibility. What strikes me about this idea is how it applies to liberalism itself. How naïve are those of us who presume to share this school of thought? Recently, at a rather fancy awards dinner held by an association of Spanish liberals at the Casino de Madrid, the scandalously incomprehensible Gallegan anarcho-capitalist Miguel Anxo Bastos was understood by some present to have complained about what he called "liberalismo de canapé." He seemed to refer to that intellectually satiated form of liberalism which clings to insights about markets and politics while washing its hands of activism. It's easy to decry from afar the manifold fallacies of communists and fascists.

I hope Brewer can laugh about it, but Deirdre McCloskey and Peter Boettke strike me as case studies in how liberal theorists spend a lot of time describing a social order which still decays with unsettling frequency into tyranny, poverty, and death. Nor can I exempt myself from the habit. Indeed, I'd have attended that fancy dinner in Madrid, except that after having made my reservation I was denied a payment option. Thus, I was turned away at the top of the stairs of the Casino de Madrid like a wedding crasher. I downed another Coke Zero in the lobby before limping back to my hotel. At least a friend took a photo of me with the great Javier Milei.

Classical liberals like to think we have superior ideals and that we perceive more than most people do the unintended consequences of political and economic interventionism. But we lack realism about the human animal, and so we tend to disregard the fight to be free. The reason I prefer Niccolò Machiavelli, Alexis de Tocqueville, Carl Schmitt, or René Girard is not because they're exemplary people but, rather, because they offer accurate theories and communicate the fact that moral and social virtues are nice but ultimately insufficient. Modern history is riddled with examples of nations in which liberalism failed: Russia,

Argentina, Cuba, Venezuela, Germany, etc. To observe that such societies lacked liberal principles is mastery of the obvious. The real questions are why and what should be done about it? Thomas Sowell says there are only trade-offs. A slightly more agonizing way of putting this is that all societies require sacrifices. But it's worse than that. The spontaneous order of a liberal society can spontaneously self-destruct. Likewise, though many of us might think of them as happy and humane, there are serious costs to ideas like open borders and elections overseen by the United Nations.

Is literature a tool in this regard? A civilizing mechanism for peaceful coexistence? Brewer suggests so. Perhaps encounters between different people are precisely how what makes us liberal, open-minded human beings emerges. The lowest-ranked nobleman and his peasant neighbor in Baroque Spain, or a member of the middle class and an immigrant in the modern West, must converge, argue, and laugh to get past dehumanizing stereotypes. But this won't be devoid of strife. Conversations between Don Quijote and Sancho are often exercises in justifying points of view that fail to bridge the chasm between them. Other times they devolve into physical aggression. No doubt Brewer would note that these struggles are more complicated than a cream pie to the face. Whereas the rest of the authors here demonstrate the genius of Cervantes's novel, I suspect Brewer hits most on the genius of Cervantes the novelist.

(7) "TOCQUEVILLE'S CERVANTINE FEDERALISM"

As for my own contribution, it's a final epilogue to my meditations on the relation between liberalism and *Don Quijote*, meditations I now close. Along with Brewer's, I hope my piece eases Riano's and Cabrillo's reservations about the degree to which we can consider Cervantes a liberal. Tocqueville, I think, shows us another way around the problem. The parallels and points of contact among the ideas of the School of Salamanca and those of the American Founders, as well as the geopolitical division of the New World between Anglo and Hispanic cultures, have transformed his novel into a liberal manifesto regardless of Cervantes's intentions. Too many important thinkers and actors in the modern West have signaled *Don Quijote* as a book focused on big issues that concerned them and which still concern us today. Arguing that those readers bequeathed to us an oversimplification of the novel is to risk our own form of hubris.

Recognizing Tocqueville's enormous debts to Cervantes brings the greatest political theorist of modern democracy into view as an important missing link between early modern Spain and the Atlantic region that spawned classical liberalism in the nineteenth century. Tocqueville reveals *Don Quijote* as the nadir of an aristocratic conception of liberty which coincided with the dawn of the authoritarian state. But he also signals the need for liberty's resurrection and its renewed defense for the proper practice of democratic federalism. Liberty mobilizes the negative rights of regions and individuals as bulwarks against the massive power of the modern nation state.

The essence of liberalism, as best I can figure, is an attempt at social coordination through triangulation. This involves the constant demolition of monadic, linear thinking, a demolition that occurs when we acknowledge the complexity, contingency, and coarseness of human life. Recent controversies over free speech are not new. The past's complexities have always been erased to make way for utopian programs. Liberal triangulation simply offers a way to grasp the emergence of the modern individual by way of her negational and hence self-affirming conflicts with myriad groups and authorities. The latter can range from a marauding group of Catalan nationalists to the stifling inflationist welfare state of Argentina.

For too many reasons to list here, I also think it's high time to expand the legacy of Salamanca to include something most students of Spanish literature intuit but do not articulate sufficiently. The economic and political thought of Salamanca is indelibly tied to the modern history of the novel form, which for its part is a major (not a marginal) factor in the evolution of liberalism. A proper understanding of the scope of Cervantes's achievement allows us to formulate a bigger picture of these relations and their impact on many fields of cultural production. Here's a simplified view:



Why is this graphic important? It reveals what Borges infers in his famous essay entitled "Nuestro pobre individualismo" (1944). The project of protecting the individual can never be finished in a democracy, just as the endless quest for an ideal checked by reality is the essence of the novel form. The Salamancans were mostly theologians and thus rather imposing political and economic theorists, but it's arguably the satirical by-product of their school, i.e., the novels of Rojas, Mendoza, and Cervantes, that have most sustained their ideas while also managing to restrain their totalitarian potential. Novels remind us that a contested dialogical process is not just sufficient but *necessary* for useful economic and political ideas to exist in the first place. It is only by way of insisting on dialogue that such fields as economics or politics can lay claim to scientific status.

The novel's role is to keep totalitarian confidence from creeping into any social system, including systems arranged by proper attention to commercial and legal realism. Mario Vargas Llosa and Javier Cercas have both dwelt on this idea, which is perhaps more obvious in the Hispanic world. Tocqueville saw it too. Constitutions are not novels. Constitutions establish society's rules. No doubt respect for the rules and procedures for changing them are critical. Novels play a different role by laying the grounds for everything else. They show us how to play our respective parts in that game previously delimited by the rules. Novels apply a living and breathing code, what Hayek might call "social subsidiarity," such that we're not constantly appealing to authorities to intervene and solve problems that we ought to learn to work out on our own and in far more innovative ways than could ever occur to some government pinhead.

The Austrian and Salamancan schools are often referred to as "causal realist economics." Now we can see how great literature allies itself with economics against Marxism. Literature can provide additional insight, not just into suffering but also into a complex web of human motives and a range of consequences of human actions, as well as factors like individual choice, risk tolerance, uncertainty, and time preference. Similarly, serious novels are disruptive and anti-ideological rather than monological, moralizing, and activist. Novels are realistic whenever they offer greater insight than the stock materialist fantasies of revolutionaries. I hope my book offers readers ways to reclaim the novel as a reflection on life and a warning about the downsides of politicizing morality. I imagine this view as one opposed to the predetermined grievance orthodoxy that handicaps so much modern fiction, especially in the United States, where a novel is now practically *de rigueur* a matter of whining about oppression in the freest nation on Earth.

Only late in life, after reading a range of classical liberal thinkers, did I come to appreciate the complexity of the Salamancan and Austrian schools and their significance for understanding the evolution of Western Civilization. Methodologically speaking, accessing and demonstrating the existence of these schools to readers in the Western hemisphere is still difficult because much of its textual legacy remains locked away in Latin and German. But translations will appear soon enough. More importantly, the term "school" is a problem since it gathers under a static rubric a range of works by authors who had no such unity in mind. Nevertheless, until recently, a school also implied ongoing *debate* in search of the truth, even if that truth was understood to remain elusive. And there has never been any way to have that without permitting differences of opinion among a school's members. Indeed, *diversity, changeability, and fallibility of thought* are the true and evidently quixotic essence of freedom. This is why the liberation of the human mind is affirmed in the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. And this is also why its defense can never be taken for granted.

Thanks to all the contributors and readers for their time and patience. Godspeed!

ECG, Miami, FL (7/4/23)

The True and Godly Liberal: Public Theology for the Age of Innovism

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CONTENTS

APOLOGIA PRO LIBRO SUO ET APOLOGIA PRO FIDE SUA

One can be a serious Christian, favoring for all humans a turn towards the Triune God, and at the same time, without serious contradiction, a serious economic and social and political liberal, favoring for all humans a serious equality of permission under law. That is, one can be serious all round, advocating both for the divinity of Jesus and for the fullest liberty for human conduct, conscience, conversation, and commerce. One can reject Satan in all his ever-popular forms, and yet also reject physically coerced collectivism in almost all of its own ever-popular forms. One can be a "true liberal Christian," advocating liberty of the will, and rejecting "statism, "the widespread belief that our masters should rule over us unruly children.

A Christian liberalism can entail, though, a cheerful obedience to a modest state pursuing a few reasonable public purposes. For example, compelled vaccination for fatally contagious diseases. Non-imperial national defense. Judges and police enforcing a restrained criminal law and a civil law of torts. Yet much of what the state has abrogated to itself during the past century, with the approval of voters wishing in effect to be mastered and parented, should in justice and temperance and prudence be left to the initiative of you and me and our fellow citizens, as responsible adults. The few collective initiatives should be as small and local as is prudent, in the manner of the principle of subsidiarity in Catholic social teaching. True, sometimes a centralized standard should be applied, with an occasional subvention for, say, elementary education out of Illinois taxes and even out of Federal taxes. But very seldom should we want direct supply from the state, especially states that have been captured by one group, such as the Illinois medial doctors or Illinois unionized electricians or the upper-middle class members of the Illinois school boards and the draft boards. Urged on by uniformed voters and misled theorists, the modern state, from American municipal socialism in the late 19th century to Soviet central panning un the late 20th, have repeatedly misstopped in sensible supply or demand. As is already the case in, say, Sweden, there should instead be many private or highly local roads, water supplies, schools. A Christian liberal, in other words, is not required to approve of a big, all-wise, top-down, coercive, corrupted, centralized, infantilizing governance by a set of human masters, "integralism" in its extreme Christian form. We are vastly richer now than in 1776 not because of most state policies but in spite of them.

Nor is the Christian liberal required to approve of what many good people, boldly appropriating the honored name of "liberal," view as a *nuanced*, *moderate* statism. An anti-liberal "liberalism" since the British New Liberals, the American Progressives, and the coming of increased "state capacity" has resulted in mega-states even in the UK, the USA, and France, those cradles of our liberties. Coercions by the state have expanded beyond wise limits. They have sometimes been overturned, yet sometimes affirmed, for example by the Supreme Court of the United States. Brown v. Board of Education. Loving v. Virginia. Kelo v. City of New London. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization.

What I have called "statism," proliferating on the left and right and center in the century past, is the opposite of true liberalism. We true liberals, listening intently to Adam Smith or John Stuart Mill or Isaiah Berlin, do admit a role for the state. We are not literal anarchists. Admittedly, accusing us of wanting to abolish the state entirely makes it easier to get around our very reasonable suggestions for improvement. But it's a short-cutting ploy, not a reasoned argument. And it supposes that Smith, Mill, and Berlin were idiots.

We true *Christian* liberals, who listen intently to the poetry of King David and of Leonard Cohen, and to the prose of St. Paul and of the Dalai Lama, note that God has liberated our individual human wills. God evidently wants us to use them without unreasonable human coercions by the masters or the husbands or the parents or the governors. A true economic and political liberalism can contribute mightily to Christianity, as much as to Islam and Hinduism and even to an earnest agnosticism.

God comes first and last, of course, the telos of our being, in the church, the home. and the market, being present in prayer, in love, and in work. Yet economic liberalism, I repeat, can contribute to a virtuous faith. It can do so, for example, by encouraging in the marketplace a practice of virtuous soul-crafting. The crafting was called *doux commerce* by some 18th-century French writers, who had ample experience with the coerced, collective alternatives imposed by *l'État*. Montesquieu declared, "wherever there are sweet

manners, there is commerce; and … wherever there is commerce, there are sweet manners."[1] An emerging scientific finding affirms that Homo sapiens is an unusually cooperative and loving species, like the dogs that women domesticated from wolves twenty millennia ago. Christianity and liberalism, both, differ from a wolfish paganism or statism, by speaking steadily of love, not hate, of grace, not coercion.

Commercial liberty, in other words, does not inevitably corrupt a soul to a wolfish worship of Mammon—Jesus' Aramaic for "money /wealth," as in Matthew 6:24. The corruption has been routinely claimed, especially by Christians, to be inevitable, an irresistible temptation to the sin of greed. The claim, despite its ancient and modern dominance over popular and academic rhetoric, has surprisingly little backing in logic or evidence. A version of a carelessly labeled "greed," after all, is present in all living things, or else they don't live. Yet human greed is *not* good. Many other virtues, such as an adult justice and temperance, are specifically human, and prominent in *doux commerce*. Yes, a childish, wolfish, greed for money (*philarguria*, "avarice," literally "love of silver"), and for other earthly trinkets, is a root of all, or at any rate much, evil, as was asserted in Timothy 6:10 by a pseudo-Paul (writing, miraculously, decades after the death of the actual Paul). But the root of the root is the sin of greed defined carefully, not the money/silver/wealth in itself, or the system in which it is used.

Money and its system, after all, are not, as is widely believed, some corrupting novelty peculiar to our nasty age of iron, or of plastic. They are ancient devices, used by sinner and saint alike for their evil or innocent purposes. They are no more intrinsically corrupting than horses or arrows or inheritance practices. Ever since the pyramids, or the song lies, or the caves, we humans have used money in its triple aspects, as a store of capital, a standard of social value, and a medium of exchange. Of the first two: we have always and everywhere accumulated and calculated. Even Robinson Crusoe before Friday did. A soon as any property exists, a compound spear, say, all human societies have such stores and standards of value.[2] True, inside a single person or a family or a group of loving friends, or inside organizations of command such as armies and firms, we do not need the third function of money, as a medium of exchange. In such contexts the intrusion of money-as-exchange is called "corruption," because it crowds out sacred values. But when dealing with strangers, especially at arm's length, we do need such a medium, that is, some convenient item to offer in exchanges. It is therefore to be called "money" in all three of its aspects. The units of money can be remembered promises, cowry shells, bits of gold clipped from a coil, bank accounts, crypto currencies. Even hunter-gatherers needed money when they came to worship and marry and trade from all over Britain at Stonehenge, or, similarly, according to one interpretation, from all over the upper Middle East at Göbekli Tepe.

In particular, money is not merely coinage issued by the kings of northern Asia Minor c. 700 BCE, or the paper money issued by merchants in China c. 700 CE, reinvented in colonial Massachusetts in the 1690s. For one-and-a-half million years Acheulean hand "axes" were piled by the hundreds at numerous sites of Homo erectus and Homo sapiens. Obviously they could have acted as money in its functions as a store of value and a unit of account. Yet the axes could even, in an admittedly clumsy manner, be used for exchange with outlanders—my little bag of lovely post-Acheulean Clovis points could exchange for the steak from your mastodon kill. Aboriginal Australians traded for jewelry and boomerangs over hundreds of miles.[3] Cigarettes served a money in POW camps, and fell in value when the Red Cross packages brought more of them on the first of each month, rising in value as people smoked them up.

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1 Montesquieu 1748, Bk. 20, Chp. 1, "If Commerce.": "que partout où il y a des mœurs douces, il y a du commerce; et que partout où il y a du commerce, il y a des mœurs douces."

2 Wilson, Bart. 2020. *The Property Species: Mine, Yours, and the Human Mind.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wilson, Bart and Vernon L. Smith. 2019. *Humanomics: Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations for the Twenty-First Century.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

3 Ronald M. Berndt and Catherine H. Berndt. 1964. *The World of the First Australians,* p.113. London: Angus & Robertson Ltd.

You can call all this "barter" if you wish, and believe you have thereby cleverly evaded using the word "money." But, a "bartered" commodity, such as cattle in East Africa, is money even in its function on of exchange if it is habitually used to buy, say, wives, as it was there. The words "cattle" and "chattel" and "capital" are Latinate cousins. The Greek word *drachma* is derived from the word for "clutch," the original coin being worth a clutch of arrows—which is to say that arrows themselves, those handy little compound spears with an artificial intelligence machine for hurling them, could be seen as money.

And likewise it has always been, too, in exchanges of labor for money. The workers on the pyramids, traditionally believed to be enslaved, have been found recently to have probably been free labor paid in money. Jesus the Anointed One c. 30 CE lived in a commercial and monetized society ("Show me the coin of the poll-tax"), and did not require that every single fisherman leave his nets to become his mendicant disciple.[4] He is said in Luke 5:6 to have given the fisherman Simon Peter a great catch miraculously. Simon and his fellows promptly sold it in the market for *mammon*, to feed their families, by the secular miracle of voluntary exchange, and to pay the poll-tax, by the anti-miracle of statist coercion.

In short, we have always been modern. As the medievalist David Herlihy declared decades ago, "Research has all but wiped from the ledgers the supposed gulf, once considered fundamental, between a medieval manorial economy and the capitalism of the modern period."[5] Contrary to a belief present in the minds of most educated people—a belief contradicted over the past century by historical research—human *mammon,* commerce, wages, employment, property, land rents, capital, saving, accumulation, money, trade, credit, accounting, factories, large-scale manufacturing, banking, bills of exchange, individualism, objectification, commodification, luxury, consumerism, rationality, calculation, business as *eine Berufung,* disenchantment, self-control, entrepreneurship, price, and profit are mostly ancient and universal. They need not be corrupting, if we perform also the right spiritual work.

What then is the problem?

The modern and secular granting of liberty of permission yields an adult liberated from hierarchy in order to deal at will in the market, church, society, and home—though constrained in justice by identical liberal permissions granted to all others, and by the laws of God and Nature. Modern liberty matures our souls.

The good result is not of course automatic. It requires that spiritual work, guided by what the theologian Charles T. Matthewes calls—referring to the old genre during the age of naturalized hierarchy called a "mirror for princes" offering instruction to a prince who wanted to be good, or at any rate effective—"a mirror for Christian citizens."[6] But populist preaching against *mammon*, or self-flagellation for one's honestly acquired wealth, or marxoid superstitions about exploitation in the "capitalist" economy, or lofty sneering at consumption by *profanum vulgus*, all of which nowadays are commonplaces in theological circles, and even in the writings of my friend the excellent Chuck Mathewes, is not the right kind of spiritual work. A corruption of souls comes rather from any of the numerous ancient and modern means of keeping us as slaves or children under supervision by our betters—or, more terribly, corrupting us to *want* to be slaves or children, not of God but of humans, evermore. Then we assuredly do become greedy, and sinful in every means and manner available.

And on the other side, the choice to become that physically coercive supervisor, and then unjustly, arrogantly presuming to be an arbitrary master or parent over other adults, damages the supervisor's soul, too. The supervising economists in the past century of steadily increasing state power, for example, have

4 All direct quotations from the New Testament are from Hart's new translation, because I admire it and because I want to bias the case against my own liberalism and in favor of Hart's statism. Hart, David Bentley. 2017. *New Testament*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

5 Herlihy, David. 1971. *The history of feudalism*. New York: Walker.

6 Matthewes, Charles T. 2007. *A Theology of Public Life,* p. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

become notoriously proud, and accustomed to recommending more and more coercions. Tax Peter to pay Paul. Reregulate this or that innocent deal.

Such coercive power tends to corrupt. The greater the coercive power a person has, the higher—I say, being myself for my sins one of the economists, and therefore unable to resist making such a point—is the opportunity cost of refraining from using it, in material trinkets and masterful pride given up. A liberal economist such as I am who recommends restraint in policy—no coercive zoning, no occupational licensing, no tariffs on imports, no Jones Act between U.S. ports—is recommending that her power be surrendered, at the cost to her of her employment and pride. The logic of trinkets given up is why a tyrant such as Putin or Erdogan seems so often to be pathetically trapped in his power, unable to surrender any bit of it. And such power is of course macho, beloved especially by men. In Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* the Party man O'Brien declares, "Always—do not forget this, Winston—always there will be the intoxication of power, constantly increasing and constantly growing subtler. Always, at every moment, there will be the thrill of victory, the sensation of trampling on an enemy who is helpless. If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face—forever."[7]

Contrariwise, the relative price of giving up coercive power—being instead a just and temperate person, and submissive to the masters—declines as the power a person possesses declines. It's conventionally seen as feminine. When she witnessed a religious procession one night in the late 1930s in a Portuguese fishing village it was suddenly plain to Simone Weil (1909-1943), a French secular Jew on her way to a mystic Christianity, that "Christianity is pre-eminently the religion of slaves, that slaves cannot help belonging to it, and I among others."[8] She echoes Nietzsche's sneer at "slave morality," subordinate to the pagan and masculine and aristocratic virtues he admired. Aristotle, too, admired them. Alasdair MacIntyre notes that "Aristotle would certainly not have admired Jesus Christ and he would have been horrified by St. Paul," with all his embarrassingly feminine talk of a slavish subordination to Christ Jesus.[9]

A true adulthood in a true liberalism depends on properly using God's gift of liberty of the will, justly, prudently, temperately, courageously, lovingly, hopefully, faithfully, when it has not been stolen by the masters of the Party of the Boot, or by a corrupt secular clergy, or when it has not been cravenly cast away by submission to these. Until the coming of liberalism in the 18th and 19th centuries in northwestern Europe, our masters routinely claimed to channel God's will, and most of us believed them. In 1598 James VI of Scotland, soon to be James I of England declared that "a king is preferred by God above all other ranks and degrees of men."[10] The declaration did not startle his future English subjects, accustomed as they were to Tudor statism. His son Charles declared from his scaffold that "a sovereign and a subject are clean different things," and for a long time after 1649 most English people agreed. Mastery was thereby naturalized with holy water. Then slowly, incompletely, but with great consequence, there arrived, at first only in northwestern Europe and some of its offshoots, a liberty from coerced human mastery. The nascent liberalism was often articulated in the writings and actions of devout and liberal Christians, such as John Newton, Abigail Adams, Robert Burns, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Tocqueville, Acton.

One must want to be so liberated, to be as Burns put it, "a man o' independent mind," as one must want to be an adult man instead of a perpetual boy, a liberated woman instead of a perpetual girl. The liberal economist and Nobelist James Buchanan (1919-2013) wrote in 2005 an essay entitled "Afraid to Be Free: Dependency as Desideratum, "as the psychoanalyst Erich Fromm had written in 1941 *Escape from Freedom*. Though Buchanan would not have been comfortable with the religious point, and Fromm confined religion to Protestantism, a grown-up liberty is in fact a leading promise of any Christianity. As St. Paul may have said, "however long a period the heir is an infant, he is no different from a slave … He is subject to legal guardians" (Gal. 4: 1,2; this one may have been genuinely Pauline). God does not want us to

7 Orwell, George. 1949. *Nineteen Eighty-Four.* London: Secker & Warburg.

8 Coles, Robert. 2001. *Simone Weil: a modern pilgrimage,* p. 116. Woodstock, Vt.: Skylight Paths Pub.

9 MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1984. *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory.* Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

10 James VI 1598.

be perpetual, predestined children, the slaves to Big Brother or to our own childish passions. After redemption by Christ, "you are no longer a slave, but a son" to God (Gal. 3:7). The result of liberated adulthood is an approach to God, says Paul, becoming the "heir." A Christian God says: Grow up to *imago Dei*. Another word for Christian liberalism could be "adultism."

Such in brief is the case for an economically liberal Christianity, which I will call a "liberalist" Christianity. The case for the other, reversed order of words—a Christian liberalism—is in brief that liberalism without a commitment to something like Christianity leaves us as vending machines, not as adult heirs with a liberated will turned voluntarily, yet by God's grace, towards God, or towards some other transcendent giving a virtuous meaning to our lives. The other, stripped-down model of humanity was favored by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Bentham, and is favored now by too many of my colleagues in economics. The turn towards a vending-machine model of humans, responding only to outer incentives such as offers of *mammon,* or the lash applied to the slave, made it seem plausible that our ruler should be *Il Principe,* or the Leviathan, or the prison guard surveilling us from the panopticon—or the modern politician, advised by the wise economist, applying top-down coercions alleged to result in a chaste citizenry or the general will or the national good or the greatest utility or the maximum GDP per person.

But to the contrary, we are humans, with adult, liberated, creative, and sweetly persuadable wills, with varied innocent or even helpful projects, happily possessing, or sadly lacking, this or that virtue of temperance and courage and the rest of the human virtues. And humans then trade and converse. We are therefore to be studied with a liberal and Christian "humanomics." Humanomics as science still does the economics rigorously in the usual ways. Coherent economic theory. Econometrics when relevant. Common sense, always. Good show. But it retains the human soul, and the four thousand years of reflection on it by humans writing, in order to achieve a full and honorable science of humans in the economy. It does its experiments, say, soulfully. And humanomics furthermore says that we are to be ruled by something like a Christian liberalism—by liberal laws not by illiberal men. Nonetheless, it does the world's work in the market and in the state efficiently. No tariffs on international trade, or a Jones Act on trade between the mainland and Puerto Rico. Use local knowledge instead of industrial policy from Washington. Innovate by helpfully breaking some of the existing rules of the game. Splendid. But humanomics also retains the sacred human ethics that in fact undergirds godly human action, for full and honorable work in the world. It works and governs ethically, temperately, justly, lovingly.

I said that liberalism would be better with a commitment to "*something like* Christianity." Cicero lambastes the Epicureans—the ancient Mediterranean's version of modern economists and their materialist allies—as "those men who in the manner of cattle [*pecudum ritu*, literally 'by the rite of the cattle'] refer everything to pleasure" and who "with even less humanity. . . say that friendships are to be sought for protection and aid, not for caring." He calls them "men abandoned to pleasure," being theorists of a prudence-only vending-machine who "when they dispute about friendship have understanding of neither its practice nor its theory."[11] Yes. In the Sanskrit epic *The Mahabharata* the identical metaphor against the vending machine appears. A hero of the tale, the virtue-seeking if flawed Yudhishthira, is asked by his wife, "Why be virtuous?" He replies, "Were *dharma* [truth leading to virtue] to be fruitless … [humans] would live as cattle."[12] That's right, and Ciceronian—though Yudhishthira seems actually to be making more a social and Kantian point about outcomes of cattlelike behavior than making the properly stoic point about justice and self-respect, disregarding the outcomes. Virtue is anyway adult and godly, not cattle-like, a human turning towards God. Matthewes argues that "Augustinians [such as he is] can affirm that public life can be a way for humans to come to participate in God."[13] Contrary to the side-swipes by Matthewes at the "consumer society," a creative life in an economy can be purifying—to use his favorite words, "ascetically" and as a

11 Cicero, *De amicitia* ix, 32; xii, 46; xiv, 52.

12 Marx, Karl. 2009. *Das kapital: a critique of political economy,* p. 73. Washington DC: Regnery Pub.

13 Matthewes 2007, p. 21.

matter of "enduring." "Genuine goods can be pursued," he rightly concludes, as the *boni ardui* that Aquinas called them. It's not all stupid tinsel.

Mere human cattle, of course, are best driven by an expert human cowherd. Or the faux-human vending machine is to be kicked. They are to be "incentivized" or "nudged" or "planned," as the modern economists and their followers left or right have been saying now for a century and a half, in their justifications for proliferating coercions by our masters, commissars, *Führers*, parents, husbands, administrators, and social engineers.

Prominent in this line recently, for example, are the economist Daron Acemoglu and the political scientist James Robinson, in their many eloquent and scholarly yet relentlessly anti-liberal and state-loving publications. In their 2019 book *The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty* for example, they urge a fuller empowerment of Leviathan, to increase what they call, startlingly, "liberty."[14] They view with equanimity that the modern Leviathan, in the words of 1776, has "erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance."

In Acemoglu and Robinson, and in a similar book by Acemoglu and Johnson, A bigger and bigger state serves a bizarrely slavish conception of "liberty." They merge a liberty defined as lack of coercion by a master with a "freedom" to acquire goods. A higher budget line, as an economist would put it, makes you free. You're "free" to fly to Paris if you're rich. Never mind if your liberty *from coercions by masters* is at the same time null and void. The master coerces you, say, to fly to Paris, perhaps to install you in the Bastille, or coerces taxes from you to subsidize an Anglo-French Concorde airplane on which you ride, in shackles. A slave with ample food and airplane tickets is said in such a political rhetoric to be "free."

Merging a lack of coercion by humans into a lack of material income is a characteristically modern error, most easily committed in English, with its doubled words liberty/freedom. The two words have in the past couple of centuries diverged in connotation. The Latinate word "liberty" still connotes on English tongues the right not to be coerced by other humans; the right of a non-slave, as in Franklin Delano Roosevelt's first of Four Freedoms in his declaration of 1941: freedom of speech. The Germanic word "freedom" by contrast has come to connote the right to have lots of stuff, even if achieved by takings from others—in Roosevelt's quadrivium a "freedom from want." The error is most easily committed by economists, with their mechanical view of liberty as freedom from the constraints of nature or scarcity, that is, having a higher budget line. The Nobel economist Amartya Sen, for example, declared in 1999 that enriching development simply *is* freedom.

Yet even the economics is directive. A bigger state does not obviously give us higher budget lines. On the contrary, considering the historical evidence and the economic logic, it seems likely to reduce, not increase, the goods we can make and consume. The Concorde did. The profitable innovations exploding after 1776 came from individual minds freshly liberated, not from fresh schemes of coercion by the masters. And setting the economic likelihoods aside, the associated politics is most worrying. The "liberty" in *The Narrow Corridor* is a program to remain—so long as the manna keeps falling, and Concordes keep being built—a dependent child or an obedient slave to the Leviathan state. Quoth Jmes I/VI, in any "well ruled commonwealths the style *Pater patriae* was ever … used to kings." Acemoglu and Robinson assure us that the *Pater*/Leviathan will be kept sweet. They do not tell us how.

The hoped-for sweetness of the Acemoglu-Robinson paternalism, or the Sen-Nussbaum provision of capabilities beyond a full equality of permission, or the Thaler-Sunstein nudging by oh-so clever economists, echoes the old justifying myth in a slave society of the Good Master. One sees the myth articulated in

14 The full case for Acemoglu and Robinson's statism, their definition of liberty, and their inattention to how the Leviathan is to be kept with the narrow corridor is given in McCloskey, D. N. 2021. *Bettering Humanomics: A New, and Old, Way of Doing Economic Science.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. See also: Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2019. *The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty.* New York: Penguin Press.

the letters of Seneca to Lucilius**,** or for that matter in St. Paul's letter to Philemon. Seneca writes, "Live mercifully with your slave, amicably even. … Don't you know what our ancestors did to eliminate resentment towards masters and abuse towards slaves? They used the name 'father of the household' for the master and 'members of the household' for the slaves."[15] Yet of course, when exercised over adults, such a paternalism diminishes in soul and even often enough in goods both "father" and "son." To call a Black man "boy" has the same valence, and when elevated to law the same material result.

A Christian liberalism of redeemed adulthood seems on its face better. A dissolution of enslavement to other humans need not interfere with the loving intimacy of our relationship with God, even a metaphorical slavery to God. Aquinas would say that on the contrary a true liberty even in commerce, like a true liberty elsewhere, functions in bringing humans closer to God. Or can.

Unlike the justifications in the modern theory of the sweet social engineer or in the ancient one of the Good Master, humanomics and liberalism honor the liberated soul and honor its commitment to an ethical transcendent.[16] The liberal and virtuous—though lamentably anti-theistic—David Hume called such a commitment "moral sentiment," felt prior to any intellectualizing of the virtues. The Soviet novelist and emergent liberal of the 1950s Vasily Grossman called it "dumb, blind love" for individual humans, against the systematic corruptions of "love" for the Good Master or the mega-State or the permanent Revolution or the mythologized *Duce*.[17] Another name for the adult, soulful, loving, ethical, liberal transcendent, I say again, is Christianity.

Humans require some sort of transcendent, whether good, indifferent, or evil, which can be God or Baseball or the Thousand-Year Reich. They just do. The Anglican theologian Richard Hooker expressed it in 1593:

> Man doth seek a triple perfection: first a sensual … then an intellectual. …Man doth not seem to rest satisfied … but doth further covet … somewhat divine and heavenly, which with hidden exultation … [such desire] rather surmiseth than conceiveth. … For although the beauties, riches, honors, sciences, virtues, and perfections of all men living, were in the present possession of one; yet somewhat beyond and above all this there would still be sought and earnestly thirsted for.[18]

Such an earnest thirst motivates what Eric Hoffer in 1951 called the true believer.[19] In politics, as in Europe repeatedly from 1517, the true believer staffs a revolution, whether violent or peaceful. Political revolutions, Hoffer noted, resemble religious revivals. The liberal Christian, however, thirsts earnestly for a peaceful, inner revolution, rejecting a violent, outer one. Listen to Archbishop Tutu. The Romanian political rhetorician Cătălin Mamali puts it this way: "The core point is that the inner revolution, based on high moral principles, is the necessary condition for any social revolution that could make the human condition more

15 Seneca. C., 47:13-14. D*ominum patrem familiae appelaverunt*—"they called their master father of the household." The earlier Latin genitive, *paterfamilias,* is here refereed to. *Familieiae* commonly meant "slave staff" (as Richard Saller notes, quoted in the Wilionary entry for "*familia*"). It is so used in medieval documents, meaning "servants."

16 And the full case for humanomics is given in McCloskey 2021. The very word was first used in 1976 as the title of his book by the Czech economist Eugen Loegl, though after a promising start he drifted away from its intrinsic liberalism. The recent coinage is due to Bart Wilson.

17 Vasily Grossman (p. 394) at the end of Ikonnikov's letter: "This dumb, blind love is man's meaning. ... . If what is human in human beings has not been destroyed even now, then evil will never conquer." Grossman, Vasily. 1960/2006. *Life and Fate.* New York: Random House.

18 Hooker, Richard. *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity.* First Book, XI, 4, pp. 205-206.

19 Hoffer, Eric. 1951. *The True Believer.* New York: Harper & Brothers.

humane."[20] It is exhibited in a true Buddhist like the Dalai Lama (b.1935) or a true Christian like Harriet Tubman (b. 1822) or a true liberal like Adam Smith (b. 1723). The violent, outer revolution doesn't pause to change minds or souls. It doesn't have to. It therefore sounds dead easy, which is part of its charm. Presto! Merely put the enemies of the outer revolution blindfolded up against a wall, and shoot—the Catholics, say, the Loyalists, the bourgeoisie, the fascists. Without changed minds, though, the coercions of outer revolution regularly corrupt the spiritual goal of the revolution itself. They have done so repeatedly, dismally, tragically. Absolute power corrupts absolutely.

Mamali wonders why this point in a political sermon—that only inner revolutions work for permanent good—is nonetheless "marginalized by so many political and social scientists."[21] Perhaps it is because the point is rhetorical, and after the hard men of the 17th century, who preached passionately against preaching in English, French, and Latin, the "merely" rhetorical, or for that matter the "merely" ethical, and by now the "merely" religious, has been under a tough-guy, materialist cloud. We are all historical materialists now. Mamali observes that the rhetorical and ethical point of an inner revolution has been especially preached since the 18th century by Americans, such as Franklin, Thoreau, Emerson, Lincoln, Billy Graham, and Martin Luther King. And such preaching in the American liberal experiment inspired others, Mamali further observes, such as "Gandhi, Patočka, Kołakowski, Mandela, imprisoned A. S. Kyi."

It's puzzling that this second and characteristically American contribution to political thought—the first, as Louis Hartz pointed out long ago, is the liberalism of "No Masters"—has been absentmindedly set aside by American political philosophers of the academy. Perhaps the setting aside comes out of the old U.S. cringe in the presence of European culture, or perhaps out of the rhetoric a century ago of the Revolt Against the Village, by people like by Edgar Lee Masters, Sherwood Anderson, H. L. Mencken, and Sinclair Lewis. Whatever its origin, American political philosophers have adopted a European hermeneutics of suspicion and a European fatalism of outlook and a European materialism of causation. Tough-guy technique. Taken together, such theoretical axioms support the sufficiency of a solely outer revolution. "No preaching, please, no persuasion. We're tough guys. When I hear the word 'culture,' I reach for my gun. Realize, all you soft and naïve and feminine fools, the role of your class in history, materially determined, or of the *deutsche Volk* in the next thousand years, genetically determined. For any merely inner, rhetorical supplements, trivial though they are—being mere superstructures erected upon a material foundation—you can rely on films about the battleship *Potemkin* or about the triumph of the will, or on the changing nature of man under the dictatorship of the proletariat, or on the Little Red Book of Chairman Mao, or on the handsomely bound volumes of Marxist-Leninist texts." American academic theologians, suspicious and fatalistic and materialist in theory, disdain what they take to be American materialism in the Midwestern village. You would think that "No Human Masters" and "Inner Spiritual Revolution" would appeal to any Christian, especially an American one. You would think that when they hear the word "gun," they would reach for their culture.

One in the long list of Americans such as Walt Whitman and Will Rogers and Barack Obama preaching against masters and in favor of inner revolution was my wise and ethical colleague, the economist Milton Friedman (1912-2006). Yes, I know. you are shocked and indignant. Many anti-liberals believe they detest what they believe are Milton's ideas and actions, wholly misapprehended. As you may read in Jennifer Burns's *Milton Friedman: The Last Conservative* (2023), Milton was in fact open-hearted and optimistic, though steadily and irritatingly argumentative in aid of his truth. Like Maggie Smith playing Violet Crawley, the dowager countess in "Downton Abbey," Milton didn't argue. He explained. Unceasingly.

Except for service during the War against fascism, Milton never did paid work for any state. Persuasion of people, not coercion by states, was his policy. He advised theoretically on state policy from a distance, out in Chicago or San Francisco, solely in his writings, his speeches, and his TV show. Rhetoric. He relied on sweet talk, even in his one meeting with General Pinochet, the tyrant of Chile, a relationship absurdly exaggerated and distorted in the nightmares of the left. Milton was not "an advisor "to the Pinochet regime. He

20 Mamali, Cătălin. 2019. https://www.easp.eu/news/itm/?id=1024

21 Mamali, Cătălin. 2022. Suppressed in his homeland. *Zeitschrift für Psychodrama und Soziometrie* 21(S1):1-8.

spent a total of 45 minutes—unwisely perhaps in view of his lifelong disdain for tyrants—trying to persuade the General to restrain the money supply. That was it. Don't print too much state currency. He advocated all such liberalisms. Abolish the military draft. Legalize all recreational drugs. Eliminate professional licensure by the state. End all tariffs on imports. Encourage immigration. Give people the liberty to choose.

I once overheard Milton arguing amiably in the coffee room of the Social Science Building at the University of Chicago with his materialist colleague and friend George Stigler, another Nobel winner in economics. Stigler said in effect, "It's silly of you, Milton, to try to persuade people. Be instead, like me, suspicious and fatalistic and materialistic. People follow only their material self-interests, incentivized by the coercions of the state's law. Persuasions are mere superstructure, and therefore bootless." (You can see why I once in print called Stigler, and Murray Rothbard the anarchist economist, "vulgar Marxists"; George was amused, Murray was indignant, and wrote to George complaining about me).

In the coffee room in response to George's advocacy of cynicism, Milton, after a thoughtful sip, replied in effect, "No, George, people can be persuaded to an inner revolution. Laws and souls can be changed. I am a teacher—if you wish, a 'preacher.'" This non-"conservative" preached No Masters and the Inner Revolution. And he achieved them in part, at least among auditors willing to listen, really listen—as, startlingly, late in his own life the French leftist Michel Foucault troubled to do.

Friedman was a true liberal. But his line of argument, put forward also by my many dear, anti-religious, male, American friends in the Liberty Movement 1776 to the present, such as A.C. Harberger, Walter Block, Steven Landsburg, Donald Boudreaux, Daniel Klein, Peter Boettke, David Levy, David Boas, Ian Vasquez, Price Fishback, John Wallis, Robert Higgs, and David Friedman (*fils*), has been to eschew religion and to take Liberty itself as the god term. (Many of my dear, female, American friends in the Liberty Movement, such as Karen Vaughan and Emily Chamlee-Wirght and Sandra Peart, are like me *not* anti-religious). I agree with most of the implications my friends draw from the rule of such a god. An adultist worshiping of Liberty commonly does lead to human flourishing for both poor and rich. I will presently tell you how. But such a liberalism—seeking liberty but lacking the One True God, *Allah*, *Yahweh*—fails to answer the overwhelming question: So what? *Et alors*? *¿Y qué? Nou en*?

An answer to "So what?" modifies the working of secular liberty. Without an answer, a human can easily devolve into an instrumental vending machine, fueled in populist style by soul-eroding resentments. If by contrast a Christian God is our telos, then such a commitment to loving our neighbor and even our enemy supervenes, elevating former slaves and former masters, both. Frederick Douglas in such a faith would forgive Thomas Auld and Edward Covey. And Auld and Cover would confess their sin of coercive mastery. The Dutch economist Arjo Klamer in a secular vein calls it simply "doing the right thing."[22] But Arjo struggles with the fundament, the reply to *Nou en?* Beyond prudence alone, that is, the other virtues of love, justice, temperance, courage, hope, and faith come to matter to humans, as they appear to matter to Our Lord crafting our souls. "High moral principles, "as Mamali calls them, are not optional in human flourishing unto salvation, in this life or in the next.

I do recognize the theological dilemma of whether God is good because virtuous, which would make God dependent on human notions of virtue; in particular the notions of one-life mortals; or whether virtue is good because God anyway commands it, which would make the virtuous believing humans into dependent children, besides making virtues entirely arbitrary. It is the same dilemma in constitutional government. Is a law good because the Constitution says so, or is the Constitution to be justified by natural law, in which case its clauses are unnecessary?[23] Is *dharma* good because of its personal or social consequences or because it simply is? I have no snappy solution to such dilemmas, which places me with all the others who have recognized it.

A Christian who is over-confident of his salvation is liable to exhibit a pagan god's indifference to virtues. Why exhibit courage, for example, if one is deathless? It would make martyrdom easy, as it appears to

22 Klamer, Arjo. 2017. *Doing the Right Thing: A Value Based Economy.* London: Ubiquity Press.

23 See McCloskey on Fletcher v. Peck.

be for the tiny group of Moslems willing to strap themselves to bombs and kill children, rather in the way the large group of Christians have been willing to do. For a pagan god the virtues of temperance and hope and justice and even love would also lack point.

But at least one can say that our God wishes the good however defined for the souls of his creatures called humans, which is the core claim of Abrahamic religions. On the available evidence, liberalism not tyranny, and markets not coercions, and eventual adulthood not perpetual childhood, turn out to be the best ways among humans for fulfilling God's wish. Or so a liberalist Christian says.

I address here mainly the Christians, pastors, and theologians now suspicious of an economically liberalist Christianity. Their name is Legion, for they are many, especially in progressive Christian circles. True, many of my beloved social democratic friends say they accept *some* markets. They better, eagerly patronizing Trader Joe's and buying on Amazon.com. But then they claim to have further a "nuanced," middling view of socialism versus "capitalism." It would be like claiming that a "nuanced" view of Christianity would be to split the difference between God and Satan. They speak warmly of the "mixed economy," or "market socialism," constructions of contradiction long touted by New Liberals and Euro-communists. It sounds judicious. But it merely splits the difference between liberty and tyranny. Let's have state tyranny, as in the distributist proposals of Pope Leo XIII, G. K. Chesterton, Hilaire Belloc, Dorothy Day, Pascal-Emmanuel Gorby, and Pope Francis. My New-Liberal friends, in the next and justificatory sentence after delcating that they are nuanced, exhibit a belief, against the scientific evidence, that the market works exceptionally poorly, and a belief, also against the scientific evidence, that the state with the guidance of the church or the economists works exceptionally well. Oh, my dear, dear friends, do reconsider.

Likewise, the modern Christian evangelical and Jewish orthodox and Muslim fundamentalist—mostly not so much my friends, though God bless them, too—are often by contrast cordial towards laissez faire in commerce. But they are notably less cordial towards other liberties, especially for other people, such as women or gays or Blacks. Look at the American versions of the radically religious ever since, during the 1970s, they first gave up their quietism, and entered politics with a bang. American Black pastors had done so twenty years earlier. White Southern Baptists decided to give a reply, as did ultra-orthodox rabbis replying to Israel's founding cultural liberalism.

To both groups of believers, to my "liberal" or socialist friends, and to my conservative not-so-much friends, I say: think it possible you may be mistaken. Liberty is liberty is liberty, supported by God's material and spiritual economy.

The little band of fellow theists who do also accept economic true liberalism, such as my friends Israel Kirzner, Paul Oslington, P. J. Hill, Larry Iannaccone, the late Don Lavoie, and the late Robert nelson, maybe will find here a few additional reasons *contra gentiles*. And maybe open-minded, believing Jews or Moslems or Buddhists or other faithful will find reasons to urge liberalism in their own faiths, as my friend and colleague at the Cato Institute, Mustafa Akyol, does for Islam so persuasively.[24]

Sadly, most of my academic colleagues and friends in the humanities and social sciences are proudly non-believing, having been stoutly atheistic since the very wise age of 14. In the United States, further, most of them, since that other very wise age of 21, would call themselves "liberals." I wish to persuade them that they are less than wise in their anti-faith faith and in their anti-liberal liberalism, and that they need to become wiser on both counts. Alas, most of my economically wise, true-liberal allies at the Cato Institute and

24 Akyol, Mustafa. 2011. *Islam Without Extremes.* New York: W.W. Norton & Company; 2021a. *Reopening Muslim Minds: A Return to Reason, Freedom, and Tolerance*. London: St. Martin's Press; 2021b. *Why, As A Muslim, I Defend Liberty*. Washington DC: Cato Institute.

elsewhere are also atheistic, from that same age of 14. (All of which explains, you see, why I don't have any friends).

I pray that all of you—you "liberals" and you liberals—will rethink how the universe, human consciousness, and human liberty of the will could have arisen. Hint: a stony materialism might not suffice.

That is, I claim as an economist and historian, and as a late-life convert to Christianity, to have a good deal to tell you-all about the economics and history relevant to the issue at hand. I will tell you about the economics and the economic history chiefly out of my own mouth and mind and my own claim, well justified I assure you, to professional authority. But for the theology and political philosophy I depend upon others, and quote them frequently. The appeal to the authority of others will become I fear a little tiresome. I apologize. Yet the argument /explanation requires it, because an amateur such as I am in theology and political philosophy is trying to persuade professionals in fields in which she cannot claim expertise.

And you will soon spot, if you have not already, my imperfect grasp even of the large modern conversation about the relationship between Christian faith and liberal economics. I have observed, and have been informed querulously by my critics, that many progressive theologians regard themselves as "liberals." They must mean something lovely by the word. But I can only report what has been my repeated experience over the past few decades in talking with and reading the writings of progressive and conservative theologians, pastors, and lay Christians when the economy and economics and economic history come up—namely, their unease, astonishment, even outrage when I make in reply the most elementary and scientifically solid points out of a true economic liberalism. By "true" I mean scientifically grounded, critically self-conscious, skeptical of bumper stickers and headlines, ethically serious yet knowing the factual score. I say things like, "Trade is mutually beneficial." Denial. "National income is national expenditure." Bored incomprehension. "People are not always idiotic." Indignant citation of the 250-odd cognitive biases asserted in social psychology. "When they ate idiotic, entry and exit of firms often saves them." Indignant claim that the invisible hand is mere mysticism. "Externalities have been claimed but not measured." Indignant citation of econometrics is beside the point. "States are not staffed by philosopher kings." Indigent accusations that I am a terrible cynic. "Markets are ancient." Indignant accusations that I must not know the conventional wisdom learned at school. The anti-liberal liberals have a whole lot of indignation. Not so much logic and evidence.

Yet if Christianity is improved by a true liberalism, as I said the serious game here may be worth the candle. If true liberalism is improved by Christianity, likewise. The stake is human salvation, here and beyond—or as Frank Fukuyama puts it in secular terms, the end of history.[25] A Victorian atheist proposed that every church door should have a large sign saying, "Important If True." Liberalist Christianity and Christian liberalism are surely important, if true. Testing such important propositions seems worth risking a good many tiresome and amateurish passages.

I beg for your patience, then, on the grounds Rabbi Tafron articulated, in Hillel's version: "It is not upon you to finish the work, but neither are you free to desist from it." He also said, "The day is short, the work is great, the workers are lazy, but the reward is great, and the master of the house is knocking."[26] Or as a later rabbi said, reported in Matthew 9:37, "The harvest is plentiful, but the laborers are few." Let me at least try, so great is the reward and so plentiful the harvest from a serious and sensible inquiry into God's purposes in the modern economy.

25 Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man.* New York: Free Press. My defense of his argument is in McCloskey, D. N. 2019. *Why Liberalism Works: How True Liberal Values Produce a Freer, More Equal, Prosperous World for All.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

26 Pirkei Avot 2:15-16. I thank Joel Mokyr for helping me track it down. A version of it was used by Henry Rosovsky as the motto for a festschrift for the economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron.

The book will require another sort of patience, though, aside from my clumsy and ignorant forays into theology and political philosophy. Namely: the product, as you will already have seen, is not exactly beach reading. Wait for some cold, quiet evenings in winter. The logic and evidence are sometimes intricate. Often, I fear, my earnest attempts at scientific accuracy combined with rhetorical lucidity will fail. True, the book does not trouble you with technical economics, or much even of the details of history. I scribble away elsewhere in both genres, but here I stick to arguments and evidence that an interested (and admirably patient and open-minded) outsider to professional economics and professional history might find perspicuous.

I do suppose, though, that you will properly scorn going to the other extreme, and resting easy with populist bumper-stickers of left or right. "Tax corporations, not people." "Hang the bankers." "Capitalism is Protestant." "Jesus was a salesman." "God promises me to have a Cadillac." Nor do you not want I suppose to adopt the convenient supposition that the true liberalism of Adam Smith or John Stuart Mill or Milton Friedman or for that matter Deirdre Nansen McCloskey is easy to refute, a tissue of factual and logical absurdities, and therefore its advocates must be evil or morons or in the pay of dark money, or all three. I instead suppose you want to hear the best case for a liberalist Christianity and for a Christian liberalism, or at any rate a pretty good one, not the loony worst. Then you can compare it with the best opposite case—also assessed here, though not very sympathetically—for Christian socialism and secular regulation and ubiquitous coercion in aid of the general will. Therefore, I again beg of you a certain patience.

Still another patience-need—they're piling up, aren't they?—is that if you start with the other opinion, whether on economics or on theology, the case for liberalist Christianity and Christian liberalism will often be startling, even irritating. "How can she believe *that*!" No one likes to be startled or irritated by being told that his settled opinion is mistaken. Modern psychology and ancient literature attest that the experience commonly arouses merely defensiveness in the auditor, if he can hear it at all, and that it seldom changes his mind. As Abe Lincoln, wise beyond his 33 years, said in an address to the temperance society of Springfield, Illinois in 1842, "If you would win a man to your cause first convince him that you are his sincere friend. On the contrary, assume to dictate to his judgment, or to command his action, or to mark him as one to be shunned and despised, and he will retreat within himself."[27] I assure you that I am your sincere friend, and beg of your forgiveness if I occasionally slip into dictating to your judgment.

Most otherwise learned and intelligent people, often calling themselves "liberals" and "Christians," stand astonished. They accuse me loudly: "You are not nuanced, balanced, middling." By this they seem to mean that there must be *something* in statism, so popular has it been since it replaced the cynical yet realistic conviction of most citizens before the Liberty Movement took hold, that governments were in fact established for the glory of kings and the profit of oligarchs. When such learned and intelligent moderns reject indignantly my liberal scientific evidence, I reply patiently that perhaps there is nothing "nuanced" about denying that water does run downhill, or that voluntary trade does benefit both sides, or that God does want us to be liberated adults.

I have concluded from the experience—I hope you can show me I am mistaken about it; but I'll need to see the evidence—that most Christians, and even the more thoughtful among them, have a feeble grasp, comparable I suppose in quality to mine of theology, of how a modern economy works. This does not, I admit, distinguish them from most people, fish swimming in water they cannot sense.

Yet here I stand. As a professional economist and historian, and an embarrassingly amateur theologian and political philosopher, I can do no other than give you some of the more important intricacies illuminating the question of what God has to do with the economy, and even some of the irritations. *Gott helfe mir.*

By way of truth in advertising let me say at the outset, irritatingly I suppose yet by now wholly unsurprisingly, that I am assuredly what I have been calling a "true" liberal, that is, a follower of Smith, Paine, Wollstonecraft, Mill, Spencer, Jane Jacobs, James Buchanan, Wendy McElroy, and, yes, Friedman. In such matters I am not wishy-washy, as the sweet Catholic social teachers and the sweet preachers of the Protestant social gospel and the sweet social democratic atheists do tend to be. I love them all dearly, but sharply dis-

27 Lincoln 1842.

agree with them, and can do no other. I oppose all physical coercion except to prevent it, and oppose it even if exercised under cover of the general will, excepting only the handful of cases of catastrophic emergencies. And I am a fierce egalitarian, believing in strict equality of permission, as of souls, and the dignity of everyone. I advocate love, not hate/Things to do/It's getting late/We're all brothers/And are only passing through. I believe further that a good community should be the outcome of individual love and choice, not collectively enforced appeals to that imagined general will. I believe for example that the virtue of justice is a matter of each person's choice, not a collective guilt to be enforced by the state. Liberty of the will to choose sin or salvation should not be generalized by group, to condemn the Judeans "because they killed Christ" or to condemn the businesspeople "because they gouge in pricing" or to condemn "the iniquity of the fathers [and bring punishment] upon the children, and upon … the fourth generation of them that hate me." Understand, my dear wishy-washy friends who call yourself liberal and Christian yet do not grant everyone liberty of permission, that for adults I support a liberty of loving, a liberty of contracting, a liberty of trade, a liberty of migration, a liberty to consume drugs, a liberty of professions, a liberty of property, a liberty of monetary affairs. And I would make numerous other startling and irritating proposals, such as a liberty of gender choice and a liberty in a woman's right to choose, in aid of a truly liberal society—all of them part of the Liberty Movement that made the modern world. I readily admit that many of the proposals are "impractical," if that means that they are unlikely soon to pass Congress and get the President's signature. But even as proposals they might serve to persuade us to stop digging, considering that we are presently at the bottom of a deep and deepening statist hole.

You will resist, and you should. You are right to be skeptical. There are many opinions circulating in the world, most of them not well grounded, or plain bonkers. Watch out. Consider soberly what you know, really know.

Yet especially consider with a proper Christian humility what you don't really do know. Josh Billings, an American humorist contemporary with Mark Twain, said, in one of serval versions of the thought, "It ain't what you don't know that hurts you. It's what you know that ain't so." For example, you know that life was not so very bad in merry Robin Hood's day, that peasants then were primitive communists, that possessive individualism arose during the 16th century, that "capitalism" is new, that Calvinism explains it, that saving more and working harder explains "capitalist" enrichment, that material causes not the new liberal idea made us rich, that the riches are dubiously beneficial because accompanied by environmental degradation, that we therefore face an existential crisis, that debt is exploitation, that enclosure in English agriculture drove peasants into the arms of factory owners, that during the Industrial Revolution the workers were exploited, that Europe grew rich by stealing from the colonies, that slavery caused "capitalism," that Europeans were the main profiteers from the slave trade, that enslaved labor was free of cost to the purchasers of enslaved people, that we are all anyway wage slaves to the bosses, that the bosses have gold piled in the backroom we can expropriate without limit for higher wages and better working conditions, that unionization and regulation therefore greatly improved our condition, that protection from foreign competition helps the average American, that withholding Federal lands from private sale was America's best idea, that businesses engage in planned obsolescence, that corporate taxes fall wholly on rich stockholders, that advertising manipulates us foolish consumers in the grip of consumerism, that monopoly is increasing, that natural resources are the basis of a modern economy, that rising population is a big problem, that declining population is a big problem, that capital accumulation is how economic growth happened, that most of the gain of economic growth went to the bosses, that "capitalism" caused inequality, that only financial capital is capital, that inequality of capital ownership has increased, that the U.K. has failed economically since 1900, that the U.S.A. faces an economic threat from China, that most businesspeople are thieves, that inflation is caused by the greed of businesspeople, that the system in which they work is evil, that therefore we need a radically new system, that "neo-liberalism" has made the poor poorer, and that markets, unlike the modern state which so wisely regulates markets with the help of wise economists, have very, very many and grave imperfections. Each one of these facts you know to be true has been shown to be at best scientifically dubious or, mostly, plain bonkers. They ain't so.

Still you resist the truths of economics and economic history, and therefore true liberalism, perhaps because the erroneous tales support your sacred identity as a pious Christian who cares very deeply about the poor. Or perhaps you believe the tales because they support the politics you came to favor at age 21, which has now become your sacred identity. That belief in such tales, considered sorely in view of its actual effects instead of its lovely intentions, have damaged the poor, and have underlain the worst tyrannies in history, and have denied Christian truths, is not something that you know, or will readily accept even if some sincere friend points it out to you. Yet I beg you to open your mind and consider the possibility that much of what you know about the economy and economic history and economic policy ain't so. Realizing it, I promise as your sincerest friend, will improve your faith and your politics.

The atheists I have less hope of persuading. The attacks by the New Atheists are similar to those, I have noted, of that spirited adolescent boy, age 14, who reckons that he's pretty clever to deny God, against the *rubbish* of his *stupid* parents and teachers. The political philosopher and conservative Episcopalian J. Budziszewski describes his own callow rebellion: "Like Nietzsche, I imagined myself one of the few who could believe such things—who could walk the rocky heights where the air is thin and cold." The New Atheists would do well to look into the theological notion of spiritual pride. In a *New Yorker* cartoon two monks are walking in the cloister. One exclaims, "But I *am* holier than thou!"—and Satan swoops in at the last to claim his soul.

The New Atheists do not approach their own angry faith by reading books that might possibly challenge it, and especially not books about theology, whether amateur or professional. Look at the bibliographies in Dawkins' books. After all, why read J. Budziszewski, John Polkinghorne, David Bentley Hart, David Klemm, Jean Bethke Elshtain, or William Schweiker—not to speak of John Henry Cardinal Newman of Dublin or Julian of Norwich or Thomas of Aquino or Augustine of Hippo—when you know at the outset that it's all *stupid rubbish*?

Yet in humility, I say to my dear, dear fellow Christians, judge not that you may not be judged. And to my dear atheist friends, do listen to such good advice. During Oliver Cromwell's invasion of Scotland he tried one last time to persuade the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland to give up on royal Charles II hiding out in France after his father had been beheaded: "I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken." Beware, my friends, that you do not suppose prematurely, before you know the elementary logic and evidence for liberalism, that the economic part is merely stupid rubbish. It may be. Let us think it possible. We should all be open to the hypothesis that it is. But to find out, I think you will agree, would require a good deal of reading and reflection—beyond, say, the editorial page in the parish newsletter for the herd of independent minds, or even *The Economist* written by fluent British youngsters.

It's wise to give up especially the untutored conviction that you already know all there is to know about the relation between faith and prudence. You would not say so about Greek philology, probably, or nuclear physics, surely. Systematic economics is no easier than Greek grammar or quantum mechanics or systematic theology. It cannot be reduced to, say, your daily experience in the economy. Nor, at a more academic level, can it be reduced to a reading of an economics stopping at 1867, derived from a dazzled reading as an undergraduate of *Das Kapital,* confirmed by listening the David Harvey's eloquent on-line course during 2923, without subsequently reading with care of Marx's master, Adam Smith, or any of the other economics that came later than Marx. It would be like a fish supposing that because he swims in the ocean, and saw last night a popular show on fish-TV about the ocean, and reads religiously the oceanic version of *The New York Times*, that he is an expert judge of oceanography.

Think it possible, that is, that your settled moral sentiments against economic liberalism and in favor of economic statism might be mistaken. To cling to untested opinions on such an important matter is surely unwise. In 1859 John Stuart Mill used in *On Liberty* the debate over Christianity pro and con as his hard-case argument for liberty of speech. He might as well have used the debate then just begun over economic liberalism and in favor of a new statism. Without knowing the other side, he wrote,

> [even a] true opinion abides in the mind, but abides as a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument—this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being … He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that … [The dogmatists] have never thrown themselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them, and considered what such persons may have to say; and consequently they do not, in any proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess … Instead of a vivid conception and a living belief, there remain only a few phrases retained by rote. … The fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half their errors.[28]

The philosopher Amélie Oksenberg Rorty once spoke of the habit of intellectual humility, which we all should practice. Such humility is rare among experts and ideologues eager to speak but reluctant to listen. What is crucial, she wrote, is "our ability to engage in continuous conversation, testing one another, discovering our hidden presumptions, changing our minds because we have listened to the voices of our fellows. Lunatics also change their minds, but their minds change with the tides of the moon and not because they have listened, really listened, to their friends' questions and objections."[29] I carry this motto on a card in my purse, to accuse myself on the too-frequent occasions in which I do not follow it. And I recently learned that the great faith-man Thomas Merton wrote similarly, in various places much quoted on websites, though seldom changing anyone's behavior in debate: "If I insist on giving you my truth, and never stop to receive your truth in return, there can be no truth between us."[30] A second purse card.

Even if we at first believe we disagree, then, let us converse, the better to discern the Christian and economic truth between us.[31]

28 Mill 1859, pp. 65, 67, 68, 72, 80.

29 Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg. 1983. Experiments in Philosophical Genre: Descartes' Meditations. *Critical Inquiry* 9:545-565.

30 The sentence is from *The Waters of Siloe*, 1949, and reprinted in numerous of his collections.

31 The editor of C+T acknowledges that some of Professor McCloskey's notes might have been incorrectly rendered.

Author Index

SIEO refers to the assimilated *Studies in Emergent Order*
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Editorial Information

AIMS AND SCOPE

COSMOS + TAXIS takes its name and inspiration from the Greek terms that F. A. Hayek invoked to connote the distinction between *spontaneous orders* and *consciously planned* orders.

COSMOS + TAXIS is a joint initiative run under the auspices of the Department of Economics, Philosophy and Political Science at The University of British Columbia Okanagan and the Political Science Department at Simon Fraser University.

COSMOS + TAXIS offers a forum to those concerned that the central presuppositions of the liberal tradition have been severely corroded, neglected, or misappropriated by overly rationalistic and constructivist approaches. The hardest-won achievements of the liberal tradition has been the wrestling of epistemic independence from overwhelming concentrations of power, monopolies and capricious zealotries. The very precondition of knowledge is the exploitation of the *epistemic* virtues accorded by society's *situated* and *distributed* manifold of spontaneous orders, the DNA of the modern civil condition.

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